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ANNUAL REPORTS

OF THE

WAR DEPARTMENT

FOR THE

FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1903.

VOLUME III.

REPORTS OF DEPARTMENT AND DIVISION COMMANDERS.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1903.

ARRANGEMENT OF THE ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT FOR THE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1903.

Volume I.—Secretary of War:

Chief of Staff.
Adjutant-General.
Inspector-General.
Judge-Advocate-General.

Volume II.—Armament, Transportation and Supply:

Quartermaster-General.
Commissary-General.
Surgeon-General.
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Volume III.—Department and Division Commanders:

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Department of the Colorado.
Department of the Columbia.
Department of Dakota.
Department of the East.
Department of the Lakes.
Department of the Missouri.
Department of Texas.
Division of the Philippines—
1. Department of Luzon.
2. Department of the Visayas.
3. Department of Mindanao.

**Volume IV.—Military Schools and Colleges; Record and Pension Office;
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SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE ARMY, JULY 1, 1902, TO JUNE 30, 1903.

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- July 1.—Commanding officer, Calapan, Mindoro, reports following additional captures and surrenders for the month of May: Captured by Lieut. Albert U. Faulkner, Artillery Corps, Victoriano Salagan, insurgent presidente and ladrone leader, with 1 revolver, 1 Remington rifle, and 44 rounds ammunition; Ildefonso Macinay, first lieutenant and secretary to Colonel Quintera. Surrendered to Lieutenant Faulkner, Capt. Ramon Oracion, insurgent, and Maj. Antonio Jalos, insurgent, with 1 Remington rifle and 20 rounds ammunition. Surrender of Manuerto Bagos, ladrone leader, with 2 Krag carbines and 100 rounds ammunition Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell reports following arms, officers, and men captured and surrendered for the month of June: Rifles, captured 1, surrendered 7; revolvers, captured 1, surrendered 1; ammunition, captured 243, surrendered 44 rounds; officers, captured 2, surrendered 4; men, surrendered 4 Transport *Kilpatrick* sails from San Francisco with Second Squadron, Fifth Cavalry (287 enlisted men, 8 officers) The enlisted strength of the Army is fixed at 66,711 (General Orders, No. 63, A. G. O., 1902).
- 2.—The Sixth Infantry arrives and takes station at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., coming from the Philippine Islands Troop E, Thirteenth Cavalry, leaves Fort Keogh, Mont., for a tour of service at Camp Merritt, Tongue River Indian Agency, Mont.
- 3.—Second Battalion, Twenty-second Infantry, returns to station at Fort Crook, Nebr., from Omaha Indian Agency, Nebr., having completed annual target practice at latter place Headquarters, band, and Companies E, F, G, H, K, L, and M, Ninth Infantry, from San Francisco, Cal., arrive at Madison Barracks, N. Y. Companies A, C, and D, Ninth Infantry, from San Francisco, Cal., arrive at Fort Niagara, N. Y.
- 4.—Proclamation of the President declaring the insurrection in the Philippine Islands (except in the country inhabited by Moro tribes) at an end, and extending amnesty and pardon to all who have participated therein The office of military governor of the Philippine Islands is abolished Transport *Buford* arrives at Manila Headquarters First Battalion and Companies A and D, Eighth Infantry (7 officers, 191 enlisted men), leave Fort Harrison, Mont., for Seattle, Wash., en route to Alaska.
- 6.—Transport *Thomas* sails from Manila.
- 7.—Troops G and H, Second Cavalry, and Fourth Battery, Field Artillery, leave Fort Myer, Va., for Gettysburg, Pa., where they remain in camp with the National Guard of Pennsylvania until July 18.
- 8.—Transport *Logan* arrives at San Francisco with Companies C, D, H, and M, Seventh Infantry (8 officers, 378 enlisted men); headquarters, band, and Companies A, C, D, E, F, I, K, and L, Sixteenth Infantry (28

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officers, 642 enlisted men); 1 officer and 1 enlisted man United States Marine Corps; 11 enlisted men United States Navy; 15 officers, passengers.....Companies A, B, and D, Eighth Infantry, sail from Seattle, Wash., on *Warren* for posts in northern Alaska.

July 10.—Sixty-fourth Company, Coast Artillery, is transferred from Alcatraz Island to Fort Miley, Cal.....Two Moros attack a sentinel at engineer camp near Camp Vicars, wounding him and capturing a rifle and 93 cartridges; the Moros escape.

11.—Transport *Lawton* sails from Aparri, Luzon, P. I., for San Francisco.....Companies K and M, Fourteenth Infantry, are transferred from Fort Niagara to Fort Porter, N. Y.....Company L, Seventh Infantry, transferred from Presidio of San Francisco to Alcatraz Island, Cal., for temporary duty.

14.—Headquarters and Companies A, B, C, D, and E, Nineteenth Infantry, transferred from discharge camp, Angel Island, Cal., to the depot of recruit instruction, Presidio of San Francisco, Cal.

15.—Headquarters, band, and Companies E, F, I, K, and L, Sixteenth Infantry, leave San Francisco for Fort McPherson, Ga.

16.—Transport *Sherman* sails from San Francisco, with 14 officers, passengers; 2 officers in charge of recruits; 8 hospital and 2 signal corps men; 3 army nurse corps, female; 25 casuals, and 49 recruits.....Transport *Meade* arrives at Manila.....Brig. Gen. Jacob H. Smith is retired from active service.

17.—Transport *Crook* sails from Manila.....Sixty-third and Seventy-first Companies, Coast Artillery, transferred from Alcatraz Island, Cal., to Fort Canby, Wash.....Companies F, G, H, I, K, L, and M, Nineteenth Infantry, transferred from discharge camp, Angel Island, to the depot of recruit instruction, Presidio of San Francisco, Cal.....Company F, Seventh Infantry, transferred from the Presidio to Alcatraz Island, Cal., for temporary duty.

19.—Transport *Sheridan* arrives at San Francisco with headquarters, band, and 12 companies, Thirteenth Infantry (34 officers, 601 enlisted men), Troops A, B, C, and D, Third Cavalry (12 officers, 153 enlisted men); 16 officers, passengers; 1 veterinarian; 2 army nurse corps, female; 130 discharged men; 449 short-term men; 9 hospital corps men; 9 furloughed; 1 officer and 6 enlisted men, United States Marine Corps; 65 sick.....Company F, Seventh Infantry, rejoined station at the Presidio of San Francisco from temporary duty at Alcatraz Island, Cal.....Second Battalion, Thirteenth Infantry, assigned to station at Alcatraz Island, Cal.....Companies A, B, C, D, I, and L, Thirteenth Infantry, assigned to station at the discharge camp, Angel Island, Cal.

20.—Headquarters, band, and Companies K and M, Thirteenth Infantry, assigned to station at Fort McDowell, Cal.....Company B, Eighth Infantry, arrives and takes station at Fort Davis, Alaska.

21.—Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur takes temporary command of the Department of the East, relieving Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke, retired; and Maj. Gen. John C. Bates assumes command of the Department of the Lakes, relieving Major-General MacArthur.....Transport *Sumner* arrives at San Francisco with Companies A, C, D, and L, Seventeenth Infantry (9 officers, 203 enlisted men); Companies C, D, K, and M, Twenty-fourth Infantry (7 officers, 227 enlisted men); 11 officers, passengers; 85 discharged men; 96 short-term men; 1 contract surgeon; 5 sick; 6 furloughed.....Transport *Relief* sails from Manila.....Troop

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A, Fourteenth Cavalry, leaves Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo., for Fort Duchesne, Utah. Headquarters, band, and Companies E, F, I, K, and L, Sixteenth Infantry, arrive at Fort McPherson, Ga., from San Francisco.

July 22.—Companies A, C, and D, Sixteenth Infantry, leave San Francisco for Fort Slocum, N. Y., for station. Company A, Eighth Infantry, arrives and takes station at Fort St. Michael, Alaska. Moros from north side of Lake Amai-manibilang, of Madaya, also the Sultans of Madaya and Punud, friends of hostile Bayan element, visit Camp Vicars. Company D, Eighth Infantry, arrives at Fort St. Michael, en route to Fort Gibbon.

23.—Third Battalion, Twenty-third Infantry, from Fort McPherson, Ga., arrives at Plattsburg Barracks, N. Y.

24.—Company D, Eighth Infantry, leaves Fort St. Michael for Fort Gibbon, Alaska, via river.

28.—Companies A, C, and D, Sixteenth Infantry, from San Francisco, arrive at Fort Slocum, N. Y. Transport *Buford* sails from Manila.

29.—Transport *Kilpatrick* arrives at Manila. Troops A and D, Third Cavalry, leave the Presidio of San Francisco for Fort Assinniboine, Mont., and Troops B and C, Third Cavalry, leave the presidio for Fort Yellowstone, Wyo.

30.—Companies A, C, and D, Seventeenth Infantry, leave the presidio for Vancouver Barracks. Company L, Seventeenth Infantry, leaves the presidio for Fort Lawton, Wash.

31.—Troop E, First Cavalry, leaves Fort Washakie, Wyo., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippine Islands.

Aug. 1.—Transport *Logan* sails from San Francisco with 6 officers, passengers; 1 officer in charge of recruits; 1 contract surgeon; 10 hospital corps and 3 signal corps men; 9 casuals, and 19 recruits. Transport *Thomas* arrives at San Francisco with headquarters, band, and Companies A, B, E, F, G, H, and I, Twenty-fourth Infantry (26 officers, 657 enlisted men); Companies A, B, C, and D, Twenty-fifth Infantry (6 officers, 389 enlisted men); Troops E, F, G, and H, Tenth Cavalry (15 officers, 291 enlisted men); 7 officers, passengers; 1 contract surgeon; 14 hospital corps men; 2 army nurses, female; 61 discharged soldiers; 55 short-term men; 70 sick; 3 insane; 5 casuals. Companies A, C, and D, Seventeenth Infantry, arrive at Vancouver Barracks, Wash., and Company L, Seventeenth Infantry, arrives at Fort Lawton, Wash.

2.—Headquarters First Squadron and Troops A and D, Third Cavalry, arrive at Fort Assinniboine, Mont., and Troops B and C, Third Cavalry, arrive at Fort Yellowstone, Wyo. Company D, Eighth Infantry, arrives at Fort Gibbon, Alaska.

3.—Troops F and G, First Cavalry, leave Fort Yellowstone, Wyo., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippine Islands.

4.—Companies C and D, Twenty-fourth Infantry, leave the Presidio of San Francisco for Fort Harrison, Mont. Companies K and M, Twenty-fourth Infantry, leave the Presidio for Fort Missoula, Mont.

5.—Companies A, B, E, and I, Seventh Infantry, en route from posts in Alaska to San Francisco, arrive at Seattle, Wash., on the *Warren*.

6.—Seventh Battery, Field Artillery, with hospital detachment, leaves Fort Riley, Kans., for Beatrice, Nebr., to attend Interstate and Southeast District Reunion of the G. A. R., arriving at destination August 12.

8.—Transport *Meade* sails from Manila. Companies C and D, Twenty-fourth Infantry, arrive at Fort Harrison, Mont. Companies K and

1902.

- M, Twenty-fourth Infantry, arrive at Fort Missoula, Mont.....Company D, Twenty-first Infantry, leaves Fort Harrison, Mont., for Fort Keogh, Mont.
- Aug. 9.—Companies A, B, E, and I, Seventh Infantry, arrive at San Francisco from posts in Alaska.....Company D, Twenty-first Infantry, arrives at Fort Keogh, Mont.
- 12.—Transport *Lawton* arrives at San Francisco with Third Squadron, Third Cavalry (9 officers, 155 enlisted men); Companies B, G, H, and M, Sixteenth Infantry (13 officers, 302 enlisted men); 4 officers, passengers; 24 discharged soldiers, and 52 hospital corps men.....Troop A, Fourteenth Cavalry, arrives at Fort Duchesne, Utah.....Companies A and B, Twenty-fourth Infantry, leave San Francisco for Fort Harrison, Mont.....Company I, Twenty-fourth Infantry, leaves San Francisco for Fort Missoula, Mont.....Companies E, F, G, and H, Twenty-fourth Infantry, leave San Francisco for Fort Assinniboine, Mont.....Outpost of Company G, Twenty-seventh Infantry, at Camp Vicars, Mindanao, attacked by party of 10 or 15 Bacolod Moros at midnight, 2 soldiers killed and 2 wounded; Moro loss unknown.
- 13.—Transport *Crook* arrives at San Francisco with headquarters, band, and Companies E, F, H, I, K, L, and M, Twenty-fifth Infantry (22 officers, 570 enlisted men); 10 officers, passengers; 1 contract surgeon; 32 discharged soldiers, and 8 general prisoners.....Transport *Sherman* arrives at Manila.....First Battalion, Twenty-fifth Infantry, leaves San Francisco for Fort Niobrara, Nebr.
- 14.—Third Battalion, Twenty-second Infantry, with band, leaves Fort Crook, Nebr., for Council Bluffs, Iowa, to attend reunion of the National Society, Army of Philippines.....Troops G and H, Tenth Cavalry, leave San Francisco for Fort Mackenzie, Wyo.; Troop E for Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo., and Troop F for Fort Washakie, Wyo.
- 15.—Transport *Relief* arrives at San Francisco with 31 officers and 14 casualties.....Camp at Monterey, Cal., established.
- 16.—Transport *Sumner* sails for Manila with Second Squadron, First Cavalry (8 officers, 298 enlisted men); 8 officers, passengers; 51 hospital corps and 22 signal corps men; 5 casualties, and 8 recruits.....Headquarters, band, and Companies A and B, Twenty-fourth Infantry, arrive at Fort Harrison, Mont.....Companies E, F, G, and H, Twenty-fourth Infantry, arrive at Fort Assinniboine, Mont.....Headquarters Third Battalion and Company I, Twenty-fourth Infantry, arrive at Fort Missoula, Mont.....Pack train en route to Mataling River, Mindanao, attacked by 4 Moros armed with bolos; escort drives them off; 1 Moro killed, 1 wounded.....Moros again attack Camp Vicars, Mindanao, wounding 1 soldier; Moro casualties unknown.
- 17.—Transport *Kilpatrick* sails from Manila.....Transport *Seward* sails from Seattle, Wash., for Manila.....Troop E, Tenth Cavalry, arrives at Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo.....First Battalion, Twenty-fifth Infantry, arrives at Fort Niobrara, Nebr.
- 18.—Troops G and H, Tenth Cavalry, arrive at Fort Mackenzie, Wyo.....Company B, Twenty-second Infantry, leaves Fort Niobrara, Nebr., for Fort Logan H. Roots, Ark.....Company M, Twenty-first Infantry, leaves Fort Yates, N. Dak., for Fort Lincoln, N. Dak.
- 19.—Company C, Fourteenth Cavalry, leaves Fort Mackenzie, Wyo., for Fort Huachuca, Ariz.....Company M, Twenty-first Infantry, arrives at Fort Lincoln, N. Dak.....Company F, Twenty-second Infantry, leaves

1902.

Fort Crook, Nebr., for Elk City to attend G. A. R. reunion, arriving August 20; returned to station August 25.

Aug. 20.—Troop C, Tenth Cavalry, marched to logging camp, Elm Springs, Nebr., relieving Troop K, Tenth Cavalry, which returned to post same dateTroops I, K, L, and M, Third Cavalry, leave San Francisco for Fort Assinniboine, Mont.

21.—Company B, Sixteenth Infantry, leaves San Francisco for Fort Slocum, N. Y.Companies G, H, and M, Sixteenth Infantry, leave San Francisco for Fort McPherson, Ga.Company B, Twenty-second Infantry, arrives at Fort Logan H. Roots, Ark.Troops G and H, Thirteenth Cavalry, leave Fort Assinniboine, Mont., for Fort Keogh, Mont.Severe earthquake in Lake Lanao country, Mindanao, badly wrecks commissary and quartermaster storehouses at Camp Vicars and demolishes hospital dispensary; 12 Moros reported killed by falling houses at Tubaron.

22.—Troops G and H, Thirteenth Cavalry, arrive at Fort Keogh, Mont.Headquarters, band, Companies I, K, L, and M, Twenty-fifth Infantry, leave San Francisco for Fort Niobrara, Nebr.Companies E, F, and H, Twenty-fifth Infantry, leave San Francisco for Fort Reno, Okla.

23.—Seventh Battery, Field Artillery, arrives at Fort Riley, Kans., on return from Beatrice, Nebr., where it left August 18, after participating in ceremonies of the Interstate and Southeast District Reunion, G. A. R.Second Battalion, Third Infantry, leaves San Francisco for Columbus Barracks, Ohio.Companies K and M, Thirteenth Infantry, are transferred from Fort McDowell to Fort Mason, Cal.Sixty-second Company, Coast Artillery, transferred from Fort Mason, Cal., to Fort Worden, Wash.

24.—Headquarters Third Squadron and Troops I, K, L and M, Third Cavalry, arrive at Fort Assinniboine, Mont.Troop F, Tenth Cavalry, arrives at Fort Washakie, Wyo.Troop C, Fourteenth Cavalry, arrives at Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

26.—Company L, Eighteenth Infantry, leaves Fort Douglas, Utah, for Whipple Barracks, Ariz.First Battalion, Twentieth Infantry, is transferred from Columbus Barracks, Ohio, to Fort Sheridan, Ill.

27.—Headquarters, band, and Third Battalion, Twenty-fifth Infantry, arrive and take station at Fort Niobrara, Nebr.Companies E, F, and H, Twenty-fifth Infantry, arrive and take station at Fort Reno, Okla.

28.—Company B, Sixteenth Infantry, from San Francisco, arrives at Fort Slocum, N. Y., for station.Transport *Logan* arrives at Manila.Second Battalion, Third Infantry, arrives at Columbus Barracks, OhioCompanies G, H, and M, Sixteenth Infantry, arrive at Fort McPherson, Ga.

29.—Company L, Eighteenth Infantry, arrives at Whipple Barracks, Ariz.Company K, Seventh Infantry, takes station at the Presidio of San Francisco, from Alaska.

30 to Sept. 6.—Combined army and navy maneuvers at the eastern entrance to Long Island Sound. The garrisons forming the artillery districts of New London and Narragansett, viz, the Second, Twelfth, Forty-second, Forty-third, Seventy-second, Seventy-eighth, Seventy-ninth, Eighty-eighth, Ninety-seventh, One hundredth, One hundred and ninth, One hundred and tenth, and One hundred and twenty-fifth of Coast Artillery, reinforced by the Forty-eighth Company, Coast Artillery, from Fort Hancock, N. J.; the Thirty-fifth and Sixty-ninth Companies, from

1902.

Fort Monroe, Va.; the Thirty-ninth and Ninetieth Companies, from Fort McHenry, Md.; the Forty-fourth and One hundred and fourth Companies, from Fort Washington, Md.; the Fifty-fourth and Eighty-second Companies, from Fort Totten, N. Y.; the Fiftieth, Eighty-fifth, and Eighty-sixth Companies, from Fort Wadsworth, N. Y.; the Fifty-first and One hundred and twenty-third Companies, from Fort Hamilton, N. Y.; the Forty-sixth Company, from Fort Strong, Mass.; the Forty-fifth Company, from Fort Du Pont, Del.; the Seventy-sixth Company, from Fort Banks, Mass.; the Seventy-seventh Company, from Fort Warren, Mass.; the Seventy-fourth Company, from Fort Williams, Me., and the One hundred and seventh Company, from Fort Preble, Me., as well as by the First Regiment Heavy Artillery, Massachusetts Volunteer Militia; First and Second Companies, Heavy Artillery, Connecticut National Guard, and detachments of signal corps of the national guards of New York and Connecticut, participate in a series of maneuvers in combination with the following vessels of the Navy, reinforced by the Naval Militias of New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut: Battle ships *Alabama*, *Kearsarge*, *Indiana*, and *Massachusetts*; cruisers *Brooklyn*, *Olympia*, *Prairie*, *Panther*, *Mayflower*, and *Montgomery*; monitor *Puritan*, and gunboats *Topeka*, *Machias*, *Scorpion*, *Gloucester*, *Peoria*, and *Aileen*.

- Sept. 1.—Transport *Sheridan* sails from San Francisco with 17 officers, passengers; 1 officer in charge of recruits; 48 hospital corps men; 13 recruits, and 2 casualties. Troops at Matiling Falls, 7 miles from Camp Vicars, Mindanao, are attacked by Moros, 1 soldier being killed and 1 officer and 2 soldiers wounded. Troops have been attacked 12 times since May 2, with loss to us of 4 killed and 12 wounded. Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner authorized to move troops into Maciu country and exact promise of good behavior in future from datos and followers.
- 2.—Troop C, Thirteenth Cavalry, leaves Fort Yellowstone, Wyo., and marches overland to Fort Meade, S. Dak., for station.
- 3.—Transport *Dix* sails from Manila.
- 4.—Transport *Sherman* sails from Manila. Troop C, Tenth Cavalry, abandoned camp at Elm Springs, Nebr., and returned to post, Fort Robinson, Nebr.
- 5.—Headquarters, and Second and Third Battalions, Twenty-second Infantry, leave Fort Crook, Nebr., marching to Fort Riley, Kans., to participate in the fall maneuvers at that point.
- 6.—Headquarters, First and Second Squadrons, Tenth Cavalry, leave Fort Robinson, Nebr., on practice march to Hot Springs, S. Dak., reaching there September 9 and leaving to return September 13, arriving back at post September 16; total distance marched, 162.5 miles. Transport *Buford* arrives at San Francisco with headquarters and Second and Third Battalions, Eighth Infantry (18 officers, 462 enlisted men); Companies E and F, Fifteenth Infantry (3 officers, 143 enlisted men); Company G, Twenty-fifth Infantry (3 officers, 103 enlisted men); 10 officers, passengers; 11 casualties and short-term men; 92 sick; 5 insane; 5 general prisoners, and 66 discharged men.
- 8.—The First Battalion, Engineers and Second Squadron, Fourth Cavalry, with detachments Hospital Corps, leave Fort Leavenworth, Kans., marching to Fort Riley to participate in maneuvers; squadron of cavalry arrives at destination September 15 and the engineers September 19; total distance marched, 137 miles.

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- Sept. 9.—First and Third Battalions, Sixth Infantry, with detachment of Hospital Corps, leave Fort Leavenworth, marching to Fort Riley, Kans., where they arrive September 19, to participate in maneuvers; total distance marched, 137 miles.
- 10.—The Twenty-eighth Battery, Field Artillery, leaves Fort Leavenworth, Kans., marching to Fort Riley to participate in maneuvers, arriving at destination September 21; distance, 137 miles.
- 11.—Transport *Meade* arrives at San Francisco with headquarters, band, and Companies A, B, C, D, G, H, I, K, L, and M, Fifteenth Infantry (26 officers, 878 enlisted men); 8 officers, passengers; 1 contract surgeon; 1 general prisoner; 2 casualties, and 3 discharged men.
- 12.—Companies K and L, Twenty-first Infantry, leave Fort Yates, N. Dak., for Fort Keogh, Mont. Troops G and H, Second Cavalry, and Fourth Battery, Field Artillery, leave Fort Myer, Va., for Gettysburg, Pa., to participate in the ceremonies incident to unveiling of statue to Major-General H. W. Slocum; rejoin post Sept. 27.
- 14.—Transport *Kilpatrick* arrives at San Francisco with 34 officers, passengers; 318 short-term, including discharged, men; 139 sick; 6 insane; 1 casual, and 134 discharged men. Companies A and D, Twenty-first Infantry, leave Fort Keogh, Mont., for Fort Snelling, Minn. Companies K and L, Twenty-first Infantry, arrive at Fort Keogh, Mont. Company G, Twenty-fifth Infantry, leaves San Francisco for Fort Reno, Okla.
- 15.—Second Battalion, Eighth Infantry, leaves San Francisco for Fort Lawton, Wash. Companies I and M, Eighth Infantry, leave San Francisco for Camp Skagway, Alaska. Companies K and L, Eighth Infantry, leave San Francisco for Fort Wright, Wash. Companies E and F, Fifteenth Infantry, are transferred from the Presidio of San Francisco to Camp at Monterey, Cal. Company I, Thirteenth Infantry, is transferred from the Discharge Camp, Angel Island, to Fort McDowell, Cal.
- 16.—Transport *Crook* sails from San Francisco with 15 officers, passengers; 18 hospital corps and 2 signal corps men. Transport *Sumner* arrives at Manila and transport *Logan* sails from Manila. Companies A and D, Twenty-first Infantry, arrive at Fort Snelling, Minn.
- 17.—Companies B and C, Twenty-second Infantry, leave Fort Logan H. Roots, Ark., for Fort Riley, Kans., to take part in the maneuvers, arriving on the 18th.
- 18.—Field and staff, First Battalion, Twenty-second Infantry, with Companies A and D, leave Fort Reno, Okla., for Fort Riley, Kans., where they arrive September 19th, to take part in the maneuvers. Troop L, Nineteenth Cavalry, leaves Fort Robinson, Nebr., for logging camp at Elm Springs, going into camp same date. Company G, Twenty-fifth Infantry, arrives at Fort Reno, Okla. Second Battalion, Eighth Infantry, arrives at Fort Lawton, Wash. Companies I and M, Eighth Infantry, leave Seattle, en route from San Francisco to Skagway, Alaska. Companies K and L, Eighth Infantry, arrive at Fort Wright, Wash.
- 19.—First Squadron, Eighth Cavalry, leaves Fort Sill, Okla., for Fort Riley, Kans., to participate in the maneuvers, arriving September 20. Field, staff, and Second Battalion, Sixth Infantry, leave Fort Leavenworth, Kans., for Fort Riley, arriving same date, to participate in maneuvers.

1902.

Sept. 20.—Headquarters, Second and Third Battalions, Twenty-second Infantry, arrive at Fort Riley, Kans.

22 to Oct. 9.—Maneuvers at Fort Riley, Kans. The following troops serving in the Department of the Missouri engage in a series of maneuvers at Fort Riley: Sixth Infantry, Eighteenth Infantry (except Company L), Twenty-second Infantry, first and second squadrons, Fourth Cavalry; Troops A, B, C, D, and K, Eighth Cavalry; Sixth, Seventh, Nineteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-eighth batteries, Field Artillery, and First Battalion of Engineers. These maneuvers were also participated in by the following State troops: First and Second regiments of infantry and Batteries A and B, Kansas National Guard, and one battalion of infantry, National Guard of Colorado.

22.—Companies I and M, Eighth Infantry, arrive at Skagway, Alaska..... Headquarters, field, staff, band, and Companies A, B, C, D, G, H, I, K, L, and M, Fifteenth Infantry, are transferred from the Presidio of San Francisco to camp at Monterey, Cal.....The band and Second Battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, from Fort Wayne, Mich., participate in the parade of the Spanish-American War veterans at Detroit, Mich..... Commanding general, Division of the Philippines reports that Capt. John J. Pershing, Fifteenth Cavalry, left Camp Vicars, Mindanao, on the 18th, with a battalion of infantry, troop of cavalry, and platoon of mountain battery, on an expedition against the obstinate Maciu sultans, capturing 7 forts and inflicting a loss of about 25 killed on the Moros; no casualties.

24.—Captain Pershing returns to Camp Vicars, being unable to reach Maciu on account of water and swamps.

25.—Transport *Seward* arrives at Manila.

26.—Transport *Sheridan* arrives at Manila.

27.—Transport *Dix* arrives at San Francisco; no passengers or cargo.....Troop F, Thirteenth Cavalry, leaves Fort Keogh, Mont., for a tour of service at Camp Merritt, Mont.

28.—Troop C, Thirteenth Cavalry, arrives at Fort Meade, S. Dak.....Captain Pershing leaves Camp Vicars, Mindanao, on another expedition against the Maciu forts.

30.—Maj. Gen. George W. Davis is assigned to command the Division of the Philippines, relieving Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee.....The Division of the Philippines is reorganized, the departments of North Philippines and South Philippines being discontinued, and the Department of Luzon, Department of the Visayas, and Department of Mindanao organized. Brig. Gen. James F. Wade is assigned to command the Department of Luzon, Brig. Gen. Frank D. Baldwin the Department of the Visayas, and Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner the Department of Mindanao.

Oct. 1.—Transport *Thomas* sails from San Francisco with Lieut. Gen. Nelson A. Miles and 24 other officers, passengers; 1 officer in charge of recruits; 1 dental surgeon; 27 hospital corps, 4 signal corps men, and 29 casualsTransport *McClellan* sails from Manila for New York.

2.—Transport *Sumner* sails from Manila.

3.—Captain Pershing with his command returns to Camp Vicars, having captured and destroyed all the forts in the Maciu district; also captured 3 cannon, 2 lantakas, and 3 rifles; Moro loss, 40 or 50 killed and as many wounded; casualties, 2 men wounded.

4.—One hundred and twenty-second Company, Coast Artillery, leaves Fort Columbus, N. Y., for Key West Barracks, Fla.

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- Oct. 5.—Troop A, Thirteenth Cavalry, leaves Fort Yellowstone, Wyo., for Fort Meade, S. Dak.
- 6.—Transport *Sheridan* sails from Manila.....Second Battalion, Eighth Infantry, leaves Fort Lawton, Wash., for Fort Columbus, N. Y.....Company K, Eighth Infantry, leaves Seattle, Wash., for Fort Niagara, N. Y.....Company L, Eighth Infantry, leaves Seattle for Fort Wood, N. Y.
- 7.—Provisional companies A and B, Discharge Camp, Angel Island, Cal., discontinued and a casual company created in their stead.....Fifth Band, Artillery Corps, and Fifty-first, Eighty-fourth, Ninety-eighth, and One hundred and twenty-third companies, Coast Artillery, from Fort Hamilton, N. Y., participate in ceremonies attending the laying of the corner stone of the new custom-house in New York City.....The band and Third Battalion of Engineers from Washington Barracks; band and Second Squadron, Second Cavalry, and Fourth Battery, Field Artillery, from Fort Myer, and 12 companies of Coast Artillery from Forts Washington, Hunt, McHenry, Howard, and Monroe, take part in military parade in Washington, D. C., in connection with encampment of the G. A. R.
- 8.—Transport *Sherman* arrives at San Francisco with 44 officers, passengers; 8 contract surgeons; 136 short-term and discharged men; 109 sick; 2 insane, and 26 remains of deceased soldiers; 13 casualties during the voyage.....One hundred and twenty-second Company, Coast Artillery, arrives at Key West Barracks, Fla.....Troop A, Thirteenth Cavalry, arrives at Fort Meade, S. Dak.....Troop L, Thirteenth Cavalry, leaves Fort Yates, N. Dak., by marching, for Fort Meade, S. Dak.
- 9.—The Second Squadron, Fourth Cavalry, leaves Fort Riley, Kans., marching to Fort Leavenworth, where it arrives October 15.....Field, staff, and band, Sixth Infantry, leave Fort Riley for Fort Leavenworth, Kans., arriving same date.....Companies A and D, Twenty-second Infantry, leave Fort Riley for Fort Reno, Okla., where they arrive October 10.....Companies B and C, Twenty-second Infantry, leave Fort Riley for Fort Logan H. Roots, Ark., where they arrive October 11.
- 10.—Field, staff, and First Battalion, Engineers, except mounted detachment, leave Fort Riley for Fort Leavenworth, Kans., arriving same date.....The mounted detachment, First Battalion Engineers, leaves Fort Riley, marching to Fort Leavenworth, where it arrives October 17.....Field and staff, First Squadron, and Troops A, B, C, and D, Eighth Cavalry, leave Fort Riley, marching to Fort Sill, Okla., where they arrive October 29.....First, Second, and Third Battalions, Sixth Infantry, leave Fort Riley, marching to Fort Leavenworth, where they arrive October 19.....Field, staff, and band, and Second and Third Battalions, Twenty-second Infantry, leave Fort Riley, marching to Fort Crook, Nebr., where they arrive October 22.
- 11.—The Sixteenth Battery, Field Artillery, leaves Fort Leavenworth, Kans., marching to Fort Riley, to engage in annual target practice, arriving October 18.....Companies F and G, Twenty-fifth Infantry, leave Fort Reno, Okla., for Tuskahoma, Ind. T., to assist in preserving order while elections at that point are in progress.....Company K, Eighth Infantry, arrives at Fort Niagara, N. Y.....Companies E and G, Eighth Infantry, arrive at Fort Columbus, N. Y.
- 12.—Company L, Eighth Infantry, arrives at Fort Wood, N. Y.....Companies F and H, Eighth Infantry, arrive at Fort Columbus, N. Y.

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- Oct. 13.—Transport *Logan* arrives at San Francisco with headquarters, field, staff, band, and Troops F, G, H, K, L, and M, Ninth Cavalry (16 officers, 569 enlisted men); Brigadier-General Grant and 21 officers, passengers; 3 contract surgeons; 44 hospital corps men; 112 sick; 5 insane; 184 casuals; and 15 furloughed men.
- 14.—First and Twenty-fourth Batteries, Field Artillery, leave the Presidio of San Francisco for target practice at Point Reyes, Cal., returning Oct. 28.
- 16.—Troop L, Thirteenth Cavalry, arrives at Fort Meade, S. Dak., having marched from Fort Yates; distance, 250 miles. Troop F, Thirteenth Cavalry, returns to Fort Keogh, Mont., from detached service at Camp Merritt, Tongue River Indian Agency, Mont.
- 18.—The Tenth Battery, Field Artillery, leaves Fort Walla Walla, Wash., for Fort Snelling, Minn.
- 19.—Transport *Crook* arrives at Manila. Troops F and G, Twenty-fifth Infantry, return to Fort Reno, Okla., from Tuskahoma, I. T.
- 20.—Troop L, Tenth Cavalry, returns to Fort Robinson, Nebr., from logging camp at Elm Springs.
- 21.—The Twenty-eighth Battery, Field Artillery, having completed maneuver duties and annual target practice, leaves Fort Riley, marching to Fort Leavenworth, Kans., where it arrives October 29.
- 23.—The Tenth Battery, Field Artillery, arrives at Fort Snelling, Minn.
- 24.—The enlisted strength of the Army is fixed at 59,866 (General Orders, No. 108, A. G. O., 1902).
- 25.—The First Battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, takes part in civic parade at Sault Ste. Marie, Mich. Company E, Porto Rico Provisional Regiment, leaves Henry Barracks, P. R., marching to Mayaguez for station, arriving October 29. The Sixteenth Battery, Field Artillery, leaves Fort Riley, marching to Fort Leavenworth, where it arrives November 1.
- 27.—Work is commenced on the military road from Iligan to Lake Lanao, in Mindanao.
- 28.—Troops E and F, Third Cavalry, rejoin station at the Presidio of San Francisco from detached service in the Yosemite and Sequoia National parks, California. Brig. Gen. F. D. Grant assumes command of the Department of Texas, relieving Col. W. C. Forbush, Twelfth Cavalry.
- 30.—Company H, Porto Rico Provisional Regiment, leaves Mayaguez, P. I., marching to Henry Barracks for station; arrives November 4. Transport *Thomas* arrives at Manila. Two Moros run amuck in Jolo, severely wounding 1 soldier; both Moros killed.
- 31.—Transport *Sheridan* arrives at San Francisco with Troops A, B, C, D, E, and I, Ninth Cavalry (12 officers, 493 enlisted men); 26 officers, passengers; 2 contract surgeons; 136 sick; 247 casuals; 9 furloughed; 73 discharged; 8 general prisoners, and 3 casualties. Transport *Crook* sails from Manila.
- Nov. 1.—Transport *Logan* sails from San Francisco with 39 officers, passengers; 1 officer in charge of casuals; 4 hospital corps and 31 signal corps men, and 20 casuals.
- 4.—Fifth and Eighteenth Batteries, Field Artillery, leave the Presidio of San Francisco for Point Reyes, Cal., for target practice, returning November 14.
- 7.—Troop E, Ninth Cavalry, leaves the Presidio of San Francisco for Fort Walla Walla, Wash. Field, staff, and Troop E, Second Squadron, Third Cavalry, leaves San Francisco for Boise Barracks, Idaho. Troop F, Third Cavalry, leaves the Presidio for Fort Yates, N. Dak.

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- Nov. 8.—Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur relinquishes command of the Department of the East.....Field, staff, and First Squadron, Ninth Cavalry, takes station at Camp Monterey, Cal.
- 10.—Troop E, Third Cavalry, arrives at Boise Barracks, Idaho.....Troop E, Ninth Cavalry, arrives at Fort Walla Walla, Wash.
- 11.—Transport *Sumner* arrives at San Francisco with Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, 6 other officers, passengers; 6 casuals; 4 general prisoners, and 2 army nurse corps, female.....Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur assumes command of the Department of the Lakes.
- 18.—Troop F, Third Cavalry, arrives at Fort Yates, N. Dak.
- 21.—Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee assumes command of the Department of the East.
- 23.—Transport *Thomas* sails from Manila.
- 29.—Transport *Crook* arrives at San Francisco with 29 officers, passengers; 3 contract surgeons; 96 discharged men; 13 furloughed; 6 enlisted men for retirement; 268 short-term men, and 87 sick.....Transport *Logan* arrives at Manila.....Transport *McClellan* arrives at New York from Manila.
- 30.—Company L, Thirteenth Infantry, transferred from Fort McDowell to Benicia Barracks, Cal.....Convalescent Company No. 2 is transferred from the Discharge Camp, Angel Island, to Benicia Barracks, Cal., where it is consolidated with Convalescent Company No. 1.
- Dec. 1.—Transport *Sherman* sails from San Francisco with 21 officers, passengers; 1 officer in charge of casuals; 6 hospital corps and 8 signal corps men, and 74 casuals.
- 15.—Transport *Logan* sails from Manila.
- 23.—Transport *Thomas* arrives at San Francisco with 24 officers, passengers; 14 furloughed; 169 short-term men; 66 sick; 800 discharged men; 2 general prisoners; 12 casuals; 2 army nurse corps, female; Company H, Second Infantry (2 officers, 61 enlisted men), as guard, and 7 remains deceased soldiers.
- 29.—Transport *Sherman* arrives at Manila.

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- Jan. 1.—Transport *Sheridan* sails from San Francisco with 16 officers, passengers; 1 officer in charge of recruits; Company H, Second Infantry; 13 casuals; 7 hospital corps and 16 signal corps men.
- 13.—Transport *Logan* arrives at San Francisco with 34 officers, passengers; Company D, Thirtieth Infantry (3 officers, 69 enlisted men); 7 army nurse corps, female; 1,040 discharged men; 214 sick; 279 casuals, and 6 casualties.
- 20.—Ninth Field Battery leaves Fort Sheridan, Ill., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippine Islands.
- 21.—Seventeenth Field Battery leaves Fort Sam Houston, Tex., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippine Islands.....Act of Congress to promote the efficiency of the militia is approved.
- 22.—Thirty-eighth Company, Coast Artillery, leaves Fort Caswell, N. C., for San Francisco, Cal., en route to the Philippine Islands.....Eighty-fifth Company, Coast Artillery, leaves Fort Wadsworth, N. Y., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippine Islands.....The One hundred and eighth Company, Coast Artillery, leaves Fort Williams, Me., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippine Islands.
- 23.—The Tenth Company, Coast Artillery, leaves Fort Getty, S. C., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippine Islands.

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Jan. 25.—The Eighteenth Battery, Field Artillery, is relieved from duty at the Presidio of San Francisco to await transportation to the Philippine Islands.

27.—Transport *Sheridan* arrives at Manila.

31.—Transport *Thomas* sails from San Francisco with the Ninth Battery, Field Artillery (3 officers, 120 men); Seventeenth Battery, Field Artillery (4 officers, 117 men); Eighteenth Battery, Field Artillery (2 officers, 120 men); Tenth Company, Coast Artillery (1 officer, 109 men); Thirty-eighth Company, Coast Artillery (1 officer, 109 men); Eighty-fifth Company, Coast Artillery (1 officer, 105 men); One hundred and eighth Company, Coast Artillery (1 officer, 107 men); Company D, Thirtieth Infantry (3 officers, 68 men); 12 officers, passengers; 15 officers and 309 enlisted men, United States Marine Corps; 11 hospital corps men, and 13 casuals.

Feb. 6.—Transport *Sheridan* sails from Manila.

9.—The Twenty-ninth Battery, Field Artillery, Troops A and D, and a detachment from Troops B and C, Eighth Cavalry, leave Fort Sill, Okla., for Oklahoma City, to participate in cattlemen's convention; returning February 13.

14.—Act of Congress establishing a General Staff Corps is approved, to take effect August 15, 1903.

16.—Headquarters, field, staff, band, and the First Squadron, Thirteenth Cavalry, leave Fort Meade, S. Dak., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippine Islands. Company I, Twentieth Infantry, is transferred from Fort Sheridan, Ill., to Fort Brady, Mich. Companies L and M, Twentieth Infantry, are transferred from Fort Sheridan, Ill., to Fort Wayne, Mich. Company K, Eighth Infantry, is transferred from Fort Niagara to Fort Porter, N. Y. Company E, Porto Rico Provisional Regiment, leaves Mayaguez for Henry Barracks, P. R., for station, a detachment of 1 officer and 10 men being left at Mayaguez.

18.—Headquarters, band, and Second Battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, leaves Fort Wayne, Mich., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippine Islands.

19.—Company D, Porto Rico Provisional Regiment, leaves Ponce for San Juan, P. R., a detachment of 1 officer and 10 men being left at Ponce. First Battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, leaves Fort Brady, Mich., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippines.

20.—Company E, Porto Rico Provisional Regiment, arrives at Henry Barracks, P. R. Company G, Eighth Infantry, leaves Fort Columbus, N. Y., for Washington, D. C., to take part in the ceremonies incident to the laying of the corner stone of the Army War College. Third Battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, leaves Fort Porter, N. Y., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippine Islands.

21.—The corner stone of the Army War College, at Washington Barracks, Washington, D. C., is laid at 12.45 p. m., in the presence of the President of the United States, the members of the Cabinet, the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, the Admiral of the Navy, and diplomatic representatives of foreign nations, the ceremonies being participated in by Company G, Eighth Infantry, from Fort Columbus, N. Y.; the Forty-fourth Company, Coast Artillery, from Fort Washington, Md.; the Third Battalion of Engineers, from Washington Barracks, and the Fourth Battery, Field Artillery, and band and Troop F, Second Cavalry, from Fort Myer, Va. Detachment of 11 men, Sixteenth Company, Philippine Scouts, is attacked by force of between 300 and 400 ladrones

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dressed as constabulary, at Cainta, Rizal; 11 carbines and belts captured by ladrones after ammunition of scouts exhausted; 1 scout wounded; 2 ladrones wounded.

Jan. 22.—Brig. Gen. J. M. Lee assumes command of the Department of the Visayas.....Company G, Eighth Infantry, returns to Fort Columbus, N. Y., from Washington, D. C.

23.—Company D, Porto Rico Provisional Regiment, arrives at San Juan, P. R.

25.—Transport *Thomas* arrives at Manila.

27.—The Forty-seventh Company, Coast Artillery, from Fort Hunt, Va., takes part in annual parade in Alexandria, Va., and returns to post same date.

28.—Transport *Kilpatrick* sails from San Francisco with headquarters, field, staff, and band, and 12 companies Fourteenth Infantry (39 officers, 797 men); 1 contract surgeon and 3 hospital corps men.....Transport *Logan* sails from San Francisco with headquarters, field, staff, and band, and First Squadron, Thirteenth Cavalry (19 officers, 294 men); 3 hospital corps and 28 signal corps men, and 9 casuals.

Mar. 3.—Transport *Sheridan* arrives at San Francisco with 11 officers, passengers; 2 contract surgeons; 19 officers and 404 men, U. S. Marine Corps; 285 discharged men; 343 short-term men; 147 sick; 7 insane, and 73 hospital corps men.....Company E, Twelfth Infantry, leaves Fort Apache, Ariz., for Whipple Barracks, Ariz.

5.—Troops E and H, Thirteenth Cavalry, leave Fort Keogh, Mont., for Fort Meade, S. Dak.

6.—Transport *Thomas* sails from Manila.

7.—Troops E and H, Thirteenth Cavalry, arrive at Fort Meade, S. Dak. Detachment of Company C, Porto Rico Provisional Regiment from San Juan, arrives at Mayaguez, P. R., for station.....Detachment of Company F, Porto Rico Provisional Regiment, from Henry Barracks, arrives at Ponce for station.

9.—Company E, Twelfth Infantry, arrives at Whipple Barracks, Ariz.

12.—Active scouting operations have been in progress in the provinces of Rizal and Bulacan, Luzon, for the past month against bands of ladrones, resulting in 21 ladrones being killed and a number wounded and captured; a few arms were also recovered; casualties, 1 enlisted man killed and 1 wounded.

14.—The Twenty-first Company, Native Scouts, return from scout from Novaliches, Rizal, bringing in 2 ladrones and 9 Remington rifles, all in good condition; no casualties.

16.—Governor Tezon, of Bulacan Province, Luzon, reports the capture of Pastor Antonio, and through him the capture of 1 revolver, 1 Japanese rifle, 2 bolos, 2 Remington rifles, 70 cartridges, 2 Katipunan seals, 1 pair field glasses, and many documents.....Lieut. John H. Neff, Philippine Scouts, reports that through the 2 prisoners captured in fight on the 14th he has recovered 6 Remington and 3 Krag rifles.

17.—The Tenth Band, Artillery Corps, and the Seventy-seventh and Ninety-sixth Companies, Coast Artillery, from Fort Warren; the Forty-sixth Company, Coast Artillery, from Fort Strong, and the Eighty-ninth Company, from Fort Banks, take part in the Evacuation Day parade in Boston, returning to their posts same date.

18.—Company L, Eighteenth Infantry, leaves Whipple Barracks, Ariz., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippine Islands.

19.—Companies A, B, C, D, I, K, and M, Eighteenth Infantry, leave Fort Logan, Colo., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippine Islands.

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Mar. 20.—Lieutenant Schermerhorn, Philippine Constabulary, reports capture of 3 Remington rifles, 33 rounds ammunition, 1 flag, and some documents near San Felipe Neri, Rizal.

21.—Lieutenant Schermerhorn reports capture of 5 Remington rifles, 2 carbines, and 100 rounds ammunition near San Felipe Neri, Rizal..... Headquarters and Second Battalion, Eighteenth Infantry, leave Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippine Islands.

22.—Third Squadron, Thirteenth Cavalry, leaves Fort Meade, S. Dak., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippine Islands.

23.—Maj. Gen. John C. Bates assumes command of the Department of the Lakes, relieving Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur..... A party of about 20 or 30 ladrones and insurrectos, under Adrian Concepcion, an insurgent who escaped from prison in January, enter Surigao, Mindanao, and evidently as result of prearrangement, are joined by about 100 natives; sentinel at constabulary headquarters is overpowered, building looted, 100 arms taken, 3,000 rounds ammunition, 7,000 pesos of civil funds, and number of constabulary uniforms; outlaws leave town for the interior same evening; 1 constabulary inspector killed.

25.—Brig. Gen. Jesse M. Lee, a detachment of 30 men, Tenth Infantry, and Companies G and H, Twenty-ninth Infantry, arrive at Surigao, Mindanao, and General Lee assumes command of all troops and the Philippine constabulary in the province of Surigao, for the purpose of running down the Surigao outlaws.

26.—Transport *Logan* arrives at Manila.

27.—Force of 160 Philippine Scouts assault and capture trenches 6 miles north of Manila held by a like number of ladrones. Enemy lose 40 killed and many arms captured, insurgent General San Miguel being among the dead. Casualties, 3 enlisted men, Philippine Scouts, killed; 1 officer and 11 men wounded.

30.—Transport *Kilpatrick* arrives at Manila..... Artillery post of San Juan, P. R., is discontinued..... Lieut. Col. W. C. Taylor, Philippine Constabulary, recovers at Joboson, Surigao, 3 Springfield and 5 Remington rifles and 6 Remington shotguns..... Captain Marshall, Philippine Constabulary, with 50 constabulary, scouting in the Magtayaco country, Surigao, is attacked by the outlaws and 1 constabulary killed and 2 wounded; 1 rifle lost..... Col. A. L. Myer, Eleventh Infantry, with Companies K and L, Eleventh Infantry, arrives at Surigao and assumes command of the operations against the outlaws.

Apr. 1.—Maj. Gen. Arthur McArthur assumes command of the Department of California, relieving Maj. Gen. R. P. Hughes..... Transport *Sheridan* sails from San Francisco with headquarters, field, staff, band, and 12 companies, Eighteenth Infantry (44 officers, 759 enlisted men); Third Squadron, Thirteenth Cavalry (13 officers, 251 enlisted men); 4 officers, passengers; 3 hospital corps and 4 signal corps men, and 2 casuals.

2.—First Lieut. Junius I. Boyle, Philippine Scouts, with 50 scouts of the Twenty-ninth Company, and Inspector Guevara, with 25 constabulary from Indang, Cavite, strike a band of 200 ladrones, camped near Tagmuia, Cavite, killing 3 and capturing 2. Ladrones escape and go to Indang and attack the guard at that place, 4 being killed and 12 wounded.

3.—Transport *Thomas* arrives at San Francisco with Twenty-fifth, Twenty-seventh, Thirty-first, and Thirty-sixth Companies, Coast Artillery, and

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Fourteenth and Fifteenth Batteries, Field Artillery (9 officers, 584 enlisted men); 10 officers, passengers; 2 dental and 5 contract surgeons; 86 sick; 2 insane; 62 furloughed and enlisted men under orders; 150 short-term men; 149 discharged, and 2 casualties.

Apr. 4.—Transport *Logan* sails from Manila.

5.—Lieut. S. M. Hibbard, Philippine Constabulary, with detachment of Company G, Twenty-ninth Infantry, and constabulary, strike band of outlaws at Gamoton, Surigao, killing 1, and capturing 3 Remington rifles and 1 revolver.....Lieutenant Schreiner, Philippine Constabulary, with Company E, Twenty-ninth Infantry, and constabulary, in scouting through the Magtayaco country, kill 3 outlaws and recover 1 Remington rifle and 1 shotgun.

6.—A force of 30 or 40 ladrones make an attack on Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, capturing arms of 2 constabulary and 1 Krag; burn several shacks, and wound 1 woman and 2 boys. One ladrone killed.....Captain Pershing leaves Camp Vicars, Mindanao, with 1 battalion, Twenty-seventh Infantry; 3 troops, Fifteenth Cavalry, and Seventeenth and Twenty-fifth Batteries, Field Artillery, to explore the west coast of Lake Lanao.

7.—Twenty-fifth Company, Coast Artillery, assigned to Fort Miley, Cal.....

Twenty-seventh Company, Coast Artillery, assigned to Fort Baker, Cal.

8.—Captain Pershing, on approaching the Moro fort at Bacolod, is fired upon and 2 men wounded. The fort is assaulted and captured, with a loss of 11 enlisted men wounded. Moro loss heavy, some 60 dead being found in the fort proper and others in ditches and smaller defenses in the vicinity. Seven cannon, 4 lantakas, and many other arms are captured.....Lieut. Anton Seemann, Philippine Scouts, with detachment Forty-fourth Company Scouts, strikes outlaws on the Mamcas River, Surigao; no casualties.

9.—The Fourteenth Battery, Field Artillery, leaves San Francisco for Fort Sheridan, Ill.

11.—The Thirty-first Company, Coast Artillery, leaves San Francisco for Fort Caswell, N. C.....The Thirty-sixth Company, Coast Artillery, leaves San Francisco for Fort Getty, S. C.....The Fifteenth Battery, Field Artillery, leaves San Francisco for Fort Sam Houston, Tex.

13.—Brig. Gen. Frank D. Baldwin assumes command of the Department of the Colorado.....Lieut. Charles W. Harris, Twenty-eighth Infantry, attacks band of ladrones at sunrise near Agusan, Misamis; kills 1, wounds 13, captures 18. No casualties.

14.—The Fourteenth Battery, Field Artillery, arrives at Fort Sheridan, Ill.....

The Fifteenth Battery, Field Artillery, arrives at Fort Sam Houston, Tex.

15.—Companies E and F, Ninth Infantry, are transferred from Madison Barracks to Plattsburg Barracks, N. Y.....Companies I and K, Third Battalion Engineers, leave Washington Barracks, D. C., for San Francisco.....The post of Indianapolis Arsenal, Ind., having been duly sold, is turned over to the trustees of the Winona Agricultural and Technical Institute fund, the detachment of the Third Infantry stationed there being withdrawn to Fort Thomas, Ky.

17.—The Thirty-sixth Company, Coast Artillery, arrives at Fort Getty, S. C.....

The Thirty-first Company, Coast Artillery, arrives at Fort Caswell, N. C.

18.—Captain Pershing returns from exploring expedition along the west coast of Lake Lanao, Mindanao.

20.—Transport *Sumner* sails from San Francisco with 7 officers, passengers; 1 veterinarian; 4 army nurse corps, female; 16 casuals; 1 hospital corps man and 4 signal corps men.....Second Squadron, Twelfth Cavalry,

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leaves Fort Clark, Tex., for San Francisco.....The Twenty-third Infantry leaves Plattsburg Barracks, N. Y., for San Francisco.

Apr. 23.—Transport *Sherman* sails from Manila.

25.—Troops K and L, Ninth Cavalry, leave the Presidio of San Francisco, Cal., for patrol duty in the Yosemite National Park.

26.—Transport *Sheridan* arrives at Manila.

27.—The First Battalion Engineers; the Third Squadron, Fourth Cavalry; the Sixth, Seventh, Sixteenth, and Twenty-eighth Batteries, Field Artillery; headquarters, band, and six troops, Eighth Cavalry; headquarters, band, and two battalions, Third Infantry; headquarters, band, and two battalions, Twentieth Infantry, and headquarters, band, and two battalions, Twenty-second Infantry, participate in the dedicatory ceremonies of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition at St. Louis, Mo.

28.—Transport *Logan* arrives at San Francisco with the First Squadron, Sixth Cavalry (14 officers, 197 men); the First Infantry (29 officers, 864 men); 8 officers, passengers; 4 contract surgeons; 81 discharged men; 2 general prisoners; 349 casuals, and 4 casualties.

May 1.—Transport *Thomas* sails from San Francisco with field, staff, and companies I and K, Third Battalion Engineers (7 officers, 182 men); field, staff, and Second Squadron, Twelfth Cavalry (9 officers, 241 men); headquarters, field, staff, band, and 12 companies, Twenty-third Infantry (42 officers, 760 men); 3 officers passengers; 6 signal corps men, and 3 casuals.

2.—Company I, Thirteenth Infantry, leaves Fort McDowell, Cal., for Fort Liscum, Alaska.....Captain Pershing leaves Camp Vicars, Mindanao, with 4 companies of infantry, 3 troops of cavalry, 2 guns, and 1 mortar on an expedition around Lake Lanao.

4.—Company I, Thirteenth Infantry, arrives at Fort Lawton, Wash., en route to Fort Liscum, Alaska.

5.—Headquarters, band, and Troops A and C, Sixth Cavalry, leave San Francisco for Fort Meade, S. Dak.....Troops B and D, Sixth Cavalry, leave San Francisco for Fort Keogh, Mont.

6.—Headquarters, band, and Second Battalion, First Infantry, leave San Francisco for Fort Wayne, Mich.....Third Battalion, First Infantry, leaves San Francisco for Fort Porter, N. Y.

7.—First Battalion, First Infantry, leaves San Francisco for Fort Brady, Mich.

8.—Company I, Thirteenth Infantry, sails from Seattle, Wash., for Fort Liscum, Alaska, on steamer *Nome City*.

9.—Headquarters, band, and Troops A and C, Sixth Cavalry, arrive at Fort Meade, S. Dak.

10.—Troops B and D, Sixth Cavalry, arrive at Fort Keogh, Mont.....Captain Pershing returns to Camp Vicars, having completed a circuit of Lake Lanao via the east coast. Had one sharp fight at Taraca. Captured 10 forts, many prisoners, 36 lantakas, and 60 rifles. Casualties, 2 killed; 4 wounded.

11.—Brig. Gen. Jesse M. Lee relinquishes command of the Department of the Visayas.

12.—Company K, Eighth Infantry, is transferred from Fort Porter to Fort Niagara, N. Y.....Third Battalion, First Infantry, arrives at Fort Porter, N. Y.....Headquarters, band, and Second Battalion, First Infantry, arrive at Fort Wayne, Mich.....Transport *Sheridan* sails from Manila.

13.—First Battalion, First Infantry, arrives at Fort Brady, Mich.....Commanding officer, Forty-third Company, Philippine Scouts, scouting on

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the island of Camaguin, strike band of insurgents numbering about 300, led by Valero Cameron; after a fight of about an hour the band is broken up and dispersed, leaving 12 dead on field. Casualties, 2 wounded.

May 15.—Moro prisoners who are being guarded by Capt. Clough Overton, Troop D, Fifteenth Cavalry, at Suclatan, near Tagaloan, Mindanao, break away and secure their bolos, killing Captain Overton and 1 enlisted man, and wounding 1 man, Troop D.

16.—Company I, Thirteenth Infantry, arrives at Fort Liscum, Alaska.

17.—Detachment Forty-fourth Company Scouts strikes band of outlaws at Hina-gnewyen, Surigao, capturing 1 outlaw and 1 Krag rifle.

18.—Headquarters, band, and Third Battalion, Fourth Infantry, leave Fort Sam Houston, Tex., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippine Islands.

19.—Companies E, F, and H, Fourth Infantry, leave Fort McIntosh, Tex., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippines; Company G, from Eagle Pass, Tex., joining command en route.

20.—Transport *Sherman* arrives at San Francisco with 18 officers, passengers; 53 sick; 3 insane; 2 general prisoners; 220 casuals.....First Battalion, Fourth Infantry, leaves Department of Texas for San Francisco, en route to the Philippine Islands.

21.—Troops E and H, Thirteenth Cavalry, leave Fort Meade, S. Dak., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippine Islands.....Headquarters Second Squadron and Troops F and G, Thirteenth Cavalry, leave Fort Keogh, Mont., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippine Islands.....Lieutenant Delaplane, with detachment of Company L, Eleventh Infantry, strikes band of 7 outlaws near Mainit, Surigao, killing 3 and capturing 4, among latter de los Santos, second in command of outlaws. Also captures 2 rifles, 1 carbine, 1 revolver, and 176 rounds ammunition.

22.—Detachment of Company K and scouts, under Lieutenant Seemann, strikes camp of Concepcion, the outlaw leader, in Surigao Province, Mindanao, capturing 3 Remington rifles, 1 shotgun, 4 revolvers, and 100 rounds ammunition. No casualties.

27.—Transport *Thomas* arrives at Manila.....Company A, Thirteenth Infantry, is transferred from the discharge camp, Angel Island, to Fort McDowell, Cal.

28.—Transport *Sumner* arrives at Manila.....Lieutenant Grennan, with 29 men of Forty-third Company, Philippine Scouts, returns to Surigao from Camiguin Island, with 40 prisoners; encountered on several occasions small parties of insurgents ranging from 2 to 8; reports 18 killed since 15th.

30.—Band and 4 companies Eighth Infantry from Fort Columbus, 2 companies Coast Artillery from Fort Hamilton, and 2 companies Coast Artillery from Fort Wadsworth take part in the ceremonies attending the dedication of the Sherman monument, New York City.

June 1.—Transport *Logan* sails from San Francisco with Second Squadron, Thirteenth Cavalry (15 officers, 239 men); Fourth Infantry (37 officers, 755 men); 13 officers, passengers; 4 hospital corps and 9 signal corps men, and 32 casuals.

2.—The Thirty-second Company, Coast Artillery, arrives at Fort Baker, Cal., from San Francisco.....Companies A and C, Corps of Engineers, leave Fort Leavenworth, Kans., for Lawrence, Kans., marching, with pontoon bridge material to bridge the Kaw River and aid flood sufferers

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in the vicinity.....Companies A and C, Sixth Infantry, leave Fort Leavenworth for Kansas City to assist in protecting flood sufferers and property.

- June 4.—Lieutenant Seemann, with Forty-fourth Company Scouts, surprises outlaws at Suvo River, Surigao, capturing 6 and recovering 1 revolver.
- 6.—Transport *Sheridan* arrives at San Francisco with Second Infantry (33 officers, 615 men); headquarters and Third Squadron, First Cavalry (12 officers, 209 men); 1 veterinarian; Twenty-fifth Battery, Field Artillery (3 officers, 96 men); 10 officers, passengers; 3 contract surgeons; 74 casuals; 75 discharged, and 5 sick.....Troop A, Third Cavalry, leaves Fort Assiniboine, Mont., marching to Fort Yellowstone, Wyo., for duty in the Yellowstone National Park.
- 11.—Troops B and D, Fourteenth Cavalry, leave Fort Huachuca, Ariz., and Troops I, K, and L, Fourteenth Cavalry, leave Fort Grant, Ariz., for Morenci, to maintain order during a strike at that point, arriving same date.
- 13.—Company B, Corps of Engineers, leave Fort Leavenworth for Kansas City with bridge material to bridge the Kaw River.....Third Battalion, Second Infantry, leaves San Francisco for Fort Logan, Colo.....Troop F, Third Cavalry, leaves Fort Yates, N. Dak., for Fort Yellowstone, Wyo.
- 14.—First Battalion, Second Infantry, leaves San Francisco for Fort Logan, Colo.....Headquarters, band, and Second Battalion, Second Infantry, leave San Francisco for Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo.....Transport *Thomas* sails from Manila.
- 15.—First Squadron, Twelfth Cavalry, leaves Fort Sam Houston, Tex., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippines.....Headquarters, band, and Third Squadron, First Cavalry, arrive in Department of Texas from San Francisco; headquarters and Troops I, K, and L stationed at Fort Clark, and Troop M at Fort Sam Houston, Tex.....Detachment Company E, Twenty-ninth Infantry, strikes band of 4 outlaws near Tubog, Surigao, killing 1, capturing 1, and wounding 1; recovers 1 revolver.
- 16.—First Battalion, Second Infantry, arrives at Fort Logan, Colo., from San Francisco.....Headquarters, field, staff, band, and Second Battalion, Second Infantry, arrive at Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo., from San Francisco.
- 17.—Troop G, Third Cavalry, leaves Fort Apache, Ariz., for Morenci, Ariz.....Third Battalion, Second Infantry, arrives at Fort Logan, Colo., from San Francisco.
- 18.—Troops B and D, Fourteenth Cavalry, return to Fort Huachuca, Ariz., from field duty at Morenci, Ariz.....Troops I, K, and L, Fourteenth Cavalry, return to Fort Grant, Ariz., from Morenci, Ariz.....Troop F, Third Cavalry, arrives at Fort Yellowstone, Wyo.
- 19.—Companies I and L, Nineteenth Infantry, leave San Francisco for Fort Wright, Wash.....Companies K and M, Nineteenth Infantry, leave San Francisco for Fort Lawton, Wash.
- 20.—Troop G, Third Cavalry, arrives at Morenci, Ariz.
- 21.—Headquarters, field, staff, band, and First Battalion, Nineteenth Infantry, leaves San Francisco for Vancouver Barracks, Wash.
- 22.—Companies K and M, Nineteenth Infantry, arrive at Fort Lawton, Wash.Companies I and L, Nineteenth Infantry, arrive at Fort Wright, Wash.....Companies K and M, Seventeenth Infantry, leave Fort Wright, Wash., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippine Islands.
- 23.—Company E, Sixteenth Infantry, leaves Fort McPherson, Ga., for Griffin, Ga., to attend State encampment of Georgia National Guard, rejoining

1903.

post June 28.....Headquarters, band, and First Battalion, Nineteenth Infantry, arrive at Vancouver Barracks, Wash.....Company I, Seventeenth Infantry, leaves Boise Barracks, Idaho, for San Francisco..... Company L, Seventeenth Infantry, leaves Fort Lawton, Wash., for San Francisco.

June 24.—Company D, Thirteenth Infantry, leaves the discharge camp, Angel Island, Cal., for temporary duty at Benicia Barracks.....The First Squadron, Second Cavalry, and Twenty-third Battery, Field Artillery, leave Fort Ethan Allen, Vt., and 8 officers, 160 men, Ninth Infantry, leave Madison Barracks, N. Y., for Boston, Mass., to participate in the ceremonies attending the dedication of the statue to General Joseph Hooker on June 25; rejoining their posts on June 26.....Headquarters, staff, band, and First and Second Battalions, Seventeenth Infantry, leave Vancouver Barracks, Wash., for San Francisco, en route to the Philippines..... Troop A, Third Cavalry, arrives at Fort Yellowstone, Wyo.

25.—The troops from Forts Banks, Revere, Strong, and Warren, Mass., participate in the ceremonies attending the dedication of the statue to General Hooker at Boston.

26.—Transport *Logan* arrives at Manila.

A.—REPORT OF MAJ. GEN. ARTHUR MACARTHUR, U. S. ARMY, COMMANDING THE DEPARTMENT OF CALIFORNIA.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF CALIFORNIA,
San Francisco, Cal., August 19, 1903.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: The business of the Department of California for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1903, embraced a considerable mass of well-executed routine, but very little of an exceptional character or of notable importance.

The volume of emergency work transacted at these headquarters may be appreciated by reference to the fact that during the five years immediately preceding June 30, 1903, 132,284 men were transported to Manila and 98,596 received therefrom. All the exacting details to carry out this great administration have been performed in an exemplary manner, but the records incidental thereto are not in a satisfactory condition and need to be carefully rearranged and filed for permanent preservation, which can only be accomplished by means of increased clerical facilities at these headquarters, at the recruit depot of instruction, Presidio, and at the discharge camp, Angel Island. Specific representations in these premises are now before the Department, which are again respectfully urged for immediate and favorable consideration.

MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS.

The military record of the year is confined almost exclusively to matters incidental to troops changing stations and the rearrangement of officers at these headquarters, a tabular list of which events is respectfully appended hereto, marked "A."^a

^a Not printed.

MILITIA.

The following-named officers were appointed, under General Orders, No. 49, Adjutant-General's Office, current series, to inspect the organized militia in the States and Territories within the Department of California: States of California and Nevada, Maj. E. E. Hardin, Seventh Infantry; Territory of Hawaii, Maj. John McClellan, Artillery Corps.

But one officer was designated for the militia of California, as the governor requested that the army inspector accompany the State inspector throughout. As there was but one State inspector whose itinerary was fixed, the result was that but one officer could be usefully employed on this duty, and his inspection could not be completed until the State inspector had finished his tour.

The State inspector did not include the Naval Militia in his tour; hence the organization of this force was not presented for the inspection of the regular army inspector.

Brief tables, in which the result of the foregoing inspections is tabulated, are respectfully appended, marked "B."^a

Under section 19 of the act approved January 21, 1903, to promote the efficiency of the militia, Maj. Arthur C. Ducat, Seventh Infantry, is now attending the encampments of the organized militia of the State of California to impart instruction and information to the officers and men assembled in camp, in accordance with the instructions transmitted from your office under date of July 11, 1903. As soon as the duty is completed Major Ducat will make immediate report thereof, as required by the statute.

The arrangement submitted from these headquarters November 21, 1902, to which the approval of the Secretary of War was given in your letter of January 3, 1903, having in view the instruction of the officers and men of the artillery arm of the California National Guard at the forts around San Francisco Harbor, has been carried forward with intelligent energy and very satisfactory results. Commencing in April the officers and noncommissioned officers of each company of a battalion of California Artillery, the four companies of which formerly belonged to the First Infantry of the National Guard of this State, but which now form a separate organization for instruction and service as coast artillery, visited the Presidio separately once a week, and by means of lectures at the batteries were instructed in a variety of subjects appertaining to the service of coast artillery, including, among other things, theory of fire direction, range finding and predicted fire, the use of the range finders and other instruments, the use of the plotting board, and the use of communications. The course terminated in the latter part of May with four days' practical training at the guns of a large detachment of the battalion.

Aside from the importance of the actual work accomplished by reason of the partial instruction of a certain number of intelligent men in important military duties, the action in this instance must be regarded as the initiatory step toward the creation of an artillery reserve for the Pacific coast.

The importance of such a reserve can hardly be overestimated. Under the most favorable conditions the regular establishment can

^aNot printed.

furnish hardly more than one-fifth of the force necessary to fully mobilize all the batteries. The other 80 per cent must, in case of emergency, come from the contiguous population. Fortunately the harbor defenses of San Francisco Bay are in the midst of a hardy and valiant people, ready and willing to defend the important national interests committed to their keeping. To accomplish this end, however, intelligent direction is necessary, for the accomplishment of which, in the first instance, it is respectfully recommended that the entire organized militia of all arms, located within easy distance of this city, be invited to participate in a course of coast artillery training at the Presidio. The rudimentary instruction, such as described above, which can be quickly imparted under the tuition of competent officers, is of incalculable practical value and can be readily extended to embrace all troops in this vicinity, and if systematically carried out would, in a few years, create an artillery reserve in every way adequate for the defense of this harbor against any coalition that could possibly be brought against it.

OFFICERS' SCHOOLS.

The officers' schools created by paragraph 5, General Orders, No. 155, Adjutant-General's Office, 1901, have been organized at all the posts in the department and have been conducted in accordance with the methods prescribed in General Orders, No. 102, 1902, from your office. Detailed reports received from posts in the command are all to the same effect and strongly in favor of the post school as an efficient institution for the primary instruction of officers. It is apparent, however, that time and experience will suggest amendments of the organic order, but at present post commanders are reluctant to recommend radical changes in the premises, especially so as the year has been very satisfactory in respect of general results.

DESERTIONS.

One thousand three hundred and forty-four men deserted during the fiscal year covered by this report. Of this number 914 were from the permanent garrisons in the department and represent, approximately, 19.42 per cent of the main strength thereof for the year. The remaining 430 were from recruits, casuals, and regiments passing to and from the Philippines.

It is not apparent why so many men resorted to this violent method of separating from the service, and if the depressing result could in any way be attributed to American methods it would certainly justify the deepest solicitude on the part of all concerned in the military administration of the nation. As a matter of fact, however, the American soldier is so well provided in respect of all his material necessities and his personal rights are so carefully safeguarded in respect of all matters of discipline, that a conclusion arises spontaneously in the minds of experienced investigators to the effect that desertion to a large extent is incidental to human nature rather than an expression of specific defects in a military system, and as such is not within the scope of ordinary methods of punitive control.

In the light of past experience and of present conditions it seems apparent that the United States, as a nation, must accept desertion as

a necessary evil unless enlightened public opinion can be induced to realize that it is not only inimical as it affects the Army as a separate organization, but in remote consequences is a menace to the stability of our institutions, through its corrupting effect upon the military ideals of the population that must furnish the improvised troops upon which the Republic must always rely in time of war. The practical value of this view may be determined with considerable precision by any one who will take the trouble to inquire into the aspects of desertion in the Union and Confederate armies during the great civil war of 1861-1865.

The subject is well calculated to attract the attention and intelligent consideration of such citizens as are concerned about the future of our military establishment.

ARTILLERY.

The artillery as a special arm of exclusive necessities has received careful and nourishing attention. The service of the coast batteries is being systematized, and a fine professional spirit pervades the arm which inspires confidence in the early solution of all the perplexing questions now under consideration.

In reporting upon the Army and Navy maneuvers of 1902, in the New London and Narragansett artillery districts of the Department of the East, the undersigned, among other things, remarked as follows:

* * * Considering all the elements that enter into the transaction, even the ordinary practice firing of a high-power gun is an event of national importance. In war there is absolutely no margin for a high-power coast-defense gun missing. To be effective to the end in view nearly every shot must be a hit. Such a condition of utility does not at present exist, but fortunately it is a scientific possibility which can readily be made an actual fact by the simple process of affording the necessary facilities for proper artillery training and providing an adequate instrumental equipment together with a qualified personnel to manipulate the same.

An old-time fort, with its numerous guns, was capable of almost continuous fire, such as it was, and when employed against sailing ships, had considerable chance of hitting because of the numerous shots fired and of the long exposure of the ship. Instead of the broadside effects of the old forts, a modern work has only a few high-power guns, in which are concentrated an enormous weight of metal, from which can be delivered only comparatively few projectiles at ships moving at full speed under steam. Although the accuracy as well as the range of guns has been immensely increased, the chance of hitting by reason of the relatively small number of shots that can be fired has greatly diminished, unless each shot can be delivered from a gun laid with scientific precision, which will be possible only under a perfect system of fire control. Such a system does not exist at present, and as its creation must be preceded by laborious, experimental investigation, it is apparent that time is the important consideration in working out the problem. In other words, a useful system of artillery fire control is one of the elements of military power that can not be extemporized, and should accordingly be developed and perfected regardless of expense in advance of any emergency; and in this connection it is asserted with all confidence that the accomplished officers who have these affairs in charge will, in a few years, be able to announce a satisfactory solution, if the facilities to carry on the practical work are furnished. * * *

Conclusions are therefore suggested by the maneuvers to the following effect:
* * *

3. For the purpose of experimental investigation necessary to the evolution of a satisfactory fire-control system, the supply of full service charges of ammunition for practice firing at moving targets to be quadrupled for five years.

In the light of further reflection and observation of the coast-defense system of the Department of California, I now withdraw the qualification contained in the above recommendation by striking out the last three words, namely, "for five years," so that my recommendation shall stand unequivocally in behalf of a quadrupled allowance of ammu-

dition for seacoast guns for an unlimited time, and incidentally for such experimental investigations as will be made possible in consequence of such an increase.

TARGET PRACTICE.

Preeminent military efficiency depends almost entirely upon skill in the use of ballistical weapons. The military strength of an armament, either high-power weapons or small arms, does not depend upon the number of guns, or even upon the number of shots that can be fired therefrom, but upon the number of hits that can be made thereby in a given time. In other words, gun power is the useful effect of an armament expressed in hits per minute.

The practical value of this formula may be readily understood by a cursory consideration of the fact that a soldier who can make five hits per minute is, for all purposes of fire action, equivalent to five men who can make only one hit per man per minute. Again, assuming that the United States has 60,000 soldiers who can make one hit per minute, and that the skill of the body by due process of systematic training can be raised to two hits per minute, the useful effect for purposes of battle would be the same as increasing the force to 120,000 men.

Extending the range of the inquiry to embrace the entire nation, it is found that the supply of men available for military emergencies is practically inexhaustible, but men almost entirely destitute of military qualifications, except so far as patriotic determination and abundant valor are concerned. If, by any process of suggestion, the collective thought of this mass of potential military energy could be induced to a voluntary investigation of the nature, possibilities, and attractions of military marksmanship, it might result in the institution of popular target ranges, and thereby increase incalculably the gun-power of the Republic for use in war.

The general ideas embodied in the foregoing remarks are intended to apply equally to all service guns, from the pistol to the 12-inch cannon, and the purpose in submitting the same is to emphasize urgent recommendations in behalf of improved facilities and a large increase in the allowance of ammunition for the target training of troops of all arms.

At present the United States does not own a suitable site in this department for either small arms or field artillery target practice. Full courses in these arms under the present firing regulations have been arranged for over improvised ranges upon rented land, and this method will probably have to be followed another year, although everything possible is being done to locate a permanent range with a view to recommending the purchase thereof, if such a one can be found within accessible distance of San Francisco. This aspect of the subject will be further discussed in special reports, or again in the next annual report of this command, as may be found most expedient.

In order to accomplish satisfactory results from the point of view set forth above, every post must have, in addition to an open range, a closed gallery to accommodate at least one target for each company or other similar organization at all ranges to include 300 yards. To be effective to the end in view, the building must be contiguous to the barracks and equipped with every possible facility for scientific fire instruction, and kept open all the year around, during reasonable hours of the day and night, for the accommodation of military men of all ranks who wish to practice or to qualify for records.

The present allowance of ammunition for small arms and field artillery is entirely inadequate; indeed, it is hardly sufficient for a good preliminary course for trained troops, whereas the American Army at present is composed largely of inexperienced young officers and men, requiring for proper training not only infinitely careful supervision, but a greatly increased amount of ammunition, which is accordingly recommended to the extent of four times the present allowance.

As it is desired to make this latter recommendation the principal feature of this report, it is submitted in the hope that it may receive special consideration.

Very respectfully,

ARTHUR MACARTHUR,
Major-General, Commanding.

**B.—REPORT OF BRIG. GEN. FRANK D. BALDWIN, U. S. ARMY,
COMMANDING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE COLORADO.**

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE COLORADO,
Denver, Colo., August 15, 1903.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the affairs and administration of the Department of the Colorado for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1903.

In compliance with General Orders, No. 13, current series, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, I assumed command of the department on April 13, 1903, relieving Col. T. C. Lebo, Fourteenth Cavalry, who had been temporarily in command pending my arrival and following the departure of Brigadier-General Funston.

The following table shows the distribution of troops in the department at the close of the last fiscal year:

Stations of troops.

Posts..	Commanding officer.	Troops.
Fort Apache, Ariz.....	Maj. Edwin P. Andrus, Third Cavalry.	Troops G and H, Third Cavalry, Company F, Twelfth Infantry.
Fort Douglas, Utah....	Col. John W. Bubb, Twelfth Infantry.	Headquarters, band, and Companies A, B, C, D, Twelfth Infantry, Twelfth and Twenty-second Batteries, Field Artillery.
Fort Duchesne, Utah ..	Maj. Herbert S. Foster, Twelfth Infantry.	Troop A, Fourteenth Cavalry, Companies G and H, Twelfth Infantry.
Fort Grant, Ariz.....	Col. Thomas C. Lebo, Fourteenth Cavalry.	Headquarters, band, and Troops I, K, L, and M, Fourteenth Cavalry.
Fort Huachuca, Ariz..	Maj. Chas. M. O'Connor, Fourteenth Cavalry.	Troops B, D, and C, Fourteenth Cavalry.
Fort Logan, Colo.....	Col. Chas. L. Cooper, Fifth Cavalry....	Troops E and H, Fourteenth Cavalry, and Companies A, B, C, D, I, K, L, and M, Second Infantry.
Fort Mackenzie, Wyo..	Capt. James S. Parker, Tenth Cavalry.	Troops G and H, Tenth Cavalry.
Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo.	Maj. Harry L. Bailey, Second Infantry.	Troop E, Tenth Cavalry, Thirteenth Battery, Field Artillery, headquarters, band, and Companies E, F, G, and H, Second Infantry.
Fort Washakie, Wyo...	Capt. Thos. G. Carson, Tenth Cavalry.	Troop F, Tenth Cavalry.
Whipple Barracks, Ariz.	Capt. Guy G. Palmer, Thirtieth Infantry.	Company E, Twelfth Infantry.
Fort Wingate, N. Mex.	Maj. Francis H. Hardie, Fourteenth Cavalry.	Troops F and G, Fourteenth Cavalry.

Indian Scouts.—Fort Apache, 10; Fort Grant, 11; Fort Huachuca, 2; Fort Wingate, 4. Total 27.

The movements of troops within the department, or entering or leaving it during the period covered by this report, are shown in the following tabulated statement:

Changes in stations of troops during fiscal year 1902-3.

Troop or company.	Regiment or corps.	Departure.		Arrival.	
		Date.	From—	Date.	At—
A	Fourteenth Cavalry.	July 21, 1902	Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo.	Aug. 12, 1902	Fort Duchesne, Utah.
E	Tenth Cavalry	Division of the Philippines.	Aug. 17, 1902	Fort D.A. Russell, Wyo.
F	do	do	Aug. 24, 1902	Fort Washakie, Wyo.
G	do	do	Aug. 18, 1902	Fort Mackenzie, Wyo.
H	do	do	do	Do.
C	Fourteenth Cavalry.	Aug. 19, 1902	Fort Mackenzie, Wyo.	Aug. 24, 1902	Fort Huachuca, Ariz.
E	First Cavalry...	July 31, 1902	Fort Washakie, Wyo.	Division of the Philippines.
E	Twelfth Infantry.	Mar. 3, 1903	Fort Apache, Ariz	Mar. 9, 1903	Whipple Barracks, Ariz.
Headquarters.	Eighteenth Infantry.	Mar. 21, 1903	Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo.	Division of the Philippines.
A	do	Mar. 19, 1903	Fort Logan, Colo.	Do.
B	do	do	do	Do.
C	do	do	do	Do.
D	do	do	do	Do.
E	do	Mar. 21, 1903	Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo.	Do.
F	do	do	do	Do.
G	do	do	do	Do.
H	do	do	do	Do.
I	do	Mar. 19, 1903	Fort Logan, Colo.	Do.
K	do	do	do	Do.
L	do	Mar. 18, 1903	Whipple Barracks, Ariz.	Do.
M	do	Mar. 19, 1903	Fort Logan, Colo.	Do.
Headquarters, band.	Second Infantry	Division of the Philippines.	June 16, 1903	Fort D.A. Russell, Wyo.
A	do	do	do	Fort Logan, Colo.
B	do	do	do	Do.
C	do	do	do	Do.
D	do	do	do	Do.
E	do	do	do	Fort D.A. Russell, Wyo.
F	do	do	do	Do.
G	do	do	do	Do.
H	do	do	do	Do.
I	do	do	June 17, 1903	Fort Logan, Colo.
K	do	do	do	Do.
L	do	do	do	Do.
M	do	do	do	Do.
B	Fourteenth Cavalry.	June 11, 1903	Fort Huachuca, Ariz.	June 11, 1903	Morenci, Ariz.
B	do	June 18, 1903	Morenci, Ariz....	June 18, 1903	Fort Huachuca, Ariz.
D	do	June 11, 1903	Fort Huachuca, Ariz.	June 11, 1903	Morenci, Ariz.
D	do	June 18, 1903	Morenci, Ariz....	June 18, 1903	Fort Huachuca, Ariz.
I	do	June 11, 1903	Fort Grant, Ariz.	June 11, 1903	Morenci, Ariz.
I	do	June 18, 1903	Morenci, Ariz....	June 18, 1903	Fort Grant, Ariz.
K	do	June 11, 1903	Fort Grant, Ariz.	June 11, 1903	Morenci, Ariz.
K	do	June 18, 1903	Morenci, Ariz....	June 18, 1903	Fort Grant, Ariz.
L	do	June 11, 1903	Fort Grant, Ariz.	June 11, 1903	Morenci, Ariz.
L	do	June 18, 1903	Morenci, Ariz....	June 18, 1903	Fort Grant, Ariz.
G	Third Cavalry..	June 17, 1903	Fort Apache, Ariz	June 20, 1903	Morenci, Ariz.

Changes in personnel (enlisted).

Gain:		
Enlistments	836	
Reenlistments	179	
From desertion	75	
Loss:		
Discharged (expiration term service)	539	
Discharged (disability)	98	
Discharged (by order)	668	
Retired	8	
Died	22	
Deserted	296	

The strength of the department, present and absent, June 30, 1902, was 167 commissioned officers and 3,019 enlisted men; the strength on June 30, 1903, 199 commissioned officers and 2,891 enlisted men.

STAFF DEPARTMENTS.

The staff officers of the department are capable and energetic, and the business of their respective offices has been conducted ably and promptly.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

Maj. A. C. Sharpe, U. S. Infantry, Assistant Adjutant-General, has had charge of this department. During the year 9,668 communications have been received and acted on; 14,533 letters, telegrams and indorsements have been sent, and 140 general and special orders and circulars have been printed and issued, involving the usual exacting office work, which has been dispatched efficiently and without delay. Attention is invited to the report of the adjutant-general, herewith, relating to schools. (A. R., 358).^a

INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

The office of the inspector-general has been under the charge of three different officers during the year—Maj. J. A. Irons, inspector-general, Maj. C. A. Varnum, Seventh Cavalry, and Capt. J. H. Wholley, Second Infantry—and much routine work has been performed. It is the opinion of that office that the present system of confining military convicts in post guardhouses is demoralizing in many respects. It necessitates placing recruits confined for military offenses with men of long guardhouse records, and with criminals. The present system has never been satisfactory, and for long-term men a return to the military prison at Fort Leavenworth or other similar institution is commended to careful consideration.

JUDGE-ADVOCATE'S DEPARTMENT.

The judge-advocate, Maj. George M. Dunn, after quoting from report of the inspector-general of the department with reference to the establishment of a military prison similar to the one formerly at Fort Leavenworth, remarks as follows:

The result most to be feared from overcrowding of prisoners is that the few vicious characters may debauch young men, and we must expect to find prison vices existing. The fact that regular employment can not be given prisoners, that useful trades can not be taught them, means that at the end of their terms of confinement we turn them out worse men than they were when we imprisoned them.

In this connection I beg to renew my recommendation of June 18 last, as follows:

The construction of larger guardhouses at posts in this Department is imperatively necessary, unless the old military prison at Fort Leavenworth becomes available very soon for the confinement of general prisoners. Several reports of post commanders and of inspection of the posts set forth this necessity. At Fort D. A. Russell the garrison will be doubled when the quarters now under construction and those provided for are completed. The present guardhouse there, although completed about one year ago, is inadequate even for the present small garrison; hence,

^aNot printed

and four or six dark cells, lavatory, etc., to accommodate 30 prisoners, in which general prisoners and garrison prisoners serving sentence shall be confined—the present guardhouse to be used for confining garrison prisoners. The necessity for this can I would recommend that an additional building be constructed, with two iron cages not but be apparent, and it is urged that additional prison room be constructed as soon as practicable.

A new guardhouse of increased capacity is also urgently needed at Fort Douglas, Utah, and is included in the scheme for the enlargement of that post. Indeed, all guardhouses in this Department are crowded and it is impossible to relieve the situation by transfers from one to another. Meanwhile efforts are being made by mitigation and remission of confinement, so far as compatible with the maintenance of discipline, to relieve the existing congestion.

QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

The operations of the quartermaster's department during the year, under charge of Lieut. Col. J. W. Pope, chief quartermaster, have been comprised within the limits of customary routine, with the exception of the difficulty experienced in promptly securing railroad transportation for the movement of troops to Morenci, Ariz., in June. Requisition for the necessary cars was made on the morning of June 10, and although responded to with great promptness by the railway officials at this point, box cars only could be secured, and this not by special but on the regular train. It required thirty-four hours to deliver the troops at their destination, a distance of only 223 miles, which is usually made in a run of seven hours at ordinary speed. The delay in part in this instance was caused by washout and heavy rains. Efforts were also made to secure transportation for the troops at Fort Wingate, but nothing could be furnished until the regular train of the following day. The floods were more extensive than ever before known in that section of country, and illustrate the importance of having troops stationed at railroad centers.

The receipts and disbursements of this department during the fiscal year were as follows:

On hand June 30, 1902.....	\$125,479.84
Received from different sources	1,020,138.19
Expended, transferred, etc.....	921,768.13
Balance on hand June 30, 1903	223,849.90

SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

The chief commissary, Maj. George B. Davis, reports a satisfactory condition in his department. Stores have been sufficient in quantity and excellent in quality. Storage facilities at the different posts are reported ample.

This department reports receipts and disbursements of funds amounting to \$72,657.47.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

The chief surgeon, Lieut. Col. Edward B. Moseley, reports that the mean strength constantly ineffective on account of disease, etc., during the year was 4.15 per cent, as against 4.99 per cent for the previous year; that the results obtained from drill and instruction of the hospital corps were satisfactory, and that medical and hospital supplies have been liberally provided and were of the best quality.

PAY DEPARTMENT.

The chief paymaster, Lieut. Col. William H. Comegys, advocates a return to the old system, where the paymaster visited the troops and made payments in person. The fact that the funds have to pass through several hands before reaching the individual, that rolls are complicated and liable to contain errors, that in case of loss of funds the paymaster, being a bonded officer, might be held responsible or at least kept in suspense until a claim could go through Congress, are the chief reasons, and which seem to be well taken, for desiring the change.

This department reports receipts and disbursements of funds by the several paymasters during the year as follows:

On hand June 30, 1902.....	\$62, 701. 39
Received from different sources during year.....	2, 182, 213. 99
Disbursed during year.....	2, 144, 913. 64
Balance on hand June 30, 1903	100, 001. 74

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT.

The engineer office has been administered by several officers. It reports a large amount of routine work, and in addition thereto a new map of the department has been completed, which will soon be forwarded to the Chief of Engineers of the Army for examination and lithographing.

SIGNAL CORPS.

The signal office also has been administered by different officers during the year. An inspection of the detachments and work at several posts was made by the chief signal officer, Capt. E. B. Ives, who has recommended the abandonment of the line between Forts Apache and Grant for military purposes, in which I concur. It might be utilized to advantage by the Interior Department.

During the year \$3,142.32 was collected in tolls at the various military telegraph offices in the department.

CLERICAL FORCE.

The clerks at these headquarters are efficient and reliable. The chief clerk, Mr. William S. Carr, receives but \$1,400 per annum, which is deemed inadequate, considering his long service of more than forty years, his exceptional ability, and the further fact that the appropriation act (General Orders, No. 24, current series, Headquarters of the Army) provides for fourteen \$1,600 and \$1,800 positions, one of which, presumably, was intended for the chief clerk at each department headquarters. It seems only reasonable to assume that the important, responsible, and exacting position of the chief clerk of a department should carry with it one of the higher salaries. I therefore recommend that Mr. Carr be advanced, and to at least a \$1,600 position.

OFFICERS' SCHOOLS.

Officers' schools were successfully conducted at all posts in the department, and the results attained, as shown by the reports of examining boards, were generally satisfactory. Recommendation was made

by the inspector-general of the department in his report of inspection of Fort Grant, Ariz., and in which recommendation I concurred and now wish to renew, that the course of study in the officers' schools be rearranged so that all subjects pursued in any school year be fully completed in that year.

SMALL-ARMS PRACTICE.

Small-arms practice has been systematically conducted at all posts with satisfactory results.

In reference to the award of medals to successful competitors at the various competitions, I would recommend the abolishment of this system and the substitution of an increase in the soldier's monthly pay. If the increase is a fair amount the interest in these competitions will be greater. The reward of a medal has not a lasting effect; it may mean a great deal to the soldier for probably the first six months after procuring the same; whereas the monthly increase in pay will not only be lasting but also a beneficial reward and be much more appreciated.

TRIALS BY COURTS-MARTIAL.

Two commissioned officers were tried by general court-martial during the year, one of whom was convicted and the other acquitted.

Two hundred and two enlisted men were tried by general court-martial, 190 of whom were convicted, 9 acquitted, and in 3 cases sentence or acquittal was disapproved.

Offenses charged were as follows:

For violation of the seventeenth article of war	2
For violation of the twentieth article of war	4
For violation of the twenty-first article of war	14
For violation of the thirty-second article of war	32
For violation of the thirty-third article of war	12
For violation of the thirty-eighth article of war	11
For violation of the thirty-ninth article of war	12
For violation of the fortieth article of war	5
For violation of the forty-seventh article of war	66
For violation of the sixtieth article of war	3
For violation of the sixty-second article of war	118

ENLISTMENTS.

I respectfully recommend a return to the five-year enlistment period, or at least that the second and subsequent enlistments be for that period.

REGIMENTAL BANDS.

Experience has demonstrated the importance of good military music to the contentment and efficiency of the soldier. Patriotic airs played by a good band furnish an inspiration which nothing else can impart, and contribute in a marked degree to the esprit de corps of a command, and yet with the present organization and rates of pay it is found exceedingly difficult to secure or retain competent instructors or musicians. I would recommend that the strength of regimental bands be increased to 30 or even 35 men, including the drum major and two cooks, and that the pay of the various grades be increased 50 per cent. This, with the usual percentage absent on furlough, sick, and temporary vacancies intervening between discharges and reenlistments,

would give an average present of about 25, which is the minimum possible for satisfactory service.

FIRES.

Fires have occurred at several posts in the department, destroying property as follows: Fort Logan, Colo., September 11, 1902, barracks of Troop E, Fourteenth Cavalry, damage, \$300; Fort Duchesne, Utah, night of September 18, 1902, destroyed sawmill, pumping plant (with machinery and tools), and damaging water tank, loss, \$2,905.10; Fort Wingate, N. Mex., October 24, 1902, destroyed buildings Nos. 52, 53, 54, noncommissioned staff and laundress quarters, loss, \$6,582; Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo., night of November 12, 1902, destroyed building No. 85, containing 45 tons hay, 42,000 pounds straw, and 75 telegraph poles; Fort Huachuca, Ariz., night of November 14, 1902, \$50 damage to woodwork in library in rear of barracks of Troop B, Fourteenth Cavalry; Fort Mackenzie, Wyo., destroyed temporary frame building used as administration building.

The circumstances in each case were carefully investigated by boards of officers and reports duly rendered, showing the origin of fires to be due to unavoidable accident, except at Fort D. A. Russell, which was believed to be of incendiary origin and due to a tramp. All reports showed that the usual precautions for protection against fire had been taken.

WATER SUPPLY.

The water supply at all the posts in the department is practically the same as last year, with the exception that the controversy heretofore reported between the city of Cheyenne and Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo., has apparently been satisfactorily adjusted.

INDIANS.

The Indians living within the limits of this department have not manifested a disposition to be troublesome during the year. With the exception of a few instances where individuals only were involved they have been very quiet. The following table shows the strength of the various tribes in the department:

Indian agencies and agents in this department and approximate number of each tribe.

Agency.	Agent.	Post-office.	Telegraph station.	Tribes.	Number.	Total.
Colorado River	Jesse C. Moore ..	Parker, Yuma County, Ariz.	Yuma, Ariz.....	Mojave.....	518	1,700
				Mojave, at Needles.	500	
				Mojave, at Fort Mojave.	582	
				Chemehuevi ...	100	
Truxton.....	J. S. Perkins, industrial teacher.	Truxton, Ariz...	Hackberry, Ariz.	Walapai	600	850
				Havasupai	250	
Navajo	George W. Hayzlett.	Fort Defiance, Ariz.	Gallup, N. Mex.	Navajo	18,000	18,000
Hopi	Charles E. Bunton.	Keams Canyon, Ariz.	Winslow, Ariz..	Hopi Pueblo....	1,936	3,862
				Navajo, Nomadic.	1,926	
Pima	Elwood Hadley.	Sacaton, Pinal County, Ariz.	Casa Grande, Ariz.	Pima	4,400	
				Maricopa	350	
				Papago	1,275	
				Papago, Nomadic.	2,125	8,150

Indian agencies and agents in this department, etc.—Continued.

Agency.	Agent.	Post-office.	Telegraph station.	Tribes.	Number.	Total.
San Carlos.....	George D. Corson.	San Carlos, Ariz.	San Carlos, Ariz.	Coyotero Apache. San Carlos Apache. Tonto Apache.. Mojave	647 1,288 863 562 42	3,402
White River...	C. W. Crouse	White River, Ariz.	Fort Apache, Ariz.	White Mountain Apache.	1,952	1,952
Southern Ute..	Joseph O. Smith	Ignacio, La Plata County, Colo.	Ignacio, La Plata County, Colo.	Moache	220	
				Capote.....	200	
				Wiminuche Ute	545	965
Mescalero Apache.	James A. Carroll, superintendent.	Mescalero, Otero County, N. Mex.	Tularosa, N. Mex.	Mescalero Apache.	452	452
Jicarilla	N. S. Walpole ...	Dulce, N. Mex...	Dulce, N. Mex..	Jicarilla Apache	831	831
Pueblo	C. J. Crandall ...	Santa Fe, N. Mex.	Santa Fe, N. Mex.	Pueblo (11).....	3,300	3,300
Do.....	Ralph P. Collins	Albuquerque, N. Mex.	Albuquerque, N. Mex.	Pueblo (7).....	5,115	5,115
Uinta and Ouray.	Howell P. Myton	White Rocks, Uinta County, Utah.	Fort Duchesne, Utah.	Uinta Ute	457	
				White River Ute	354	
				Uncompahgre Ute.	820	1,631
Shoshone.....	H. G. Nickerson.	Shoshone Agency, Fremont County, Wyo.	Fort Washakie, Wyo.	Shoshone (or Snake).	804	
				Northern Arapaho.	822	1,626
Total						51,836

NOTE.—The area of this department is 522,385 square miles; of this there are 36,642 square miles of Indian reservations. Population, including Indians, 1,227,221.

STRIKE AT MORENCI, ARIZ.

On June 10, 1903, telegraphic information was received from the War Department to the effect that 3,000 miners, mostly foreigners, were on strike at Morenci, Ariz., and that the Secretary of War directed troops be sent from Forts Grant and Huachuca to that point to protect life and property. Accordingly Colonel Lebo, with Troops I, K, and L, Fourteenth Cavalry, from Grant, and Major O'Connor with Troops B and D of that regiment, from Huachuca, were at once ordered to Morenci, all dismounted, and to be under command of Col. T. C. Lebo. The troops at Fort Wingate were also ordered to be in readiness to take the field if necessary, and authority was received from the War Department to divert the Third Squadron, First Cavalry, if needed, en route from San Francisco to the Department of Texas. Colonel Lebo's command arrived at Morenci at 9 o'clock in the evening of June 11, and found that quiet prevailed; that the Territorial troops had the situation well in hand; that a number of the worst agitators were in confinement, and others of the bad element were leaving. Under instructions from these headquarters Colonel Lebo made investigation into the cause of the trouble and found that Italians and Mexicans were the principal agitators and leaders, demanding ten hours' pay for eight hours' work, and that the mining companies offered them nine hours' pay for eight hours' work.

On June 13 Colonel Lebo reported that some of the miners were returning to work, that the property was well guarded and every precaution taken against violence, but that it was the opinion of the mine owners that they should have protection for possibly six months. On

June 15 the situation seemed to warrant a reduction of the force, and orders were sent to the commanding officer at Morenci to return his troops to their proper stations upon arrival of transportation. They accordingly rejoined their stations at Forts Grant and Huachuca, June 18. In the meantime instructions had been given to the commanding officer of Fort Apache to send one troop on practice march to Morenci, and Troop G, Third Cavalry, started for that point June 17, arriving June 20, 1903. This troop is now in camp at Morenci, the commanding officer reporting the strike situation quiet, and that he expects it will remain so.

ABANDONMENT OF FORT GRANT.

The water supply at Fort Grant, Ariz., has always been inadequate, and during the last summer and fall it almost totally failed. As a result the ice plant was closed, the sewerage system for several months could not be used, and water for cooking and laundry purposes had to be hauled from neighboring ranches. A portion of the garrison was sent to establish a camp in the Apache Mountains, while the animals which remained had to be sent a distance of 5 miles, where water was purchased for them. Experience in past years has demonstrated that it is impracticable to construct dams or reservoirs for storage of water at this post, as the enormous pressure resulting from heavy storms and cloud-bursts will cover with débris or sweep away any obstruction of this character. During winter there is also considerable difficulty from freezing and bursting of pipes, to remedy which it would be necessary to bury the pipes, involving great expense, as the distance to be traversed is considerable, and extends through rock which would have to be blasted.

In addition to these obstacles Fort Grant is 27 miles from the nearest railway, necessitating a long haul for supplies.

In view of these facts the department commander, on August 23 last, recommended the abandonment of this post, or that it be reduced at least to one troop of cavalry. The latter recommendation was approved by the Secretary of War by letter of February 5, 1903, who also directed that estimates be submitted for such enlargement of Fort Huachuca as might be necessary to accommodate a full squadron of cavalry. Owing to the number of troops in this department, and others due to arrive soon from the Philippines for whom only temporary shelter is available, it has not been found practicable to carry out these instructions, and it will be necessary to continue to occupy this post until proper accommodations can be provided elsewhere. I would recommend that, as soon as practicable, provision be made for carrying out the orders of the Secretary of War for the abandonment of Fort Grant, utilizing it only as a subpost for one troop of cavalry. Suitable accommodations can be provided at Forts Huachuca, Logan, Douglas, and D. A. Russell, and possibly Whipple Barracks. Since my recent inspection of Whipple Barracks and the several mines in the vicinity thereof, my opinion as to the importance of this station has greatly changed. It is an important center for great mining enterprises in that section of Arizona.

POST EXCHANGES.

Exchanges have been maintained at all posts in the department except Forts Mackenzie and Washakie, where, owing to the small

number of troops it was not found practicable. At Fort Logan, also, the exchange was closed on March 7, 1903, the garrison having been reduced to but two troops of cavalry, by the departure of the Eighteenth Infantry. Following is a statement of the receipts and expenditures at the various exchanges for the fiscal year:

Statement of receipts and expenditures of post exchanges.

Post.	Receipts.	Expenditures.
Fort Apache	\$36,138.00	\$33,665.79
D. A. Russell.....	17,080.88	15,166.50
Douglas.....	21,510.19	20,416.18
Duchesne.....	13,272.25	12,195.55
Grant.....	22,985.92	21,175.47
Huachuca	13,844.24	12,700.54
Logan, exchange closed March 7.....		
Mackenzie, no exchange.....		
Washakie, no exchange.....		
Whipple Barracks	1,570.72	1,370.55
Fort Wingate	7,243.79	6,958.11

CANTEEN.

From a somewhat extensive observation as inspector-general and as commander of troops, I have been deeply impressed by the very marked difference in discipline and general contentment among the enlisted men since the abolition of the canteen feature of the post exchange. If men are unable to get a glass of beer in a decent and orderly manner in the garrison, they will resort to the vile brothels which cluster around the borders of the reservation, where they drink all manner of alcoholic beverages and often sink into debauchery and ruin.

A return to the post-canteen system was recommended in last year's annual report by the commanding general of this department in the following terms:

Since this action (the abolition of the canteen) was taken, saloons of the lowest type have been established just outside the boundaries of the various reservations. Their proprietors are in almost every case unprincipled scoundrels, who leave nothing undone to debauch the soldiers and obtain their money. Being in all cases outside the limits of any city, the proprietors of these resorts are subject to no municipal police regulations, and sell liquor regardless of hours and whether the buyer is already intoxicated or not. Gambling is universal in these "dives," and they are frequented by dissolute women. The soldier, whose desire for a drink would ordinarily be satisfied by a few glasses of beer in the canteen of the post exchange, goes to one of these resorts, and does well if he escapes before he has spent or gambled away all his money, overstayed his leave, or engaged in an altercation. As a rule, the local authorities regard the existence of these places with indifference or approval, as it causes the soldier to spend his money in the community. The efficiency of the Army or the ruin of a good soldier is nothing to them. There can be no reasonable doubt that most of the trials by general courts-martial and summary courts, at least so far as this department is concerned, are directly traceable to this cause. Since I have had command here there has taken place the ruin and degradation of several noncommissioned officers of long service and fine record. In short, the recent legislation by Congress on this question, so far as this department is concerned, has had no effect except to lower the discipline of the Army, ruin scores of good soldiers, and fill the pockets of a lot of saloon keepers, gamblers, and prostitutes.

The experience of the past year has demonstrated the wisdom of these remarks, and I earnestly recommend that the sale of beer and light wine, under proper restrictions, be again authorized in the post exchange.

COMMUTATION OF QUARTERS.

I would respectfully recommend that, in view of the fact that rents have so generally advanced all over the United States, officers be allowed an increase of commutation of quarters of one room for each grade, as the present allowance is not sufficient to secure quarters becoming the station of officers on duty at department headquarters, recruiting service, etc. As an illustration, the commanding general of this department is unable to obtain a suitable house at less than \$100 per month, while his commutation is but \$60.

REWARDS FOR MERITORIOUS OFFICERS.

I would also recommend the adoption of a system for substantially rewarding meritorious officers who distinguish themselves either in the field or in other professional lines.. This may be attained by creating one or more additional positions in each grade, to which officers of exceptional merit might be advanced without prejudice to their seniors. Thus, provision might be made for 2 extra colonels, 7 lieutenant-colonels, 9 majors, 12 captains, and 5 first lieutenants in addition to the present authorized strength. These places should be available for the proper reward of meritorious officers who may be recommended by their immediate superiors, and whose names should be presented to the Secretary of War or to the President on the recommendation of a board of officers appointed to investigate the circumstances of the particularly conspicuous, gallant, or other meritorious conduct; reports to be transmitted to the Secretary of War, for the information of the President.

Owing to the scarcity of officers by reason of numerous details on special duty, absence on leave, and sick, the services of these additional officers would be readily absorbed, as they are greatly needed to take the places of those who are on detached service as instructors at the United States Military Academy, the Artillery School, the General Service and Staff College, the Fort Riley School, and other institutions, as well as at universities and colleges, as now provided by law; also in place of the large number who are withdrawn from duty with their proper commands for recruiting service or by detail on other detached duty. There are at this date in this department alone 44 officers absent on detached service and 13 absent with leave, besides 8 withdrawn from duty by reason of sickness—a total of 29 per cent.

The natural flow of promotion contemplated by law would be unimpeded by the distinguished list above suggested. There would be no discouragement to officers of long and meritorious service by being overslaughed by juniors, and at the same time it would afford an opportunity of rewarding in appropriate manner deserving officers of lower rank.

A distinguished general officer of our Army in writing of this subject has observed:

Anyone unacquainted with army life and conditions can not realize the good or the harm that results at times, directly or indirectly, from a single appointment—how it encourages and bouys up every officer whose heart is in his work, if good and deserved, and how it depresses and discourages him if bad or undeserved. Here it is proper to advert to the fact which can not be sufficiently emphasized, that in no profession or class of men does sentiment play so important a rôle as in the Army.

Deprive a soldier of his interest in his life's work by unjustly humiliating him, take from a corps its esprit, and his or its usefulness is seriously impaired. What can be expected from a colonel of a regiment who time and time again has been over-slaughed by juniors, and has thus been discredited in the eyes of his officers and men? The command of a regiment involves so much for good or evil that the manner in which it is exercised should point the way either to advancement or retirement.

I have prepared and transmit herewith the draft of a bill which I believe would meet these suggestions, and recommend that the attention of the Secretary of War be specially called to it.

Very respectfully,

FRANK D. BALDWIN,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

[Inclosure.]

A BILL making provision for appropriate recognition and reward for specially meritorious and distinguished services of officers of the United States Army in the line of their profession.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, in order to provide appropriate recognition and reward for officers of the United States Army who may distinguish themselves in action or otherwise in the line of their profession, there is hereby added to the strength of the Army as now authorized by law the following grades in the Army to be known as the "distinguished-service list," namely: Two colonels, seven lieutenant-colonels, nine majors, twelve captains, and five first lieutenants. The President is authorized, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and upon the recommendation of a board of officers, as hereinafter provided, to appoint any officer of the Army to the next higher grade on the "distinguished-service list" to that held by him in the regular establishment. Officers appointed to the "distinguished-service list" shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of corresponding grades of the regular establishment, and shall hold such office until they vacate the same by being promoted in their own branch of the service to the corresponding grade in the Army, or by further advancement on the "distinguished-service list," as hereinafter provided. Officers holding such appointments on the "distinguished-service list" shall be eligible for detail on staff duty, as now provided by law for officers of the line, and for detail, not exceeding two years, with any other arm of the service than that to which they permanently belong.

SEC. 2. It shall be the duty of every department, regimental, squadron, battalion, troop, battery, company, or detachment commander of the Army, who is a witness to or has knowledge of any particularly conspicuous, gallant, or meritorious conduct on the part of any officer of his command to report the same through military channels with names of witnesses to the commanding general in the field or the department commander. Upon receipt of such information it shall be the duty of the said commanding general or department commander to convene a board of three officers, consisting of the commanding general in the field or the department commander, the adjutant-general and the inspector-general of his command; also a recorder. The members and recorder of said board shall be sworn to impartially perform their duty and shall have the same power to send for and examine witnesses and papers as a general court-martial. The board shall investigate the circumstances of the particularly conspicuous, gallant, or other meritorious conduct and submit a report in writing with their recommendations direct to the Secretary of War for the information of the President.

SEC. 3. No appointment shall be made to the "distinguished-service list" hereinafter created, except on the recommendation of a board of officers convened as provided in section two of this act: *Provided*, That in case of two or more recommendations by the same or separate boards the same officer may be advanced on the "distinguished-service list" one grade for each recommendation so made not exceeding two grades in all.

SEC. 4. The provisions of this act shall be construed to apply to officers who have been commended in official reports for particularly conspicuous, gallant, or meritorious conduct during the Spanish-American war, the military operations of the Army in the Philippine Islands, the relief expedition in China, or the military occupation of Cuba or of Porto Rico. In such cases the board of officers provided for in section

two of this act shall be convened by the commanding general under whose orders the officer is serving, to which board authenticated copies of all papers and records on file in the War Department pertaining to the case shall be sent by the Secretary of War.

SEC. 5. That all acts and parts of acts contrary to the provisions of this act or inconsistent therewith be, and the same are hereby, repealed.

REMARKS ON PROPOSED BILL FOR REWARDING MERITORIOUS OFFICERS.

The purpose of this bill is stated in the title. Numerous instances have arisen in the past five years in the Spanish-American war, during the military occupation of Cuba and the insurrection in the Philippines, and the military operations in the island of Mindanao, in which officers of inferior rank have repeatedly distinguished themselves and been often recommended for proper recognition and reward; but under the existing law there is no means provided for their reward except by brevet, which carries with it no substantial remuneration or authority, or by overslaughing seniors and advancing the officer to the grade of brigadier-general. In the cases of two surgeons, Majors Reed and Gorgas, of the Medical Department, it was necessary to pass a special act of Congress for their reward, Major Reed having died pending the legislation and Major Gorgas having been advanced to the grade of colonel, that grade having been added for the purpose to the authorized strength of the Medical Department. Numerous other cases have occurred of conspicuous gallantry in the field for which there exists no provision, except as stated, by an empty brevet or overslaughing large numbers of veterans both of the Spanish and former wars. A great majority of the officers who have so distinguished themselves are of inferior rank, usually lieutenants and captains. The provision contemplated by this bill to advance them two grades would in general be found a sufficient and most acceptable reward.

Provision is made in this bill for investigation by a board of officers in order to guard against extraneous unmilitary influences which might be invoked in behalf of those less deserving. The commanding general, adjutant-general, and inspector-general are named as being probably a most disinterested board, best acquainted with the personnel of the command and being least subject to personal bias. Provision is also made that the board be sworn to still further insure its impartiality.

Section 4 is added simply to extend the provisions of this act to conspicuously gallant or meritorious conduct for which officers have already been recommended in the service heretofore referred to.

The total number added by this bill to the strength of the Army would be 35 commissioned officers at an estimated increased salary of \$20,000, being the difference between their pay in their actual rank and that which they would temporarily hold on the "distinguished-service list." The services of these officers would be readily absorbed and indeed are at all times urgently needed to fill the places of others of similar rank who are absent on detached service either as recruiting officers, superintendents and instructors at the United States Military Academy and various other governmental institutions, on college detail, sick, absent with leave, etc. By reference to the report of Brig. Gen. Frank D. Baldwin, commanding the Department of the Colorado, for August 15, 1903, it will be seen that these detached duties withdraw from their proper stations a very large number of officers, amounting in that department to 29 per cent. General Baldwin recommends the adoption of the system herein proposed in his annual report in the following words:

"I would also recommend the adoption of a system for substantially rewarding meritorious officers who distinguish themselves either in the field or in other professional lines. This may be attained by creating one or more additional positions in each grade to which officers of exceptional merit might be advanced without prejudice to their seniors. Thus, provision might be made for 2 extra colonels, 7 lieutenant-colonels, 9 majors, 12 captains, and 5 first lieutenants, in addition to the present authorized strength. These places should be available for the proper reward of meritorious officers who may be recommended by their immediate superiors and whose names should be presented to the Secretary of War or to the President on the recommendation of a board of officers appointed to investigate the circumstances of the particular conspicuous, gallant, or other meritorious conduct; reports to be transmitted to the Secretary of War for the information of the President.

"Owing to the scarcity of officers by reason of numerous details on special duty, absence on leave, and sick, the services of these additional officers would be readily absorbed, as they are greatly needed to take the place of those who are on detached service as instructors at the United States Military Academy, the Artillery School, the General Service and Staff College, the Fort Riley School, and other institutions, as

well as at universities and colleges as now provided by law; also in place of the large number who are withdrawn from duty with their proper commands for recruiting service or by detail on other detached duty. There are at this date in this department alone 44 officers absent on detached service, and 13 absent with leave, besides 8 withdrawn from duty by reason of sickness—a total of 29 per cent.

"The natural flow of promotion contemplated by law would be unimpeded by the distinguished list above suggested. There would be no discouragement to officers of long and meritorious service by being overslaughed by juniors, and at the same time it would afford an opportunity of rewarding in appropriate manner deserving officers of lower rank.

"A distinguished general officer of our Army, in writing of this subject, has observed:

"'Anyone unacquainted with army life and conditions can not realize the good or the harm that results at times, directly or indirectly, from a single appointment—how it encourages and buoys up every officer whose heart is in his work, if good and deserved, and how it depresses and discourages him, if bad or undeserved. Here it is proper to advert to the fact, which can not be sufficiently emphasized, that in no profession or class of men does sentiment play so important a rôle as in the Army. Deprive a soldier of his interest in his life's work by unjustly humiliating him, take from a corps its esprit, and his or its usefulness is seriously impaired. What can be expected from a colonel of a regiment who time and time again has been overslaughed by juniors, and has thus been discredited in the eyes of his officers and men? The command of a regiment involves so much for good or evil that the manner in which it is exercised should point the way either to advancement or retirement.'

"I have prepared and transmit herewith a draft of a bill which I believe would meet these suggestions, and recommend that the attention of the Secretary of War be specially called to it."

C.—REPORT OF BRIG. GEN. FREDERICK FUNSTON, U. S. ARMY, COMMANDING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE COLUMBIA.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE COLUMBIA,
Vancouver Barracks, Wash., September 20, 1903.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the affairs and administration of the Department of the Columbia for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1903:

The movements of troops within the department, or entering it or leaving it during the period covered by this report, are shown by the following tabulated statement:

Changes and movements of troops from July 1, 1902, to June 30, 1903.

CHANGES OF STATION.

Station.	Troops.	Remarks.
Boise Barracks, Idaho..	Field and staff, Second Squadron, and Troop E, Third Cavalry; 5 officers and 72 enlisted men. Company I, Seventeenth Infantry; 1 officer and 45 enlisted men.	Arrived at post Nov. 10, 1902, from Presidio of San Francisco, Cal. (Department of California). Left post June 23, 1903, en route to the Philippine Islands, via San Francisco, Cal.
Fort Canby, Wash.....	Detachment of Thirty-third Company, Coast Artillery; 58 enlisted men. Thirty-third Company, Coast Artillery; 3 officers and 100 enlisted men.	Left post Oct. 18, 1902, for temporary duty at Fort Stevens, Oreg. Returned to Fort Canby, Nov. 25, 1902. Left post June 30, 1903, for Fort Columbia, Wash.

Changes and movements of troops from July 1, 1902, to June 30, 1903—Continued.

CHANGES OF STATION—Continued.

Station.	Troops.	Remarks.
Fort Casey, Wash	Sixty-third and Seventy-first companies, Coast Artillery; 4 officers and 187 enlisted men. Detachment of Twenty-sixth and Ninety-fourth companies, Coast Artillery; 33 enlisted men.	Arrived at post July 19, 1902, from Alcatraz Island, Cal. (Department of California). Left post July 22, 1902, to rejoin companies at Fort Flagler, Wash.
Fort Columbia, Wash ..	Thirty-third Company, Coast Artillery; 3 officers and 100 enlisted men.	Arrived at post June 30, 1903, from Fort Canby, Wash.
Fort Flagler, Wash.....	Detachment of Twenty-sixth and Ninety-fourth companies, Coast Artillery; 33 enlisted men. One hundred and sixth Company, Coast Artillery; 2 officers and 96 enlisted men.	Rejoined post July 22, 1902, from Fort Casey, Wash. Arrived at post Sept. 26, 1902, from Camp Skagway, Alaska.
Fort Lawton, Wash	Company L, Seventeenth Infantry; 2 officers and 36 enlisted men. Company B, Seventeenth Infantry; 1 officer and 59 enlisted men. Headquarters, band, and Companies E, F, G, and H, Eighth Infantry; 9 officers and 209 enlisted men. Headquarters, band, and Companies E, F, G, and H, Eighth Infantry; 9 officers and 217 enlisted men. Companies K and M, Nineteenth Infantry; 4 officers and 122 enlisted men. Company L, Seventeenth Infantry; 1 officer and 46 enlisted men.	Arrived at post Aug. 1, 1902, from the Philippine Islands, via San Francisco, Cal. Left post Sept. 1, 1902, for Vancouver Barracks, Wash. Arrived at post Sept. 18, 1902, from the Philippine Islands, via San Francisco, Cal. Left post Oct. 6, 1902, for Fort Columbus, N. Y. (Department of the East). Arrived at post June 21, 1903, from Presidio of San Francisco, Cal. (Department of California). Left post June 23, 1903, en route to the Philippine Islands, via San Francisco, Cal.
Fort Stevens, Oreg	Detachment of Thirty-third Company Coast Artillery; 58 enlisted men.	Arrived at post Oct. 18, 1902, from Fort Canby, Wash., for temporary duty. Left post Nov. 25, 1902, for Fort Canby, Wash.
Vancouver Barracks, Wash.	Companies A, C, and D, Seventeenth Infantry; 8 officers and 142 enlisted men. Company B, Seventeenth Infantry; 1 officer and 59 enlisted men. Headquarters, staff, band, and Companies A, B, C, and D, Nineteenth Infantry; 13 officers and 283 enlisted men. Headquarters, staff, band, and Companies A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H, Seventeenth Infantry; 24 officers and 451 enlisted men.	Arrived at post Aug. 1, 1902, from the Philippine Islands, via San Francisco, Cal. Arrived at post Sept. 2, 1902, from Fort Lawton, Wash. Arrived at post June 23, 1903, from Presidio of San Francisco, Cal. (Department of California). Left post June 24, 1903, en route to the Philippine Islands, via San Francisco, Cal.
Fort Walla Walla, Wash.	Tenth Battery, Field Artillery; 3 officers and 111 enlisted men. Headquarters, band, and Troops F, G, and H, Ninth Cavalry; 12 officers and 294 enlisted men. Troop E, Ninth Cavalry; 1 officer and 83 enlisted men.	Left post Oct. 18, 1902, for Fort Snelling, Minn. (Department of Dakota). Arrived at post Oct. 25, 1902, from the Philippine Islands, via San Francisco, Cal. Arrived at post Nov. 10, 1902, from the Philippine Islands, via San Francisco, Cal.
Fort Worden, Wash....	Sixty-second Company, Coast Artillery; 2 officers and 103 enlisted men.	Arrived at post Aug. 26, 1902, from Fort Mason, Cal. (Department of California).
Fort Wright, Wash.....	Companies K and L, Eighth Infantry; 4 officers and 132 enlisted men. Companies K and L, Eighth Infantry; 3 officers and 133 enlisted men. Staff Third Battalion, and Companies I and L, Nineteenth Infantry; 6 officers and 122 enlisted men. Companies K and M, Seventeenth Infantry; 6 officers and 104 enlisted men.	Arrived at post Sept. 18, 1902, from the Philippine Islands, via San Francisco, Cal. Left post Oct. 6, 1902, for Forts Niagara and Wood, N. Y. (Department of the East), respectively. Arrived at post June 21, 1903, from Presidio of San Francisco, Cal. (Department of California). Left post June 22, 1903, en route to the Philippine Islands, via San Francisco, Cal.
Fort Davis, Alaska.....	Company B, Eighth Infantry; 1 officer and 87 enlisted men. Company A, Seventh Infantry; 2 officers and 91 enlisted men.	Arrived at post July 20, 1902, from Fort Yates, N. Dak. (Department of Dakota). Left post July 27, 1902, for Presidio of San Francisco, Cal. (Department of California).
Fort Gibbon, Alaska ...	Company D, Eighth Infantry; 3 officers and 96 enlisted men. Company K, Seventh Infantry; 2 officers and 91 enlisted men.	Arrived at post Aug. 4, 1902, from Fort Harrison, Mont. (Department of Dakota). Left post Aug. 7, 1902, for Presidio of San Francisco, Cal. (Department of California).

Changes and movements of troops from July 1, 1902, to June 30, 1903—Continued.

CHANGES OF STATION—Continued.

Station.	Troops.	Remarks.
Fort Lisicum, Alaska...	Company I, Thirteenth Infantry; 2 officers and 65 enlisted men.	Arrived at post May 15, 1903, from Fort McDowell, Angel Island, California (Department of California).
Fort St. Michael, Alaska.	Thirty-second Company, Coast Artillery; 1 officer and 75 enlisted men. Staff First Battalion, and Company A, Eighth Infantry; 5 officers and 95 enlisted men. Company I, Seventh Infantry; 2 officers and 87 enlisted men.	Left post May 21, 1903, for Fort Baker, Cal. (Department of California). Arrived at post July 24, 1902, from Fort Harrison, Mont. (Department of Dakota). Left post with Companies B and E, Seventh Infantry, 4 officers and 178 enlisted men (from Forts Gibbon and Egbert, Alaska, respectively), July 24, 1902, for Presidio of San Francisco, Cal. (Department of California).
Camp Skagway, Alaska.	Companies I and M, Eighth Infantry; 4 officers and 111 enlisted men. One hundred and sixth Company, Coast Artillery; 2 officers and 96 enlisted men.	Arrived at camp Sept. 22, 1902, from the Philippine Islands, via San Francisco, Cal. Left camp Sept. 22, 1902, for Fort Flagler, Wash.

Movements of troops in the period between the close of the fiscal year and the date of preparation of this report were as follows:

Changes and movements of troops since June 30, 1903.

CHANGES OF STATION.

Station.	Troops.	Remarks.
Fort Flagler, Wash.....	Sixth Band, Artillery Corps; 16 enlisted men.	Arrived at post July 19, 1903, from the Philippine Islands, via San Francisco, Cal.
Vancouver Barracks, Wash.	Staff Second Battalion and Companies E, F, G, and H, Nineteenth Infantry; 8 officers and 158 enlisted men.	Arrived at post July 15, 1903, from Presidio of San Francisco, Cal. (Department of California.)

The following table shows practice marches carried out during the fiscal year 1902-3:

Field service.

Station.	Troops.	Remarks.
Boise Barracks, Idaho..	Company I, Seventeenth Infantry.	Left post Sept. 11, 1902, on practice march to Payette River; returned to post Sept. 24, 1902; distance marched, 135 miles.
Vancouver Barracks, Wash.	Eighth Battery, Field Artillery.	Left post July 14, 1902, for National Guard encampment near Tacoma, Wash., and on practice march to Olympia, Wash.; returned to post Aug. 28, 1902; distance marched, 456 miles.
	Twenty-sixth Battery, Field Artillery.	Left post July 17, 1902, on practice march and to National Guard encampment near Albany, Oreg.; returned to post July 26, 1902; distance marched, 213 miles.
	Companies F, G, and H, Seventeenth Infantry.	Left post Aug. 14, 1902, on practice march to Amboy, Wash.; returned to post Aug. 23, 1902; distance marched, 84 miles.
	Eighth Battery, Field Artillery.	Left post Sept. 22, 1902, for target practice near Sandy, Oreg.; returned to post Sept. 30, 1902; distance marched, 72 miles.
	Companies A, C, D, and E, Seventeenth Infantry.	Left post Oct. 4, 1902, on practice march to Lewisville, Wash.; returned to post Oct. 13, 1902; distance marched, 49 miles.
Fort Walla Walla, Wash.	Thirtieth Battery, Field Artillery.	Left post July 14, 1902, en route to Touchet, Wash., for field instruction and target practice; returned to post July 20, 1902; distance marched, 32 miles.

Field service—Continued.

Station.	Troops.	Remarks.
Fort Walla Walla, Wash.	Tenth Battery, Field Artillery	Left post July 21, 1902, en route to Touchet, Wash., for field instruction and target practice; returned to post July 27, 1902; distance marched, 32 miles.
do	Left post Aug. 11, 1902, en route to Touchet, Wash., for field instruction and target practice; returned to post Aug. 18, 1902; distance marched, 32 miles.
	Thirtieth Battery, Field Artillery.	Left post Aug. 19, 1902, en route to Touchet, Wash., for field instruction and target practice; returned to post Aug. 24, 1902; distance marched, 32 miles.
do	Left post Sept. 13, 1902, en route to Touchet, Wash., for field instruction and target practice; returned to post Sept. 19, 1902; distance marched, 32 miles.
	Tenth Battery, Field Artillery	Left post Sept. 20, 1902, en route to Touchet, Wash., for field instruction and target practice; returned to post Sept. 25, 1902; distance marched, 32 miles.
	Right platoon, Thirtieth Battery, Field Artillery.	Left post May 14, 1903, on practice march to Athena, Oreg.; returned to post May 19, 1903; distance marched, 98 miles.
Fort Wright, Wash.....	Company M, Seventeenth Infantry.	Left post Nov. 8, 1902, on practice march to Coeur d'Alene Lake, Idaho; returned to post Nov. 10, 1902; distance marched, 76 miles.
	Company K, Seventeenth Infantry.	Left post Nov. 16, 1902, on practice march to Sprague, Wash.; returned to post Nov. 24, 1902; distance marched, 80 miles.

Changes in personnel July 1, 1902, to June 30, 1903.

COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.

Gain:		
By transfer, etc		239
Loss:		
By transfer, etc		189

ENLISTED MEN.

Gain:		
By enlistment		1,005
By reenlistment		163
By transfer		2,895
From desertion		77
Total		4,140
Loss:		
Discharged—		
By expiration of service		536
For disability		118
For other causes		439
Transferred		2,192
Retired		6
By death		21
By desertion		548
Total		3,860

The strength of the department, present and absent, June 30, 1902, was 122 commissioned officers and 2,767 enlisted men. The strength of the department, present and absent, June 30, 1903, was 172 commissioned officers and 3,047 enlisted men.

DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS.

The double set of officers' quarters at department headquarters, authorized last year, has been completed and is now occupied. The additions to the department headquarters building, recommended by my predecessor, have been authorized, and construction will soon be commenced.

VANCOUVER BARRACKS.

This post is garrisoned by the headquarters and two battalions of the Nineteenth Infantry, and the Eighth and Twenty-sixth Field Batteries.

Progress in the new construction work, authorized last year, has been satisfactory. The new artillery barracks, one double set of infantry barracks, and quarters for bachelor officers are approaching completion and will be ready for occupancy during the coming winter. Contracts have been awarded for the hospital, guardhouse, shops, and one double set of infantry barracks, recently authorized, while the bids on the gun sheds have been forwarded to the Quartermaster-General. An allotment was made by the War Department for the construction of a post exchange and gymnasium, but no bids were received within the limits of the appropriation.

A matter seriously affecting the usefulness of this post is the fact that firing on the target range is limited to 600 yards, owing to the danger to persons traveling along a public highway near the reservation. The two battalions of the Nineteenth Infantry stationed here completed their firing at the longer ranges during the present season at American Lake, near Tacoma, Wash., where an excellent range was rented. The field batteries at Vancouver Barracks have had their target practice this season at Sandy, Oreg.

FORT LAWTON, WASH.

Fort Lawton is now garrisoned by two companies of the Nineteenth Infantry. The new double set of barracks will be completed very shortly, when, if deemed advisable, the garrison can be increased to a battalion. I recommend that no additional construction work be undertaken at that post. The reservation of 541 acres is covered with a dense forest, with the exception of the few acres that have been cleared to make room for buildings and parade ground. To clear the entire reservation, removing stumps and roots, and seeding the ground to grass would cost \$100,000. Unless cleared, the land is worthless and might as well be an equal area of water. The only target range is one of 300 yards along the beach. To construct a thousand-yard range on the reservation would require an expenditure for clearing off timber and grading that would be out of all proportion to results. The garrison had its target practice during the past season at American Lake, near Tacoma, Wash. There is no railroad on the post, and all supplies are hauled by wagon from Seattle, a distance of 3 miles. A wharf could be constructed on the sea front of the reservation, making it possible to utilize water transportation, but would necessitate a roadway with very steep grade.

FORT WRIGHT.

This post is 3 miles from Spokane, Wash., and is garrisoned by two companies of the Nineteenth Infantry. A new double set of infantry barracks will be completed shortly, making it practicable to increase the garrison to a full battalion. From a strategical standpoint Fort Wright is the best located post in this department. The city of Spokane, distant 3 miles, has railroads running north, east, south, and west. An important feature is that it has two of the great trans-continental lines—the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific. The Great Northern Railroad has a track with switch on the reservation. The terrain of the reservation is diversified and the ground covered with a scattering growth of pine, which furnishes shade and adds greatly to the appearance of the reservation. The timber growth is not sufficiently dense to interfere with drills and exercises in extended order. The climate of that region is exceptionally fine throughout the year. The Spokane River runs through the post, furnishing excellent drainage. There is an absolutely safe target range of 1,000 yards.

In view of the conditions above set forth it is recommended that additional buildings be constructed so that the post can accommodate a full regiment of infantry, or, at least, a headquarters and two battalions.

FORT WALLA WALLA, WASH.

Fort Walla Walla is garrisoned by the headquarters and one squadron of the Ninth Cavalry and the Thirtieth Battery Field Artillery. In my opinion this post has outlived its usefulness and should be abandoned. It is situated on a railroad, and consequently not difficult to supply, but has no especial strategic value. The reservation, which contains 613 acres, adjoins the town of Walla Walla, Wash. The buildings at the post are old and almost without exception in bad repair. Unless the post is to be abandoned it should be at once entirely reconstructed. Even if it is to be occupied for another year only, considerable expenditure would be required to render some of the quarters and barracks habitable for that length of time. This post was established in 1857 for the purpose of exercising control over the Indians living in its vicinity, a necessity which no longer exists.

BOISE BARRACKS, IDAHO.

Boise Barracks is garrisoned by Troop E, Third Cavalry. The quarters and barracks at this post are old and not in good repair, but with some minor improvements can be utilized for several years to come. The location of this post is so satisfactory and the sanitary and climatic conditions so perfect that it is recommended that it be largely reconstructed and increased to accommodate a headquarters and one squadron of cavalry. The target range is the best in this department. The location has no especial strategic advantages, but the post being on a branch of the Oregon Short Line troops could be readily moved anywhere along that road in southern Idaho, northwest into Oregon and Washington, or southeast into Utah.

FORT STEVENS, OREG., AND FORTS COLUMBIA AND CANBY, WASH.

These posts constitute the artillery district of the Columbia, with headquarters at Fort Stevens, Oreg. This post is garrisoned by the Thirty-fourth and Ninety-third companies of Coast Artillery. The batteries bearing on the river are completed and the guns mounted. The battery bearing on the sea front is in course of construction. The question of a water supply at this post is still unsettled, but steps have been taken which is hoped will dispose of this matter.

Fort Columbia, Wash., is garrisoned by the Thirty-third Company of Coast Artillery. The emplacements have been completed and the guns mounted. The fear that had been entertained that the proximity of buildings to the batteries would cause them to be injured by concussion has been proven groundless.

Fort Canby, Wash., is now occupied by only a small detachment of enlisted men as a guard for Government property. This arrangement will be satisfactory until the completion of the modern batteries projected for this post.

ARTILLERY DISTRICT OF PUGET SOUND.

Fort Flagler, the headquarters of the district, is garrisoned by the Sixth Band of the Artillery Corps and the Twenty-sixth, Ninety-fourth, and One hundred and sixth companies of Coast Artillery. Two of these companies are in new barracks building, while the other is in temporary quarters pending the construction of a barracks which has been authorized.

At Fort Casey, garrisoned by the Sixty-third and Seventy-first companies of Coast Artillery, and Fort Worden, garrisoned by the Sixty-second and One hundred and twenty-sixth companies of Coast Artillery, officers and men have been living in temporary quarters of the crudest kind, enduring much inconvenience and hardship, tending greatly to discontent and increased desertion among the enlisted men. Barracks, quarters, and other buildings, the construction of which was begun last spring, will be completed before the close of the fiscal year. In the meantime the troops will have been practically camping out for two years in a region which has an excessive rainfall. The most of the emplacements were completed and the guns mounted before anything was done regarding the construction of permanent quarters.

It is recommended that in future the construction of quarters and barracks be undertaken in such time that they can be completed and ready for occupancy by the time men are needed to properly care for the armanent. There is no apparent reason why the Engineer's and Quartermaster's Departments could not carry on construction work at the same time.

The question of a permanent water supply for the forts of the artillery district of Puget Sound has not yet been satisfactorily settled.

At the new post at Haines, near Skagway, Alaska, construction work is making good progress. The location of this post is in every respect all that could be desired.

Companies I and M, Eight Infantry, are still stationed at Skagway, Alaska. The various buildings used as quarters, barracks, and store-houses, are rented from private parties, and are scattered over the

town. Contrary to what might have been expected under such circumstances, there were few bad results in discipline or health of the command, and no friction with the civil authorities, a result due largely to the tact and efficiency of the commanding officer, Maj. W. L. Pitcher, Eighth Infantry.

FORT EGBERT, ALASKA.

Fort Egbert is garrisoned by Company C, Eighth Infantry. The quarters and barracks are good and the garrison as comfortable as could be expected at a post located in so inhospitable a region. The post hospital, however, is a most unsatisfactory building, being small and poorly constructed. Although Fort Egbert is within a very short distance of the Arctic Circle, the post garden is the best in the Department of the Columbia, and at the time of my inspection was furnishing all the fresh vegetables needed by the post.

FORT GIBBON, ALASKA.

This post is garrisoned by Company D, Eighth Infantry. The buildings at the post are substantial and comfortable. This post is the most expensive to supply of all the Alaskan posts, but can not be abandoned owing to its relation to the Trans-Alaskan military telegraph. The flat-bottomed stern-wheel river steamer *Van Vliet* is under control of the commanding officer at Fort Gibbon, and is engaged, during the season of navigation, in transporting supplies up the Tanana for distribution among the stations along the military telegraph line.

FORT ST. MICHAEL, ALASKA.

This post is situated on the island of the same name in Bering Sea, near the mouth of the Yukon, and is garrisoned by Company A, Eighth Infantry. The post was built for two companies, but not more than one company being considered necessary at present one of the barracks is used as a storehouse.

At St. Michael, near the post, and separated from it by the buildings and wharves of the North American Transportation and Trading Company, is the quartermaster's depot, under charge of Capt. F. L. Knudsen, Eighth Infantry. As this depot was established by order from these headquarters and not from the War Department, it is my intention to abolish it, as a depot, at the close of the present fiscal year, putting the buildings under charge of the post quartermaster at Fort St. Michael, and discharging nearly all employees. A great quantity of quartermaster's supplies, which will never be needed in Alaska, are stored at this depot, having been shipped there when it was established. It is intended to have all these surplus stores that can not be used at the various posts in Alaska shipped to the United States next summer.

Unusual conditions prevail at this post, as the entire island of St. Michael is a part of a military reservation. Two large commercial companies—the North American Transportation and Trading Company and the Northern Commercial Company—have their stores, warehouses, hotels, dwellings, etc., on the reservation, acting under permits from the Secretary of War. A question having arisen between the

War Department and the Northern Commercial Company regarding the holdings of the latter, the matter was referred to me for investigation, and is made the subject of a special report.

FORT DAVIS, ALASKA.

This post, situated 4 miles from the important gold-mining town of Nome, is garrisoned by Company B, Eighth Infantry. There are barracks for two companies. The buildings at this post, like those at all other posts in Alaska, are comfortable and well suited to the purpose.

FORT LISCUM, ALASKA.

Fort Liscum, near the town of Valdez, is garrisoned by Company I, Thirteenth Infantry. The post is well constructed, but its location is regarded as unfortunate. Mountains 2,000 feet high lie immediately behind the post to the southward, shutting off the sun for a considerable part of each day, a consideration of no small importance where there is such a phenomenal snowfall. During the winter the post is fairly buried in snow, only the roofs of two-story buildings being visible. Owing to its northern exposure and the mountains to the southward this snow does not entirely disappear until June. A location could have been found on the opposite side of Valdez Bay, 2 miles below the town of Valdez, where there is more space, and with a southern instead of a northern exposure. This post is easily supplied, as on the southern coast of Alaska navigation is open during the entire year, and Fort Liscum has direct steamer communication with Seattle.

TRANSALASKAN MILITARY TELEGRAPH.

The military telegraph line, connecting Forts Liscum, Egbert, Gibbon, and St. Michael, has, after two years of the hardest labor, been completed. Too much can not be said in praise of the officers and men of the Signal Corps and the various infantry and artillery organizations stationed in Alaska for successfully accomplishing the task of constructing nearly 1,500 miles of telegraph line through country nearly all of which is an unsurveyed and uninhabited wilderness. The line was, in the greater part of its length, of necessity crudely constructed. It was absolutely impossible to adequately guard against damage by forest fires or trees falling on the line by clearing the forest on each side; such work would have required a much larger force than was available. The difficulty of properly setting poles in a country where the ground is perpetually frozen eighteen inches below the surface can be readily appreciated. As the roots of trees in the valley of the Yukon do not extend deeper than eighteen inches, on account of frozen ground, these trees are continually falling across the line.

Forts Liscum, Egbert, Gibbon, and St. Michael are really merely bases of supply for the detachments of men distributed along the telegraph line to keep it in repair by resetting fallen poles, removing trees that have fallen across the line, etc. These detachments usually consist of three men, one of the Signal Corps and two infantrymen. Many of them are absent from their respective posts a year at a time. The supply of these numerous isolated stations, by pack train in summer and dog sled in winter, has been accomplished only by the greatest

effort. No men are kept at the posts other than those absolutely necessary for their proper care. The companies of the Eighth Infantry came to Alaska in 1902 at their war strength and have gradually been decreased by expiration of enlistments to 65 men each. Fort Liscum, which was garrisoned last year by a coast artillery company at full strength, now has an infantry company of 65 men. It required the utmost efforts of the troops to keep the line open last year, and even then they were not entirely successful. Now, with the companies decreased by one-third, and much more line to care for than last winter, the outlook for the coming winter is not encouraging.

The question of the advisability of maintaining all the posts in Alaska is one requiring more knowledge of the policy and intentions of the Government than is vouchsafed a department commander before it can be intelligently dealt with. The military telegraph line was presumably constructed for the purpose of keeping up communication between the posts in Alaska and department headquarters, yet almost the entire garrisons at four of these posts are constantly in the field maintaining the line, leaving no men available for duty in connection with any emergency that might arise. The only way that any one of the posts on the telegraph line could send twenty men into the field would be to draw them in from the various isolated stations, which would cut the post off from telegraphic communication. This is a clearly illogical situation. Fort Davis is the only post in Alaska located near any considerable community of white people, it being 4 miles from Nome, which, with the mining camps in its vicinity, has a population of 10,000. The community is not a turbulent one, and the town has a large proportion of citizens who, in case of necessity, could be depended upon to support the Federal civil authorities in the maintenance of law and order. The abandonment of Fort Davis would not affect the maintenance of the telegraph line, but, owing to the distance from the town, it is not probable that the expensive buildings of the post could be sold for more than the merest fraction of their cost. If the post had been located as it should have been, immediately adjoining the town, these buildings would now bring but little less than their original cost at auction. No one of the posts, Fort St. Michael, Fort Gibbon, Fort Egbert, and Fort Liscum, can be abandoned unless the Department is prepared to abandon the telegraph line, constructed at the cost of so much labor and privation. It is taken for granted the garrison at Camp Skagway will be withdrawn on the completion of the new post at Haines, distant only 17 miles from Skagway.

There are no natives in Alaska who require observation by troops. The relations between natives and white men are everywhere friendly, and there is no reason why they should not remain so. The natives, both Indians and Eskimos, are quite docile and not much addicted to crimes of violence. Such as they do commit are adequately dealt with by the civil authorities. The fact that there are no tribal organizations and no powerful chiefs would make extensive uprisings quite impossible, even if there were a motive, which there is not.

AMERICAN LAKE, WASHINGTON.

It is recommended that steps be taken without delay to acquire a large tract of ground at American Lake, near Tacoma, Wash., for maneuver purposes, and as a site for the concentration of troops in

time of war. The location of the tract, from a strategic standpoint, is unexcelled. It is crossed by the main line of the Northern Pacific Railway, and is bounded on one side by the waters of Puget Sound, where the largest vessel afloat could lie in well-protected water within a few rods of the shore. The tract is a vast bed of gravel, covered by a thin layer of soil, with a growth of short grass. There is no dust in dry weather, and no mud in the rainy season. Abundant water of the best quality can be had from several lakes, as well as streams coming down from the mountains. The tract is mostly a rolling prairie, with here and there small areas of fir and hard-wood trees, which, however, are not of sufficiently dense growth to interfere with movements of troops. The terrain is diversified by lakes and small streams, with occasional ridges and depressions. The land is unfit for agricultural purposes owing to the thinness of the layer of soil over the gravel bed, hence its acquirement for military purposes would not be open to the objection that would be urged against using arable land for such a purpose. The land possesses value, however, owing to its favorable location near Tacoma, and the fact that it is used for grazing purposes. It is believed that 30,000 acres could be obtained for \$300,000. This is only three times the sum that would be required to clear of trees the Fort Lawton reservation of 541 acres. When its strategic location, suitability and cheapness are considered it is not believed that another such tract can be found in the United States. The price is sure to double in ten years and if it is to be obtained it should be done at once. If occasion arose several army corps could be encamped here and be within a half-hour's march of transports.

The chief surgeon of the department reports that the health of the command has been excellent throughout the year. No epidemics or infectious diseases have occurred, and only a few cases of typhoid fever. The sanitary condition of all the posts is reported as excellent. But 15 deaths occurred in the Department, from all causes, during the twelve months covered by this report.

JUDGE-ADVOCATE'S DEPARTMENT.

The number of court-martial records received and forwarded to the Judge-Advocate-General during the fiscal year were 3 of trials of commissioned officers and 229 of enlisted men. Two commissioned officers were convicted and dismissed the service, and 1 was acquitted. There were 206 convictions of enlisted men and 23 acquittals.

A comparison of the number of trials of men serving in the department, and the percentage as to enlisted strength, with previous years, is shown by the following table:

Year.	Average enlisted strength.	Trials.	Per cent.
1900-1901.....	773	16	2.1
1901-2.....	3,022	158	5.2
1902-3.....	3,240	215	6.6

The chief paymaster of the department reports that the arrangement by which the commanding officers at Forts Davis, Egbert, Gibbon, and St. Michael, Alaska, are designated as "acting paymasters" for

the payment of troops at their respective posts is working satisfactorily. These posts being cut off from communication during the greater part of the year, the shipments of funds by express upon receipt of pay rolls could not be made. Heretofore payments were made by the agents of the Northern Commercial Company at considerable expense and trouble, but as that company did not feel justified in continuing the work the present arrangement was made, by which the funds necessary for a year's payment were shipped during the season of navigation to the various post commanders.

OFFICERS' SCHOOLS.

The scheme of instruction for officers' schools at the various posts in the department, submitted by post commanders and approved by the department commander, were carried out at all posts, with the exception of Fort Liscum, Alaska, where the school had to be discontinued after December, 1902, owing to the unusual conditions at that post, most of the officers being absent from the post on the military telegraph line. At Vancouver Barracks the sessions were discontinued April 18, 1903, in view of the early departure of the Seventeenth Infantry for the Philippine Islands, but the course was practically completed. With the exceptions noted above, the courses at the various posts were completed and the results obtained satisfactory.

SMALL-ARMS PRACTICE.

The following remarks and recommendations by the inspector of small-arms practice are approved:

Target practice is now progressing under the new firing regulations. These regulations are believed to be a decided improvement over the old ones in many respects, but it is regretted that they make no provision for instruction for firing with a rest. No hunter or a soldier in actual battle would fail to avail himself of the great advantages of a rest in aiming and firing. A part of the instruction on the range and record practice should be with a rest, horizontal and vertical, viz, log and tree rest.

The encouragement offered superior marksmanship by increased pay is an excellent step in the right direction, but the standard is too high and should be lowered. At present nearly all men are discouraged from the hope of reaching it. So far no soldier in this department has succeeded in making scores to entitle him to the extra pay as expert rifleman.

Sharpshooters should have some conspicuous insignia on the service and field uniform. The metal crosses are never worn by men in the field. Often it is highly desirable for an officer to be able to select at a glance a few sharpshooters from a command, with which he may not be personally familiar.

It is believed that the most serious questions affecting the efficiency of the Army to-day are those relating to the personnel of the enlisted force. There is no disguising the fact that recruits are obtained with difficulty, and that the most of them are not of satisfactory quality. Very few men reenlist after the expiration of their terms of service, while the number of desertions and of dishonorable discharges is phenomenal. To get and keep a good class of men there must be a radical increase in the pay of the rank and file. The Government can not get something for nothing any more than a railroad company or manufacturing concern can. When there is considered the amount of work they are required to do, and the degree of intelligence necessary for the proper performance of their duties, the pay of the enlisted men of the Army is ridiculously small. The wonder is, not that so few men

enlist and that so small a percentage of them reenlist after three years, but that we obtain and keep so many really good men as we do. Since the present rates of pay for the Army were established the wages of both skilled and unskilled labor have made great advances, having, in some occupations, doubled. In localities where twenty years ago farm laborers employed by the year received \$14 per month and board, they now command \$25 and board.

In many parts of the United States ignorant, unskilled laborers, working by the day, are able to save, above their board and clothing, twice the amount received by a private soldier on his second enlistment, and yet only a small percentage of these men could pass the test in a recruiting office. If the pay of a private on his first enlistment were made to approach that of a farm laborer, I am of the opinion that there would be a sufficient number of enlistments of a very superior class—young men from the farms, who are usually of good physique and have common school education, and are not so much addicted to intemperate habits as men recruited in the cities. If there were proportionate increases of pay for length of service, and a much higher rate of pay for noncommissioned officers, many of these men would remain in the service. Considering present rates of wages it is believed that the pay should be increased on the following basis: Privates on first enlistments, \$18; corporals, \$30; sergeants, \$45, and first sergeants, \$60 per month, with increases for length of service. If men are not worth these rates of pay, they are not worth anything.

RATION.

The present ration is wholesome and sufficient in quantity, but somewhat monotonous. Since the prohibition of the sale of beer in the post exchange the company, troop, and battery funds have fallen very low, and have been kept up by the men contributing from their pay in order to help out the ration by the purchase of articles not issued, as milk, eggs, fruit, etc. This is evidently unjust, and is a source of discontent. It could very properly be remedied by legislation, which would allow the payment from public money of a small sum, say \$1 per month, for each man into the funds of the various organizations, with some supervision by higher authority to see that the money was properly expended and not allowed to accumulate.

SPECIAL GUARDHOUSE RATION.

It is recommended that there be a special ration for inmates of the guardhouse. This institution has too few terrors for a certain class of soldiers. Men who are lacking in pride and who wish to shirk their duties find the average guardhouse a comfortable haven, especially in bad weather. Such men can usually be appealed to through their stomachs, and it is believed that a diet of hard, instead of soft bread, and salt or canned instead of fresh meats, with the usual allowances of vegetables, and no coffee, would have a beneficial effect, and would not injure the health of the men.

REWARD FOR DESERTERS.

It is recommended that the reward for capturing and delivering deserters be increased to \$100.

CLOTHING ALLOWANCE.

In my opinion the present clothing allowance should be abolished and clothing issued to men whenever their immediate commander deems it necessary. All this clothing, except shoes and underwear, should be taken from the soldier on his discharge. As men who are dishonorably discharged by sentence of court-martial usually forfeit all pay and allowances, they should, before being released, be furnished with a cheap civilian suit. It is recommended that if possible legislation be obtained prohibiting any person other than members of the Regular Army or militia from wearing the army uniform and insignia, or anything that can be readily mistaken for it.

OFFICERS' UNIFORM.

The trousers straps and box spurs, provided for in General Orders, No. 132, series of 1902, are most unpopular with officers. It is safe to say that nine out of ten condemn them without reserve. It is difficult to sit down with comfort when one is wearing the trousers straps, and the spurs are an unmitigated nuisance. There is nothing to be said in favor of wearing spurs when not mounted except that they are in vogue in European armies on dress occasions, a reason which does not appeal very forcibly to our officers.

The abolition of the chapeau and epaulets for general officers is recommended; the former is hideous, the latter heavy and gaudy. The new full-dress cap is handsome and military in appearance, and the shoulder knots are neat and not too conspicuous. The blue facings of the infantry are a failure. They fade and discolor readily.

OFFICERS' MESS.

It is recommended that bachelor officers in posts and all officers in the field be assisted in their messing arrangements by having cooks enlisted for the purpose, just as company cooks are now, said cooks to be paid, however, by the officers who utilize their services instead of by the Government. When a regiment goes into the field the officers are put to much hardship and inconvenience because of the question of cooks for their messes, and are at the mercy of the whims of civilian cooks, if they are able to obtain them. It is as essential that officers be fed as enlisted men, and they should not be expected to cook for themselves, which is not done even by the soldiers, who have cooks especially enlisted for them. Cooks enlisted for bachelor messes in posts would be available for all officers in the field.

The compensation received by the clerks in the adjutants-general's offices of the various departments is lower than that of the clerks in the offices of the chief quartermaster and the chief commissary, an evident injustice, as the work is of the same nature and the hours the same. They appear to be largely overlooked in the matter of promotion to the higher classes.

MILITIA.

The militia of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho have been reorganized in compliance with the provisions of the act of January 21, 1903.

In the two former States encampments were held in September,

1903, which were, at the request of the governors of the two States, attended by regular officers from these headquarters. At these encampments good hard work was the rule, and there was no attempt to make the occasion an outing or picnic.

The target practice by the Washington regiment was very good. These troops have been armed for several years with the United States magazine rifle, caliber .30. The Oregon militia has just been armed with that weapon, and had practice with it this year.

There has been a general reawakening in National Guard circles owing to recent legislation, with a constant increase of efficiency.

The Idaho militia had no encampment this year.

In concluding this report I wish to express my appreciation of the faithful and efficient work of the department staff since I have been in command.

Very respectfully,

FREDERICK FUNSTON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

D.—REPORT OF BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM A. KOBBE, U. S. ARMY, COMMANDING THE DEPARTMENT OF DAKOTA.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF DAKOTA,
St. Paul, Minn., ——— ———, 1903.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: The last annual report of this department was made by me August 29, 1902.

On June 30, 1903, the posts were garrisoned by headquarters, band, and 9 troops of the Third Cavalry; headquarters, band, and the First Squadron of the Sixth Cavalry; the Tenth Battery, Field Artillery, and the Twenty-first and Twenty-fourth Regiments of Infantry. The remaining squadrons of the Sixth Cavalry are under orders to proceed from the Philippines and take station in this department.

ARRIVALS.

August 2, 1902, headquarters First Squadron and Troops A and D, Third Cavalry (6 officers and 67 enlisted men), Lieut. Col. E. Z. Steever, Ninth Cavalry, commanding, arrived from San Francisco, Cal., and took station at Fort Assinniboine.

August 2, 1902, Troops B and C, Third Cavalry (2 officers and 76 enlisted men), Capt. F. O. Johnson, Third Cavalry, commanding, arrived from San Francisco, Cal., and took station at Fort Yellowstone.

August 8, 1902, headquarters First Battalion, and Companies C and D, Twenty-fourth Infantry (6 officers and 144 enlisted men), Maj. J. C. Dent, Twenty-fourth Infantry, commanding, arrived from San Francisco and took station at Fort Harrison.

August 8, 1902, Companies K and M, Twenty-fourth Infantry (5 officers and 151 enlisted men), Capt. William Black, Twenty-fourth Infantry, commanding, arrived from San Francisco and took station at Fort Missoula.

August 16, 1902, headquarters, staff, and band, and Companies A and B, Twenty-fourth Infantry (13 officers and 225 enlisted men), Col. Chambers McKibbin, Twenty-fourth Infantry, commanding, arrived from San Francisco and took station at Fort Harrison.

August 16, 1902, headquarters Second Battalion, and Companies E, F, G, and H, Twenty-fourth Infantry (6 officers and 282 enlisted men), Maj. E. B. Bolton, Twenty-fourth Infantry, commanding, arrived from San Francisco and took station at Fort Assinniboine.

August 16, 1902, headquarters Third Battalion and Company I, Twenty-fourth Infantry (5 officers and 83 enlisted men), Lieut. Col. Daniel Cornman, Twenty-fourth Infantry, commanding, arrived from San Francisco and took station at Fort Missoula.

August 24, 1902, headquarters Third Squadron and Troops I, K, L, and M, Third Cavalry (6 officers and 152 enlisted men), Maj. H. P. Kingsbury, Third Cavalry, commanding, arrived from San Francisco and took station at Fort Assinniboine.

October 23, 1902, the Tenth Battery, Field Artillery (3 officers, 115 enlisted men, 100 horses and 6 pieces field artillery), Capt. Thomas Ridgway, Artillery Corps, commanding, arrived at Fort Snelling for station. (The battery left Fort Walla Walla, Wash., October 18, by rail. Distance traveled, about 1,686 miles.)

November 18, 1902, Troop F, Third Cavalry, dismounted (2 officers and 73 enlisted men), First Lieut. George B. Comly, commanding, from the Presidio of San Francisco, arrived and took station at Fort Yates. Distance traveled, about 2,500 miles.

May 9, 1903, headquarters, band, and Troops A and C, Sixth Cavalry (10 officers and 115 enlisted men, dismounted), Col. Allen Smith, Sixth Cavalry, commanding, arrived and took station at Fort Meade.

May 10, 1903, Troops B and D, Sixth Cavalry (4 officers and 97 enlisted men, dismounted), First Lieut. Archie Miller, Sixth Cavalry, commanding, arrived and took station at Fort Keogh.

DEPARTURES.

July 4, 1902, headquarters First Battalion and Companies A and D, Eighth Infantry (7 officers and 191 enlisted men), Capt. Charles Gerhardt, Eighth Infantry, commanding, left Fort Harrison for Seattle, Wash., en route for service in Alaska.

August 3, 1902, Troops F and G, First Cavalry (2 officers and 145 enlisted men), left Fort Yellowstone for San Francisco, en route for service in the Philippine Islands. Maj. S. L. Woodward, squadron commander, First Lieut. R. C. Foy, squadron adjutant, and the squadron sergeant-major, who had been stationed at Fort Keogh, joined the troops at Livingston, Mont., and proceeded with them to San Francisco.

February 16, 1903, the headquarters, field, staff, and band, and the First Squadron, Thirteenth Cavalry (20 officers and 285 enlisted men, dismounted), Lieut. Col. Earl D. Thomas, Thirteenth Cavalry, commanding, left Fort Meade, S. Dak., at 4 p. m. this date, marched to Sturgis, S. Dak., and there took train for San Francisco, en route for service in the Philippine Islands.

March 22, 1903, headquarters Third Squadron and Troops I, K, L, and M, Thirteenth Cavalry (13 officers and 253 enlisted men), Maj. Charles W. Taylor, Thirteenth Cavalry, commanding, left Fort Meade,

S. Dak., marched to Sturgis, S. Dak., and there took train for San Francisco, Cal., en route for service in the Philippine Islands.

May 21, 1903, headquarters Second Squadron and Troops F and G, Thirteenth Cavalry (9 officers and 111 enlisted men, dismounted), Maj. Thaddeus W. Jones, Thirteenth Cavalry, commanding, left Fort Keogh, Mont., by rail for San Francisco, Cal., en route for service in the Philippine Islands.

May 21, 1903, Troops E and H, Thirteenth Cavalry (6 officers and 116 enlisted men, dismounted), Capt. E. L. Phillips, Thirteenth Cavalry, commanding, left Fort Meade, marched to Sturgis, S. Dak., and there took train for San Francisco, Cal., en route for service in the Philippine Islands.

CHANGES OF TROOPS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT.

July 2, 1902, Troop E, Thirteenth Cavalry (1 officer and 53 enlisted men), First Lieut. Charles A. Romeyn, Thirteenth Cavalry, commanding, left Fort Keogh, Mont., for a tour of service at Camp Merritt, Tongue River Indian Agency, Mont. Distance marched, about 90 miles.

August 8, 1902, Company D, Twenty-first Infantry (2 officers and 72 enlisted men), Capt. C. E. Hampton, Twenty-first Infantry, commanding, left Fort Harrison by rail for station at Fort Keogh, arriving there August 9.

August 18, 1902, Company M, Twenty-first Infantry (2 officers and 60 enlisted men), accompanied by one contract surgeon and detachment of hospital corps men, Capt. John S. Parke, Twenty-first Infantry, commanding, left Fort Yates by boat for Bismarck, N. Dak., en route to garrison Fort Lincoln, the new post in process of construction near that place. Command arrived and took station at Fort Lincoln August 19.

August 21, 1902, Troops G and H, Thirteenth Cavalry (5 officers and 153 enlisted men, dismounted), Capt. A. L. Dade, Thirteenth Cavalry, commanding, left Fort Assiniboine by rail for station at Fort Keogh, arriving there August 22.

September 2, 1902, Troop C, Thirteenth Cavalry (3 officers and 70 enlisted men), Capt. P. D. Lochridge, Thirteenth Cavalry, commanding, left Fort Yellowstone, Wyo., and marched overland (via Fort Keogh) to Fort Meade, for station. Arrived September 28. Distance marched, 599 miles.

September 12, 1902, Companies K and L, Twenty-first Infantry (2 officers and 107 enlisted men), First Lieut. George E. Ball, Twenty-first Infantry, commanding, left Fort Yates, N. Dak., by rail for station at Fort Keogh. Arrived September 14.

September 14, 1902, Companies A and D, Twenty-first Infantry (4 officers and 123 enlisted men), Capt. C. E. Hampton, Twenty-first Infantry, commanding, left Fort Keogh by rail for station at Fort Snelling. Arrived September 16. Distance traveled, 751 miles.

September 27, 1902, Troop F, Thirteenth Cavalry (2 officers and 49 enlisted men), Capt. G. H. Preston, Thirteenth Cavalry, commanding, left Fort Keogh for a tour of service at Camp Merritt, a subpost of Fort Keogh at Tongue River Agency, Mont.

October 5, 1902, Troop A, Thirteenth Cavalry (3 officers and 65 enlisted men), Capt. R. C. Williams, Thirteenth Cavalry, commanding, left Fort Yellowstone, Wyo., marched to Cinnabar, Mont., 9 miles, thence proceeded by rail to Fort Meade, for station, arriving there October 8. Total distance traveled, 665 miles.

October 8, 1902, Troop L, Thirteenth Cavalry (2 officers and 64 enlisted men), First Lieut. James Goethe, Thirteenth Cavalry, commanding, left Fort Yates, N. Dak., and marched to Fort Meade, for station, arriving there October 16th. Distance marched, 250 miles.

October 16, 1902, Troop F, Thirteenth Cavalry, returned to Fort Keogh from detached service at Camp Merritt, Tongue River Indian Agency, Mont. Distance marched, about 90 miles.

March 5, 1903, Troops E and H, Thirteenth Cavalry (3 officers and 119 enlisted men), Capt. Ervin L. Phillips, Thirteenth Cavalry, commanding, left Fort Keogh, Mont., by rail for station at Fort Meade, arriving there March 7, 1903.

June 6, 1903, Troop A, Third Cavalry, Capt. Casper H. Conrad, jr., and Second Lieut. Arthur P. Jones, troop officers; Capt. G. A. Skinner, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, medical officer; Second Lieut. R. B. McConnell, battalion quartermaster and commissary, Twenty-fourth Infantry, acting quartermaster for the march; 52 enlisted men, and 2 privates of the hospital corps, with 64 horses, left Fort Assiniboine to march to Fort Yellowstone, Wyo., for duty in the Yellowstone National Park during the tourist season; arrived at Fort Yellowstone at 9 a. m. June 24.

June 13, 1903, Troop F, Third Cavalry, left Fort Yates, N. Dak., at 11 a. m. dismounted; marched to Mandan, N. Dak., where it arrived at 10 a. m. June 16; left there June 17 by rail for station at Fort Yellowstone, arriving June 18 at 2 p. m. Troop consisted of Captain Barton, Second Lieutenant Maize, Third Cavalry, attached, and 48 enlisted men.

PRACTICE MARCHES.

September 6, 1902, Troops I, K, and M, Thirteenth Cavalry, Maj. C. W. Taylor, Thirteenth Cavalry, commanding, left Fort Meade on a practice march to Hot Springs, S. Dak., going via Tilford, Rapid City, Hermosa, and Buffalo Gap, S. Dak., and returning via Pringle, Hill City, Reynolds Ranch, and Lead City, S. Dak. Squadron returned to post September 20. Distance marched, 230 miles.

September 21, 1902, Troops B and D, Thirteenth Cavalry, Capt. C. B. Swezey, Thirteenth Cavalry, commanding, left Fort Meade on a practice march to the Little Missouri River, Montana, going via Bellefourche, Horse Creek, and Mary Ranch and returning via Alzado, Mont., and Bellefourche, S. Dak. Squadron returned to post September 28. Distance marched, 203 miles.

June 23, 1903, the First Battalion, Twenty-first Infantry, consisting of 9 officers and 229 enlisted men, accompanied by 1 medical officer and 4 hospital corps men, Lieut. Col. Cornelius Gardener, Twenty-first Infantry, commanding, left Fort Snelling at 7.50 a. m. for a practice march to the State of Minnesota rifle range, near Lake City, Minn., and to hold its annual target practice at that range. Arrived June 22 at 3.15 p. m. Distance marched, 74.8 miles. Preliminary practice commenced June 23 and regular practice June 29.

ABANDONMENT OF POSTS.

Under authority of the War Department of September 18, 1902, Camp Merritt, Mont., a subpost of Fort Keogh, Mont., located on the Tongue River Indian Reservation near the Indian agency, about 90 miles from Fort Keogh, established July 26, 1891, was abandoned April 21, 1903, the public buildings on that date having been formally turned over to the Interior Department for Indian school purposes. The receipt for the buildings is signed by J. C. Clifford, Indian agent, Tongue River Agency.

Under telegraphic authority from the War Department of May 19, 1903, arrangements are being made to abandon Fort Yates, N. Dak., as a military station at an early date.

INSTRUCTION.

The mean strength of the command present was 133 officers and 2,824 men. With troops returning from insular service and the relatively large number of young and more or less inexperienced officers, progressive instruction throughout the year seemed of first importance. Officers' schools were organized and department general order No. 6 issued to provide for systematic courses, including drills, military signaling, exercises in minor tactics, practice marches, target practice, and physical training, supplemented by a complete set of rules and regulations for the conduct of field exercises and another for athletic sports and field days. While the arrivals and departures of troops enumerated above have interfered in a measure, the results have been very satisfactory. Unusual interest was taken in the course of physical training, which extends throughout the year, and field days either have been or will be held at all posts, with prizes of considerable value for the victors. The reports of field exercises in minor tactics are voluminous and indicate gratifying interest. They will receive as soon as possible critical review and be returned for future reference to the posts.

Officers have been infinitely encouraged in providing and pursuing courses of instruction by considering that with the organization of a general staff these will not, as has frequently happened, fall into disuse, but that what is good in each territorial department will eventually be adopted for all, and that the Army will make progress everywhere with the same approved methods.

A post school for enlisted men has been maintained at each post in the department, with an attendance of 406 and a daily average attendance of 262.

Schools for children have been maintained at all posts except Forts Keogh, Lincoln, and Missoula, where the children attend public schools in the neighboring towns, and Yellowstone, where there are no children of a school age. The average daily attendance at children's schools was 53.

Progress in all cases has been good and satisfactory.

It is observed that the daily average attendance of enlisted men was only 65 per cent of the total number attending school. This will be remedied by a recent order which exempts enlisted men attending school from all duty that will interfere therewith, except regular

guard, and other duty only in case of emergency and when ordered by the post commander.

Officers in charge of post schools have shown commendable interest in their duties, as well as enlisted men detailed as teachers, and have done efficient work.

I renew my recommendation of last year that in each company and troop a permanent squad be instructed as scouts, providing thereby a necessary body of expert special troops when the regiment is consolidated in whole or in part for active service.

Lieutenant-Colonel Reynolds, inspector-general, makes recommendation, in which I concur, that in view of the difficulty of obtaining band musicians by enlistment they be recruited from the field musicians in each regiment and corps by requiring them to learn music and play band instruments.

DISCIPLINE.

The discipline of the command has been good, as a rule, and with evidence of steady improvement. It varies considerably with different posts and even with different companies at the same post.

There have been 3,824 trials by court-martial, of which 3,582 were by summary court. These trials have embraced 4,690 counts, of which nearly one-half were for drunkenness or offenses growing out of drunkenness. Over 87 per cent of these counts were disciplinary offenses, such as absences without leave, etc.; in other words, for offenses which in civil life would not be punishable. Excluding 460 counts for drunkenness, there were only 101 for offenses punishable by the civil criminal code. Not included in any of the foregoing were 40 convictions for desertion.

An improvement in discipline would, I believe, follow a proper change in the method of issuing uniform clothing. The method followed now is indirectly responsible for many irregularities. The soldier purchases his clothing on credit, exceeding or keeping within a certain allowance, and owns it. If he keeps within the allowance, the balance to his credit is paid him; if he exceeds it, the excess is deducted from his pay. In theory this is supposed to be an incentive for men to be careful of their own, to take proper care of their uniform and to appear neatly dressed, but in practice the theory works in this way only with a very few. The great majority of men accumulate clothing and with many it becomes an article of barter and sale, not only among themselves but with civilians in the vicinity of the posts. Convictions under the seventeenth article of war, so far as clothing is concerned, are rare, and civilian purchasers can not be held accountable because of sales of clothing made at different times by the Government or by discharged volunteers and regulars. When a soldier deserts he disposes of most of his clothing or it is taken from his locker by those who first become aware of his absence.

An alternative system can not be given in this report, but will be embodied in a separate recommendation. It is based on the provision that uniform clothing shall be the property of the United States, as arms, accouterments, etc., are now; that it shall be easily identifiable and its sale or purchase be a felony by law.

W. A. KOBÉ,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.

**E.—REPORT OF MAJ. GEN. ADNA R. CHAFFEE, U. S. ARMY,
COMMANDING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST.**

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST,
Governors Island, New York City, September 15, 1903.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit the annual report of this department for the year ending June 30, 1903, containing a résumé of the reports of the chiefs of the staff departments on duty at these headquarters, the latter being filed here for future reference and the necessary action.

On concluding the annual inspection of posts in the department—January 23 to June 6—my report in detail, covering generally the matters embraced in paragraph 954, Army Regulations, was forwarded to the Department, and it seems unnecessary, therefore, to repeat here what has been heretofore stated.

A brief synopsis of the reports made by staff officers follows:

(A) ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

Memorandum from the adjutant-general shows that the aggregate strength of the personnel on June 30, 1902, was 16,256, and on June 30, 1903, 16,301. The number of company organizations in the department June 30, 1902, was 153, viz, engineers, 4; cavalry, 22; field artillery, 5; coast artillery, 97; infantry, 25. On June 30 the number of such organizations was 165, viz, engineers, 2; cavalry, 22; field artillery, 5; coast artillery, 95; infantry, 41. The reduction of the enlisted strength of troops of cavalry from 75 to 65, and of companies of infantry from 80 to 65, directed by War Department Orders, No. 108, series of 1902, has been effected. The movement of companies, changes of station, etc., noted in memorandum "Record of events," have from time to time been made of record on the monthly return of the department forwarded to Washington as completed. Seemingly, therefore, it is not necessary to state in detail in this report the movements of companies that have occurred during the year.

(B) INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

Disbursing officers' accounts have been examined as required by law and regulation. Two hundred and ninety-one inspections of money accounts involving statements of accountability for \$35,630,422.59 were made and checked over. Public property of invoiced value amounting to over one million dollars was inspected for condemnation, and property costing \$693,264 was eliminated from property returns, viz, destroyed or sold, being no longer serviceable.

Forty-one of the garrisoned posts were inspected by officers of the Inspector-General's Department; also cemeteries, arsenals, and depots to the number of 24. Twenty-seven recruiting stations were visited and inspected. The department commander inspected all stations located in the United States between January 23 and June 6.

(C) JUDGE-ADVOCATE'S DEPARTMENT.

The judge-advocate of the department reports the number of trials by general courts-martial during the year as 7 officers and 1,438 men. Two officers and 79 men were acquitted. The number of trials by general courts-martial exceeds the number tried last year by 316. The number of cases apparently brought before general courts-martial with a view to discharge on proof of five previous convictions within the year was 328 as against 122 of the previous year. The number of trials for fraudulent enlistment was 19—26 less than the previous year. The number of men tried for desertion was 398. Of this number 31 surrendered after an absence of not more than thirty days; 86 after an absence of more than thirty days. One hundred and thirty-seven men apprehended had been in service not more than six months; 144 other men apprehended had been in service more than six months. One hundred and thirty men tried for desertion were found guilty of absence without leave. The number of trials by summary court was 16,142, of which 2,548 were convicted of drunkenness; 591 were acquitted of complaints alleged against them.

(D) QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

The chief quartermaster reports that the duties pertaining to his department were satisfactorily performed by officers of the department and officers of the line detailed for that purpose; that fuel, forage, and straw required for posts and depots in the department, exclusive of Cuba, were purchased under contracts; that clothing and equipment, tableware and cooking utensils and quartermaster's stores, were as a rule supplied from depots of the department upon special requisitions; that the number of estimates and requisitions received and acted upon by his office was 4,572; that buildings constructed and authorized during the year, and the other work done, such as constructing roads and walks, water and sewer systems, lighting, etc., at 53 posts in the department involve expenditures amounting to \$2,387,137.79; that owing to the disturbance in the normal supply of coal during the past winter there was necessity for the purchase of this article in excess of contract price amounting to \$23,946; that the concentration of troops in Porto Rico permitted of material reduction of public transportation there, also a reduction of supplies on hand in excess of requirements for two years, and that the quartermaster's depot at San Juan has been discontinued.

Pertinent to the statement of the chief quartermaster that 4,572 estimates and requisitions have been received and acted upon by his office, it should be further noted that practically all these estimates and requisitions were forwarded to the War Department for final action by the Quartermaster-General—this without regard as to how large or how small the sum of public money involved, how consequent or insignificant the matter for decision. Request for the repair of a wagon wheel, the shoeing of a horse, a dollar's worth of car tickets, the issue of a water bucket under this centralized system of the Quartermaster's Department, are in the same category with the construction of a barrack and a set of officers' quarters, and travel the same highway to the single goal of authority for final action—the Quartermaster-General.

Seemingly, centralization of power in administration can not exceed the present development in the Quartermaster's Department. It is the full-blown rose, so to speak. When centralization has been carried to such a degree in military matters that high command can not give effective assistance in administration of minor or common affairs, it is evident decentralization to a limited extent would be useful and desirable. The risk would not be extraordinary if department commanders were authorized to exercise final authority on matters involving expenditures not exceeding \$200; and it is fair to assume that the exercise of such authority would engender a sense of responsibility fully adequate for the protection of the Government's interests. The sum of assistance which the chief quartermaster of this department and the department commander is capable of rendering in administration of affairs of the Quartermaster's Department under present conditions is limited to formal recommendations, and as regards this assistance it is probable that one-half of the 4,572 recommendations made during the past year for the information of the Quartermaster-General have not had the weight of a hair in the determination of the matter involved. Valuable time would have been saved had these papers been forwarded direct from the post concerned to the Quartermaster-General at Washington.

It is recommended that the necessary action be taken with a view to constructing during the ensuing fiscal year permanent barracks and quarters for the company of artillery garrisoning the defenses at Portsmouth, N. H. The temporary shelter of officers and men at that place is very poor; officers' quarters are mere shells constructed for summer use only. During periods of low temperature last winter officers were compelled to wear their overcoats and overshoes when in their quarters, it being impossible to maintain the desired warmth with stoves.

The recruit barracks at Fort Slocum are no longer fit for occupancy, nor are the buildings worth repairing. New barracks with capacity that will accommodate 300 men are urgently required.

There is a large deficiency in quarters at Fort Totten for officers of the garrison and school of submarine defense.

Permanent barracks for two companies should be constructed at Fort Schuyler. The purchase of additional land for this post has been recommended.

Permanent barracks for two companies, quarters for five officers, and new hospital are required at Fort Mott.

A modern two-story barrack should be constructed at Fort Fremont.

Quarters for five officers and one modern two-story barrack are necessary at Fort Screven.

A two-story barrack should replace the one-story temporary building now in use at Fort Dade. The reservation is a low sand pit, the temperature of the place very high for nine months of the year. Spacious quarters and barracks are necessary to insure a reasonable degree of comfort for officers and men at this station. One set of field officers' quarters should also be constructed at this post.

One barrack is required at Fort Terry, to be erected in the new section of the post.

One barrack, quarters for four officers, and accessory buildings for a one-company post are required for Fort Andrews.

It is recommended that funds be appropriated for the erection of

barracks and quarters, storehouses, stable, guardhouse, bakery, which are still lacking for the accommodation of two battalions of native troops (the Porto Rico Provisional Regiment of Infantry) at Cayey, P. R. All troops serving in the island, coast artillery excepted, are to be concentrated at that place. It will be necessary to purchase 394 acres of land for the use of this garrison, and an appropriation of funds for this purpose is also recommended. The value of the land will be reported for information as soon as practicable.

I recommend that the Quartermaster's Department formulate plans for a complete reconstruction of Fort Hamilton, providing modern barracks and quarters, and for rearrangement of same upon the ground as constructed.

UNIFORM.

It is believed that the new uniform gives general satisfaction, and will give more when its utility has been thoroughly demonstrated by use. The thing most to be hoped for in any uniform is that after adoption it shall be adhered to without constant changes and alterations, which place everybody in a condition of uneasiness as to procuring it.

Personally I can see no use for two full-dress hats and two full-dress shoulder ornaments for general officers. It would seem to me that the chapeau and epaulets might be dispensed with. Box spurs and the straps on the bottom of the trousers serve no useful or ornamental purpose, and should be dispensed with. As trousers are cut and made in this country they can not be worn with any comfort with straps at the bottoms except in a standing position.

(E) SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

The chief commissary reports that the net loss to the Government for subsistence stores at 56 posts in the United States was \$1,283.70—an average per post of \$22.92. The loss sustained at posts in Porto Rico was \$486.69; in Cuba \$1,177.50. The loss in Porto Rico is but one-sixth what it was last year, and the loss in Cuba is excessive, but it is reported to have occurred mostly on old stores which have been a long time in stock.

Inquiry by the department commander at the 56 stations visited by him during the year disclosed very satisfactory conditions of supply and administration of affairs pertaining to this department. The stores furnished have been of good quality, and the care of same by local commissaries noticeably good.

(F) MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

The chief surgeon reports that the mean strength of the department for the year, as shown by the reports of sick and wounded, was: Officers, 740; enlisted men, 16,515; total, 17,255. The admissions to sick report during the year for diseases in line of duty were 15,345; not in line of duty, 3,839; for injuries in line of duty, 4,192; not in line of duty, 447; aggregate for all causes, 23,823, giving a rate of 1,380.64 per thousand of mean strength against 1,542.27 per thousand of mean strength for the year previous. As a result of the diseases, wounds, and injuries, 4.28 per cent of mean strength were constantly noneffec-

tive; for the previous year the per cent of noneffective was 4.30 of the mean strength. The following-named stations showed as constantly noneffective 6 per cent or more of mean strength, viz, Fort Dade, Fort McPherson, Fort Morgan, Fort Myer, Fort Slocum, Camp George H. Thomas, Cabaña Barracks, Morro Castle, Mayaguez, Ponce—the last mentioned 7.68 per cent, the highest in the department.

One hundred and seventeen deaths occurred during the year from the following causes: Diseases, 55; injuries, accidental, 29; poisoning, accidental, 11; suicides, 6; homicides, 5. Of those reported as having died of disease, 2 were commissioned officers; 95 of the deaths were on account of disease, wounds, and injuries incurred in the line of duty, and 22 were not incident to the service.

During the year 349 men were discharged for disability; of this number the disability of 212 was not contracted in the line of duty.

TYPHOID FEVER.

This disease was unusually prevalent during the year, causing 23 deaths against 5 from this cause for the preceding year. The origin of the disease seems not to have been satisfactorily traced at any station, but there is little doubt that its location was beyond the control of post authorities in every instance.

(G) PAY DEPARTMENT.

The chief paymaster reports the balance for his department July 1, 1902, as \$429,826.88. The receipts from the Treasury, by transfers, by soldiers' deposits, and by paymaster's collections, augmented accountability for the year to \$7,476,302.68.

There was paid out on vouchers \$6,807,256.79, and further transactions by transfers and deposits with the Treasury were made in such amounts that on June 30, 1903, the balance was \$390,287.12.

The chief paymaster renews his recommendation made last year that the rate per room remain at \$12 per month, as now fixed by law, but that the number of rooms authorized by regulations be for a second lieutenant two, and for each additional grade an additional room over the grade below. The reason assigned for the recommended increase is the pertinent fact that rents have very greatly increased during the last twenty-five years, while there has been no change in the number of rooms nor in the allowance per room respectively by regulation and law to officers during the same period.

The exigencies of the service enforce detachment of a large number of officers from stations where public quarters may be provided, and it seems but just that some measure of relief be afforded to meet the very marked advance in cost of shelter which now operates as a material tax on salary in statu quo since 1878.

Conforming more nearly to officers' needs in garrisons, observed and usually provided when constructing quarters for them, I recommend that the number of rooms for which commutation be allowed officers be as above recommended.

(H) ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

The department ordnance officer reports that the new system of decentralization in ordnance administration has worked to the advan-

tage of the ordnance department and to the service; that the ordnance supplies furnished the troops and posts have been generally adequate in quantity and acceptable in quality.

During my inspection it was noted that some companies were equipped with blue cartridge belts, others with gray or white belts, at the same post. This condition quite seriously marred the military appearance of commands. Utility does not require or demand that attempt be made to shade cartridge belts to conform to color of uniforms. Better if fancy be not considered at all in the matter and that one color satisfy all conditions of dress and all occasions when the cartridge belt must be worn.

The time seems opportune for the adoption of a pack in lieu of the blanket roll for foot troops. At present we have only the experience of men with the latter to contend with, and the substitution of something better, something more convenient, of no greater burden, may be readily accomplished if an earnest effort be made to do so. That the blanket roll is an inconvenient thing in which to carry a few articles of clothing and toilet goes without the saying. No device could be more so, nor is it, in my opinion, of better form for "toting" than would be a pack. Encouragement and discipline have all to do with the carrying of a burden by soldiers, light or heavy. We know that it is not the soldier's wish to throw his extras upon the ground whenever he has need of his blanket, but using the roll he is compelled to do this. The condition is discreditable. It would seem that the burden of relief properly devolves upon the officers of infantry, who, more than anyone else, should be interested in the welfare of their men as regards this matter. It is suggested, however, that a board of general staff officers solve the problem. A minimum-capacity pack is desirable, and to that end the articles to be carried should be limited, viz, 1 shirt, 1 pair stockings, 1 pair drawers, 1 undershirt, toilet articles, blanket, overcoat, shelter tent; extra shoes, or any exterior article of clothing not to be packed, as all such articles will be good for one month's wear on day of departure if the soldier be properly clothed at that time. The cartridge belt should be carried on braces in order that the weight may be transferred to the shoulders.

(J) SIGNAL CORPS.

The signal officer of the department states that annual reports from posts received at his office up to July 30 show that the requirements of paragraph 1747, Army Regulations, have been complied with at 27 posts, and that 109 officers and 406 men are proficient in signaling; about 14 officers and 74 men are proficient in telegraphy, proficiency being indicated on the part of officers and men to send and receive 15 words per minute; that the posts in the department are well supplied with signal equipment and apparatus, the new service telephone having been supplied to a number of posts to take the place of the Bell telephone, saving the expense of rental. Charts showing telephone systems at posts have been made and filed in the office of the signal officer of the department. During the year very considerable work has been done by the signal department toward installation of fire-control systems at various posts in the harbors of New York, Boston, Portland, and Pensacola.

At Portland the installation was made sufficiently complete by

August 20 to permit its use during the army and navy maneuvers, but a considerable part is yet in an unfinished condition. Telautographs were not installed, telephones being generally substituted, and much of the wire remains exposed which should be buried. The system installed at Pensacola Harbor was tested during April with fair success. Wireiess telegraph stations were established at Forts Wadsworth and Hancock under contract with the De Forrest Company, and worked successfully. Rather frequent and annoying interruptions of cable communications between posts have been experienced, due to dragging of ship anchors. Posts in the Boston, Narragansett, Trumbull, New York, and Delaware districts have been affected through interruption of communication by cable. Cable communication in connection with the defense of harbors is now so extensive and so liable to interruption by ship anchors that the signal officer urgently recommends that a properly equipped cable boat be furnished at the earliest practicable date. It is recommended that inquiry be made regarding cost of vessel and its equipment and that the Chief Signal Officer of the Army then make recommendation to the chief of staff. In the past we have received courteous and generous assistance from the Western Union Telegraph Company, which on various occasions has placed its cable boat at the disposal of the Signal Corps to make repairs. The courtesy is greatly appreciated.

(K) SMALL-ARMS PRACTICE.

The inspector of small-arms practice reports that 70 company organizations have had complete practice, as against 29 organizations during the previous year; that the percentage of proficiency increased 2.7 per cent in the cavalry and 1.6 per cent in the infantry; that it will be impracticable to compare the firing of the current season with those of last on account of the change of system, but it is believed that the results will be better on account of the increasing interest in the work.

He recommends, also, that a large permanent rifle range be secured in the vicinity of Washington for the use of troops stationed thereabouts, and for department, national, and international competitions, and suggests that a board of officers be convened to locate an available and suitable site and that steps be taken to acquire the same.

I fully concur in this recommendation. Year by year it is growing more and more difficult to obtain by lease grounds that are suitable and safe for rifle practice. The range of the rifle and carbine are now so great that extraordinary measures must be taken to make secure against infliction of accidental injuries in the country adjacent to the ranges. It seems necessary, therefore, to concentrate the firing at as few ranges as practicable which may be made really safe. It is believed that weather conditions in the vicinity of Washington are favorable for a practice season of ample length to afford time to complete work by all troops convenient to send there.

Attention is invited to two reports by the inspector of artillery, transmitted to the Department with my report of inspection of posts. The duties imposed upon the Coast Artillery in this department are very onerous now, so great indeed as to require that attention be invited to the necessity of an increase in its strength as a measure of relief and to meet fairly new development of defenses made year by year. It would seem reasonable that one relief be taken as the mini-

num of strength of Coast Artillery troops necessary for the care of armament and instruction of men for this highly important section of national-defense system. At present less than 10,000 men are available in this department, while over 15,000 are required to compose one relief.

THE NATIONAL GUARD.

With the passage of the act "to promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes," approved January 21, 1903, known as the "Dick bill," the War Department in compliance therewith instituted proceedings looking to carrying into effect the provisions of the law.

The purpose of the act to promote the efficiency of the National Guard of the country further provides for placing it under such national supervision as will bring about closer relations between it and the Regular Army, organizing it on the same lines as the latter and causing it to conform, as nearly as practicable, to its equipment, drill, instruction, etc.

The first duty under the law was to make a thorough inspection of the National Guard, in order to determine whether or not it was sufficiently armed, uniformed, and equipped for active duty in the field, and, when so appearing by report of inspection, then, on requisition of the governor of the State, the Secretary of War is authorized to pay so much of its allotment out of the annual appropriation as shall be necessary for the payment, subsistence, and transportation of such portions as shall engage in actual field or camp instruction. This inspection was directed in General Orders, No. 49, current series, Headquarters of the Army, by which the commanding generals of the several departments were directed to designate such number of experienced officers as may be necessary to inspect all of the organized militia of all the States and Territories lying within the limits of their respective commands. Within the limits of this military department lie 20 of the largest States of the Union and the District of Columbia—all of which have regularly organized militia. For the purpose of this inspection, 37 officers were detailed, who performed their duty satisfactorily, and before the end of the fiscal year had made a thorough inspection of the National Guards of the following States: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, District of Columbia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, and forwarded an estimate showing the number of magazine rifles, including equipments, necessary to thoroughly arm said guards. These inspections covered 932 companies of infantry, 53 troops of cavalry, 38 batteries of field artillery, 40 companies of heavy artillery, 9 separate signal corps, and 6 separate hospital and ambulance corps, a total of 67,603 officers and enlisted men, and in the main showed a very satisfactory condition.

The officers making the inspections exercised care and tact. Their reports indicate that in the important items of discipline, mobilization, and target practice the National Guard show commendable progress, that the governmental supervision to the extent defined by law will produce beneficial results, and that within the time fixed (five years from the date of the approval of the act) the organization and armament of the National Guard will conform to the organization and armament prescribed for the Regular and Volunteer Armies of the United States.

Under the stimulus of the law and these inspections there has been hearty cooperation between the National Guard and the Regular Army in this department.

The next step, under section 15 of the act, was an endeavor to ascertain the wishes of the governors of the several States in respect of participation of the organized militia in maneuvers, encampments, and field instruction with the Regular Army. In this department there is no large tract of land under the jurisdiction of the department commander suitable for encamping large bodies of troops.

The National Guards of the following States held their usual annual encampments at which troops of the Regular Army attended as indicated, viz:

Pennsylvania.—The Fourth Battery, Field Artillery, proceeded by marching from its station, Fort Myer, Va., to Mount Gretna, Pa., where it participated in the encampment of the Third Brigade, National Guard of Pennsylvania, from July 11–18, inclusive.

Maryland.—Two troops of the Second Cavalry from Fort Myer, Va., proceeded by marching to Belair, Md., and participated in the encampment of the National Guard of the State there from July 9–19, 1903.

District of Columbia.—Two troops of cavalry proceeded by marching from Belair, Md., to Leesburg, Va., and participated in the encampment there of the National Guard of the District of Columbia, July 23 to August 2, 1903.

West Virginia.—Two companies of the Ninth Infantry from Madison Barracks, N. Y., attended the State camp at Parkersburg, W. Va., August 4–13, 1903.

South Carolina.—Company E, Sixteenth Infantry, from Fort McPherson, Ga., participated in the encampments of the National Guard of this State at Anderson, S. C., August 3–9, and at Camden, S. C., August 10–16, 1903.

Georgia.—One company, Sixteenth Infantry, from Fort McPherson, Ga., participated in encampments of the National Guard of Georgia at Griffin, Ga., June 22–28; at Augusta, Ga., July 7–13, 1903, and at Rome, Ga., July 20–29, 1903. One troop of the Seventh Cavalry, from Camp George H. Thomas, Ga., participated in the encampment of the Georgia National Guard at Savannah, Ga., July 20–27, 1903.

Florida.—Company E, Sixteenth Infantry, from Fort McPherson, Ga., participated in the encampment of the National Guard of this State at Jacksonville, Fla., September 8–15, 1903.

Alabama.—Company H, Sixteenth Infantry, from Fort McPherson, Ga., participated in the encampment of the National Guard of this State at Mobile, Ala., August 3–9, 1903.

New Jersey.—Companies E, F, G, and H, and the band of the Eighth Infantry, from Fort Columbus, N. Y.; Company L, Eighth Infantry, from Fort Wood, N. Y.; Companies A, B, C, and D, Sixteenth Infantry, from Fort Slocum, N. Y., were sent to Sea Girt, N. J., for target practice and participated in the State camp there.

Under the provisions of section 19 of the act approved January 21, 1903, and in accordance with authority contained in War Department letter of June 16, 1903, officers were detailed as instructors to attend encampments of State troops, as follows:

Rhode Island.—State encampment at Quonset, R. I., July 6–11, 1903, Maj. John P. Wisser, Artillery Corps.

Massachusetts.—Second Brigade, Massachusetts Volunteer Militia, at Framingham, Mass., July 18–25, 1903, and the Fifth Regiment of Infantry, Massachusetts Volunteer Militia, at Duxbury, Mass., August 8–14, 1903, Capts. James A. Shipton and Lloyd England, Artillery Corps.

Connecticut.—State encampment at Niantic, Conn., August 9–17, 1903, Maj. Wallis O. Clark, Fifth Infantry, and Maj. William R. Hamilton, Artillery Corps.

Pennsylvania.—Camp of the First and Second Brigades of the Pennsylvania National Guard at Perkasio, Bucks County, Pa., July 11–18, 1903, and at Somerset, Somerset County, Pa., July 25 to August 1, 1903, Lieut. Col. Walter Howe, Artillery Corps, assistant to the inspector-general of the department. Camp of the Third Brigade of the National Guard of Pennsylvania at Mount Gretna, Lebanon County, Pa., July 11–18, 1903, Maj. D. C. Pearson, Second Cavalry.

North Carolina.—Camps of the National Guard of this State at Morehead, N. C., July 22–28, 1903; Greensboro, N. C., August 6–12, 1903, and Asheville, N. C., August 19–25, 1903, Maj. F. H. French, Sixteenth Infantry.

South Carolina.—Camps of the National Guard of this State at Columbia, Charleston, Anderson, Camden, and Beaufort, S. C., commencing at the first-named city July 20, 1903, Capt. Leo F. Foster, Artillery Corps.

Georgia.—Encampments of Georgia State troops at Rome and Griffin, July 15–30, 1903, Capt. John B. Bennett, adjutant, Sixteenth Infantry.

The officers and enlisted men of the regular troops acted as instructors, and from all quarters nothing but praise has been heard of the hearty cooperation and good will between the services.

In the combined Army and Navy maneuvers which took place in the artillery district of Portland, Me., the entire National Guard of the State of Maine participated, the First Massachusetts Heavy Artillery, and two companies of the New York Signal Corps. The association, instruction, and experience were profitable alike to the regulars and militia. The Thirteenth Regiment, Heavy Artillery, of New York, and two companies of the Connecticut Heavy Artillery were mobilized at Fort Terry, N. Y., for ten days with the regular troops of that post and thoroughly instructed in the use of large caliber guns, modern ordnance, and the necessary fire-control systems.

There being no target range in the vicinity of New York Harbor, the infantry troops there stationed would have had no target practice without considerable expense had it not been that the authorities of the State of New Jersey very courteously offered the use of their range at Sea Girt, N. J., whereat nine companies of regular infantry and certain men of the Battalion of Engineers from Washington Barracks, D. C., completed the prescribed course of small arms practice, encamping on the range for periods covering three months, during which time part of the National Guard of the State was encamped there.

On the other hand, the National Guard in the western part of the State of New York were permitted to use the range at Fort Niagara. These reciprocal courtesies tend to harmonious cooperation to the lasting good, both of the regulars and militia. The courtesy of the authorities of the State of New Jersey is appreciated, and has been duly acknowledged.

The experience of the past year indicates that the National Guard

troops in this section of country can best arrange to encamp during July and August, for the reasons (1) that the weather conditions are favorable at that time of year, and (2) that the members can then best arrange to obtain leave from their employers.

These same months are designated for the regular target practice season in this department, and it has been difficult, and at times impossible for this reason, to meet satisfactorily the requests of governors of States for regular troops to camp with the State troops. It is therefore suggested that an understanding be had, if possible, whereby combined encampments of United States and National Guard troops shall be held from July 1 to August 15, which period could be excluded from the regular target season in this department.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,
Major-General, Commanding.

F.—REPORT OF MAJ. GEN. JOHN C. BATES, U. S. ARMY, COM-
MANDING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE LAKES.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE LAKES,
Chicago, Ill., August 24, 1903.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of matters pertaining to this territorial department for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1903:

The department was, from the beginning of the year covered by this report until July 19, 1902, commanded by Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, who, on the date mentioned, left these headquarters to assume temporary command of the Department of the East. I exercised command of the department, temporarily, from July 19 to November 11, 1902, when General MacArthur resumed command and retained it until March 23, 1903, on which date I again assumed command, under instructions from the President promulgated in General Orders, No. 13, current series, Headquarters of the Army.

The strength of the command, present and absent, June 30, 1903, was as follows:

	Present.	Absent, within and without the depart- ment.	Total.
Commissioned officers.....	114	54	168
Enlisted men.....	2,182	414	2,596
Aggregate	2,296	468	2,764
ATTACHED.			
Commissioned officers.....	2	3	5
Enlisted men.....			
Aggregate	2	3	5

These troops occupied the following posts June 30, 1903:

Fort Brady, Mich.—Maj. Robert N. Getty, First Infantry, commanding; First Battalion, First Infantry.

Columbia Arsenal, Tenn.—Capt. Fielder M. M. Beall, Third Infantry, commanding; Company K, Third Infantry.

Columbus Barracks, Ohio.—Lieut. Col. John B. Rodman, Twentieth Infantry, commanding; Second Battalion, Third Infantry; Second Battalion, Twentieth Infantry.

Fort Sheridan, Ill.—Col. William S. McCaskey, Twentieth Infantry, commanding; headquarters and First and Third Battalions, Twentieth Infantry; Troops L and M, Second Cavalry; Fourteenth and Twenty-first Batteries, Field Artillery.

Fort Thomas, Ky.—Col. John H. Page, Third Infantry, commanding; headquarters and First Battalion and Companies I, L, and M, Third Infantry.

Fort Wayne, Mich.—Col. Walter T. Duggan, First Infantry, commanding; headquarters and Second Battalion, First Infantry.

A detachment of Company M, Third Infantry, consisting of 2 officers and 36 enlisted men from Fort Thomas, Ky., was on duty at Westlawn Cemetery, Canton, Ohio.

Since the date of the last report the following movements of troops have taken place in the department:

INCOMING TROOPS.

The Second Battalion, Third Infantry, returning from the Philippines, arrived at Columbus Barracks, Ohio, August 28, 1902, and took station thereat.

The Fourteenth Battery, Field Artillery, returning from the Philippine Islands, arrived at Fort Sheridan, Ill., April 14, 1903, and took station at that post.

The headquarters and Second Battalion, First Infantry, returning from the Philippines, arrived at Fort Wayne, Mich., May 12, 1903, having been assigned to station thereat.

The First Battalion, First Infantry, also returning from the Philippines, arrived May 13, 1903, at Fort Brady, Mich., and took station at that post.

OUTGOING TROOPS.

The Ninth Battery, Field Artillery, left Fort Sheridan, Ill., January 30, 1903, for San Francisco, en route to the Philippines.

Headquarters, band, and Second Battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, left Fort Wayne, and the First Battalion of the regiment left Fort Brady, February 18, 1903, for the same destination.

CHANGES OF STATION WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT.

August 30, 1902, First Battalion, Twentieth Infantry, from Columbus Barracks to Fort Sheridan.

February 10, 1903, Company I, Twentieth Infantry, from Fort Sheridan to Fort Brady, and Companies L and M, Twentieth Infantry, from Fort Sheridan to Fort Wayne; returning May 13, 1903, to Fort Sheridan.

December 26, 1902, the detachment of Company C, Fourteenth Infantry, on duty at Westlawn Cemetery, Canton, Ohio, joined the First Battalion of the regiment at Fort Brady, Mich., being relieved by a detachment of Company M, Third Infantry, from Fort Thomas.

ABANDONMENT OF POST.

April 15, 1903, the post of Indianapolis Arsenal, Ind., having been duly sold, was turned over to the trustees of the Winona Agricultural and Technical Institute fund. The detachment of the Third Infantry there stationed was withdrawn to Fort Thomas.

PARTICIPATION OF TROOPS IN CEREMONIES.

September 22, 1902, the band and Second Battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, Fort Wayne, participated in the parade of the Spanish-American war veterans at Detroit, Mich.

October 25, 1902, the First Battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, took part in a civic parade at Sault Ste. Marie, Mich.

April 27, 1903, headquarters, band, and five companies, Twentieth Infantry, from Fort Sheridan; headquarters, band, and five companies of the Third Infantry from Fort Thomas, and a battalion of the Third Infantry and battalion of the Twentieth Infantry from Columbus Barracks, Ohio, participated in the dedicatory ceremonies of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition at St. Louis, Mo.

Troop M, Second Cavalry, the Twenty-first Battery, Field Artillery, and the band and four companies of the Twentieth Infantry from Fort Sheridan, participated in the Memorial Day exercises at Chicago, the cavalry and artillery marching both ways—total distance, 52 miles—while the infantry traveled by rail.

Company B, Twentieth Infantry, from Fort Sheridan, participated in encampment of Spanish-American war veterans at Bloomington, Ill., June 2 to 4, 1903.

NUMBER OF RECRUITS SENT FROM COLUMBUS BARRACKS DURING THE YEAR.

Infantry	1,461
Cavalry	100
Coast Artillery	862
Engineers	27
Military Academy detachment	11
Total	2,461

Col. Arthur L. Wagner, assistant adjutant-general, has been on duty as adjutant-general during the year. Attention is invited to his report hereto appended^a relating to post schools.

INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

Col. Charles H. Heyl, Inspector-General, U. S. Army, assumed charge January 7, 1903, relieving Col. Arthur L. Wagner, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. Army, who had been temporarily in charge of the office from date of departure of Col. E. A. Garlington, inspector-general, November 7, 1902. The work of inspections was taken up by

^a Not printed.

Colonel Heyl, and all general inspections under Army Regulations 967, 968, and 971, have been completed without departing materially from the line of travel in making routine inspections.

Nothing of unusual character was developed during inspections of the year. Such irregularities and defects as were observed at inspections of posts and commands were generally minor in character, and in every case attention of the commanding officer was called to the deficiency, verbal suggestions made, and remedial action taken at the time.

At the inspections of the various commands and during stay of inspector at posts it was observed that the character and general physical appearance of recruits is not up to the same standard as compared with those of former years. The number of undeveloped youths appeared especially noticeable.

Colonel Heyl states that he observed that the "Baby blue" facings for infantry is unpopular and without exception opposed by all infantry officers and that return to the white facings is universally desired, as also is the retention of the officers' former blue overcoat in lieu of the new olive drab overcoat.

The inspector-general reports the behavior of the troops at each post as good, and proper discipline appeared to be maintained. The general mess system in operation at Fort Sheridan, Columbus Barracks, and Fort Thomas is in each instance reported to be unsatisfactory. Return to company mess system is recommended.

With the establishment of larger posts, and the increase of additional field uniform, the necessity of installing laundries in all garrisons is greatly felt. This is especially noticeable at posts where cavalry and field artillery are stationed, where, from the requirements of mounted duty, the gradual increased cost for laundry work is a hardship on the enlisted men.

The inspector-general reports the arms and equipments of the commands throughout the department in good condition and the uniforms generally neat and well fitting.

The supplies of all kinds are sufficient in kind and quantity, and the various commands in their several organizations are thought to be in readiness and in good condition for both field and garrison service; and all regulations and orders for the comfort, health, and cleanliness and discipline of the men, and care and use of property are complied with throughout the department.

JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

Capt. Blanton Winship, acting judge-advocate, U. S. Army, assumed charge of the office of judge-advocate of this department April 20, 1903, relieving Col. S. W. Groesbeck, judge-advocate.

In the period covered by this report there were 357 enlisted men tried by general court-martial, this being an increase of 22 over last year. It should be remembered, however, that 118 of the men tried in this department belonged to other departments. Of the 357 men tried 342 were convicted, 11 were acquitted, and in the cases of 4 the sentences were disapproved. Three thousand three hundred and ninety-four men were tried by summary and 9 by garrison courts. The number of convictions for desertion was 200.

QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

Maj. William H. Miller, quartermaster, U. S. Army, was on duty as assistant to the chief quartermaster of the department until February 23, 1903, on which date, in addition to his other duties, he took charge of the office of the chief quartermaster, relieving Col. Edwin B. Atwood, assistant quartermaster-general. Major Miller submits the following statement of financial operations during the year:

Appropriations.	Receipts.	Disbursements.	Balance on hand June 30, 1903.
Regular supplies	\$196,628.83	\$166,115.14	\$29,513.69
Incidental expenses.....	89,168.49	86,043.01	3,125.48
Cavalry and artillery horses	10,473.77	10,473.77
Army transportation.....	364,096.88	311,632.66	52,464.22
Barracks and quarters	75,574.21	74,115.52	1,458.69
Clothing and equipage.....	57,446.84	56,293.67	1,153.17
Hospitals.....	5,783.45	5,768.07	15.38
Quarters for hospital stewards	128.75	128.75
Shooting galleries and ranges.....	2,223.00	2,223.00
Bringing home remains of soldiers.....	7.00	7.00
National cemeteries.....	33.00	16.30	16.70
Cemetery at Prairie du Chien.....	3,000.00	48.00	2,952.00
Confederate cemetery at Camp Chase.....	2,000.00	40.00	1,960.00
Road on Fort Sheridan Military Reservation	8,000.00	7,925.64	74.36
Military post near Manila, P. I.....	97.74	97.74
Military post exchanges.....	2,500.00	2,500.00
Military post (no year).....	72.00	72.00
Total	816,233.96	713,026.50	103,207.46

Supplies of fuel, forage, and straw have been furnished to the troops at the several stations under contract. A contract was entered into May 4, 1903, and is now in course of completion, for the installation of an electric-light system at Fort Sheridan. At Fort Wayne, Mich., gas was used for the first time in March, 1903.

Buildings from special appropriation were in course of construction at the close of the year as follows: Two brick barrack buildings and a post exchange and gymnasium building at Fort Brady, and a brick exchange and gymnasium building at Fort Wayne, and at Fort Thomas the drill hall is being converted into a gymnasium building.

The number of public animals in the service at the close of the fiscal year was 129 cavalry horses, 199 artillery horses, 58 draft horses, and 92 mules.

During the year transportation was furnished as follows:

	Paymaster's funds.	Passengers.	Animals.	Freight.
By rail	2,381	87	<i>Pounds.</i> 13,971,880
By water.....	140,134
By stage	10
By express.....	\$304,599.18	5,024
Total.....	304,599.18	2,391	87	14,117,038

Amounts paid for animals purchased during the year:

25 cavalry horses, at an aggregate cost of	\$4,375.00
14 artillery horses, at an aggregate cost of	2,750.00
1 mule, at an aggregate cost of.....	150.00
7 draft horses, at an aggregate cost of.....	1,393.00

Major Miller reports the force of employees decreased during the year, there being 67 employed June 30, 1902; on June 30, 1903, only 54.

SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

Maj. Albert D. Niskern, commissary, was on duty as chief commissary of the department during the year. The subsistence stores and property required for the posts in this department have been supplied on requisition by the purchasing commissary in this city, excepting Columbia Arsenal, which has been supplied from St. Louis. Contracts were duly made for the supply of fresh beef, mutton, potatoes, and onions to the posts in the department.

The meal-ticket system has been an unqualified success, but one report of unsatisfactory service having been received and that was found to be groundless. The list of railroads west of this city on which meal requests are available shows practically every road concerned. Major Niskern is of opinion that it would be to the advantage of the service if the system of using meal requests instead of commutation of rations was extended over the country, and certainly an established system of this kind would prove of great value in an emergency such as that of 1898. If arrangements were made by the chief commissaries of the different departments with roads having headquarters in the limits of the department, the system could be extended and a commissary meal request be made as available as money for meals at any point in the country.

Under direction of the Commissary-General, U. S. Army, arrangements have been made by which parties of insane soldiers and their guard en route to the United States Hospital for the Insane at Washington, are furnished with meals in the car in which traveling between this city and Washington. Similar arrangements have been made between San Francisco and this city by the chief commissary, Department of California.

The money accountability of the chief commissary is reported as follows:

Appropriation subsistence of the Army, 1902.

Balance per last report.....	\$15,602.33	
Received since	2,135.78	
		<hr/>
		\$17,738.11
Disbursed	2,949.34	
Transferred	108.85	
Deposited.....	14,679.92	
		<hr/>
		17,738.11

Appropriation subsistence of the Army, 1903.

Receipts	\$157,873.67	
Transferred	\$130,358.58	
Disbursed	17,173.32	
Deposited.....	611.71	
		<hr/>
		148,143.61
		<hr/>
Balance		9,730.06

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

The duties of the office of the chief surgeon of the department were performed from July 1 to 28, 1902, by Lieut. Col. Timothy E. Wil-

cox, deputy surgeon-general; by Col. Charles L. Heizmann, assistant surgeon-general, from the latter date until October 10, 1902; by Maj. Thomas U. Raymond, surgeon, temporarily, until October 23, 1902, on which date Lieut. Col. Philip F. Harvey, deputy surgeon-general, assumed charge.

The sanitary conditions, care of the sick, management of the hospitals, efficiency of the hospital corps, etc., are in the main quite satisfactory. An obstacle to the accomplishment of the best results derived from instruction to the number of the hospital corps was found in the frequent changes made in the personnel of detachments which were incidental to the demands of the service. It is believed, however, that under existing conditions a higher degree of discipline and efficiency will be attained than hitherto.

One contract dental surgeon is on duty in this department, who, during the year visited each post, and to the best of his ability extended his services to the officers and enlisted men thereat. He treated 1,966 cases. The work performed has been largely of an emergency character owing to the lack of facilities for laboratory work at most stations. Application was made for the assignment of an additional dentist to duty in this department, as the work was thought greater than one could properly perform. It was the intention to recommend the establishment of a dental office at a central point in the department, where one dentist could attend to operative and prosthetic dentistry and one make annual or semiannual visits to all stations. It was believed this arrangement would place the dental service on a more satisfactory footing in this department. No other dental surgeon was available for this detail, and the one at present on duty continues to make periodical visits to the various stations until such time as it may be practicable to obtain the assignment of another to the department.

The admissions to sick report for disease and injury were 3,313. The admission rate per thousand was 1,108.8. The total number of days lost by sickness, 41,093. Average number of days lost by each sick man, 13.75. Four men were transferred to the Army and Navy General Hospital at Hot Springs, 9 to Fort Bayard, N. Mex., 5 to the Government Hospital for the Insane, and 2 to the General Hospital at Washington, D. C. Forty-seven men were discharged on surgeon's certificate of disability. Fourteen deaths occurred during the year.

The chief surgeon reports that the drinking water supplied the troops has been wholesome. At Columbus Barracks the supply at times has been inadequate and regarded by the surgeon as dangerous. The latter feature has been remedied by the construction of a large tank in the basement of the mess hall, which is connected by pipes with the boiler in the kitchen above, by which means an abundant supply of boiled water is furnished. It is distributed in covered barrels conveniently located in the barracks.

The sanitary reports from the various posts have contained very few recommendations, showing that a satisfactory state of sanitation has obtained.

The quality and quantity of medical supplies have been entirely satisfactory.

Capt. William E. Purviance, assistant surgeon, was on duty as attending surgeon and examiner of recruits in this city since November 15, 1902, relieving Maj. Thomas U. Raymond, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army.

PAY DEPARTMENT.

Col. Albert S. Towar, assistant paymaster-general, has been on duty as chief paymaster of the department during the year.

The troops in the department have been paid monthly, and with promptness and regularity.

The receipts and disbursements during the year were as follows:

On hand July 1, 1902.....	\$162,835.17
Received from the Treasurer, United States.....	1,085,000.00
Received from paymasters.....	530,000.00
Received from soldiers' deposits.....	49,114.85
Received from collections.....	40,950.96
Total.....	1,867,900.98
Disbursed in payment of troops.....	1,654,096.25
Unexpended balances refunded to the Treasurer, United States.....	76,628.18
Collections deposited with Treasurer, United States.....	40,950.96
On hand June 30, 1903.....	96,225.59
Total.....	1,867,900.98

Maj. Harry L. Rees, paymaster, was on duty in Chicago until September 29, 1902, and Maj. Harry L. Rogers, paymaster, from November 5, 1902, to date. Capt. Joseph S. Wilkins, paymaster, reported for duty August 2, 1902; is now under treatment in the Army and Navy General Hospital at Hot Springs, Ark.

OFFICE OF ENGINEER OFFICER.

Col. Oswald H. Ernst, Corps of Engineers, was on duty as engineer officer of the Department during the entire year. The usual routine work has been performed in the office; maps have been furnished for the information of the officers at these headquarters and in the department, and drawing material and surveying instruments have been issued to the engineer officers at posts in the department upon requisition.

OFFICE OF CHIEF ORDNANCE OFFICER.

Col. John R. McGinness, Ordnance Department, assumed charge of the office of the chief ordnance officer of the Department July 19, 1902, relieving Capt. Frank B. McKenna, Twenty-eighth Infantry.

The business of this office has been more or less of a routine character, consisting of revising requisitions and examining proceedings of boards of survey, inventory, and inspection reports, etc. The ordnance supplies furnished the troops have given satisfaction.

Colonel McGinness reports that complaint has been made against the stuffed leather equipments on account of the exuding oil soiling the soldiers' clothing. He states that this is a defect inherent in this method of preserving the leather and will more or less cure itself with time and the use of a special soap issued by the Ordnance Department.

The troops arriving from the Philippines have been allowed to turn in their arms brought back with them, which were generally impaired by hard service and the nature of the climate there. New arms have been issued.

OFFICE OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER.

First Lieut. Van Leer Wills, Twelfth Infantry, aid-de-camp, assumed charge May 25, 1903, relieving Capt. Francis J. Kernan, Second Infantry, aid-de-camp. The business of the office has been of a routine character.

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR SMALL ARMS PRACTICE.

Capt. Frank B. McKenna, Twenty-eighth Infantry, was in charge until September 8, 1902, being relieved by Col. Arthur L. Wagner, assistant adjutant-general, who was relieved by Capt. Francis J. Kernan, Second Infantry, aid-de-camp, November 19, 1902, who was relieved May 29, 1903, by First Lieut. Van Leer Wills, Twelfth Infantry, aid-de-camp, who has been in charge since.

The results of small-arms firing for the year 1902 were published in General Orders, No. 6, January 26, 1903, these headquarters. This year's practice is now being carried on in accordance with the instructions and regulations published in General Orders, No. 20, current series, Headquarters of the Army. Forts Brady, Sheridan, and Thomas have post ranges; practice for the troops at Columbia Arsenal and Fort Wayne is held on leased land. The garrison at Columbus Barracks has practice on the State range at Newark, Ohio. Special measures were taken to have the ranges in good condition and to provide for as complete safety as can be obtained on any target range located in a rather thickly settled farming country.

Appropriation for shooting galleries and ranges, 1903, allotted to Department to be expended at discretion of department commander—\$2,223.

Allotted by department commander to:

Fort Brady	
Columbia Arsenal	\$116. 60
Columbus Barracks.....	46. 26
Fort Sheridan.....	1, 243. 74
Fort Thomas.....	62. 00
Fort Wayne.....	698. 65
Camp Douglas.....	30. 75
Army and department competitions	25. 00
Total	2, 223. 00

MILITARY INSTRUCTION.

The six months beginning November 1, 1902, and ending April 30, 1903, were designated as the period for officers' schools at all posts in the department. They were conducted strictly in accordance with the requirements of General Orders, No. 155, series 1901, and General Orders, No. 102, and Circular No. 8, current series, Headquarters of the Army. The progress made has been satisfactory.

During the school period named a school for noncommissioned officers and selected privates was conducted in each company, troop, and battery, and consisted of instruction in Army Regulations of the arm to which the men belong, and in the several manuals pertaining thereto, in minor tactics, and the elements of making and reading military maps.

All men, except the guard and sick, were required to attend calisthenic exercises and physical drills, which were held daily, Saturdays

and Sundays excepted. Special instruction in the duties of litter bearing and the methods of rendering first aid to the sick wounded was given to all enlisted men of the line as required in Army Regulations 1608, and the companies and detachments are reported to show a very fair degree of proficiency. Instruction in military signaling has been given at each post in accordance with Army Regulations 1747, and a general efficiency has been attained.

INSPECTIONS OF ORGANIZED MILITIA.

The inspections of organized militia in this department at date of this report were in progress in accordance with the requirements of General Orders, No. 7, current series, Headquarters of the Army. The inspections were ordered as follows:

STATE OF ILLINOIS.

Inspecting officers.—Lieut. Col. John B. Rodman, Maj. James S. Rogers, and Capt. Frank D. Webster, Twentieth Infantry, and Capt. Edward L. King, Second Cavalry.

	Officers.	Men.	Total.
First Infantry (12 companies).....	50	632	682
Second Infantry (12 companies)	52	645	697
Third Infantry (12 companies).....	34	700	734
Fourth Infantry (12 companies)	36	729	765
Fifth Infantry (12 companies)	35	629	664
Sixth Infantry (12 companies)	34	620	654
Seventh Infantry (12 companies)	51	752	803
Eighth Infantry (12 companies)	52	774	826
First Cavalry (8 troops)	36	334	370
Artillery battalion (3 batteries)	11	238	249
Engineer company.....	3	48	51
Signal Corps.....	3	70	73
Total	397	6,171	6,568

STATE OF INDIANA.

Inspecting officers.—Capts. Benjamin Alvord, Charles Crawford, and Frank D. Webster, Twentieth Infantry.

	Officers.	Men.	Total.
First Infantry (10 companies).....	26	577	603
Second Infantry (12 companies)	50	674	724
Third Infantry (12 companies).....	31	696	727
Artillery battalion (3 batteries)	11	185	196
Total	118	2,132	2,250

STATE OF KENTUCKY.

Inspecting officer.—Maj. William L. Buck, Third Infantry.

	Officers.	Men.	Total.
Second Infantry (5 companies).....	30	228	258
Third Infantry (11 companies).....	47	539	586
Unassigned infantry (4 companies)	8	161	169
Artillery battalion (3 batteries)	16	221	237
Total	101	1,149	1,250

STATE OF MICHIGAN.

Inspecting officer.—Maj. William T. Wood, Twentieth Infantry.

	Officers.	Men.	Total.
First Infantry (12 companies).....	49	868	917
Second Infantry (12 companies).....	49	783	832
Third Infantry (12 companies).....	51	897	948
First Independent Battalion (4 companies).....	16	294	310
Total	165	2,842	3,007

STATE OF OHIO.

Inspecting officers.—Maj. Arthur Williams and Capt. John W. Barker, Third Infantry.

	Officers.	Men.	Total.
First Infantry (10 companies).....	40	541	581
Second Infantry (8 companies)	30	456	486
Third Infantry (11 companies).....	40	580	620
Fourth Infantry (11 companies).....	37	523	560
Fifth Infantry (10 companies)	41	520	561
Sixth Infantry (12 companies)	36	601	637
Seventh Infantry (10 companies)	42	559	601
Eighth Infantry (12 companies).....	35	629	664
Battalion Ninth Infantry (4 companies)	16	246	262
Battalion of Engineers (4 companies).....	14	216	230
Cavalry (2 troops).....	6	90	96
Artillery battalion (4 companies).....	15	206	221
Total	352	5,167	5,519

STATE OF TENNESSEE.

Inspecting officer.—Capt. Fielder M. M. Beall, Third Infantry.

	Officers.	Men.	Total.
Fifth Infantry (7 companies)	22	389	411
Sixth Infantry (11 companies)	41	585	626
Infantry (8 companies unassigned).....	23	434	457
Battery A, Field Artillery.....	3	64	67
Troop B (unassigned).....	4	60	64
Total	93	1,532	1,625

STATE OF WISCONSIN.

Inspecting officers.—Capt. John F. Morrison, Twentieth Infantry, and Capt. G. Maury Crallé, Tenth Infantry.

	Officers.	Men.	Total.
First Infantry (12 companies).....	34	743	777
Second Infantry (12 companies).....	34	758	792
Third Infantry (12 companies).....	35	766	801
Tenth Battalion (4 companies)	12	255	267
First Cavalry (1 troop)	4	67	71
First Battery, Field Artillery.....	4	68	72
Total	123	2,657	2,780

The need of a military prison has been fully demonstrated. The post guardhouses have been overcrowded, although under instructions from superior authority I have released many prisoners where, in my judgment, such action was not likely to be detrimental to discipline, and, in some cases, I am afraid I have rather exceeded that limit in efforts to reduce the number of prisoners. Furthermore, I think it has a bad effect upon the young soldier entering the service to have constantly before his eyes these old soldiers serving long sentences, and that it would be in the interest of discipline to send all men under sentence of a year or more away from the post to a military prison.

Very respectfully,

J. C. BATES,
Major-General, Commanding.

G.—REPORT OF MAJ. GEN. JOHN C. BATES, U. S. ARMY, COMMANDING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
Omaha, Nebr., June 30, 1903.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of affairs in this department since the date of my last report, June 30, 1902:

In the last year this command has been increased by the arrival of the Sixth and Twenty-fifth Regiments of Infantry. The former took station at Fort Leavenworth July 2. The First Battalion, Twenty-fifth Infantry, reached and took station at Fort Niobrara, Nebr., August 17, and the headquarters, band, and Third Battalion on the 27th of the same month. Companies E, F, and H took station at Fort Reno, Okla., August 27, and Company G, September 18. Both regiments came from the Philippine Islands. No troops have been ordered from the department during the year.

The command is now composed as follows: First Battalion of Engineers; Fourth Cavalry, Eighth Cavalry, and the headquarters, band, First and Third Squadrons, Tenth Cavalry; the Sixth Infantry, Twenty-second Infantry, Twenty-fifth Infantry; the Sixth, Seventh, Sixteenth, Nineteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-eighth, and Twenty-ninth Batteries, Field Artillery, of which the Sixteenth is a siege and the Twenty-eighth a mountain battery. There is also a detachment of Indian scouts at Fort Sill, Okla. The strength of the command on this date is as follows: Commissioned officers, 349; enlisted men, 6,266; aggregate, 6,615. These numbers include the present and absent. The roster of troops attached hereto (Appendix A^a) shows the stations of the several organizations.

As far as practicable, I have made a personal inspection during the year of the garrisons within the department, but my assignment to the command of the Department of the Lakes on March 23, since which time I have commanded both departments, together with absence in Washington as a member of the board to recommend officers for detail on the General Staff, and duty in St. Louis, Mo., in command of the

^a Not printed.

regular troops assembled there in the latter part of April to participate in the dedicatory exercises of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, interfered with the programme I had laid out for inspections and prevented the completion of the work. I found the military posts visited by myself much improved since the year before, and the inspector-general of the department reports similar improvement elsewhere. During the Spanish-American war and part of the insurrection in the Philippines, the lack of sufficient garrisons to care for the several posts caused them to deteriorate, but, during the past year, those in this department have, largely through the care and foresight of the post commanders, been placed in as good condition as practicable, without much rebuilding at Forts Robinson and Niobrara, Nebr., and Forts Reno and Sill, Okla., none of which are modern posts. I will enter, further on, somewhat more into detail as to necessary repairs and rebuilding.

INSTRUCTION.

I note with pleasure the progress made during the year in military instruction. This includes not only careful and persistent theoretical instruction, but also practical training in the drill regulations, target practice, field exercises, and athletics.

The maneuvers held at Fort Riley, Kans., from September 20 to October 10 have been reported upon previously, but it is proper to add here they were of immense benefit to this command, especially so, of course, to the troops attending, but also in a large measure to those who were not so fortunate as to be present. The exercises and problems were carefully reported, and the published reports set a standard for similar instruction elsewhere, the beneficial results of which are so evident that I wish to dwell upon them with a view to emphasizing the importance of continuing the autumn maneuvers so auspiciously begun. In general, it may be said, officers and men have exhibited an interest and zeal in their military duties that bid fair to soon place their organizations on the high plane of efficiency held by company and regimental organizations on the outbreak of hostilities with Spain.

The Department orders in 1902 required field exercises to be distributed through the drill season, except when interfered with by target practice, commencing with at least one practice per week for all troops. For this purpose one portion of each garrison was ordered to alternate with the other, so that organizations designated for field exercises might parade with their full strength, all garrison duties being performed by the other units for that day. After October 1 these exercises were required more frequently, in order to make up the full forty days required by War Department orders, and all organizations were directed to turn out then as complete as possible, including hospital corps and signal classes, for more comprehensive problems. Similar orders prevail for the present drill season. In addition to the foregoing, instruction has been given in making and breaking camp with the several kinds of tents and in the practical use of the individual mess kit.

Reports of solutions of problems in minor tactics, including sketches and written reports from umpires, have been required.

It has been impressed upon officers that thoroughness in instruction, under conditions simulating as nearly as possible those of war, must be kept strictly in view, and they have been directed to strive for the

gradual development of entire units. The progress made has been gratifying.

Target practice.—As a result of recent changes of stations, the several organizations in the department labored under many disadvantages during the practice season of 1902 for small-arms firing. The Twenty-fifth Infantry did not arrive in time to participate in the department infantry competition held at Fort Leavenworth, and, although the Sixth Infantry had had some small-arms practice previous thereto, the prescribed course had not been completed. The Sixth and Twenty-second Regiments of Infantry were the only ones represented in the competition. Considering the disadvantages under which it was held, the competition was fairly successful and served to arouse interest in this important instruction.

In compliance with orders from the War Department no cavalry competition was held.

Instructions under the new Small-Arms Firing Regulations has been taken up with zeal throughout the department, although seriously interfered with at several of the posts by unusually heavy rains, notwithstanding which the improvement in target practice is marked. Careful and thorough training has also been given in the same practice in field batteries.

Officers' schools at posts.—The existing regulations have greatly improved this important instruction. When we consider the great number of young officers who have joined the colors in the past five years, and whose theoretical education was at first necessarily neglected because of active operations in the field, the importance of thoroughness in these schools is apparent. The examinations which follow the school season, and the certificates of proficiency given to those whose work is considered satisfactory by their instructors, add a definiteness to the course that did not exist under the provisions that governed the former lyceum. As it is impossible for all lieutenants of the line to have the benefit of the course at Fort Monroe, Fort Leavenworth, or the School of Application for Cavalry and Field Artillery at Fort Riley, it is recommended that the officers' schools continue to receive the constant care and supervision of the War Department in order to secure not only thoroughness in instruction, but uniformity in attainments, so that the certificate of proficiency will everywhere indicate substantially the same knowledge of the subjects studied.

While the War Department has retained the direct supervision of the special instruction given at the General Service and Staff College, and at the School of Application at Fort Riley, mentioned above, I deem it proper, and am pleased to say, that the commanding officer at each place has shown an attentiveness to duty and appreciation of the ends sought that have merited and attained success.

Post schools.—The school season for enlisted men covered the period from December 1 to March 31. The advisability of continuing instruction as it has been given in these schools for a number of years is doubtful. Enlisted men are supposed to receive therein such instruction as is given in some of the lower grades of our public schools. The regulations require that no man be enlisted who can not speak, read, and write the English language. The great mass of men who enlist have discontinued going to school, either because they have reached the age when men in this country habitually stop such attendance, or because it is distasteful to them. Enlistment in the Army

does not in any way change their views on this subject, and experience has shown that, with some exceptions, it is not the most efficient class of soldiers who elect to attend post schools. I recommend their discontinuance and the substitution of more general and thorough theoretical military education of the soldier under the immediate supervision of his company commander.

Athletics.—Instruction in athletics has been conducted in a manner to insure the systematic training of the troops, and my orders require that when not on duty in the field, on practice marches, or when not interfered with by target practice or field exercises, all troops be given some kind of athletic instruction for not less than twenty minutes per day, for at least four days in the week. While this instruction is placed under the general supervision of post commanders, they have been advised to give company commanders wide discretion in introducing variety. Instruction in bayonet and fencing exercises has been enjoined and included in the time set aside for athletics, and in mounted commands, mounted as well as dismounted exercises have been prescribed. Orders require that one day in each month be set aside for sports, games, military and athletic contests. Special reference to the work accomplished on this field day, together with the names of contestants winning individual events and of organizations winning combined events are noted on the monthly report of drills and instruction submitted to these headquarters, and the names and records of the individuals and organizations winning certain prescribed events have been published monthly in orders. To still further encourage interest in these sports, which do so much for the health, comfort, and happiness of the soldier, it is proposed during the coming autumn to hold a department contest, at which representatives of the different garrisons will be enabled to compete. As far as practicable, these contests will be between representatives chosen from different regiments and corps.

Advantages of large garrisons.—The facilities for instruction are naturally greater at military stations where there are large garrisons, and it is believed our proper policy should contemplate the ultimate building of posts for infantry and cavalry each of sufficient size to quarter a regiment, with accommodations for field batteries, where they can be stationed to the best advantage for drill and artillery practice. Such garrisons would give colonels an opportunity to exercise their proper commands, and give them experience that would prove of value to the country on the outbreak of war. We have now a number of colonels who have not had an opportunity, unless for a short period, to command a regiment, and we are likely to have a number more in the near future. While it may not be practicable, for some time to come, to station at one place sufficient troops to form a brigade, it is believed regimental garrisons might be realized in a few years. In this department I recommend that Fort Crook be made a regimental post for infantry, and that Jefferson Barracks, which is not suited for the instruction of a cavalry command, be converted into an infantry garrison, and enlarged so as to quarter a regiment. I renew my recommendation of last year that the garrison at Fort Riley be increased to two regiments of cavalry, while retaining the five batteries of field artillery which are now intended as part of its garrison. The large size of the reservation, together with its favorable location and the nature of its terrain, make it a suitable place for the maintenance and instruction of a large mounted force. Such a command would also permit selected general officers who

have not had an opportunity to command a mounted force of equal size in the field to gain experience in handling a considerable number of such troops. It is true similar experience is had during autumn maneuvers, but for a short time only.

Fort Sill, Okla., which, with the wood reserve, has a reservation of 77,920 acres, is another place where a large force might be stationed to advantage. The post is located in a mild climate, where troops can be instructed in the open for the greater part of the year and the terrain is admirably adapted for maneuvers. The wood reserve, situated about 15 miles from the balance of the reservation, contains 26,880 acres. If the land lying between the main reservation and the wood reserve could be acquired by the Government for military purposes we would then have an ideal place for maneuvers on a large scale.

The Apache prisoners of war are now located on the Fort Sill Reservation, and it must be admitted they have been permitted to believe that their location there was of a permanent nature, and that ultimately they were to acquire title to a portion of the land. In fact, Congress has added to the reservation for their especial benefit. The time has come, however, when a choice must be made between the military interests and those of the Indians. The term "prisoners" is a misnomer as applied to them, as in fact many have been born since the tribe was sent to Fort Sill in 1894. It seems undesirable to allow such a reservation—so favorable for military instruction—to pass from the control of the War Department. On the other hand, the progress these Indians have made toward civilization is justly entitled to mature consideration, and humanity dictates that their interests be closely guarded by the Government.

Fort Reno, Okla., with a reservation of 9,493 acres, lies about 90 miles from Fort Sill. The buildings are old, and if the garrison is to be continued the post had better be entirely rebuilt. It is believed to be worthy of consideration to transfer the Apache prisoners of war to the Fort Reno Reservation, giving it to them outright, including the buildings thereon, which, with perhaps, some slight alterations, might be made to admirably shelter these Indians. While the reservation is not of sufficient size to give to each 160 acres of land, if it be decided to divide it in severalty it will give to the tribe more than sufficient to maintain them in comfort, and even luxury, when they learn to use it to the best advantage. On account of the buildings they would thus receive it is not improbable they might view the change with satisfaction. It is understood there is considerable unused land adjoining the Fort Reno Reserve which belongs to the Darlington Indian Agency, and if thought desirable some of this might, perhaps, be given to the Apaches. If the suggested change be made, the Reno garrison should then be transferred to Fort Sill, to the benefit of military interests.

Concentration at St. Louis, Mo.—In the latter part of April there were assembled, under my command, at the grounds of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, St. Louis, Mo., 121 officers and 2,370 enlisted men from this department and 52 officers and 973 men from the Department of the Lakes, making a total of 173 officers and 3,343 enlisted men. These troops were thus concentrated to participate in the dedicatory exercises of the said exposition on April 30 and May 1 and 2. They were organized as a division as follows:

First Brigade.—First Battalion of Engineers; headquarters, band,

and two battalions, Third Infantry; headquarters, band, and two battalions, Twentieth Infantry. Brig. Gen. William A. Kobbé, U. S. Army, commanding.

Second Brigade.—Sixth Infantry; headquarters, band, Second and Third Battalions, Twenty-second Infantry. Brig. Gen. Frederick D. Grant, U. S. Army, commanding.

Cavalry.—Third Squadron, Fourth Cavalry; headquarters, band, and six troops, Eighth Cavalry. Maj. Frank A. Edwards, Fourth Cavalry, commanding.

Artillery.—Sixth Battery, Field Artillery; Seventh Battery, Field Artillery; Sixteenth Battery, Field Artillery; Twenty-eighth Battery, Field Artillery. Maj. Henry M. Andrews, Artillery Corps, commanding.

In addition to the foregoing the band, Fourth Cavalry, and the Ninth Band, Artillery Corps, were present. The troops made an excellent appearance, and I am much indebted to the commanding officers of the different organizations for their cordial cooperation. On several occasions, when not occupied with other duties, the troops engaged in military athletics, which exercises were well received.

The command, excepting the cavalry, which was in camp, was comfortably quartered in the educational building on the fair grounds, all necessary arrangements therefor having been made by Capt. William C. R. Colquhoun, Quartermaster's Department, chief quartermaster of the division, and both officers and men messed in the same building, all having their meals at the same hour under the very satisfactory management of Lieut. Col. Abiel L. Smith, Subsistence Department, chief commissary of the division.

The different commands were instructed to pay especial attention to entraining and detraining, and there can be no question about the concentration having furnished valuable experience to all concerned.

DISCIPLINE.

With increased instruction and larger garrisons the discipline of the command has correspondingly improved, and may be said to be generally satisfactory, although there have been many trials by courts-martial. Most of these, however, have been for minor offenses. The number of desertions continue to be large, and the opinion expressed in my report last year, that they are due in a large measure to homesickness on the part of the recruit and to the fact that a number of young men enlist with little knowledge of the life of a soldier, and without mature deliberation, is renewed, as is the suggestion that—

a trial for a few days at a military post is perhaps the best way to determine if an applicant for enlistment will probably make a desirable soldier, and it would also enable the man to decide understandingly if the life will suit him. It is believed to be practicable to apply this test in most instances.

FLOODS IN KANSAS AND MISSOURI.

During the latter part of May and first part of June heavy rains and floods inundated the southern portion of the department. The affliction was particularly felt in Kansas City, Kans., Kansas City, Mo., Lawrence, Manhattan, and Topeka, Kans. On May 31 telegraphic authority was received from the Secretary of War to extend the necessary assistance to the mayor of Kansas City, Kans. On the same date

the commanding officer, Fort Leavenworth, issued 10,000 rations and sent 85 conical wall tents and 600 blankets to the last-named city for the flood sufferers there. On June 1 the same officer was authorized to send two companies of engineers and pontoon material to Lawrence, Kans., the bridge over the river at that point having been swept away. Companies A and C, First Battalion of Engineers, were selected for this duty and left Fort Leavenworth on June 2. At the date of this report they are still at Lawrence.^a On the afternoon of the same day, Companies A and C, Sixth Infantry, were sent from Fort Leavenworth to Kansas City, Kans., to assist in preserving order and protecting property at that point. After a most satisfactory performance of this duty they returned to Fort Leavenworth on June 15.

On June 2, in compliance with instructions from the War Department, the commanding officer, Fort Leavenworth, was directed to confer with the mayors of surrounding towns and, where necessary, to render all the assistance in his power to secure the safety of lives and property. Similar instructions were given to the commanding officers, Fort Riley and Jefferson Barracks. On June 4 the commanding officer, Fort Leavenworth, sent 5 tons of straw, 10 field ranges, and 400 bed sacks to Kansas City, Kans.

On June 9 telegraphic requests from United States Senator J. R. Burton, Abilene, Kans., and from Messrs. Karnes and Cowherd, Kansas City, Mo., the former for pontoon material at Manhattan, Kans., and the others for pontoon material at Kansas City, were referred to these headquarters from the War Department with instructions to act as might seem best. The commanding officer, Fort Leavenworth, was communicated with and he reported that the 185 feet of bridge material still on hand there had been promised to Kansas City, Kans.; and this material, with Company B, First Battalion of Engineers, was sent to that point on June 11. On that date Senator Burton was informed by wire that all pontoon material was in use and that even if more were available it could not be sent to Manhattan for some time, as the railroads could not deliver and the wagon roads were impassable.

On June 9, in compliance with telegraphic request for assistance from Mr. F. G. Niedringhaus, St. Louis, Mo., the commanding officer, Jefferson Barracks, was directed to consult with that gentleman and give all possible assistance. Under these instructions there were issued for the use of flood sufferers in and about St. Louis 12 hospital tents, 17 common tents, 8 wall tents, and 17 gold-medal cots. The hospital tents were issued by the depot quartermaster, St. Louis; the remaining material by the quartermaster, Jefferson Barracks.

On June 10 the commanding officer, Fort Riley, wired these headquarters a request from the mayor of Topeka, Kans., for 500 tents. Authority for the issue of the same was granted.

About June 15 the situation had improved materially at all points which had suffered from the floods, and on June 17 instructions were

^aThe following statistics of the operation of the flying ferry at Lawrence, Kans., were supplied, subsequent to the date of this report, by Maj. S. S. Leach, Corps of Engineers:

"From June 20 to July 8, 1903, inclusive, the ferry made 653 trips, crossing the following: 26,562 foot passengers, 2,281 head of stock, 1,159 two-horse wagons, 1,286 one-horse wagons, 7,385 pounds package freight.

"The bridge at Kansas City carried a continuous stream of traffic, but as it is still in use the statistics have not been made up."

received from the War Department, under date of June 15, that "now that imminent danger of further loss of life by reason of flood has disappeared, the care of the indigent is one for the State and local authorities to meet." These instructions were repeated on June 18 to the commanding officers, Forts Leavenworth, Riley, and Jefferson Barracks.

There is no doubt but that the prompt action of the War Department in extending relief prevented much suffering and alleviated distress wherever possible.

No very serious damage from the floods occurred at any post in the department. Fort Riley suffered the loss of a bridge and two culverts, and was shut off from all communication for a short time. The Sixteenth Battery, Field Artillery, which was caught by the flood while en route from Fort Leavenworth to Fort Riley to hold its annual target practice, was delayed at St. Marys, Kans., for sixteen days. While the command experienced great inconvenience, no suffering occurred.

REPORTS OF STAFF OFFICERS.

Inspector-general's department.—This office has been held by several officers during the year, whose names will be found in Appendix C.^a Maj. Daniel H. Brush, Twenty-fifth Infantry, who has been acting inspector-general since the 19th instant, reports there have been 356 inventory and inspection reports received and recorded during the year. The property represented thereon, including public animals, consisted of 249,480 articles, inventoried at a value of \$302,352.86, and 11,279 articles of unknown value. Of the first class of property there were saved to the Government, in part at least, by being continued in service, sold at auction, or turned into depots, articles of an inventoried value of \$213,429.65. There was also a large saving made in a similar way on the articles mentioned of unknown value.

Capt. William M. Wright, Second Infantry, who performed the duties of inspector-general of the department for the greater part of the year, states as a result of his own observation, or from information received from officers while inspecting at the different posts, as follows:

The equipment for cavalry and field artillery seems to give general satisfaction, but that for infantry will admit of considerable improvement. The haversack with the present fair leather shoulder strap is excellent, but the meat-ration can, knife, fork, and spoon should be decreased in weight. There is no apparent reason why these articles should not be made of a strong, light, composite metal. The canteen should be made seamless, if possible. The seam in the present canteen accumulates filth, which is the cause of sickness.

The entrenching spade should bear no relation to the rifle, and one side of the spade should be sharpened so it can be used for a cutting tool. It should be of a light, portable weight. Combination tools are not recommended, but a certain proportion of light, pointed spades, picks, and axes should be distributed to each squad, section, platoon, and company. No entrenching tool should be attached to the cartridge belt. The tools should be carried handles up in light, stuffed, leather slings. It is recommended that the sergeants carry a cutting tool, either axe or serviceable bolo; the corporals to carry a pick, and each enlisted man a serviceable entrenching spade. In the Philippines the enlisted man should be equipped with a bolo, or serviceable cutting tool, and the entrenching tools discarded.

I am strongly in favor of having the entrenching tool carried by the soldier.

^a Not printed.

In speaking of the custom of our troops in piling their blanket rolls and haversacks as soon as they go into action, and thus separating themselves from very important parts of their equipment, he is of the opinion they should be required to carry the blanket rolls much farther into the fight, and, in fact, until it is absolutely impossible to proceed longer with them, and that the haversack should be carried by the soldier into action and never separated from him. I deem these suggestions worthy of consideration.

It is also stated that under our present system of issuing clothing to enlisted men, each man notifies his first sergeant of—

the clothing and size he wants, which is entered on the clothing schedule. The clothing is made up in bundles by the quartermaster-sergeant, or called off by the officer witnessing the issue, and the man makes off without knowing certainly whether he is fitted or not. Frequently he is not, and either changes with other men, goes back to the storehouse and exchanges, or more frequently does the best he can with what is given him. It is therefore recommended that all hats, shoes, blouses, trousers, overcoats, gloves, and exterior clothing be fitted on each man in the quartermaster storehouse, in the presence of the witnessing officer, and that this be done with care.

While the system proposed by Captain Wright will require a much greater time to be devoted by the quartermaster to the issue of clothing, it is desirable and should be enforced.

“There should be allowed to each company, battery, or troop, one regularly enlisted tailor.” I concur in this recommendation.

Captain Wright is of the opinion each chief of squad should keep a clothing book, and check the clothing belonging to the members of his squad every Saturday morning. He states he enforced this system while in Cuba in his company and found it absolutely stopped the sale or unlawful disposition of clothing.

“At the soldier’s discharge, all exterior clothing in his possession should be turned in and money credit given him on his final statements for its value as assessed by the company officers.” I think this a good suggestion; and such clothing as possesses value might then be resold at the assessed value to other soldiers who desire it, or issued to prisoners. The discharged man would then leave the garrison in civilian garb, which is desirable, as the uniform should be worn only by soldiers. This system, if adopted, will require the quartermaster’s department to keep on hand some plain but serviceable civilian clothing, which, if desired by the soldier, should be charged on his final statements.

Officers frequently criticise the present system of examination for promotion. It is a well-established fact that an officer ordered before an examining board at Fort Leavenworth receives a much more thorough examination than at some other places. Under the present system the character and thoroughness of the examination depend entirely on the personality of the board, and there can be no uniform standard of proficiency for promotions, as each board establishes its own. It is therefore recommended that the War College Board, or a board composed of officers of the General Staff Corps stationed in Washington, be placed in charge of all examinations for promotion. Questions in all subjects should be prepared by them and sent out to a suitable officer at each post, with orders for him to supervise the written examination, and on completion of each paper forward it direct to the examining board in Washington to pass on the officer’s proficiency.

The practical part of an officer’s examination should be conducted by officers detailed from the post, and their findings in this part of the examination should be final.

The physical examination should be conducted by the surgeons at the post, and the findings in each case should be carefully compared with the officer’s physical record at the War Department, and if found not to agree therewith the officer should be ordered to some other post for reexamination physically.

The foregoing remarks concerning examinations are concurred in.

Captain Wright urges that laundries be established at the different posts. I have expressed a similar opinion in a number of official communications. It is believed these laundries should preferably be conducted at public expense, or, if that be not practicable, then by authorized civilians at established rates.

Subsistence department.—Maj. W. H. Bean, commissary, U. S. Army, chief commissary, reports, from July 1, 1902, to June 30, 1903, funds received, disbursed, and remaining on hand as follows:

Received	\$312, 470. 99
Disbursed	309, 240. 41
Balance on hand	3, 230. 58

All stores and property at Forts Crook, Niobrara, and Robinson were purchased at Omaha; Forts Leavenworth, Riley, Reno, and Sill were supplied partly by the purchasing commissary at St. Louis, and partly by the purchasing commissary at Kansas City. Stores and property for Jefferson Barracks and Fort Logan H. Roots were supplied by the purchasing commissary at St. Louis. Stores were also purchased at Omaha for Fort Meade, S. Dak., in the Department of Dakota, and posts in Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico. Carloads of packing-house products were shipped from Omaha to Manila, P. I.

During the year shipments by the chief commissary included 51 carloads, 1,870,497 pounds, and 477 lots less than carload, 1,201,124 pounds, making a total of 3,071,621 pounds.

For the six months, July 1 to December 31, beef was furnished at seven posts by local dealers, and at two posts by packing houses; highest price paid, 11 cents per pound; lowest price, 5.70 cents per pound. For the six months, January 1 to June 30, beef was furnished by local dealers at two posts and by packing houses at seven posts; highest price paid, 7.44 cents; lowest price, 5.69. Fort Leavenworth was the cheapest point of supply in each case. The highest price paid for the first six months was at Fort Logan H. Roots, for local beef, and for the second six months at Fort Reno, Okla., for local beef.

The chief commissary reports no issue bacon was lost in this department during the year. The savings in bacon purchased by post commissaries were 225,946 pounds.

Major Bean is of the opinion—

it would result in improved supply to the troops at all posts in this department if potatoes and onions, and other vegetable matter that could be issued in lieu of onions, were raised in gardens at posts for consumption during the hot months of the year. In June, July, August, and, southward in September, fresh vegetables deteriorate in shipment. The supply would be more wholesome and less expensive if raised on the reservations, either by the use of soldier gardeners, or by the letting of ground on the reservation to responsible parties, with the option of purchasing fresh vegetable matter so raised at reasonable and fixed prices.

In this connection it may be stated that the cultivation of gardens at posts is quite general. The suggestion of the chief commissary for letting ground on the reservation to responsible parties, with the option of purchasing fresh vegetables from them by the subsistence department, is worthy of consideration.

In June there were issued to sufferers by the floods in Kansas rations to the value of \$1,296.96.

Captains of the subsistence department are now commissary officers at Forts Leavenworth and Riley. The large garrisons at these posts, as well as the annual maneuvers at Fort Riley, make it desirable that officers of the subsistence department continue to fill these places.

Major Bean recommends—

that the proper feeding of officers of the Army and of civilians representing the press of the country, and of all military representatives from foreign countries during war, or in actual service in the field when conditions are analogous to those of war, be made a subject of regulations.

He recommends that at such times a ration be issued to each of the persons mentioned (the foreign officers and press representatives being duly accredited by the Secretary of War), and that the Government provide the proper means for preparing and serving the same. I concur in this recommendation.

The opinion is also expressed that—

a most important necessity at posts, as shown by the records of this department, is a first-class post baker, either enlisted as such or employed as a civilian on the same basis as a post blacksmith, post wheelwright, post engineer, or other civilian employee. If post bakers are put under charge of the regimental or post commissaries, and their superintendence is made a part of the duty of the regimental or post commissary and commissary sergeant, with one competent civilian baker, soldiers can then be trained to be good bakers, and a year of such management will, in my opinion, give conclusive arguments in favor of its continuance. The increased cost will be paid by increased economy, and the quality of the bread will be superior to that now baked. A trial is recommended at Forts Leavenworth, Riley, Jefferson Barracks, Crook, Niobrara, and Robinson.

This recommendation is approved.

The average cost of the ration for the year is 14.94 cents.

Medical department.—Col. J. B. Girard, assistant surgeon-general, U. S. Army, has been chief surgeon of the department since November 4 last. During the months of May and June he made a tour of inspection comprising all of the posts in the department. He states he “was enabled to see for himself the condition of the various detachments of the hospital corps and to judge of their proficiency in the theoretical and practical knowledge demanded of them in the execution of their duties.” He reports he found the buildings and grounds generally well kept, the furniture, bedding and clothing, medicine and stores of all kinds in the best of order and condition, and that he was favorably impressed with the general efficiency of the hospital detachments.

On this date, June 30, the personnel of the medical department consists of 28 medical officers, including 10 contract surgeons and 2 contract dental surgeons. The number of medical officers is reported to have been sufficient to meet all the wants of the troops. The chief surgeon, however, invites—

attention to the fact that some discontent is caused among the officers of the line by the assignment of young lieutenants as post surgeons at several large stations where officers of higher rank and experience in military matters should properly be in charge of the hospitals. I am of the opinion that whenever practicable a medical officer of the rank of major, or at least not lower than that of captain, should be on duty at the headquarters of every regiment.

This opinion is concurred in. More dental surgeons are required.

The number of enlisted men of the Hospital Corps serving in the department is 188. They are distributed—

among the various stations in such a way as to provide each post with its complete allowance under paragraph 1606, Army Regulations, with a few extra men here and there to meet emergencies and fill prospective vacancies.

Attention is invited to Appendix G.^a A comparison of these tables with the corresponding ones in last year's report shows a decided improvement in the health of the garrisons. The percentage of noneffectiveness from disease has been lowered from 5.6 to 4.5, this in a number of troops nearly double what it was last year. This improvement is most conspicuous in the case of two very important classes of affections, viz, malarial fever and diarrhea and dysentery—diseases which are among those more easily controlled by sanitary measures. The percentage of malarial cases in the year ending June 30, 1902, was 12.6, while during the past year it has only been about 8.2. The corresponding figures for diarrhea and dysentery, 17 and 6, are still more significant and encouraging. That the measures taken at every post

^a Not printed.

to combat the mosquito plague and to prevent the use of impure drinking water by the garrisons have done much to bring about this improvement there can be little doubt.

An epidemic of typhoid fever prevailed at Fort Leavenworth during the winter months and caused a great deal of anxiety to the officers responsible for the health of the command. It was undoubtedly due to the defective water supply of the post.

The mildness of the epidemic and its final disappearance are, in the opinion of the chief surgeon, due to the zeal and persistency with which the post surgeon enforced sanitary measures. As stated elsewhere in this report an early improvement is anticipated in the water supply at Fort Leavenworth.

Colonel Girard reports:

Fort Niobrara has again this year vindicated its claim to be the healthiest post in the department, with a rate of sickness much lower than that of any other station. For some obscure reason Fort Logan H. Roots, almost a model post in all its appointments, shows a much higher percentage of cases than any other. Fort Robinson and Jefferson Barracks have improved considerably since last year.

An improvement is also noted at Fort Leavenworth, where the percentage of sick to command has been reduced from 8.1 last year to 5.9.

The chief surgeon reports that other posts do not call for special remarks concerning the sick list, and that their sanitary condition is fairly satisfactory.

Thirty-five deaths occurred during the year, of which 24 were in line of duty, 8 not in line of duty, and 3 undetermined.

The ratio of deaths per thousand of mean strength is very nearly 5.83.

During the year there were 184 enlisted men discharged on surgeon's certificate of disability.

Of these disabilities 75 were contracted in the line of duty; 109 were not incident to the service; 45 of the latter cases existed at the time of enlistment.

The ratio of discharges per thousand of the command was a little less than 31. It was last year 36.26, and the year before 41.43—a steady decrease from year to year which augurs well for the future.

In this connection I desire to invite special attention to the fact that very nearly one-fourth of these discharges were granted for causes existing at the time of enlistment, and that recruits have not always been examined with an amount of care sufficient to keep improper applicants out of the service. This complaint is not a new one, as the identical situation existed last year, and was commented upon in the corresponding annual report in the following words, which are worth repeating: "It is thus seen that in 33 per cent of the discharges made the cause existed at the time the man was accepted as a recruit. This percentage is a silent stricture on the laxity of the physical examination to which recruits are subjected, and clearly indicates that in too many instances the medical examiner, usually a civilian physician specially employed for the purpose, performs his work in an altogether superficial manner." I consider the employment of that class of medical men in recruiting offices as radically wrong.

The two hospitals completed last year at Fort Leavenworth and Fort Robinson have proved quite insufficient for the garrisons and will have to be enlarged before long by the addition of suitable wings. The hospital at Fort Riley is also inadequate, and being, furthermore, old and inconvenient in many respects the erection of a large and modern hospital is considered urgently necessary at that important station.

I concur in these remarks, and renew the recommendation made in my last annual report that a new hospital, constructed on a modern plan, be built at Fort Riley.

The hospital at Fort Niobrara—

is an old building, altered in some ways and enlarged at various times, and not up to modern standards, though fairly adapted to the treatment of the sick.

At Fort Crook—

the hospital, like all other buildings at the post, is a comparatively new and handsome brick structure, thoroughly modern in plan and appointments. I consider the

location of the kitchen in the main building a decided defect, in view of the hot summers of this region, and would advocate the addition of a wing or detached pavilion for the same purpose.

The chief surgeon reports:

The hospital at Fort Reno, though frame, is a fine building, planned on modern principles, and well adapted to the object for which it was constructed.

The hospital at Fort Sill "is an old and substantial stone structure constructed on the usual lines." The chief surgeon states, however:

The interior is antiquated, the wards poorly lighted and gloomy. The lavatories are inconveniently located on the back porches, obstructing the window space, and their fixtures are rather primitive. The hospital lacks a number of conveniences of much necessity, such as closets for patients' effects and other purposes.

The hospital at Fort Logan H. Roots is a comparatively new brick building, and in the opinion of the chief surgeon meets the requirements of the post very well.

At Jefferson Barracks the hospital is a very old structure—

The internal arrangements are antiquated, and the location of the kitchen and dining room in the basement is extremely objectionable. The plumbing is decidedly old style, though fairly efficient. The building does not harmonize with the rest of the post.

I again earnestly recommend that a new hospital be built at Jefferson Barracks.

Pay department.—Maj. John C. Muhlenberg, paymaster, U. S. Army, chief paymaster, reports that including the balance on hand June 30, 1902, there has been received by the pay department during the past fiscal year \$3,604,144.81, and that a like amount has been expended less \$144,022.56, balance in hands of paymaster on this date. He reports payments have been regularly and promptly made during the year. The manner in which the duty has been performed meets with my approval.

Major Muhlenberg also states:

I desire to invite attention to the inadequacy of the allowance of commutation of quarters to officers as now provided by law. Officers stationed in large cities can not rent suitable houses for the present allowance of commutation of quarters. The present allowance was established years ago, and rents have probably doubled since the law went into effect. Either the number of rooms for each rank should be increased or the commutation allowance for each room increased.

I strongly indorse this recommendation and prefer the second method as more equitable.

Engineer officer.—Maj. Smith S. Leach, Corps of Engineers, engineer officer, states maps of posts and reservations called for by Department orders in 1902 have been received from Jefferson Barracks, Mo., Fort Reno and Fort Sill, Okla., and that similar maps of other posts are in the course of preparation. At Forts Leavenworth and Riley—the magnitude of the work involved at Fort Robinson the disappearance of the initial points of the old survey, and at several posts the frequent changes of engineer officers have operated to delay completion.

A map of the Fort Riley Reservation and surrounding country, and another on a larger scale of the reservation only, were prepared and a large number of blue prints made for distribution to officers of the various organizations, regular and militia, participating in the fall maneuvers at Fort Riley. Another tracing was made and an edition of 500 copies lithographed for binding with the Report of the Chief Umpire—this last under a special allotment of funds from the Chief of Engineers.

Major Leach adds that the compilation of a map of the department has been in progress since January last.

The projection is completed, the principal cities and towns platted from geographical coordinates, and the transfer sheets for about one-half the entire area are drawn.

There is no map of the department with its present limits and the one now being prepared is needed.

In addition to the work mentioned above there have been a number of tracings and blueprints made for various posts.

Signal officer.—During the drill season of 1902 Department orders required that signal practice, in accordance with paragraph 1747, Army Regulations, be held in August and September; and during the present season my orders require this instruction be taken up in July and continued until proficiency is attained.

Cipher messages, as required by paragraph 1332, Army Regulations, have been sent and received from all post commanders. Forty-three officers and 140 enlisted men have become proficient in day and night signaling with flag or heliograph, or both, in the Army and Navy code.

There have been installed by the Signal Corps at Fort Riley, Kans., and Fort Crook, Nebr., telephone systems, which materially facilitate the transaction of official business at those posts.

Ordnance officer.—Organizations in the department are reported to be properly equipped. Many black leather equipments have become unserviceable and have been replaced by equipments of fair leather.

Inspector of small-arms practice.—The inspector of small-arms practice, Capt. William M. Wright, Second Infantry, aid-de-camp, reports that 144 men qualified as sharpshooters during the target season of 1902; 122 as marksmen; 388 in the first class; 713 in the second class, and 2,201 in the third class. The practice season for 1903 was announced in orders from these headquarters on March 20th last, which directed that post commanders give special attention to preliminary drills, gallery practice, and estimating distance. Different months were selected for the regular and supplementary seasons, with a view of securing suitable weather at the various stations.

After a thorough investigation, it was decided it was not safe to hold practice on the Fort Crook rifle range, and land was rented for this purpose on the Omaha Indian Reservation, at a distance of about 85 miles from the post. The site selected is not entirely satisfactory, but was the best that could be found within reasonable distance at the time.

The range at Fort Leavenworth has been enlarged and improved and at a reasonable expense can be made one of the best in the country.

The Fort Riley range is in fair condition, but with the arrival of another squadron, which is expected to take station at that post, it will have to be enlarged and its location possibly changed.

The ranges at Forts Sill, Reno, Robinson, and Niobrara are reported in fair and serviceable condition; that at Fort Logan H. Roots is only fair.

The range at Arcadia, Mo., which is used by the troops at Jefferson Barracks, will require the expenditure of considerable money to make it satisfactory. The pit is located at the foot of a hill where the soil is composed of clay and gravel, which, in the spring, is water-soaked, and drainage from the adjacent hills frequently renders the pit unfit for use. Strong oak posts set 4 feet in the ground were displaced by frost, and the sponge-like nature of the clay forms an insecure hold for timber construction. The range officer recommends that a rubble masonry retaining wall, with a cement floor for the pit, and good drainage, be constructed, in which recommendation the inspector-general of the department, after an inspection of the ground, concurs. The range is well located and can be made a good one. As it will

probably be required as long as Jefferson Barracks is maintained, it is recommended improvements of a permanent character be made, including roads and several necessary bridges. Much work was done at Arcadia by the troops during the wet season last spring, which will probably have to be repeated next year if the rains be heavy and permanent improvements are not made. The allotment from the appropriation for "shooting galleries and ranges" is not sufficient to accomplish all the necessary work. Frequently the rains are heavy and the weather often very warm, rendering it desirable to build kitchens and dining rooms for the enlisted men and sheds to cover the horses and forage. A properly constructed house to store target material is also needed. Water is obtained from a well. It is thought either an artesian well should be sunk or water piped from springs in the vicinity. Sinks have been dug from year to year, and if this practice be continued there is danger of poisoning the soil. The post commander recommends the dry-earth system be adopted, in which I concur. The reservation is fenced, but the inspector-general reports that posts are 15 feet apart and the wire sags so as to allow cattle and hogs to enter. This can be obviated by placing a support between every two posts. The necessary estimates for the above-mentioned construction and repairs will be submitted.

Judge-advocate.—Lieut. Col. John A. Hull, judge-advocate, U. S. Army, judge-advocate of the department, reports there were 468 completed trials by general courts-martial during the year, with 420 convictions, 36 acquittals, and the sentences were disapproved by the reviewing officer in 12 cases. Twenty men were tried by general court-martial more than once, and 65 belonged to other commands. One hundred and sixty-one of these trials were for desertion and 87 for absence without leave. These figures for desertion and absence without leave call for special attention. As previously stated in this report, desertions are largely due to homesickness on the part of the recruit and to the fact that young men enlist without mature deliberation. If we can succeed in making applicants for enlistments better understand the nature of the duties of a soldier it is believed we will eliminate one of the most frequent causes of desertion. In 1896-97, the last year of peace conditions before the outbreak of the war with Spain, the per cent of the men tried by general courts-martial to the average enlisted strength of this command was 5.2; in 1901-2 it was 10, and during the year just closed, 7½. This shows that although we have made material improvement in this direction during the past year over that of 1901-2, we have not reached the more favorable conditions of the year just preceding the outbreak of the recent war. In connection with trials by general courts-martial it is worthy of note that the increased power of punishment of inferior courts-martial was invoked during the year in 270 cases, many of which would, doubtless, in 1897 have been acted upon by general courts-martial.

During the year there were 22 trials by garrison court, of which 17 resulted in conviction and 4 in acquittal, and one sentence was disapproved.

There were 3,429 men tried by summary courts-martial, resulting in 6,216 trials, with 5,980 convictions and 236 acquittals. It should be observed, however, that many of these trials were for light offenses that do not demand serious attention. It is believed many of them

might have been avoided with advantage if a more liberal, although defined, power of punishment was conferred upon company commanders.

Referring again to the year ending 1897, it is observed that in this department the number of men tried by summary courts-martial was 29.4 per cent of the enlisted strength. During the past year it was 54.9. Several reasons may be assigned for this unfavorable comparison. The numerous detachments into which regimental organizations were divided for a time in the Philippines, the introduction of many young and somewhat inexperienced officers, and the great number of recruits required for an increased establishment naturally made conditions less favorable than formerly. Again, in 1896-97 the anticipated war caused an unusual number of applicants of high character to apply for enlistment.

Speaking of the offenses tried by garrison and summary courts-martial, the judge-advocate states:

The charges show that 783 are directly traceable to the use of intoxicating liquor. The number of trials by summary courts-martial due to drink can not be determined from the present reports to this office, but it is believed that an estimate that 50 per cent of the trials are so caused would be conservative.

The judge-advocate is of the opinion—

the important change in the administration of military justice that is needed in this department is reform in the care and custody of military prisoners and the return from the post-guardhouse system to the method involved in that of a military prison, and this change can not be too strongly urged

In this opinion I earnestly concur. The post guardhouses are overcrowded and, what is even more serious, the contact of the men convicted by courts-martial, especially by general courts-martial, with young soldiers "in good standing is highly prejudicial to the interests of discipline."

First Lieut. Van Leer Wills, Twelfth Infantry, aid-de-camp, was in charge of the office of the judge-advocate from July 1, 1902, until relieved by Lieutenant-Colonel Hull November 22, 1902. The duties of the office have been performed satisfactorily.

Quartermaster's department.—Lieut. Col. John W. Pullman, deputy quartermaster-general, U. S. Army, performed the duties of chief quartermaster of the department and depot quartermaster at Omaha, Nebr., during the year. He was relieved from duty at these headquarters before his report could be made up, and the tables herewith, marked Appendixes H and I,^a have been submitted by Capt. P. W. Davison, quartermaster, Twenty-second Infantry, acting chief quartermaster, from data taken from the chief quartermaster's office.

The duties of the chief quartermaster and depot quartermaster required close attention and hard work and they were performed in a very satisfactory manner.

Posts.—Building at Fort Leavenworth has been carried on during the year on an extensive scale, and the post has reached a size hitherto unknown in our service. The work accomplished is all of a substantial nature, and any added in the future should be of a permanent character. As the seat of the General Service and Staff College, where it is proposed to give a technical education to carefully selected young officers from the infantry and cavalry, it should be made in every

^a Not printed.

respect a model garrison. On this instant the strength of the command is:

Commissioned officers	92
Enlisted men	1,795
Aggregate.....	1,887

When the companies of infantry and troops of cavalry have been filled to the full strength authorized, the garrison will be materially increased and the strength of the command will be about equal to that of some of the smaller departments a few years ago. The great size of the garrison makes it desirable that a liberal policy be pursued in making improvements and repairs and in furnishing clerical assistance for post and college headquarters and for the several staff officers.

The character of the drinking water furnished at Fort Leavenworth during the past year has continued to be highly unsatisfactory. A board of officers has recommended what is believed to be a satisfactory solution of the difficulty. The proceedings of the board have received my approval, and it is hoped and believed that effective measures are about to be undertaken to give this post potable water.

At Fort Riley a number of buildings have been erected during the year, all of which were well constructed and, because of the size and character of the reservation, it is recommended that liberal allotments be made for those to be erected in the future, and for the necessary repairs.

Fort Niobrara is located on an extensive reservation. The sanitary conditions are good, but the quarters and barracks are old, and if the post is to be continued, rebuilding on an extensive scale will soon be necessary.

Fort Robinson is well located on a fine reservation. Many of the buildings are poor, and need to be replaced. It is recommended the post be enlarged to quarter a regiment.

The other posts in the department require no further remarks than have already been made in this report.

APACHE PRISONERS OF WAR.

These Indians, located at Fort Sill, Okla., continue to be under charge of Capt. Farrand Sayre, Eighth Cavalry, who has administered their affairs in a highly creditable manner.

Captain Sayre reports there were 10 births in the tribe during the year and 11 deaths, and that these people have diminished in numbers every year since they were taken into captivity, but that the percentage of loss is decreasing. In 1899 the excess of deaths over births was 16; in 1900, 15; 1901, 13; 1902, 10, and in 1903, but 1. The tribe numbers 266, including a few children absent at school.

Captain Sayre recommends that a medical officer be designated as "On duty with Apache prisoners of war," and that he devote his duty to these Indians exclusively. Captain Sayre's administration of the affairs of this tribe has been so successful it is believed this recommendation, which he has made on several occasions, should be complied with.

He states no clothing was issued gratuitously to these Indians during the year, and that they have clothed themselves and appear better dressed than when clothing was issued to them.

A reduction in the quantity of rations issued to the Apaches was begun in November last, and it is intended to make a further reduction during the present summer.

These Indians had under cultivation a year ago about 800 acres with fair success.

Their principal wealth is in horned cattle, which is their chief industry. On June 30, 1902, they had 3,438 head. They sold during the year 212 head, and on this date they are reported to possess 3,714.

About a year and a half ago horse raising was taken up systematically and promises good results.

The sum of \$4,000 was specially appropriated by Congress in 1902 for these Apaches, and was expended for building materials, labor, farming machinery, smithing coal, and barbed wire for fencing.

Three new reservoirs for retaining water for stock were constructed during the year and two old ones extensively repaired. There are now eight on the reservation. They are of great value in providing permanent water for stock on portions of the reservation which would be useless as a cattle range without them.

The Indians have been more successful in obtaining remunerative labor this year than in any preceding year, and it has resulted in increased prosperity and contentment.

Three hundred peach trees were purchased and distributed among the Indians and planted and cared for by them.

The school attendance on the reservation is reported to have been good and the results reached excellent. A special effort was made to induce some of the older boys and girls to volunteer to go to school at Chilocco and Carlisle, with encouraging results.

The conduct of these Indians is stated to have been generally good throughout the year. Improved health and increased prosperity have brought them greater comfort and contentment.

Captain Sayre recommends—

that no change be made in the status or location of these Indians. They are advancing and developing as rapidly as is consistent with solid progress, and they have opportunities for further progress under existing conditions.

My own views of what should be done with them have been previously stated in this report. If they are to be kept at Fort Sill, I concur in the recommendation of Captain Sayre that the grazing privilege on the Fort Sill wood reserve be leased for their benefit. It is believed such a lease will bring in about \$3,000 per annum.

Very respectfully,

J. C. BATES,

Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding Department.

H.—REPORT OF BRIG. GEN. FREDERICK D. GRANT, U. S. ARMY, COMMANDING THE DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,
San Antonio, Tex., July 23, 1903.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following annual report of the Department of Texas for the year ending June 30, 1903, respecting conditions and affairs which have come under my knowledge and

jurisdiction since October 28, 1902, on which date, pursuant to paragraph 21, Special Orders, No. 190, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, series of 1902, I assumed command, relieving therefrom Col. W. C. Forbush, Twelfth Cavalry, who had been in command during the preceding period of the fiscal year.

TROOPS IN DEPARTMENT.

During the past fiscal year the military command of the department embraced, at different periods, the following organizations: Twelfth Cavalry (organization in the department completed June 1, 1901); Seventeenth Battery, Field Artillery (organization in the department completed in June, 1901); Second Battery, Field Artillery; Fourth Infantry, which arrived February 5, 1902, from the Philippine Islands; one battalion of the Twelfth Infantry (Companies I, K, L, and M), which arrived May 8, 1902, from the Philippine Islands, and headquarters, band, and one squadron of the First Cavalry, which arrived from the Philippine Islands, for station in this department, June 15, 1903.

In addition to the above a detachment of Seminole Negro-Indian scouts, numbering 20 in all, has been assignable for military purposes.

The movement of troops from and to this department on account of changes in the Philippine Islands details began on January 21, 1903, when the Seventeenth Battery, Field Artillery, left Fort Sam Houston, Tex., by rail for San Francisco, en route to the Philippine Islands, and in its place the Fifteenth Battery, Field Artillery, en route from the Philippine Islands, arrived at Fort Sam Houston, Tex., April 14, 1903.

The Second Squadron, Twelfth Cavalry, under orders for service in the Philippine Islands, left Fort Clark, Tex., April 20, 1903, and was followed on May 18, 19, and 20, 1903, by the Fourth Regiment of Infantry, and by the First Squadron, Twelfth Cavalry, on June 15, 1903. The removal of the Fourth Infantry necessitated the withdrawal of all the troops stationed at Forts Brown, Ringgold, and McIntosh and Camp Eagle Pass, and the temporary garrisoning of those posts by detachments of the Twelfth Infantry from Fort Bliss. It will thus be seen that in consequence of the transfer and exchange of regiments to and from this department the aggregate command of this military department was temporarily reduced to a minimum, and, since June 20 last, has consisted of but one squadron of the Twelfth Cavalry, two batteries of field artillery, one battalion of the Twelfth Infantry, and headquarters, band, and one squadron, First Cavalry, distributed as follows, namely: Fort Bliss, 112 enlisted men; Fort Brown, 47 enlisted men; Fort Clark, 542 enlisted men; Camp Eagle Pass, 42 enlisted men; Fort McIntosh, 35 enlisted men; Fort Ringgold, 52 enlisted men; Fort Sam Houston, 335 enlisted men, the total of which, together with 29 temporary absentees, makes an aggregate of 1,194 enlisted men. From this number, however, should be deducted the enlisted strength of the headquarters, band, and Third Squadron, Twelfth Cavalry, at Fort Clark, which is under orders to pack and prepare to be relieved from duty at that post for transfer to the Philippine Islands, practically leaving for duty within the Department of Texas at this time a total enlisted strength of 912 men. The present minimized, nominal garrisons at Forts Brown, Ringgold, and McIntosh and Camp Eagle Pass consist of detachments of the Twelfth Infantry from Fort Bliss; and if the garrison of 542 enlisted men at Fort Clark seems comparatively large at the present time, it is due to the fact that 282 enlisted

men of the Twelfth Cavalry are about to be relieved from duty at that post, as above mentioned.

This anomalous and unusual condition of the garrisons of this department, it need hardly be stated, is due to the method of transfers of troops to and from this department, which, however much it would be regretted should emergency arise to require additional force, doubtless could not have been well avoided in initiating the new system or plan of Philippine service. Indeed, it may not be out of place to remark in this connection that while the changes by reason of discharge or transfer of the short-service enlisted men in the regiments under orders for the Philippine service were undoubtedly made pursuant to the best judgment of higher military authority (which I have neither purpose nor desire to criticise in any way whatsoever) and rendered necessary on account of the fact that the term of service of many enlisted men would expire on or about the same date, within a year of the time of the departure of the regiments ordered from this department to the Philippines, it was most deplorable that two such splendid regiments as the Twelfth Cavalry and Fourth Infantry, after being brought up to high standards of efficiency and usefulness, were necessarily so radically changed as almost to emasculate some of the organizations. This was especially noticeable in the Twelfth Cavalry, which even in the first year of its existence became one of the best regiments in the service, fit for any duty in any climate. Its organization under the act of Congress approved February 21, 1901, was quickly completed in this military department on June 30 of the same year, and from the good material of old soldiers and desirable recruits that eagerly sought its ranks by the subsequent reduction of troops to the newly prescribed maximum, troop commanders were enabled to weed out those who were in any way dissatisfied with the service or found to be undesirable as soldiers, thereby practically leaving in the regiment on the second anniversary of its organization 795 picked men whose status with respect to discipline, training, and general deportment was so meritorious as to suggest on my part a letter of commendation through military channels to the military commander of the Philippines. It was a matter of regret that previous to their departure for the Philippine Islands all of the troops of that regiment suffered more or less derangement by the transfer or discharge of many of their best men who happened to have but one year or less still to serve.

Of course it will be remembered that under the instructions of March 2 all men of the Twelfth Cavalry having less than one year to serve from date of sailing of their regiment were ordered to be discharged, provided they immediately reenlisted, and under that provision 266 men were discharged and reenlisted for their former organizations. Under date of March 16 all men having less than one year to serve from date of sailing who did not signify intention to reenlist were ordered to be transferred, while noncommissioned officers in that class were given the option of discharge. Under that ruling 178 men of the Twelfth Cavalry were transferred to the First and Seventh Cavalry, while 3 noncommissioned officers of the Twelfth Cavalry and 10 noncommissioned officers of the Fourth Infantry took their discharge under that ruling.

Subsequently, on April 18, all previous instructions were amended so as to allow noncommissioned officers, cooks, farriers and blacksmiths, saddlers, wagoners, and trumpeters who had been recently transferred from the Twelfth Cavalry and who had more than six months

to serve from date of sailing of the regiment to accompany former organizations in their former capacities, provided troop commanders wished their services, and under that provision 19 men reentered the service. On April 19 it was ordered that all men of the Twelfth Cavalry who had more than six months to serve from date of sailing and who had not up to that time been transferred were to be allowed to accompany their regiments to the Philippines. It would seem, however, that the Twelfth Cavalry had lost 181 men; and though it regained 19, it still had to supply the places of 162 well-trained and tried soldiers by new men. The Fourth Infantry by the transfers lost 80 of their old men, but gained 58 by transfer from the Twelfth Infantry.

In my opinion, I beg to say that it would seem to me, despite the question of economy involved, wiser to send regimental organizations to the Philippines intact, without regard to the dates of enlistments of the men composing them. I believe that had the Twelfth Cavalry and the Fourth Infantry been sent to the Philippines in the splendid condition in which their officers had placed them, many of the men who took their discharge, or who were transferred for the purpose of probable early discharge, would have reenlisted and remained in the regiment in the Philippines.

MILITARY INSTRUCTION.

According to the records previous to my arrival in this department, and within my own knowledge since that time, all the requirements of existing orders with respect to the practical and theoretical instruction of this command have, as far as practicable, been fully complied with. Owing to existing conditions, however, it need hardly be stated that the plan of outdoor practical instruction was more or less narrowed, although it is believed that the cavalry, artillery, and infantry all had a share in the general practice marching, alone and in combination with each other.

Theoretical.—Post schools for officers were conducted at all posts in the department, as required by existing regulations; the results obtained are most gratifying.

Schools for enlisted men were conducted at all posts where practicable, and also schools for noncommissioned officers under the immediate charge of troop, battery, and company commanders.

Practical.—Practical instruction (including close and extended order drills, signaling, small-arms practice, calisthenics, instruction in packing, minor tactics, field exercises, etc.) has been carried out so far as practicable, the field exercises being of necessity limited to the ground available. At Fort Sam Houston, where the drill ground is not of sufficient area to even maneuver a battalion, this instruction had to be limited accordingly. The establishment in the vicinity of Fort Sam Houston of a practice and maneuver ground of sufficient extent to accommodate all arms in combined maneuvers is recommended. In this connection I invite special attention to correspondence and the proceedings of the board of officers convened by paragraph 1, Special Orders, No. 5, series of 1902, these headquarters, with reference to the Oppenheimer tract.

All troops in the department have made practice marches or changed station by marching. In addition to this, the band and first squadron, Twelfth Cavalry, commanded by Maj. L. R. Hare, Twelfth Cavalry, attended the encampment of the Texas Volunteer Guard at Austin, Tex., from July 22 to 30, 1902; the band, Fourth Infantry, Troop

A, Twelfth Cavalry, and the Seventeenth Battery, Field Artillery, took part in the carnival at Palestine, Tex., from September 14 to September 20, 1902, and the band, Fourth Infantry, and the Seventeenth Battery, Field Artillery, commanded by Capt. G. G. Gatley, Artillery Corps, attended the Central Texas Fair at Bryan, Tex., from October 12 to October 19, 1902.

United States troops seem to be at all times welcome in every community in Texas, and upon the occasions of State or county fairs in almost every instance application is made to these headquarters for the detailing of one or more organizations, together with a band, to participate. While I feel that the granting of these requests in many instances is beneficial to the Army, some of the requests I am unwilling to grant, because the troops are used as an advertising medium, the affairs are small and lack dignity, and are not productive of sufficient good results to warrant the participation of United States troops.

I desire to call attention to the incongruity respecting the requirements under existing orders for the practical instruction of military commands in minor tactics covering the functions of the three arms in all that pertains to active duty in the field against an enemy and for the theoretical instruction of officers. In view of the restriction that the period of theoretical instruction shall aggregate ninety days, between November 1 and the 30th day of the following April, it becomes necessary to conduct the practical instruction in the active field work during the time intervening between May 1 and October 31, which, in a southern climate, whose summer temperature begins in April and lasts generally through October, is most unpropitious and unsuited for field work, involving more or less strenuous exertion and test of physical endurance. In my opinion, while the general requirements above quoted might be left intact so far as they apply, and as they alone should pertain, to commands serving in the northern or colder climates on account of climatic conditions like those prevailing in the Department of Texas, the matter should be left to the judgment and discretion of the department commander, who should have the right to fix both the theoretical and the outdoor periods of instruction at times in keeping with health and other peculiar conditions of hygiene and utility. In the Department of Texas the system should be entirely reversed, so that the theoretical course of study—which is nothing more than book and school work—might be conducted in the warm months, leaving the period between November and April entirely for such outdoor exercises as may be prescribed.

In this department not only are the troops required to make practice marches and indulge in all the other exercises outlined in General Orders, No. 53, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, series of 1896, but a system of physical training has been prescribed on lines calculated to promote military efficiency and to contribute to the health and diversion of the command.

It is especially recommended that the reversal of the periods of theoretical indoor and practical outdoor instruction be authorized, with a view to making the best use of time in this climate for the instruction of troops that are to arrive within this military department between this and the early fall.

GARRISONED POSTS.

Deeming it proper and expedient to inform myself fully, by personal observations, of the conditions of the several posts in the department,

as soon as practicable after assuming command I visited and inspected all the stations, including Fort Clark, Camp Eagle Pass, Fort Bliss, Fort McIntosh, Fort Ringgold, and Fort Brown, in the order named, between November 13 and December 15, 1902.

In my opinion, all the stations are well situated, with especial respect to strategic conditions, except possibly Fort Clark, which will hereafter be referred to.

As a matter of fact the conditions which now govern the maintenance of military posts in the Department of Texas are decidedly different from those which prevail in the other military departments. In former years in this department the matter of controlling turbulent Indians and protecting the cross-country highways against marauders, outlaws, and murderous Indians necessitated the establishment of a number of interior posts on the several latitudes between San Antonio and the Red River, bordering the Indian Territory, as well as the chain of posts running parallel to the Rio Grande. From time to time, however, as the population of the State increased, the interior posts as well as many southern posts were discontinued or abandoned, according to a formulated scheme, reducing the total number of garrisons in Texas from 33 in 1867 to 7 at the present time.

Some of the earlier records belonging to the files of the Department of Texas having been misplaced or lost during the period of consolidation of the Department of Texas with the Department of the Gulf, I have not been able to lay hands upon the exhaustive report made by General Poe, under the direction of then Major-General Schofield, commanding the Division of the South at New Orleans, which report embraced a detailed recommendation for the continuance and abandonment of various posts in southern Texas; but, in my opinion, the conditions at the present time suggest the importance of continuing our military stations in Texas only along or in the immediate vicinity of the Rio Grande, at or near important railroad crossings, beginning with El Paso in the west and extending to Brownsville in the east, which would of course include Fort Sam Houston and the station at Galveston. While it is not proposed that each border garrison shall be sufficiently large to become an aggressive and offensive command in time of war, it is my belief that each of the garrisons should be of sufficient size not only to meet all exigencies of the service, but to preserve the necessarily high standard of efficiency which can come only of practical as well as theoretical instruction of officers and men in every command.

One of the first considerations which must enter into the maintenance of military stations along the Mexican frontier is the necessity for absolute command or control in time of war or other public danger of any or all of the great international railroad lines which have so extensively grown in the past twenty years. For this reason El Paso must always be regarded as a strategic point, on account of being the most important railroad junction, next to Fort Worth and Houston, in southwestern United States. The next important railroad crossing would be at Eagle Pass, where the Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Railroad of the Southern Pacific system connects with the Mexican International Railroad, while even more important still is the station at Laredo, where the International and Great Northern Railroad in this country connects with the Mexican National Railroad.

Another important point which must be considered at an early day is Presidio, Tex., situated on the Rio Grande opposite to the town of Presidio del Norte, in Mexico, at which point a new international

railroad, extending from Kansas City to the heart of Mexico and connecting with the eastern and western shores of that Republic, is soon to be operated. This road is known as the Kansas City, Mexico and Orient, and is to extend from Kansas City, in the United States, crossing the Southern Pacific Railroad at Alpine, Tex., and the Texas and Pacific Railroad at Sweetwater, Tex., passing over the Rio Grande on the Mexican border at Presidio del Norte, and proceeding southwesterly, crossing the Mexican Central Railroad, through Chihuahua, Mexico, to the newly named point, Port Stilwell, on the Gulf of California coast. The completion of this road will be a matter of especial interest and in time of emergency of great advantage to the United States. Of all the transcontinental and international railroads with outlets upon the Pacific coast, this railroad promises to secure for the United States the shortest and quickest service to the ocean. Formerly old Fort Davis, abandoned some years ago, was the nearest post to Presidio del Norte, and it is respectfully suggested that the time is at hand when attention should be given to the location of a site for a new post in the immediate vicinity of Presidio, Tex.

At Eagle Pass, Tex., the Southern Pacific Railroad system connects with the Mexican International Railroad, which extends from Eagle Pass to Durango, Mexico, making connection at Durango with the Mexican Central Railroad for the City of Mexico.

At Laredo the International and Great Northern Railroad of the United States connects with its branch, the Texas-Mexican Railway, with the Mexican National Railroad, now known as the National Railroad Company of Mexico, whose main line extends to the City of Mexico. Already that railroad connects with the Texas-Mexican Railroad from Corpus Christi, which secures an outlet to the Gulf of Mexico at both Aransas Pass and Corpus Christi. There is already in course of construction a branch of the Mexican National Railroad from Monterey to San Miguel, in the vicinity of Camargo, which is nearly opposite to Fort Ringgold, Tex. The object of this new branch is to give the Mexican National main line a direct Gulf outlet from Monterey, via San Miguel, thence parallel with the Rio Grande to Matamoras, which is opposite to Brownsville, Tex.

With respect to the railroad crossings at El Paso, Eagle Pass, and Laredo, the importance of military protection in time of emergency can hardly be questioned. El Paso, for example, is the junction of six railroads and the starting point of one of the main Mexican railroad lines. Large workshops, etc., are located there, and it is always necessary to keep there, or in the vicinity, on the Mexican side of the river, a large number of empty freight and passenger cars. The same condition prevails at Eagle Pass, where the workshops, however, are situated or located on the Mexican side, while at Laredo the railroad workshops, etc., are on this side of the boundary.

San Antonio is, of course, the greatest railroad center, next to Fort Worth and Houston, in the entire Southwest. It is certainly the most important railroad point in the immediate vicinity of the Mexican border, and in time of emergency could supply perhaps more cars, both freight and passenger, than would be immediately needed there, and even if an unusually large body of troops should be amassed at San Antonio the railroad connections with San Antonio and Laredo would render possible the quick supply of empty cars that might be needed in addition to those which would naturally be promptly secured at El Paso, Eagle Pass, and Laredo.

It goes without saying, of course, that the United States should not

be expected to maintain in time of peace a force along the Mexican border garrisons sufficient to operate offensively in time of war, but it is respectfully submitted that as a military protection, reasonable and sensible in whatever view may be taken of it, the military garrisons along the Mexican border should at all times be of sufficient size not only to guard and protect national interests generally in time of peace, but in emergency to be able to secure, seize, and hold all available railroad facilities for the use of a larger force which might within a few days following be mobilized and dispatched to the border.

The importance of encouraging and guarding railroad enterprise in northeastern Mexico, which corresponds with and adjoins the section of our own country between Eagle Pass and Brownsville, has long been a matter of fixed governmental policy. I am reliably informed that the Mexican Government has for some time past encouraged and fostered all railroad enterprises that promised to increase the railroad system between Monterey and Matamoras on the east and Tampico on the south. Aside from the commercial interests involved in this general plan of railroad extension, the Mexican Government has important military reasons why that particular section of country, which in times past has been the hatching field of all revolutions, should be rendered quickly traversable by Mexican troops. Indeed, the very political power that prevails to-day in Mexico, whose successful revolution placed Mexico under her present splendid Government, was born and cradled in the vicinity of Camargo and San Miguel.

For these reasons, if for no other, it would seem to me that this particular section of the Mexican border is deserving of early consideration by our own General Government.

Brownsville, for so many years regarded as one of our remotest and most inaccessible towns, is now assuming a distinction and importance which ere long must secure for that growing place commercial importance entitled to military recognition and better protection. While at the present time it has comparatively little or no railroad connection with any place, the San Antonio and Aransas Pass Railroad has already under way an extension from Alice, Tex., to Brownsville, which in the course of time, it is understood, will connect with the extension of a railroad from Tampico, Mexico, north of Matamoras. Another rival road is also planned, and it is reported that within twelve months Brownsville will have at least two railroad connections this side of the border.

With regard to the seven garrisoned posts in this Department, Fort Clark would seem to possess less strategic advantages than any of the others, and aside from the advantages offered there for drill, target practice, and available area for field exercises, that post seems to be less useful in the system of border defense than any of the others. It is about 10 miles from the railroad, whose nearest station is Spofford Junction, and is therefore not to be listed as an available base of supplies. Indeed, while the distance from Fort Clark overland to the Mexican border points of Eagle Pass or Del Rio is only about 45 and 30 miles, respectively, yet to transfer the Fort Clark command by rail, either in whole or in part, any distance either east or west along the frontier would necessitate the hauling of empty railroad cars from either San Antonio or El Paso to Spofford Junction, thereby rendering any desired hasty movement of troops from Fort Clark to any point in that direction more dilatory and more difficult than from either of the two points mentioned (El Paso and San Antonio), which, by reason of their location with respect to railroads and railroad shops,

have always at their command almost unlimited supply of cars for the speedy dispatch of large numbers of men in any direction along the Mexican frontier.

In making this comment upon Fort Clark I am not unmindful of the fact that the Department recently sent to that post an experienced civil engineer, under instructions to examine into the conditions of the post, etc. It will be remembered that the engineer in question, on March 31 last, submitted a report which practically found the old post of Fort Clark to be untenable and largely, if not wholly, unfit for occupancy for any length of time, and recommended the building of a new post at a point not far distant therefrom. In forwarding the plans and estimates prepared by the civil engineer referred to under the instructions of the War Department, I did not feel at liberty at that time to do more than to say that "The thought occurs to me, in taking into consideration the question of building a new post in the vicinity of the Mexican border, whether it would not be wiser to look for a more strategic location with respect to possible emergencies and a permanent natural guard and base of supplies for the Mexican frontier." With this idea in mind and in view of the recommendation of the civil engineer of the Quartermaster's Department, who made a very exhaustive examination of the question of continuing or discontinuing Fort Clark on its present site, the argument in favor of a new site nearer the railroad would seem to be emphasized. In this connection I invite attention to the report of Mr. S. G. Brosius, the civil engineer above referred to, as well as to the accompanying letter of Colonel Dorst, Third Cavalry, who was at that time in command of Fort Clark. The conclusions formed from a careful study of the statements contained in those papers must surely suggest the abandonment of the present Fort Clark, in which event the location of the post on some new site ought to be with special regard for the main military consideration above outlined by me respecting the strategic importance of the point to be selected, and should not be restricted to that immediate locality.

CHANGES RECOMMENDED.

In my opinion Fort Clark might well be left as it is, with only such repairs as are needed for a reduced garrison, and hereafter more favorable attention should be given to the other border posts in the department.

The seven garrisoned posts in this department are Forts Bliss, Brown, Clark, McIntosh, Ringgold, and Sam Houston and Camp Eagle Pass, and if the aggregate strength of troops to be garrisoned in this department be not increased then no increased accommodations would seem to be necessary, inasmuch as only four of the posts (Forts Bliss, Clark, and Sam Houston and Camp Eagle Pass) are garrisoned to full capacity, whereas the three situated along the Rio Grande from Laredo to Brownsville are not garrisoned to their full capacity.

I beg to say, in this connection, that whatever may have been the recent disposition of troops in this department, that disposition of troops was based upon the aggregate available troops of the command, and not in accordance with the strategic and local importance of the posts in question, which, in my opinion, now and hereafter demand the allotment of a larger number of troops to this department. For example, there was formerly a full battalion stationed at Fort Brown, and no less than one battalion of infantry should be stationed there

now and hereafter, and, in addition thereto, for reasons heretofore set forth, one or two troops of cavalry should, in my opinion, be stationed not only at Fort Brown, but at all the Rio Grande or border posts.

The enlargement of the garrison at Fort Sam Houston meets with my hearty approval, and I am glad to say that arrangements have already been inaugurated looking to the extension of the military reservation there.

For reasons already set forth, I regard El Paso, Tex., as one of the most important military stations on the entire Mexican boundary line, and its garrison should, in time, be at least doubled—that is to say, it should be made the headquarters of an infantry regiment, with two battalions of infantry and also one or two troops of cavalry, and at least one battery of field artillery.

Camp Eagle Pass is entitled to early consideration. It should be rebuilt, and possibly relocated, as soon as practicable, and its garrison should be increased at least to two companies of infantry and a troop of cavalry. In connection with the question of a permanent garrison at this post I invite attention to that portion of the report of the department commander for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1900, wherein he refers to the fact that the citizens of Eagle Pass, Tex., have offered to donate to the Federal Government 640 acres of land, situated on the high ground just east of the railroad bridge in that locality. I concur with my predecessor in the opinion that that locality would be a better site for the post than the one now occupied, and regard the matter as one worthy of early consideration by the Department. The records of these headquarters show that Mr. C. C. Drake submitted a petition of the citizens of Eagle Pass, Tex., for the establishment of a new post at that place, under date of February 16, 1900, offering to make the donation of 640 acres of land for that purpose. In forwarding this communication to the Adjutant-General of the Army, Colonel McKibbin, then commander of this department, under date of February 20, 1900, set forth certain reasons why the matter was deserving of consideration, chief among which was the statement that the proper site for a post at Eagle Pass was on the high ground east of the great railroad bridge, as that point would command the bridges and fords and be safe from the encroachments of the river, which are more or less threatening to the present military reservation in that vicinity.

Forts McIntosh and Ringgold, under the general argument submitted by me, should, in my opinion, be increased in time to comprise three or four companies of infantry and one troop of cavalry each.

There should also be, in the course of time, as elsewhere stated in this report, a new post established at or near Presidio del Norte, which is to be the crossing point from the United States into Mexico of the new international railway now in course of construction, and which, for the reasons already stated, bids fair to be one of the most important railroad routes between the two countries.

In other words, after careful consideration of every point involved in the disposition of troops in the Department of Texas, I believe that to garrison the seven posts already established and the one new post proposed by me three regiments of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and three field batteries of artillery would be required. I realize, however, that this enlargement must take time, and I do not wish to be understood as recommending any precipitate haste in making the changes suggested or recommended by me.

THE MEXICAN BORDER.

Before going into further details it may be proper in this connection to set forth my views on the general importance of this Rio Grande border as a whole, not only in time of peace, but as a military line of defensive and offensive operations in time of war or other possible emergency.

While in 1887 the entire Mexican border was comprised within two military departments (the Department of Arizona, including southern California, Arizona, and New Mexico, and the Department of Texas including the State of Texas only), at the present time the border is so divided as to be comprised within three military departments, whose commanders are more or less remotely separated, with headquarters, respectively, at San Francisco, Cal., Denver, Colo., and San Antonio, Tex. That this division of the border line was due to antiquated conditions that no longer exist can not be denied. Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, on account of their extensive areas and the large population of Indians of various tribes, more or less constantly at war, or even when in a state of quasi-peace a constant and threatening menace to the safety of life and property of pioneers and settlers, especially in the period anterior to railroads in those sections, were necessarily divided into different military commands. For many years Arizona and New Mexico demanded most unremitting and vigorous military operation under zealous and capable military commanders, while during the same period Texas became conspicuous on account of the campaigns against murderous Indians. It was impracticable for a single commander of the military forces in the seventies or early eighties to manage or control all the bands and tribes of more or less hostile Indians in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, and for that reason the two military departments of Arizona and Texas were established.

But those conditions have entirely passed away. There is not now, nor has there been for a number of years, a single turbulent Indian in the State of Texas, and since the surrender of Natchez and Geronimo in 1886, and the removal of the Chiricahua Apaches from Arizona in that year, comparative peace has prevailed in the Southwest, and the war fires of the Indians in those Territories have been practically extinguished. Surely the increased population of Arizona and New Mexico, now seeking statehood, and the industrial and pastoral tendencies of the larger tribes of formerly troublesome Indians within their limits, seem to warrant the conclusion that the so-called "Indian troubles," if not entirely ended, are not likely again to menace life or property to the extent of demanding the sole attention of any military commander.

This being the fact, it would seem only rational and wise to study the existing conditions, with a view to discovering what changes are necessary to meet present demands, and in this connection should be considered the advisability of including the entire Mexican border under one military commander. It would of course be possible to continue separate military departments, each embracing a portion of the Mexican border line, and to include the two or more departments in a military division, under one division commander; but that plan seems impracticable, especially as the practice formerly, and as now proposed, would involve the longitudinal division on north and south lines without regard to the requirements of latitudinal lines like that along the Mexican border.

The Mexican border from the Pacific Ocean to the Gulf of Mexico may be estimated at 1,546 miles, of which 146 miles are now within the jurisdiction of the Department of California, 550 miles in the Department of the Colorado, and 850 miles, including all the country along the river line between El Paso and Brownsville, in the Department of Texas. It goes without saying, of course, that from El Paso westward the Mexican border demands different and far less vigilant military observation than the more important region between El Paso and the Gulf of Mexico, but it is respectfully submitted that, viewing future possibilities, the paramount purpose should be to discover the primal military object in maintaining military observation along the Mexican border. Peace between the two countries is, of course, a happy condition, in no way threatened to be disturbed on either side of the border, but it would seem to be no act of unfriendliness on our part at least to follow the example of the Mexican Government, already awake to the necessity of maintaining larger and more extended military footholds along the border. While on a visit to Laredo, Tex., in December last, a gentleman who owns property on the Mexican side and seemed generally well informed stated to me that the Mexican Government had already purchased his property in that vicinity for the purpose of establishing a military post upon it. I was also told while at Laredo that the Mexican Government was contemplating building barracks and quarters for a considerable garrison at Nuevo Laredo, which statement was afterwards confirmed by a Mexican officer at that point.

The purpose of the Mexican Government in choosing for the site of a large military post a point opposite to our own small two-company post (Fort McIntosh) on this side of the border is due, doubtless, to the fact that in that vicinity are a class of desperate persons, fugitives from justice, who, but for the presence of a military force, might cause more or less irritation and friction between the inhabitants of the two countries. A similar condition of things prevails at other points along the border, where, for one reason or another, fugitives from the laws of both countries assemble on one side or the other of the boundary line, eluding the officers of their respective governments, and, by reason of their lawless status, become all the more menacing and uncontrollable.

It so happens that the larger towns along the Rio Grande are naturally those in the vicinity of army posts, where, by reason of governmental patronage and settled garrisons, with their regular and constant flow of money, business resources are developed and population and property ownership increased. To subject the law-abiding citizens in those localities to the threatening and troublous element of riff-raff humanity, who, but for the moral effect of the military establishment in those vicinities, might undertake any invasion of individual rights, however daring or devilish, would be unjust. The State of Texas, recognizing its obligation in the matter, has for years past maintained a State constabulary known as the "Ranger Force," for the protection of the frontier against marauding and thieving parties, as well as for the suppression of crime throughout the State generally.

In 1901 the "Ranger Force" was reorganized into four companies, each commanded by a captain and composed of eight "courageous, discreet, and honest men of temperate habits and respectable families." An appropriation of \$30,000 per annum is made to maintain this force of 32 officers and men, and the headquarters of one company is located at Laredo, near Fort McIntosh. In one year the total

number of scouts made by the "Ranger Force" was about 750, while over 600 arrests were made, and in less than two years the total distance traveled by the force was over 155,000 miles. This State constabulary operating on this side of the Rio Grande border is cooperated with to some extent by the Mexican national civic-military constabulary, known as the "Rurales," and undoubtedly much good has come of the maintenance of the two organizations, but there is a moral effect and superior influence exerted by the presence of the United States military establishments along the Rio Grande which can not be overestimated. In my opinion it is safe to say that if the military station at Fort Ringgold, for example, was removed or abandoned the country in that vicinity would in time become practically uninhabitable for decent and law-abiding citizens.

EXTRADITION OF DESERTERS.

In this connection it may be remarked that some action ought to be taken looking to treaty agreements between the Mexican Government and our own respecting the extradition of deserters from the armies of the two countries. It need hardly be stated that at present there is no international authority for the arrest, on either side of the international boundary, of any person charged with desertion from the military service on the opposite side. Therefore the question of the arrest of deserters along the border has been the source of no little embarrassment. Formerly, under a tacit rule of courtesy, the Mexican local authorities in border towns have promptly arrested deserters from the United States Army and turned them over, without requisition or other formal application, to our military officials at adjacent stations. But when the Mexican military authorities expected and demanded equal reciprocal courtesy on the part of our military officers with respect to the arrest and delivery to Mexican authorities of deserters from the Mexican army who had taken refuge on this side of the boundary the refusal of one military commander to make the arrest and delivery gave rise to discussion which developed the fact that there was no provision of law to warrant that action.

In my opinion the matter is deserving of early consideration. A clause in the treaty between the two Governments providing for extradition would not only help to rid the border towns and their vicinities of the fugitives who now afflict them, but would prove a valuable auxiliary to discipline in our own Army, inasmuch as many men who desert on account of the haven of refuge and immunity from legal arrest which the various border towns now afford would be deterred from doing so if less security were promised to them in desertion. Recently, when a battery of field artillery was en route to San Francisco to take passage for the Philippine Islands, five men of that battery, I am informed, who previously had manifested no restlessness or dissatisfaction in the service, deserted and went across to the Mexican side at El Paso, Tex., remaining within plain view of their officers and comrades, without making any attempt whatever to hide or secrete themselves. Indeed, they were visited by their former comrades and even by one of their officers, I learned, who, when endeavoring to persuade them to return to duty, were told that the deserters preferred to remain in Mexico than to go to the Philippine Islands. That such a condition should be permitted is to the serious detriment of military discipline in our Army.

THE SAN ANTONIO ARSENAL.

It will thus be seen that even though peace should happily forever prevail, the Mexican border demands military consideration and is entitled to military surveillance on both sides as a guaranteed protection to the civil authorities in their enforcement of laws and maintenance of good order. But from a strictly military point of view still more important and specious considerations are involved, and first of all is the question of chief base of supplies in the possible emergency of war. With the view, therefore, to meeting all possible exigencies, and at the same time to carry out the recommendations of expert and experienced ordnance officers who have carefully studied the subject, I deem it proper to invite attention to the value and importance of the San Antonio Arsenal. Though not altogether under my direct control and command proper, that arsenal, being situated in the very heart of my military territory, is so closely allied to every consideration of proper military vigilance and preparedness along the border as to impose upon the commander of this military department unavoidable responsibility and obligation in discussing its purposes, needs, and importance.

However remote or unlikely may be regarded any exigency of war-like operations in this vicinity, the question of ready supply of munitions of war should be kept always in mind. This point assumes greater importance when it is remembered that the great commercial growth of our country and its new rôle as a world power in international affairs makes possible dangerous complications which might at any time force a rupture of the peace. Especially is this to be considered in connection with our great interoceanic-canal project and the rights we claim and exercise with respect to the South American and Central American Governments. Indeed, with these great features of extending power, duties, and obligations, the United States must regard as one of its most important land battling sections in the event of war the entire Mexican border, and especially the border from El Paso to Brownsville, which is unquestionably our most important interior line of strategic defense.

In the event of necessity to assemble an army in this direction there can be no doubt San Antonio, which is a natural as well as a protected central or distributing point, should be regarded, for strategic and common-sense reasons, as the chief base of supplies for any army that might operate in this direction.

With these views I would respectfully recommend that the San Antonio Arsenal be enlarged and equipped, not only as a great storage plant, but as a manufacturing establishment whose capacity should be as great as the largest or the second largest in the country. Even aside from the considerations already noted it goes without saying that it would be wise policy to divide into several sections, rather than to concentrate into one single establishment, the power to produce material and munitions of war. Many reasons emphasize this argument, and aside from general questions of the practicability of transmitting the supplies, the danger of destruction, particularly by fire, of the material stored, as well as of the producing machinery itself, imperatively demands attention. Had we been at war a few months ago when the fire occurred at the Rock Island Arsenal it would have proved even more disastrous than the loss of an army corps in the field, and would have seriously crippled our military operations.

In this connection I deem it proper to quote some of the views

expressed in the very able and forcible report of Lieutenant-Colonel Varney, Ordnance Department, U. S. Army, submitted in connection with his annual estimate of funds for use at the San Antonio Arsenal (of which he was until recently the commander) during the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1903, a copy of which report has been courteously submitted for my information and guidance:

As to the necessity of a depot of ordnance supplies at this point, I desire to invite your attention to some remarks bearing upon this subject, in the first annual report of your predecessor, and to the following notes, taken from a letter recently received from an eminent military critic, whose views express my own so well that I adopt them and quote without alteration:

"The necessity for having supplies of ordnance more widely distributed in time of peace, to be available in time of war without great loss of time, is becoming more apparent with the increase of our military power. Not only is this question of distribution to be considered with respect to the equipment of volunteer troops and regular troops in war times, but the ordnance depots must be located to supply our coast defenses expeditiously and economically. One of the greatest sources from which demands for supplies in the future will spring will be these coast defenses. Another determining factor in location of ordnance supply depots should be that a certain number of them should be at the bases of supply for our foreign possessions.

"The eastern and middle sections are well provided with supply depots.

* * * "The great middle section can be readily supplied from the extensive main manufacturing arsenal and depot at Rock Island. This is also near enough the eastern and southeastern sections to enable supplies to be sent to the other arsenals named for redistribution.

* * * "There is one section of the country that is unprovided with a main depot of supplies. This is the great Southwest, particularly the States of Louisiana, Texas, and New Mexico Territory. A small depot is kept at San Antonio, but the main supplies must be drawn from Rock Island, Ill., and the East. The distance by rail to these points is considerable, viz:

San Antonio to—	Miles.
New York.....	1,915
Powder depot, N. J.....	1,940
Frankford Arsenal.....	1,635
Springfield Armory, Mass.....	2,034
Rock Island Arsenal.....	1,125
San Francisco, Cal.....	1,910

"In an emergency the demands of the Central and Eastern States on the main arsenals and depots will be so great that delays in providing for the southwestern section would be inevitable. Even in peace times material turned in for repairs or renewals must be shipped long distances, with consequent delays and increase of expense.

"San Antonio appears well suited for a large supply depot for the southwestern Gulf region, including storage for powder for coast defenses bordering on the Gulf of Mexico. Being near the Gulf port of Galveston, it should be practicable to completely equip expeditions starting for service to the Isthmus or islands of the Gulf.

"The climate of San Antonio is dry and well suited for the storage of large quantities of equipments, particularly leather.

"Its distance from Galveston is only 246 miles, and the railway communications excellent and convenient for the supply of the adjacent territory. Being already a military station of United States troops and a possible rendezvous in war times, it is simply a question of enlarging the domain and functions of the existing ordnance establishment so as to provide a large depot of supplies available for equipment of troops raised in the Southwest, and, in addition, some facilities for repairs and limited manufactures, which seem to be demanded by the growing needs of the military establishment.

"* * * In connection with the subject of the usefulness of a shop it seems proper to urge the economy and necessity of collecting in time of peace and storing at San Antonio Arsenal large quantities of leather and such textile fabrics as are used extensively in ordnance manufactures (especially raw silk, cotton duck, and webbing). These articles can be stored at San Antonio Arsenal indefinitely without deterioration and are extremely hard to obtain in an emergency and in large quantities.

“Even with shops, machinery, and raw materials on hand it takes considerable time to manufacture equipments, much longer than a large army called into the field in an emergency ought to wait for them. In my judgment, therefore, the manufacture of all articles of equipment composed of leather and canvas, such as artillery harness, horse, and other equipments, horse covers, shelter tents, haversacks, etc., should be undertaken at San Antonio Arsenal and be carried on slowly but continuously while a surplus stock of materials is accumulating.”

The policy of the War Department in the past two years seems to have led to the abandonment of five or more arsenals, leaving only the important ones to be maintained and operated, which fact naturally necessitates increase in the facilities and capacities of the arsenals that remain in operation. It may not be advisable that the San Antonio Arsenal should be made a plant for continuous operations on a large scale in time of peace, but I agree with Colonel Varney in the conclusion he has formed, after careful consideration of the subject, that—

There should be provided sufficient shop room for the manufacture of considerable quantities of equipment (cavalry, artillery, infantry, and horse), packing boxes, targets for both artillery and small arms, for repairs of equipments of all kinds, small arms, artillery carriages, caissons, and limbers, field and siege.

In other words, it should be put in condition to meet minor demands at all times and should be capable of repairing the arms and accouterments in the hands of troops, rebrowning rifles and carbines, as contemplated by existing orders, nickel plating saber and bayonet scabbards, bits, spurs, etc., all of which work if done at the San Antonio Arsenal would save time and considerable expense in transporting them to and from northern and eastern arsenals, as must now be done when the work above referred to becomes necessary.

My attention has also been called to the necessity of establishing here a large magazine for the storage of powder, large quantities of which in the future will be required for the supply of Gulf coast batteries, for field and siege batteries in all this southwestern part of the country, and for fitting out military expeditions started from the Pacific coast to our island possessions, as well as such military expeditions as may be necessary to pass through the isthmian canal.

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY.

I deem it not out of place to make reference to the international boundary question, which is still in the hands of the commission appointed pursuant to the treaties of 1884 and 1889, between the United States and Mexico. As I am informed, the commissioners have been steadily at work for the past eight years, and yet the matter of the exact location of the boundary line between the United States and Mexico is still a matter of doubt. According to my information, the international commission unanimously recommended, in 1898, that the portions of the territory technically known as bancos, which had been transferred from one side of the river to the other, by cutting through bends, be eliminated, and urged that that recommendation be acted upon as soon as possible by the two Governments. The further feature of this plan, as recommended unanimously by the commissioners, was the proposed rule or agreement that the flowing water be made the boundary line, providing for a certain prescribed acreage. The statement has been made to me that the United States Government quickly agreed to this proposition, but the matter was taken under advisement by the Mexican Government in the summer of 1898 and no action has yet been announced by it.

This matter is one which might at any time assume important shape from a military point of view. Any day the question may arise as to whether any particular point along the river, especially between Fort Ringgold and Fort Brown, is on United States or Mexican soil. The attitude of a deserter with respect to the military authorities, and any other fugitive from justice with respect to the civil authorities, might be seriously involved should this matter be left in doubt.

I also invite attention to the condition of the protection work on the bank of the Rio Grande in front of the administration building at Fort Brown. This matter has been considered from time to time, and, according to the information I now have, the protection work in front of the administration building at Fort Brown is one of the best that can be established without the expenditure of a very large sum of money. It consists of tornillo brush, fastened together with fascines and anchored back to the ground by small wire cables. While the top of this brush decays and has to be renewed from year to year at but little cost of money, it is regarded, in view of the prevailing conditions, as the most effective protection work that can be put in that place without resorting to riprap or some other equally expensive work.

I concur in the opinion that this matter for the immediate present might be left as it is, with the strengthening improvements now being made with the \$1,200 recently allotted to the Quartermaster's Department for that purpose, but I regard it important that the United States engineer officer on duty in this department be specially directed to proceed to Fort Brown at his first convenience to make an examination of the condition of things there with respect to the eroding bank of the river at Fort Brown, Tex., and that he be required to make such recommendations as in his opinion are necessary for the permanent protection required.

It is needless, I presume, for me to remark in this connection that according to treaty between the two countries any matter involving construction of protection work on either side of the river must first be referred to the International Boundary Commission for their approval.

DISCIPLINE AND DESERTION.

While military discipline throughout this command has been maintained generally at a satisfactory standard, the changing and shifting of garrisons in the department, made necessary by the detaching of cavalry, artillery, and infantry for service in the Philippine Islands, had much to do with disturbing the equanimity and good behavior of the soldiers. For the reasons mentioned, it has been impossible to make anything like a fair comparison in respect to the behavior of soldiers between this and former years, and unquestionably these changes of troops, made necessary by conditions that could not be avoided, have developed more or less restlessness among the soldiers, which in some instances led to desertion.

In this connection some remarks on the general subject of desertion may not be out of place. During the past fiscal year the total number of desertions in this department has been 272, and the number of trials of deserters by general court-martial 52, more than two-thirds of whom were deserters from organizations in this department. Under the present system no specific report of the probable cause of desertion is required, as formerly, and in the absence of special investigation one is left to conjecture only respecting the particular cause or

circumstance that probably prompted the soldier to desert. Since February 1, 1903, however, I have caused a record to be kept and special reports to be made concerning desertion, and the probable causes that have been assigned have been too varied for classification.

In a large number of cases the apparent motive for desertion was liquor; and believing, as I do, that the kind of liquor furnished to soldiers at the saloons, especially those adjacent to army posts, either prompts men to desert outright or gets them into trouble which, in course of time, impels them to desert, soon after the beginning of my administration in this department I made strenuous efforts to curb and curtail the drinking habit among the men. I made known the policy of punishing noncommissioned officers who would drink in conspicuous places with private soldiers; and although I did not receive from courts-martial the support which I hoped for and had reason to expect, the simple fact that my views and purposes had been made known to the command produced, in my opinion, most beneficial results. For example, in the last six months of the fiscal year just ended there were 71 desertions, as against 201 for the preceding six months; indeed, the comparison, if carried further back, will show that out of 272 desertions for the year, 166 of them occurred in the first four months of the fiscal year, prior to my arrival in the Department.

The judge-advocate of the department, who has been making an investigation of this matter under my immediate direction, has reported to me that since February 1, 1903, in accordance with my orders, a record was kept of such cases tried by general court-martial in which it was conclusively shown that the offenses charged were directly due to drunkenness, developing the fact that 47 per cent of the cases so tried resulted from the excessive use of intoxicating liquors. In the opinion of the judge-advocate, in which I concur, many other trials were caused by drunkenness, but that fact did not appear of record in the court-martial proceedings, by reason of the prisoner pleading guilty.

The causes that lead to desertion are too numerous and varied to be summarized, but it is only fair to the soldier to say that, while a majority of those who desert are naturally depraved, viciously inclined, and morally weak men who lack the stamina necessary to good soldiery and conscientious service under their oath of enlistment, there are others who, however good be their intentions in the beginning, drift under influences and conditions peculiar to the military life which is new to them, and which sooner or later turn the well-meaning soldier, restless in his vain desire to employ his leisure lawfully and morally, into a seeker of pleasure outside of the military reservation at low doggeries or bawdish dives where lewd women and degraded men assemble to help fleece and ruin him. One, if not the chief, reason for the downfall of this class of soldiers is the lack of opportunities for proper recreation and entertainment within the post proper, which has the tendency to make men restive in leisure and to drive them to outside establishments in search of pleasure and pastime.

It may be proper to state, however, that there is another class of soldiers who, despite every incentive and all post attractions or schemes planned for their diversion and occupation, would seek degraded associations and hunt and frequent tempting places of reprehensible and forbidden pastimes. Among them is the class of men who when they enlist regard the oath of enlistment as a means only of continuing

their shiftless course through life and who in the beginning have no idea of serving out their enlistment to the end. In order to prevent this class of men from entering the Army some strenuous methods might be devised in the system of general recruitment looking to a more careful exaction on the part of recruiting officers of those evidences of character and good standing in previous occupations which, though already provided for under existing orders, are not always rigidly required anterior to enlistment.

But assuming that the morale of the service in general and the individual equations of enlisted men must be in the future as in the past about the same general average, then the question of occupying the time and attention of soldiers with military duties and proper diversion, recreation, and amusements should be studied as the best method of lessening desertion and misconduct.

With that opinion in view, I have deemed it proper to institute additional methods of diversion, including sports and athletic pastimes, which shall hereafter be made a fortnightly feature in every garrison in my command.

The abolition of the canteen feature of the post exchange, however radical and positive be the objections to the light beverages formerly served therein, I may say, although a total abstainer myself, is regarded by me as a vital misfortune to the military service. Whatever be the convictions and prejudices of reformers on the subject of temperance, the fact should be apparent that the best and surest methods of fostering temperance is to fight against and oppose all tendency to excess.

In every age the spirit of true soldiery has engendered true comradeship, and in no realm of society, in no walk of life, has the radical reformer succeeded in changing the natural disposition of man to the extent of eliminating this sentiment. To say that the soldier as a man must be unlike his brother in all the other walks of life—because he is a soldier he must be denied all privileges of even the most moderate conviviality amongst his comrades, because he is a soldier he must be subjected to unusually strenuous conditions and submit to radical reformatory methods which can not be applied to any other class of men as a body in any other phase of life—is a species of fanaticism which it is respectfully suggested lawmakers can well afford to ignore, if not to condemn. While passions may be held in bound, nature can not be wholly reversed or changed by stringent laws and rules, and the sooner rules are made looking to moderation instead of abstinence, the better will be the morale and the higher the standard of individual deportment in the United States Army.

To this end, no argument can be too earnest for the reestablishment of the canteen. Aside from other recreation features of garrison life, the canteen, which is the enlisted soldier's clubroom, is a protected circle into which no vice or degradation can intrude. There the soldier is guaranteed certain privileges which, so long as not abused, prove a bulwark against the temptations and dangers that now surround almost every post in the Army, and especially border and remote posts. To close the doors of the soldier's garrison club and send him out into the haunts of iniquity and vice run by moral vultures who, degraded themselves, set up no standard of morality, but, breaking down all barriers of restraint, invite and induce soldiers to join in all sorts of depravity and infamy, is a wrong to the soldier as well as a wrong to the community in which the soldier is located.

HOSPITALS.

The enlargement of Fort Sam Houston, already started and under way, suggests early action with respect also to an enlarged or new hospital at that post. The present hospital, which has been from time to time reported upon, was not sufficient in size or appointments for the services demanded of it, and even had there been no increase in the garrison at Fort Sam Houston the hospital at that post would have imperatively demanded early attention; but no words are necessary now, I think, to prompt the Department to take earliest possible action looking to a new or enlarged hospital at Fort Sam Houston.

On account of the distance from the barracks to the hospital and the distance from the proposed site of the new barracks, it has been suggested to me by the chief surgeon of the department that possibly some better location of the hospital might be made. In this, however, I am of the opinion that the present site of the hospital is the most central that could be selected for the old and new portions of the garrison, which practically will stand as equally distanced wings to the headquarter post, in the center of which is now located the Fort Sam Houston Hospital. I believe that the objections on account of the distance which men at sick call have to go can be obviated by the establishment of subdispensaries in the immediate vicinity of the barracks of the old and new sections of Fort Sam Houston, wherein the surgeon or assistant surgeon may daily attend sick call. Those dispensaries would be intended entirely for the sick-call service of the surgeon, and should any of the sick need hospital attention they should be sent in ambulances to the post hospital.

But this matter of the location of a hospital at Fort Sam Houston, as well as hospital needs generally throughout the department, is one which, in my opinion, should be seriously considered and systematically provided for. Under ordinary circumstances the needs of a hospital at one post may be more strenuously reported upon and more vigorously urged by the medical officer stationed there, who happens to be more energetic and painstaking than the medical officer at some other post where the hospital necessities really appeal for more speedy consideration, and yet would be neglected because of the indifference or inactivity of the surgeon in charge. I am therefore of the opinion that the department commander should be authorized to appoint a board of officers to examine into and recommend all needed repairs, enlargements, etc., of hospitals throughout the department, according to a formulated and well-considered scheme.

Only recently, when the matter of the proposed new hospital at Fort Bliss, Tex., was under consideration, involving a cost of \$20,000, the Secretary of War called for information as to whether the requirements of other posts in the Department of Texas would, as stated by the Acting Surgeon-General, be considered in the order in which the requests were received, and if any general plan was under consideration for the hospitals in this department. It was that inquiry which suggested to my mind the advisability of the recommendation I now make for the appointment of a board to consider the needs of the hospital service in this department and to make recommendations in regard thereto. As stated by me in previous reports, a new hospital at Fort Bliss is undoubtedly needed, but I have hesitated to give unqualified approval of that project at the expense of probable needed repairs and improvements of other hospitals in this department which,

in my opinion, offered no better or no more ample facilities than the one at Fort Bliss.

As heretofore stated by me, the Fort Bliss hospital is undoubtedly more or less endangered by high winds on account of its location and peculiar construction, and is certainly in need of additional conveniences, improvements, and immediate repairs, but it seemed to me as it then stood it offered such ample accommodations for the sick as would, in my opinion, justify its temporary continuance, with such slight repairs as might be deemed necessary, rather than to absorb so large an allotment of the limited amount of funds available, to the probable prejudice and detriment of hospitals at other posts in this department which were sadly in need of repairs and improvements. For that reason I refrained from recommending the building of a new hospital at Fort Bliss until the hospital service in all the other posts in this department could be put in good shape, especially as the total aggregate of the estimates for improvements was less than \$7,000.

Notwithstanding the quoted statement of the Surgeon-General that the requirements of all posts in the Department of Texas would be considered in the order in which the requests were received, I was compelled to answer the inquiry of the Secretary of War that, so far as I was aware, there was no general plan under consideration for the treatment of hospitals in this department, but that the records showed that applications have been made for new hospitals at Camp Eagle Pass, Fort Sam Houston, Fort Clark, and Fort Bliss, in the order named, all of which were approved by the chief surgeon of this department, and yet the first action taken was with respect to the last-named post, where, in my opinion, the necessities for a new or better hospital did not exceed, if they indeed equaled, those prevailing at Fort Sam Houston. I therefore earnestly recommend that authority be granted to me for the appointment of a board for the purpose above indicated, and that the recommendations of that board, with my indorsement thereon, shall become the basis for the action of the War Department.

There is one point in this connection, I may add, to which I could especially direct the attention of the hospital board, if appointed, and that is regarding the vitally needed new arrangements in this department for the sick and convalescents from other departments. During the past winter several officers and enlisted men were sent to the hospital at Fort Sam Houston from outside stations, which resulted in great inconvenience to the officers and overcrowded the wards in which the enlisted men were placed, while at the same time the already insufficient room for the surgeons and the hospital corps men became all the more cramped. Undoubtedly the climate of Texas possesses superior advantages for certain physical ailments, and it is only a question of time before a sanitarium on a large scale must be established at some post at or near San Antonio. Conversation on this subject with the chief surgeon of the department develops the possibility that, aside from the peculiar advantages of the climate of San Antonio, the section of land in the vicinity of old Fort Davis, or where the new Kansas City, Mexico, and Orient Railroad is likely to cross the Rio Grande, at Presidio, Tex., near which a military post should be established, as elsewhere recommended in this report, would be an excellent climate for that class of physical disability of officers and men who are usually sent to San Antonio or to Fort Bayard, N. Mex. Without intending to formulate any definite recommendations on the subject, it is respectfully submitted that the matter is worthy of serious consideration at an early day.

DENTAL SURGEONS.

For the best interest of the service some remarks are deemed necessary in regard to dental surgeons.

While the comparatively recent beginning of dental service in the Army makes the matter still one of an experimental nature only, opportunity has already been offered for sufficient observation to warrant the conclusion not only that the dental surgeons should be indefinitely continued, but largely increased, in order to meet the full demands of the service. In this military department where, by reason of the changes of troops to and from the Philippine Islands, unusual opportunities for observation and judgment have been offered, I have deemed it proper to inquire into the extent and nature of the dental work done for the troops in this command in the past year, and believe that the facts disclosed will appeal strongly for an increase of dental surgeons in this department, if not in the Army generally.

In the absence of any definite method of ascertaining the nature and amount of dental treatment needed by soldiers, two general methods, it seems, have prevailed in this department in regard thereto. Under one rule entire organizations have been ordered to report to the dental surgeon for examination, whereas under the other only those who desired treatment were required to report to the dental surgeon. In the former case only could a fairly accurate estimate of the work actually required be obtained. To leave it to soldiers themselves to decide whether or not they are in need of dental treatment would result in bringing to the attention of the dental surgeon only a small number of those who really are in need of dental attention. A typical case reported by the dental surgeon now in this department, under the first method, was developed in the examination of the Second Squadron and band, Twelfth Cavalry, at Fort Clark, in January last, when 260 men were examined and 1,525 teeth were found in need of attention. To this should be added about 20 per cent at least to cover cases overlooked in the first examination, together with conditions discovered during the progress of the work. Ordinary calculation will suffice to show that to perform this amount of dental work properly and thoroughly one dentist would be kept busy for at least six months, not taking into consideration the mechanical labor involved in the replacement of lost teeth, etc., and not counting the officers who were not examined at the time the enlisted men were presented. Although work had previously been done for all the organizations at Fort Clark by the dental surgeon assigned to duty there from time to time, it was found in the squadron above referred to that only six men required no dental treatment, and this in a new regiment, recruited within two years and practically all new men.

Taking the above estimate of the work required for one squadron as a basis, it may be asserted that the whole amount of dental service required in this department before the beginning of the recent movement of troops to the Philippines, in the opinion of the dental surgeon now on duty here, would have required about three and one-half years of constant work, making no allowance for loss of time, due to change of station or absence with leave; and, in this connection, no allowance has been made in the estimate of time required for additional work constantly developing, or for newly enlisted men, almost all of whom require more or less attention after joining. The dental surgeon now assigned to this department, answering inquiries on this subject, made the following statement:

The result of my experience here and elsewhere in the department forces me to the conclusion that under the most favorable conditions it is not possible for one dental surgeon to perform more than 50 per cent of the work required.

I believe that I have not done more than 30 per cent, though I have worked out of hours prescribed an aggregate of at least seventy-five days (four hundred and fifty working hours), and, besides this, did practically all my clerical work, repairs, etc., outside of the prescribed hours (9 to 4).

One of the greatest drawbacks connected with the service is the fact that very few enlisted men know anything about personal care of the teeth, and care less, and, if I can judge from appearances, it seems to be no one's business to see that they own and use a toothbrush.

It seems scarcely necessary to state that a dentist can not take the place of a toothbrush.

In my opinion, after careful investigation, the principal needs of the service with respect to dental surgeons are: First, more dental surgeons; second, a suitable operating room at each post; third, some positive and practical methods compelling enlisted men to give proper attention to personal care of the teeth. I believe that there should be three dental surgeons assigned to this department, if possible, but not less than two under any circumstances. It is well known that the Philippine climate has a deleterious effect upon teeth, and every regiment, before being sent to the Philippines, should have careful attention given to dental requirements, while those regiments returning from the Philippines should be no less carefully attended to in this regard. In the Department of Texas almost the entire command has been changed to and from the Philippine Islands, and I urgently recommend that not less than two additional dental surgeons, if possible, be assigned to this department, either permanently or temporarily. It is my purpose to recommend, in separate communications, appropriate quarters for the accommodation of dental surgeons, and I intend to require of all dental surgeons in this department that, at stated periods during the year, they give short and instructive lectures to the enlisted men of each post in the department, covering points involved in the care and preservation of teeth, etc. This would be in keeping with the general method adopted by the medical department for instructions in first aid to the sick and wounded, which have proved most useful and practical auxiliaries for the welfare of military commands.

SEMINOLE NEGROES.

I deem it wise to invite attention to the Seminole negro Indians, who are, by permission of the War Department, residing on the Fort Clark Military Reservation. These people number in all about 150, and, under a tacit rule which seems to have begun and gradually developed for a number of years past, are under the tutelary supervision and government of the commanding officer of Fort Clark. They are reputed to be a peaceable and honest tribe of people, who, either with or without the consent of the Government, squatted in the vicinity of Fort Clark, in one of the most fertile spots adjacent to the river in that section. They have constructed their own huts or houses, and have a sort of cooperative system of life, which seems to make them a contented people. The minor squabbles and petty differences that arise between them from time to time are all settled and disposed of by the commanding officer of Fort Clark, or some official designated to act for him, and, so far as I have been able to judge, these primitive, unoffending people acquiesce without murmur in whatever is decided respecting them.

But something, it would seem, should be done to define their exact status. At this time they can not be said to have any citizenship whatever. In the eyes of the law they are neither negroes, Indians, nor half-breeds. The Seminole treaty of 1866 provided for two classes of colored people only, one class consisting of persons of African descent and blood who were residing in the Seminole country on the date of the treaty and their descendants, and the other class including such other persons of the same race as should be permitted by the Seminoles to settle with them. Under the construction of the Interior Department, I am informed, it has been held—

That at the date of the treaty they were not residents of the Seminole country, nor had they been at any other time; that they were not held as slaves, nor were they even residents of this country at the date of the abolition of slavery, but they were citizens and subjects of Mexico, where they had emigrated from the United States in 1849, and were in no sense freedmen, and could not then acquire any legal right in the Indian Territory under existing treaties and laws.

These people, it seems, returned to the United States shortly after the civil war from Mexico, to which country many of them had emigrated. Many, if not all, of the male adults have been at one time or another enlisted in the Army as scouts, so that at the present time the entire adult male population may be regarded more or less as discharged veterans, in some instances the grandfather, father, and son in a family having all served as scouts in the Regular Army.

These people have forfeited their right to residence and citizenship in Mexico, and, being neither citizens of the United States nor recognized by the Seminole Indians as a part of their people, I concur with my predecessor, Colonel McKibbin, in the belief that some action should be taken whereby the status of these people may be defined. It need hardly be remarked that, with perhaps one or two exceptions, none of them came from Florida, and that the majority of them are only the descendants of the original Seminole negroes who became detached from the Seminole tribe and went to Mexico. As it is, however, they are an interesting tribe of mongrel Americans, and, dependent as they are upon the mercy and management of the military at Fort Clark, they are nothing more than wards of the military department. As recently as 1899 a flood destroyed their crops so generally as to make it necessary for the Government to provide subsistence until the people were again able to render themselves self-supporting, as they usually are, chiefly by truck farming, chicken raising, etc. At the present time 20 of their young men are employed as so-called "Seminole Negro-Indian Scouts," 13 of whom are kept at Fort Ringgold, for duty along the river between Laredo and Brownsville, 3 at Camp Eagle Pass, and 4 at Fort Clark. They are organized into a detachment of 2 sergeants, 2 corporals and 16 privates, and employed and paid as scouts, under paragraph 558, Army Regulations.

These men make excellent scouts, and their knowledge of the country and their fidelity, combined with courage, which in many instances has been put to severe test, make them very useful auxiliaries in the preservation of peace along the border and the prevention of lawlessness. The amount of money which they receive for their services being the pay and allowances of cavalry soldiers, and in addition 40 cents per day provided they furnish (as they all do) their own horses and horse equipment, makes them one of the best paid and most contented class of public servants in the country in which they are located. The headquarters of these scouts are usually regarded as fixed at Fort Ringgold, whose commanding officer supervises their management, which

is under the direct control of an officer detailed as detachment commander.

In the final consideration of the status of these people with the view to determine what shall be done with them, I recommend that the Government purchase or secure in the Indian Territory a tract of land sufficient and suitable for the support of these so-called Seminole negroes, and that they be located thereon, with full, permanent title and some immediate help to start them as farmers.

NECESSARY INSPECTIONS.

As a result of my observation and investigation of the conditions of the various posts in this department in my tour of inspection last winter, I was enabled at the time, considering the annual estimates for repairs and new work, required to exercise careful supervision, based upon practical necessities as observed by me. For example, the aggregate amount of the estimates for the several posts in this department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1904, was about \$94,000, whereas the amount approved by me was, in round figures, only about \$50,000, not including the \$5,654.15 estimated for improvements at Fort Clark, concerning which I made no recommendation. The fact that only a little more than 50 per cent of the total of the estimates for the ensuing year have been approved by me led me to hope that the amount asked for for needed work at the posts in this department would appear, to say the least, conservative, and I hoped also that it would not suffer any diminution when official action was taken on the estimates in the War Department. But it was reduced, and an allotment of only \$29,841.81 was made by the Quartermaster-General, a sum not sufficient to make the absolute repairs that are necessary to preserve the property, without regard to what is needed for the soldiers' actual care and comfort.

In this connection it may be well for me to say that a knowledge of the general conditions prevailing throughout the department is not only valuable and essential to the department commander, but also to the various staff officers in charge of the respective departments, as, for example, the chief medical officer, the chief quartermaster, the chief commissary, and, of course, the inspector-general. I believe that the chief medical officer should have ample opportunity annually, as well as at other times when exigencies require it, to proceed, under the orders of the department commander, without delay, hindrance, or restriction of army regulations, to any point in the department where his attention to medical administration is particularly and peculiarly required. For similar reasons, I believe the chief quartermaster of a military department should not only be authorized but required each year to visit in person and keep himself informed of the conditions of the buildings and public property in every post in the department concerning which estimates for repairs and new work must be submitted through his office. The same is largely true of the chief commissary officer, who might well make an annual visit, at least to each of the larger posts in his department, for the purpose of keeping in touch with those conditions which affect the food supply of the command. I believe it poor economy to restrict the travel of staff officers on account of mileage economy when the results are not for the best interests of the service.

These suggestions occur to me as a result of my own personal experience in this department. When I took command I discovered,

in conversation with my staff officers, that not one of them was in a position to give me that positive information which I needed in the administration of the affairs of the department, and I at once caused the chief medical officer of this department, as well as the chief quartermaster, to visit certain posts and to familiarize themselves, practically as well as theoretically, with their conditions and requirements. Not only is the Government protected against unwise and lavish expenditures of money, based upon estimates of comparatively inexperienced and uninformed officers at posts, but the general plan of improvement throughout the department can be more easily preserved by the wise and well-informed administration of the chief officer in each staff department. It need hardly be remarked that in reducing the estimates from nearly \$94,000 to less than \$50,000 for the ensuing year for general repairs, etc., in this department, the saving to the Government of nearly \$44,000 may be largely, if not wholly, attributable to my tour of personal inspection, which involved but a minimum cost of mileage to the Government.

I feel that I should also urge a similar argument in behalf of the absolute freedom of the department commander to send his inspector-general or his personal aid to any post in his department whenever the exigencies of the service seem to demand specific action of a direct representative of the department commander, either under instructions set forth in published orders or conveyed in separate or confidential communication. In my opinion the better policy would be to intrust to the commanding general of a military department the full, free, and unfettered exercise of his best judgment and discretion in all matters pertaining to the administration of the affairs of his department, and that it is neither wise nor good policy to so restrict him in the management of the affairs of his department and the preservation of discipline as to make him feel without authority to take quick action except with the previously obtained approval of higher military authorities—not always feasible to obtain promptly or without detailed explanations. For these reasons I respectfully recommend that existing orders bearing on the subject of the ordering of general and personal staff officers from one point to another in the military department be carefully scrutinized with a view to modification and amendment, even if an appeal to Congress should be found to be necessary (as it doubtless will) in order to change the provisions of the act approved August 6, 1894, which, though never repealed, was only recently put into operation.

STAFF DEPARTMENTS.

The officers serving as heads of the staff departments at these headquarters are:

Adjutant-general, Maj. Sydney W. Taylor, Artillery Corps.

Inspector-general, Maj. Thomas R. Adams, Artillery Corps.

Judge-advocate, Capt. C. D. Roberts, U. S. Army; performing duties of inspector of small-arms practice and signal officer, assistant to engineer officer.

Chief quartermaster, Lieut. Col. John L. Clem, deputy quartermaster-general, U. S. Army.

Chief commissary, Capt. Samuel B. Bootes, commissary, U. S. Army.

Chief surgeon, Col. Peter J. A. Cleary, assistant surgeon-general, U. S. Army.

Chief paymaster, Capt. Otto Becker, paymaster, U. S. Army.

Engineer officer, Capt. Edgar Jadwin, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, Galveston, Tex.

Ordnance officer, Maj. Daniel M. Taylor, Ordnance Department, U. S. Army.

ATTACHED.

Capt. John A. Dapray, Twenty-sixth Infantry, on light duty and temporarily in charge of matters pertaining to the organized militia of Texas.

Under the supervision of the officers above named the several staff departments have been satisfactorily conducted.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

The adjutant-general's office, under the charge and supervision of Maj. Sydney W. Taylor, Artillery Corps, assistant adjutant-general, a very competent, careful, and painstaking administrative officer, has been conducted to my perfect satisfaction.

INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

The inspector-general's office has been in charge of Maj. Thomas R. Adams, Artillery Corps, inspector-general, one of the most conscientious and capable officers that ever came under my observation. By nature peculiarly adapted to duties involving fine conception of military esprit and absolutely impartial judgment, he has administered most admirably the affairs of his office.

According to his official annual report, all the military posts in the department have been inspected, including Fort San Jacinto, near Galveston, beginning on November 10 last. The condition of each post inspected has been shown in detail in the reports already submitted, and was, in the main, satisfactory.

The military departments of the universities and colleges (one at San Antonio, one at Waco, and the other at College Station, Tex.) were duly inspected. The inspection of San Antonio arsenal, the recruiting stations at Dallas and Houston, Tex., as well as the office and records of the purchasing commissary at San Antonio, and the biennial inspection of the national cemetery at Brownsville, Tex., were all duly made and reported upon. In addition to these regular inspections the Inspector-General was required to make several special inspections and investigations.

He also inspected 32 money accounts of disbursing officers, aggregating a total of \$3,151,503.14, with verified balances of \$900,167.60.

The inspections having in view condemnation of public property have generally, as far as practicable, been made by the inspector-general of the department, special inspectors having been designated only in cases of urgent necessity. The money value of all public property inspected and condemned in the department during the past fiscal year amounted to a total cost of articles inspected of \$74,218.57, of which amount the total cost of articles condemned was \$65,356.19. The increase in the number of inspections and the quantities of property inspected was due to the fact that the troops coming into this department from the Philippine Islands brought with them a lot of old and practically unserviceable articles which were replaced, while the troops that were ordered from this department for duty in the Philippine Islands were required to put themselves in proper condi-

tion, and of course cast off as much of their old and used equipment as possible before they left this department.

JUDGE-ADVOCATE'S DEPARTMENT.

The judge-advocate of this department is Capt. Charles D. Roberts, acting judge-advocate, a very zealous and studious young officer, whose close application to official duties marks him as well calculated to meet all the requirements of his position.

According to the judge-advocate's report the total number of trials of enlisted men by general court-martial was 237, by garrison court-martial 5, and by summary court 2,290. There were also two general prisoners tried by general court-martial, making the total number of general court-martial trials in the past year 239, as compared with 281 in the year preceding. The greatest number of trials at any one post was at Fort Sam Houston, numbering 117, and the next in number was Fort Clark, with a total of 66. The explanation of these apparently large numbers of general court trials at the two posts is in part found in the fact that they are not only the largest posts in this department, but, owing to the smallness of the garrisons at Camp Eagle Pass and Fort Ringgold, men charged with offenses at those posts which called for trial by general court-martial were sent to Fort Clark or Fort Sam Houston for trial.

Of the 2,290 summary court trials there were 2,155 convictions, which, in my opinion, shows a careful compliance with existing orders on the parts of commanding officers, whose investigations and conclusions are justified by the small percentage of acquittals, which, numbering 92, are about 4 per cent of the total number of cases tried.

The largest number of summary court trials at any one post in the department are reported at Fort Sam Houston, where there were 759 trials, resulting in 710 convictions. At Fort Clark the summary court trials numbered 493, with 466 convictions, which number, however, considering the size of the post and the surrounding conditions for the greater part of the fiscal year when those trials occurred, does not betray any lack of discipline. Indeed since the publication of my general court-martial order incidentally setting forth the demoralizing influence of certain grogeries and infamous haunts of iniquity in the neighboring town of Brackettville, the garrison at Fort Clark, as well as the better and more respectable people of the town of Brackettville, have observed a marked improvement in the general moral atmosphere in that neighborhood. I may add, in this connection, that in taking the action which I deemed necessary at the time I expected to stir up resentment on the part of those who felt the lash of my criticism, but I had reason to hope for praise and commendation from the better people in Brackettville, whose families were none the less interested in improving the morals of that border town than the military garrison at Fort Clark.

As a result of the reform movement which followed my published order above referred to, concerning which there was an appeal made to the War Department by representatives of the dissatisfied persons, I may state that since its publication in February last there has been a constant diminution of trials by court-martial at Fort Clark. Indeed while the percentage of general court-martial cases tried (based upon the average enlisted strength of the garrison) at Fort Clark was less than 12 per cent, which was much less than the percentage at Fort Sam Houston and Fort Brown, the percentage of summary court cases

tried at Fort Clark was only 88.35, which proved to be the lowest of any post within the department, the percentage of summary court trials at Fort Ringgold being 212.59, at Fort Bliss 170, at Camp Eagle Pass 113.11, and Fort Sam Houston 106.41. Based upon calculations made since the publication of my court-martial order relating to Bracketville, Tex., in February last, I have reason to believe that had it not been for the general improvement and correction of the evil conditions complained of by me the percentage of trials and convictions at Fort Clark, keeping pace with records of former years, would have far exceeded the figures above quoted, and instead of having the lowest general percentage of trials of all kinds Fort Clark would have held its place near the top.

The fact should be mentioned that while the total number of trials by general and inferior courts in the past year was 2,532 and the average enlisted strength of garrisons in this department only 2,003, nearly one-half of the enlisted men of the department were not punished at all, inasmuch as the records show that only 1,161 men were tried, which, in view of the total number of trials, would give an estimated average of about two trials per man tried during the year.

I deem it proper to quote the following extracts from the report of the judge-advocate of the department, in all of which I concur:

The question of properly guarding and working general prisoners, upon which I enlarged in my last report, continues to be a serious problem. The present method of confinement of these prisoners in post guardhouses is very unsatisfactory, and a central military prison, or several of them, should be established, with a guard of general-service men, similar to the old prison guard at Fort Leavenworth. Under present conditions there is no chance of reform offered to a general prisoner, and at the expiration of his sentence he is turned out to join the large army of professional tramps and vagabonds. It is thought that a central prison, properly conducted under modern methods, could largely support itself by utilizing the prison labor on Government work, and the prisoners could be kept apart, properly disciplined, and taught a trade.

The large number of trials in this department in the last two years is due largely to the great number of recruits in the ranks and the number of new and inexperienced officers.

The three-year enlistment is undoubtedly bad for discipline.

The general mess system is in operation at Forts Bliss and Sam Houston, and to this system is undoubtedly due some of the trials at those posts, since under it there is always more or less discontent among the troops with the food furnished and the cooking.

It is hardly necessary to state that the prohibition of the sale of beer in the post exchange has resulted in a great increase in the number of saloons, generally of the lowest class, in the vicinity of all posts, and consequent injury to discipline. The conditions resultant under practical abolition of the canteen feature of the exchange have been so often and so graphically described that it is needless to go farther into the matter here than to say that the temptations to dissipation held out to soldiers immediately outside the reservation line of every post in this department are about as great as it is possible to conceive.

In order to secure a more speedy trial of apprehended deserters from organizations which have left for foreign service it is suggested that such organizations, just before leaving the United States, be required to send the descriptive lists of all absentees without leave to the Adjutant-General's Office, through the headquarters of the department in which they were serving. Charges and statement of service could then be prepared from these descriptive lists on apprehension of the offenders and the trials could be promptly conducted, discharges granted, etc., without the long delay of mail communication with the deserter's organization.

There is great necessity for a law making the wearing of the army uniform by unauthorized persons a penal offense. The uniform of a discharged soldier who does not reenlist should be repurchased by the Government at a proper appraised valuation. It is not conducive to pride in the uniform to see it worn by dive keepers and tramps, but under present conditions that can not be prevented outside of military reservations.

Efforts have been made here to secure the conviction before the United States

district court, under section 5438, Revised Statutes, of civilians who have bought soldiers' clothing, but convictions have never been obtained, the court holding that clothing issued and charged to the soldier becomes his property. The court quoted, in the decision in one of these cases, as an expression of the opinion of the executive branch, and as thus worthy of due weight, section 2274, Digest of Opinions of the Judge-Advocate-General, 1901. It is very desirable that legislation be obtained declaring that clothing issued to a soldier remains the property of the United States and that its purchase is a penal offense, under section 5438, Revised Statutes.

In addition a law should be enacted prohibiting the adoption of the United States Army uniform, in whole or in part, by civic or semimilitary organizations. On account of the recent changes in the army uniform the present is a peculiarly good time for the enactment of such a law.

The important duties of judge-advocate of general courts-martial have been much better performed during the past year than in the preceding one, showing the value of the systematic instruction now being given to officers.

QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

The chief quartermaster of the department throughout the past year has been Lieut. Col. John L. Clem, deputy quartermaster-general, U. S. Army, whose official standing is too well known to require commendation by me. His prospective transfer to Manila as chief quartermaster of the Division of the Philippines insures to the troops serving in those islands all that comfort and convenience which can result to the enlisted soldier from a liberal management of the quartermaster's department.

The total amount of funds allotted out of the various appropriations of the quartermaster's department was \$613,883.25, of which amount was disbursed \$473,479.82, leaving a balance on hand of \$141,403.43. Each of the allotments under the various appropriations was disbursed in accordance with law, in the manner specifically set forth in the report of the chief quartermaster.

Contracts for fuel, forage, straw, and transportation have been duly entered into by the chief quartermaster with various parties, in due accordance with law and regulations. Contracts, however, for various reasons and obstacles, have not yet been completed for the sewer extension at Fort Ringgold, Tex., gymnasium and post-exchange buildings at Forts Bliss and Clark, artesian well at Fort Ringgold, and pier construction work at Fort Brown, Tex.

A detailed recommendation by me with respect to the various posts in this department appears in a preceding part of this report.

SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

Capt. Samuel B. Bootes, commissary, U. S. Army, has been the chief commissary of the department during the year. Ambitious to be of fullest service in the field of labor assigned to him, he has, in my opinion, succeeded in all respects. The garrisons throughout the department have been satisfactorily supplied with rations, and all the contracts for meat, etc., have been complied with.

Aside from the chief commissary's report, after conference with him on the subject, I respectfully recommend that in addition to the list of stores now authorized to be kept on hand for sale there be added, in this department at least, the list of stores that are authorized for sale in the Philippine Islands. The reasons for this are obvious. Nearly all of the posts in this department are as much dependent upon the commissary department for the greater part, if not all, of their necessities and table supplies as garrisons of any post in the island possessions; and this is particularly true with respect to all

border posts. If, however, the full additional list as above recommended should not be authorized in this department, I think there certainly ought to be certain specific selections made from that list, including articles which are particularly needed in the Tropics, both for the purposes of toilet and health, as, for example, listerine, witch-hazel, ginger ale, and lime juice. The two latter items, judging from experience in the Philippines, not only enter into the preservation of good health among the men but tend to restrain them in satisfying their thirsts in other ways. All in all, it would seem to me that the broader rule of liberality should be followed in all that pertains to the comfort and welfare of troops stationed along the Mexican border.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

The chief surgeon of the department during the past year has been Col. Peter J. A. Cleary, assistant surgeon-general, U. S. Army, whose achievements in his profession and long years of continuous military service insured to his department efficient and useful administration of his office.

According to his report, submitted to me, the entire number taken on sick report during the year was 2,835, which, according to the average strength of the command during the year, gave a ratio of 1,310.30 per thousand. The total number of deaths in the department during the year was 10 (about 4 to the 1,000), due to the following causes:

	In line of duty.	Not in line of duty.	Total.
Peritonitis	1		1
Drowned	2		2
Opium narcosis (probably suicidal)	1		1
Gunshot wound	1	1	2
Fracture of spine by fall	1		1
Typhoid fever	2		2
Pneumonia	1		1
Total	9	1	10

It will be observed from the above that only 4 of the 10 deaths in this department occurred from diseases, which is a very satisfactory illustration of the fact that the general health of the command throughout the year has been good.

The chief surgeon reports that there were no epidemics of a general character, only one case of diphtheria occurring in the family of an officer, and several cases of typhoid fever at Fort Sam Houston.

Full investigation of the origin of the typhoid cases seemed to justify the conclusion that the infection was brought into the post by an officer and a soldier, and that during the incubation period they infected the closets, the flies, and perhaps the soil; that thereafter the infection was spread from person to person, largely by means of flies, but also by means of infected persons, shoes, clothing, and bedding. For further information on this point reference is made to the report of Major Mason, the surgeon at Fort Sam Houston, heretofore forwarded.

PAY DEPARTMENT.

Maj. Charles Newbold, paymaster, U. S. Army, was relieved from duty as chief paymaster of the department on June 22, 1903, after nearly two years' faithful and prompt discharge of the duties of his

office, to await retirement on June 25, 1903, and was succeeded as chief paymaster by Capt. Otto Becker, paymaster, U. S. Army, who appears to be an officer whose long experience in the Pay Department will guarantee able and efficient administration. Captain Becker's report sets forth the fact that Capt. T. P. Varney, paymaster, U. S. Army, who was on duty in this department from July 1, 1902, to February 11, 1903, resigned his commission as captain and paymaster, United States Army, while on leave of absence.

According to the chief paymaster's report for the year the balance on hand July 1, 1902, was \$13,347, which, together with the amount received from various sources, made a financial responsibility of \$939,688.80. The total disbursements amounted to \$884,710.34, leaving a balance on hand at the close of the fiscal year of \$54,978.46.

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT.

The engineer officer of the department during the past year, up to June 29, 1903, was Capt. C. S. Riche, Corps of Engineers, who was relieved by Capt. Edgar Jadwin, Corps of Engineers.

The engineer officer being stationed at Galveston, Tex., in charge of the Galveston district, applied for and obtained from time to time during the year authority to visit these headquarters for the purpose of overseeing the work being done and conferring with the assistant engineer officer (Capt. C. D. Roberts, Seventh Infantry, acting judge-advocate) and his civilian assistant. In his report Captain Jadwin makes acknowledgment of the interest taken in the engineer work by Captain Roberts, and states:

The work in the office has been chiefly in continuing the collection, indexing, and arranging of data for the military map of the department. To this end the alignment maps of nearly all the railways in the department have been obtained by Capt. C. S. Riche, my predecessor, and are in the process of reduction, by the pantograph, to the scale of the military map (2 miles to an inch). In addition a great deal of data has been obtained from other sources—such as United States Coast and Geodetic Survey, United States Geological Survey, Boundary Commission, etc.

All maps, itineraries, etc., submitted by troops in the department have been referred to this office and filed, or forwarded to higher authority, as the regulations require. Copies of all data sent to higher authority were retained. The office has in addition furnished prints of maps and plans when required, and prepared such tracings and maps as were required by the department commander.

A topographical survey of the land recently acquired for an extension to Fort Sam Houston was undertaken on June 29, 1903, by direction of the department commander, by Captain Roberts. Mr. Drouet is engaged in the field work on this map, but since July 1 the work has been under charge of the quartermaster's department, and Mr. Drouet's salary while so employed will be paid by that department.

It is believed that the work on the military map of the department is very important and should be pushed forward. In a short time this office will be able to furnish skeleton outlines to be filled up by officers sent out from the various posts, and the field work suspended April, 1898, can be resumed.

The office at department headquarters has supplied the various posts with the necessary instruments and material for the instruction of officers and noncommissioned officers, and a sufficient supply of these articles is on hand, or applied for, to fill all reasonable requisitions during the coming season.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

The ordnance officer of the department on June 30 was Maj. Daniel M. Taylor, Ordnance Department, U. S. Army, who is under orders to be relieved by Lieut. Col. John Pitman, Ordnance Department, U. S. Army.

Major Taylor's long experience and high standing in his corps have received fitting recognition in the practical promotion which he is about to receive in being assigned to the charge of the Watervliet Arsenal, whose responsibilities demand well-rounded capacity.

Previous to the arrival in the department of Major Taylor the ordnance officer was Lieut. Col. A. L. Varney, U. S. Army, to whom I am under many obligations for the information and suggestions furnished to me in connection with the United States arsenal at San Antonio, Tex., and the necessities for a larger and more improved establishment, both for the manufacture and storage of the material and implements of war, elsewhere set forth in detail in this report.

It was a source of great regret to me that this splendid officer, after his life-long devotion to the military service, should have been retired with the rank of lieutenant-colonel when he stood almost within the reach of his merited colonelcy. In such cases the direct intervention of Congress would seem to be but a fitting and well-earned reward, and the hope is expressed that in some way or other Lieutenant-Colonel Varney may yet be listed among the colonels on the retired list of the Army.

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR OF SMALL-ARMS PRACTICE.

In addition to his duties as judge-advocate of the department, Capt. C. D. Roberts, Seventh Infantry, is acting as inspector of small-arms practice.

The following extracts from his report have my approval:

The change in the small-arms firing regulations made by General Orders, No. 20, headquarters of the Army, February 26, 1903, found the practice of many of the organizations in this department either completed or under way. Nearly all the troops were under orders to proceed to the Philippine Islands during the spring or summer, and it was thought best to finish the practice according to the old system. Authority for this purpose was therefore sought and obtained, and the practice is just being concluded by the last of the Twelfth Cavalry. As soon as all the returns are in the results will be published.

Of course, all practice held hereafter will be made under the new regulations. These regulations prescribe the calendar year as the target year and require practice season to consist of two periods, one called the regular season, of three consecutive months, and the other called the supplementary season, of one month. These seasons are prescribed by the department commander, but the regular season must terminate on or before October 31. As some of the troops to be stationed in this department will not reach their stations before September or October, it will be impossible to have the full practice this year, unless authority is obtained to utilize the months of November and December. It is thought that in this climate these months are the best for practice, and General Orders, No. 20, ought to be modified to permit the department commander to designate any months in the year for practice.

Target ranges are on the reservations of Forts Bliss, Clark, and Ringgold. At Forts Brown, McIntosh, and Sam Houston and Camp Eagle Pass the ranges are on rented ground. An estimate for rents and repairs has been submitted by the quartermaster's department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1904. The target range for Fort Sam Houston is situated 19 miles distant from that post, at Leon Springs, and is only barely sufficient with much crowding for four organizations to practice together. Only the absolutely necessary repairs to this range have been made in view of the fact that it is on rented ground, and there is or was a prospect of the Government acquiring a large camp site in the vicinity where a suitable range could be constructed. In view of the contemplated enlargement of Fort Sam Houston the need of a good range is becoming each year more urgent. At the other posts in the department the present facilities with the allotment applied for for repairs and rents will be sufficient.

In spite of the constant change in the personnel, the marksmanship of the command shows an improvement over last year and compares favorably with that in other departments.

An infantry competition was held at Fort Bliss in July and August, 1902, at which 18 competitors took part, and the scores made were excellent, especially in consideration of the fact that some of the competitors had shortly before returned from the Philippine Islands and had not for some years received the benefit of a regular course in target practice. The results of the competition were published in General Orders, No. 18, Department of Texas, 1902.

SIGNAL OFFICE.

The signal office has been in charge of Capt. C. D. Roberts, judge-advocate of the department, who reports that instruction in military signaling, as required by army regulations and existing orders, was held at all posts in this department during the year. All commands were reported well supplied with competent signalmen, with the exception of Fort Bliss, Tex., at which post, however, 1 officer and 23 enlisted men were under instruction during the month of June, past.

The telephone systems established the previous year at Forts Bliss, Clark, McIntosh, and Sam Houston are all reported in good condition, and telephone systems have also been established at Forts Brown and Ringgold and Camp Eagle Pass, so that the posts in this department now have satisfactory telephone service. Military telegraph lines have been in operation from Fort Bliss to El Paso, 6 miles; Fort Clark to Spofford Junction, 9½ miles, and Fort McIntosh to Fort Brown, about 237 miles. These telegraph lines have been in operation during the entire year and are necessary for the prompt dispatch of business, being, in the opinion of the signal officer, far more preferable than telephone connection.

The operators at Laredo and Brownsville are furnished by the Western Union Telegraph Company, which company also keeps the end sections in repair, under agreement with the chief signal officer, and saves expense to the Government while giving satisfactory service, the only expense in maintaining the line being the employment of the regular signal-corps men and a few civilians, chiefly at the minor sub-offices.

The officer in charge reports the total number of messages handled during the past year as 18,633, the cash receipts being \$1,935.72 and the value of free messages sent \$187.43.

To show the value of the Government line along the border to the people in the vicinity, the fact may be mentioned that the number of commercial messages sent was 7,831 and those received 8,238. According to the report of the signal officer, "the only depredation reported on the line during the year was the breaking of glass insulators. The people of the section traversed have no other telegraph connection with the outside world, and appreciate the value of the line."

The following quotation from the report of the signal officer has my approval:

I did not deem it necessary to ask authority to make a personal inspection of the line this year, as I did last, but deem it advisable that such an inspection should be made by the signal officer of the department at least every two years and by the chief operator at least once a year.

MILITIA MATTERS.

Capt. John A. Dapray, Twenty-sixth Infantry, who, by reason of physical disability resulting from service in the Philippines, was sent to Fort Sam Houston for treatment, was, as soon as discharged from the post hospital, directed to report to me for such light duty as he

was able to perform under the orders of the War Department. On account of his peculiar training and experience, he was assigned to the charge of matters pertaining to the organized militia of the State of Texas under the requirements of the recent militia act, and, although still on a status of light duty and under medical treatment, is, with the advice and consent of the surgeon in charge, while awaiting the arrival of his regiment, rendering me assistance in my office. Being without an aid-de-camp, the conditions which have made Captain Dapray's services available at this time are propitious and for the best interests of the service.

The new militia law promises undoubtedly most satisfactory results in the State of Texas, whose volunteer guard already shows unmistakable signs of new life and improvement. Although since the war with Spain, according to reports of the adjutant-general of the State, there has been little or no trouble in maintaining the maximum aggregate strength authorized by law, the scattered location of the 68 organizations comprising the division at 49 towns, covering an area comprised between extreme points east and west nearly 800 miles apart and north and south about 500 miles, makes the conditions governing the Texas militia very different from those of any other State in the Union. Naturally soldierly by temperament and inclination, the Texans have maintained an unusually efficient military establishment, consisting of a division, commanded by a major-general, divided into two brigades of two regiments each, with separate signal corps, battalion of field artillery, and squadron of cavalry.

Immediately upon the receipt of telegraphic instructions from the Adjutant-General of the Army, conveying the directions of the Secretary of War to prepare for the inspections contemplated in General Orders, No. 7, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, January 24, 1903, to carry out the provisions of the act to promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes, I communicated with the governor of the State, and, by his direction, the adjutant-general of the State of Texas called on me at my headquarters for conference.

As a result of that conference the fact became obvious that, on account of the novel features of the new Federal militia act, the State militia authorities needed the fullest cooperation and assistance that could be given to them by the Regular Army, and especially from these headquarters. In the very start it was apparent that much of the duty required of me involved preliminary advice and suggestions, and, besides, I foresaw the necessity of keeping at my headquarters all the data, reports, etc., concerning the State militia within this department intact and separate from other records. For these and other reasons, which seem to me too manifest to be set forth in detail, I regarded it as advisable for the best interest of the military service in general to maintain at these headquarters, temporarily at least, a separate and distinct division or subbureau in charge of militia matters, under the immediate supervision of an available and experienced officer of my command, selected with a view to his capacity to aid, cooperate, and advise with the State officials, under my immediate direction, in their part of the work involved under the new militia act.

In fact, as afterwards developed, this action on my part seemed not only wise but imperatively necessary, owing to the fact that the old adjutant-general was about to retire from office and a new one appointed to take his place. I therefore continued the officer above named on this duty until I could report the matter to the War Depart-

ment, which I did in my communication of May 27 last, meanwhile requiring him not only to advise with but to actually work with and assist the adjutant-general in every way possible. At least for the immediate present, I believe that the division of militia affairs at my headquarters, now working so successfully and with promise of excellent results, should be continued intact, and I am pleased to have received the sanction and authority of the Assistant Secretary of War of the experimental project thus started by me.

In the beginning of the proceedings directed under the new militia law and the general orders above quoted, I detailed three competent officers to make the required inspections, dividing the State into three districts and beginning the inspections on May 23 last. During the inspections four companies that were deemed below the required standard for inspection were disbanded by order of the governor of the State, and two companies mustered in. As a result of the inspections (which have been heretofore specifically reported upon), I believe that the Texas Volunteer Guard will be placed upon a better and more efficient status than ever before. Already, I am informed, recruitment promises to be unusually active, and the fact that several new companies have been organized, uniformed, equipped, and mustered into the service within the past three months would seem to warrant the expectation that the definite shape given to what has heretofore been regarded as anomalous bodies of civic soldiery will, under the new scheme of Federal tutelage, lead to most satisfactory conditions, advantageous to both the State and General governments.

In accordance with the recent law, the Texas Volunteer Guard will be mustered out and the Texas National Guard will be mustered in, to meet the requirements of the militia act, with an authorized increase from a maximum of 3,000 to a maximum of 5,000 officers and men.

My thanks are due to all the officers named in the preceding paragraphs of my report for faithful and efficient assistance rendered to me in my administration of departmental affairs, and also to my former aids-de-camp, First Lieut. Lewis S. Morey, Twelfth Cavalry, and Second Lieut. Robert McC. Beck, jr., Twelfth Cavalry, with both of whom I parted reluctantly and with regret when they were relieved in order to accompany their squadrons to the Philippine Islands.

If this report seems unusually long, it is due to the fact that I deem it proper to cover all the conditions which I found existing in this department, and especially those matters which have been either not reported or not finally acted upon by my predecessors, and all of which, in my opinion, should now be brought to the attention of the War Department.

Very respectfully, -

F. D. GRANT,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I., July 26, 1903.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: The date of the last annual report of the commanding general, Division of the Philippines, was September 30, 1902. On the date when the undersigned retired from active service, in pursuance of law, the time for the preparation of an annual report had not yet arrived, but it was so close at hand, and as it would not be easy for the general officer succeeding to the command to review the events of the past ten months, the undersigned has undertaken such a review and has mentioned some suggestions in way of reform and improvement.

In what is now submitted there is no other reference to civil officials and government than is required in order that the observations of the writer, respecting what was committed to his jurisdiction by the assignment he had the honor to hold by the President's order, might be explained and understandingly presented.

The service of the undersigned in the Philippines has been continuous since January, 1901, and he has not failed to study the problems presented to American occupancy of these islands, for American solution, especially those of a military character.

The government was wholly military until September 1, 1900, on which date the military governor was relieved of authority to legislate and to some extent of the power to name the individuals whose services were needed to aid him in executing the laws that were then in force or that might thereafter be enacted by the Philippine Commission.

On July 4, 1901, there was transferred to the Commission, by the military governor, all civil executive authority previously exercised by him with respect to those provinces in which civil government had been established by the Commission. Within those provinces the civil power was supreme and the president of the Commission became governor of the islands. The general officer commanding the troops stationed in the Philippines had complete control over the discipline, instruction, and administration of the military force, but in the civil government provinces this military force could not be aggressively employed save in those cases of disturbance of the peace respecting which the Commission should request armed intervention. Over all other provinces, the authority of the general commanding in the capacity of military governor still continued; but during the ensuing twelve months all the territory in the Philippines, save what is now called the Moro Province, was brought under civil government and removed from military control.

On July 4, 1902, the office of the military governor was abolished and the president of the Philippine Commission was announced by the President of the United States as the chief executive of the Philippine Islands. The commander of the forces was ordered to assist with his troops the enforcement of law and order when called upon to do so by the Philippine Commission.

On January 30, 1903, the civil governor was authorized by Congressional enactment to call upon the military commander for the use of a certain class or corps of his army to assist the Philippine constabulary, the same to be commanded by the nominees in the civil government.

All Americans who have been as cognizant as the undersigned has been of the magnitude of the task committed to the Philippine Commission, and who have noticed the great progress that has been made in establishing a just government of regulated liberty for the Filipinos, can but feel that the highest ideals of our best statesmen and publicists are being incorporated into the code of laws that is being developed here, wholly and entirely for the good of the people, and the members of the Commission and their associates deserve the cordial support of all. Such support by the military has been accorded not only as a matter of duty, but also as a privilege and honor. The relations between the military and the civil officials result in cordial cooperation, and the personal and official relations between the military commander and the civil governor have been close and intimate and most satisfactory to the writer.

In respect to one official subject there was a difference of opinion as to the expediency of a course touching the Army that was adopted by the Philippine Commission and which the undersigned has felt that he should not fail to call special attention to, for the result of the action taken was to put upon the Army a slight, to say the least, that could have been avoided. The matter referred to is fully presented below under the caption of "Native scouts."

THE ARMY IN THE PHILIPPINES.

The following tabulated statement of numbers present of the different arms of service and of military officials serving in the division will serve as a graphic presentment of the numbers in these islands on June 30, 1903, as compared with September 30, 1902, the date of the last annual report of the division commander. The number of organizations has undergone no change during the ten months covered by this report, but the number of enlisted men has decreased by nearly 5,000 and the number of officers serving with the four arms of service is now greater by 120 than at the earlier date.

Comparative statement.

	October 1, 1902.			June 30, 1903.		
	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.
Division headquarters.....	82	-----	82	85	-----	85
The department headquarters.....	56	-----	56	51	-----	51
Engineers.....	19	886	405	13	885	898
Cavalry.....	191	4,756	4,947	200	3,864	4,064
Artillery:						
Field.....	11	360	371	12	350	362
Coast.....	13	429	442	13	439	452
Infantry.....	339	13,481	13,820	448	10,326	10,774
Philippine Scouts.....	94	4,841	4,935	97	4,771	4,868
Signal Corps.....	7	415	422	7	421	428
Medical Department and Hospital Corps.....	82	1,659	1,741	89	951	1,040
Contract and contract dental surgeons.....	123	-----	123	121	-----	121
Surgeons, U. S. Volunteers.....	152	-----	152	-----	-----	-----
Post noncommissioned staff.....	-----	102	102	-----	109	109
Attached.....	4	-----	4	9	-----	9
Civil duty.....	12	-----	12	15	-----	15
Total.....	1,135	29,429	27,564	1,110	21,616	22,726

The arrivals of military organizations from October 1, 1902, to July 26, 1903, have been the following:

Three batteries Field Artillery.....	Feb. 25, 1903
Four companies Coast Artillery.....	Feb. 25, 1903
Headquarters and three battalions Fourteenth Infantry.....	Mar. 26, 1903
Headquarters and one squadron Thirteenth Cavalry.....	Mar. 26, 1903
One squadron Thirteenth Cavalry.....	Apr. 26, 1903
Headquarters and three battalion Eighteenth Infantry.....	Apr. 26, 1903
Two companies engineers.....	May 27, 1903
One squadron Twelfth Cavalry.....	May 27, 1903
Headquarters and three battalions Twenty-third Infantry.....	May 27, 1903
One squadron Thirteenth Cavalry.....	June 26, 1903
Headquarters and three battalions Fourth Infantry.....	June 26, 1903
One squadron Twelfth Cavalry.....	July 26, 1903
Headquarters and three battalions Seventeenth Infantry.....	July 26, 1903

The departures have been:

Two batteries Field Artillery.....	Mar. 6, 1903
Four companies Coast Artillery.....	Mar. 6, 1903
Headquarters and one squadron Sixth Cavalry.....	Apr. 6, 1903

Headquarters and three battalions First Infantry	Apr. 6, 1903
Headquarters and one squadron First Cavalry	May 12, 1903
One battery Field Artillery	May 12, 1903
Headquarters and three battalions Second Infantry	May 12, 1903
Two companies engineers	June 14, 1903
Headquarters and one squadron Fifth Cavalry	June 14, 1903
Headquarters and two battalions Fifth Infantry	July 2, 1903

The troops serving in the Division of the Philippines on July 26, 1903, comprised the following:

Engineers, 1 battalion.
 Field Artillery, 3 batteries.
 Coast Artillery, 4 companies.
 First Cavalry, 2 squadrons.
 Fifth Cavalry, 2 squadrons.
 Sixth Cavalry, 1 squadron.
 Eleventh Cavalry, headquarters and 3 squadrons.
 Twelfth Cavalry, 2 squadrons.
 Thirteenth Cavalry, headquarters and 3 squadrons.
 Fifteenth Cavalry, headquarters and 3 squadrons.
 Fourth Infantry, headquarters and 3 battalions.
 Fifth Infantry, 1 battalion.
 Tenth Infantry, headquarters and 3 battalions.
 Eleventh Infantry, headquarters and 3 battalions.
 Fourteenth Infantry, headquarters and 3 battalions.
 Seventeenth Infantry, headquarters and 3 battalions.
 Eighteenth Infantry, headquarters and 3 battalions.
 Twenty-third Infantry, headquarters and 3 battalions.
 Twenty-sixth Infantry, headquarters and 3 battalions.
 Twenty-seventh Infantry, headquarters and 3 battalions.
 Twenty-eighth Infantry, headquarters and 3 battalions.
 Twenty-ninth Infantry, headquarters and 3 battalions.
 Thirtieth Infantry, headquarters and 3 battalions.

Native:

Under civil government, 30 companies.
 Under military government, 20 companies.
 General officers, 7.
 Officers of staff department, 64.
 Medical department—Officers, 90; Hospital Corps, 951.
 Contract surgeons—Medical, 104; dental, 17.
 Ordnance department—Officers, 3; detachment, 38.
 Signal Corps—Officers, 9; 3 companies, 426.
 Total strength, present and absent, 1,241 officers and 21,817 enlisted.

In the Department of Luzon two of the six brigade organizations established in 1901, the Second and Third, have been continued for tactical and inspection purposes. The former First Brigade was merged into the Second, and the Fourth was merged into the Third. The former Fifth and Sixth Brigades have been discontinued and the troops serving in the regions formerly controlled by these organizations now report direct to the commanding general, Department of the Visayas, while in the Department of Mindanao the troops are serving who composed the former Seventh Brigade.

The reduction of the number of men in each company or troop organization to 65 in the cavalry and infantry has been attained with favorable results, in that it has reduced the force in the Philippines and the expense of the military service. It has embarrassed company and regimental commanders, in that the men required in each organization for administrative purposes in a company of 65 is but very slightly less than the number required in a company of 100, yet the number available for fieldwork, guards, drills, etc., is very materially diminished. Stated in another way, two companies of 60 men will never be able to turn out as many men for duty as will one company

of 100, but the reasons why the numbers of each have been diminished are recognized as cogent and necessary.

The cavalry force that has been maintained here for the past year is less than half that of the infantry. The proportion of the two arms, as represented by regiments, has been the same as the ratio existing between the total force of cavalry and infantry maintained in the permanent establishment.

During the active campaigning while the insurrection in these islands continued all the regiments of the Regular Army, both foot and mounted troops, that could be spared from the United States, Cuba, and Porto Rico were sent to the Philippines. The largest number of cavalry regiments serving here in whole or in part at any date was 7, with an aggregate strength of about 7,500.

While active operations were at their most strenuous stage the impression prevailed with some military men that the insurrection could be suppressed with greater facility by mounted troops than by infantry, since it was considered that the mounted men could march more readily and occupy and control the disaffected localities better than foot men. The fact that the horsemen were available and that they were by some deemed to be more effective than men on foot is probably the reason why so large a proportion of mounted to foot men was detailed for service here, for it is now the generally accepted belief of those most experienced in Philippine campaigns that infantry will be more effective against a native enemy in this country of jungle and swamp than the same number of mounted men. They will also be far less expensive. A terrain favorable to horsemen is very seldom found save for two or three months in the dry season.

The losses among cavalry horses have been very great indeed, and there has not yet been discovered any means of preventing the ravages of some of these tropical animal diseases. For this reason it is recommended that mounted troops serving here, as their time expires, be largely replaced by infantrymen and that the enlisted men of about one-half the organizations be natives of these islands.

As to the time of Philippine service to be required of white troops, it is understood to be now the policy of the Government to limit the tropical tour to a period of two years. If the cost of maintenance of troops in the antipodes and the cost of their transportation both ways be regarded as important, there is another reason why the service should be of greater duration, and it is the fact, which none can dispute, that the officers and men can be more efficient the third than the second year, and the fifth than the third. The worst feature of military service in this tropical country is, of course, the climate, but take it all in all the liability of our race to sickness and disability here is not greater than it is for those serving in many parts of India, Java, Cochin China, Madagascar, Mauritius, Jamaica, Hawaii. All the countries named were conquered by white men and have been largely governed and civilized through the instrumentality of military men of the Caucasian race. If England, Holland, and France had adopted the policy of shipping their troops home every two years there is little hazard in saying they would never have effected the conquest of those vast tropical regions they now govern with so much advantage to the governed.

The governor of a province, or any official charged with duties that bring him into close relations with these strange people, either in a hostile or peaceful way, does not really become proficient, no matter what his aptitude or intelligence, until he has had a year for observa-

tion and study, and it is true of the enlisted men that they must learn by experience how to take care of themselves in the Tropics. The tour of duty for officers and men should be four or five years instead of two or three, for the work will be far better done by a trained army than by new men or recruits. The health of some will fail, of course, but with better quarters and a resort to hill stations the jeopardy is slight. When one remembers that there is no such thing as an exchange or repatriation of the troops of Holland serving in the Netherlands Indies—for that army is exclusively colonial; that there are 10,000 Europeans serving in the Dutch East Indies constantly for about half the pay our troops receive; that a very large proportion of the British officers in India were born in India; that hundreds and hundreds of Indian officers have reached retiring age on Indian army service alone; that the white officers of the British West India regiment (enlisted men are negroes) have a service with it averaging ten years; that the French troops in French Indo-China go out for tours of ten years, and that many apply to stay longer; that the overthrow of native rule in Hawaii was effected principally by American residents and missionaries who were born in Hawaii; with these as precedents, it would seem to be well to revise the rules respecting the length of the tour of duty for American troops in these islands.

During the year five regiments of infantry and three of cavalry, in whole or in part, have returned to the United States, while the completion of the repatriation of the eight regiments will be accomplished by October.

In pursuance with the recommendation of the undersigned the force serving in the Philippines will be soon further reduced by the withdrawal of two regiments of cavalry and two of infantry. If certain changes are made in the organization of the troops, which have been proposed to the Department and are referred to in the closing caption of this report, the number of white troops may be still further decreased.

PUBLIC ORDER.

The following is submitted as indicating the conditions as to disorders, etc., that existed during the twelve months ending August 31, 1902. It is taken from the report of the chief of the Philippine constabulary to the head of his department, dated August 31, 1902. He summarized the result of military operations coming under his own observation, and the following embodies the principal statistics furnished:

Insurgents and ladrones killed	674
Captured	2,837
Surrendered	1,067
Arms captured and surrendered	2,089
Losses by the constabulary:	
Killed	22
Wounded	41
Strength of force July 1 (officers and men)	5,510
Ponies on hand	750
Estimated number of unserviceable arms in the archipelago	1,000

Estimated military force required in the Philippines after July, 1903: Constabulary 5,500 and scouts 5,000, working in cordial cooperation under the chief executive, and also a regular force of American white troops, for moral effect, of 10,000.

Of course it will be understood that during a part of the period covered by this report active military operations were in progress in

Batangas, Laguna, Tayabas provinces, and in the island of Samar, while the scenes of the most active constabulary campaigns were the provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Tayabas, Sorsogon, islands of Negros and Leyte, and the Province of Misamis, island of Mindanao.

During this period the military activities controlled by the division commander in the Christian provinces were confined to two, and the period of such activity was less than four months.

A copy of the report dated June 30, 1903, made to the chief of constabulary by Col. William S. Scott, assistant chief of constabulary for northern Luzon, was kindly loaned to the undersigned, and such data herein as relates to the operations of the native troops in their character of assistants to the constabulary were gleaned from the report cited.

In Luzon, north of Tayabas, it appears that since February 11, 1903, 101 ladrones were captured, 78 killed, 22 wounded; 69 firearms and 1,700 rounds of metallic ammunition captured. In the operations which produced these results, 1,800 scouts participated in the character of assistants to the constabulary, but the number of the latter employed is not given.

In all the cities and large towns throughout the archipelago and throughout a very large part of the rural districts, inhabited by Christian Filipinos, life and property have been secure and the inhabitants have pursued their ordinary avocations without annoyance by the lawbreakers. There have been a few cases of serious disturbance of the peace in the smaller towns and rural districts which have resulted in some loss of life and property. Such disturbances of the peace have had the effect of discouraging industrial efforts, and in many extensive regions little attention to agriculture, the mainstay of the islands, has been practicable.

The lawless element generally consists of roving bands whose members are descendants of former generations of men engaged in the same avocation—lawbreakers and robbers by occupation. They sometimes call themselves *insurrectos* and resent the characterization of “ladrones,” but the real motive of almost all of these outlaws is loot, pure and simple, and to be supported by the peaceful and industrious inhabitants.

The more important instances of disturbance of the peace in the provinces inhabited by Christians are the following:

In the latter part of January and early in February, 1903, an *insurrecto* chief styling himself “general in chief,” raided the province of Rizal, defeating and disarming municipal police and small detachments of constabulary. Under the law requiring native troops to assist in police work, 600 well-trained men quartered near by were thrown into the region of disorder. They operated under an assistant chief of constabulary. By March 27 Gen. San Miguel had been killed, together with about 100 of his followers, and the remainder of the gang was captured or dispersed.

On February 21 a detachment of 11 men of the Sixteenth Company of Scouts, without an officer, were attacked at Cainta; one man was mortally wounded and the detachment gave up their arms to the attacking party, which was said to have numbered from 60 to 100.

On the 31st day of May a robber band raided the town of Bay and looted the place, capturing some arms and maltreating the inhabitants. This occurred the day following the departure of a detachment of one officer and a few men of the engineer battalion, who had just finished making a road from Bay to a neighboring town.

On the 11th day of February, 1903, a band of ladrones raided the town of Naujan, Mindoro, killed some of the inhabitants, and robbed them of their property.

On March 23 a chief named Concepcion, who was an escaped convict, at the head of a band of 40 of his kind entered the town of Surigao, province of same name, and killed an American constabulary officer, captured the remainder of the party of constabulary and disarmed them, thus securing about 140 firearms, several thousand rounds of ammunition, all the constabulary supplies, and the sum of about 7,000 pesos. The inhabitants of the place were either neutral or favored the robbers. When the facts were known to the civil governor, he requested the division commander to take charge of the disaffected region and ordered the constabulary serving there to act under the order of the military officer in command, who was Brig. Gen. Jesse M. Lee, U. S. Army. He at once sent troops to the scene and personally organized and directed operations until the arrival of Colonel Myer, Eleventh Infantry, who carried on the work. Five companies of white troops, two of scouts, and about 160 constabulary took part in these operations.

The civil governor intimated that the writ of habeas corpus might be suspended in this province if the necessity for so doing existed, but as criminal judicial proceedings could be promptly had in every case of those who were charged with participation in the lawbreaking, it was not necessary to invoke the more summary methods of military law. Almost all the participants in the attack were arrested and tried; 4 are under death sentence, 20 for life, and most of the others received sentences reaching to twenty years at hard labor. The leader, Concepcion, has not been caught, but an unconfirmed report says that he was wounded and has died, while his band are all in jail, as are many of his confederates. The American troops were withdrawn early in July, and peace and quiet in the province has been restored; but two companies of native troops still remain for moral effect. It is a noteworthy fact that since American occupation in March, 1900, there had been no trouble in this province, neither did the Filipino republican forces resist the American troops when they landed at Surigao in 1899.

About the 1st of April there was an outbreak in Misamis under a leader named Flores. With a following of one or two hundred very ignorant people, armed with a few rifles and many bolos and spears, this outlaw was able to raid the pueblos, rob the inhabitants of their property, and set the province in a turmoil. The provincial governor, who is a Filipino, described the uprising as an insurrection, and Governor Taft having given directions that all military operations in Misamis be under the orders of the military commander, General Lee, and afterwards General Wint, was placed in charge of the restoration of order. About April 1 a company of native troops was sent to Cagayan de Misamis and on the 13th of the same month this command encountered the insurgents at Agusan, causing them some loss. On May 11 there was an outbreak on the island of Camaguin, which pertains to the province of Misamis, where before this for four years there had been absolute peace. The provincial governor asked for help and a company of native troops arrived at the scene of the trouble the next day. A sharp fight ensued and the trouble was ended immediately.

About May 1 a troop of the Fifteenth Cavalry from Iligan had been sent into Misamis Province with the hope that the moral effect of its

presence would be beneficial. On May 16 the troop commander with a small detachment arrested and disarmed a number of Flores's adherents in Suclutan, but in some manner the natives recovered their bolos, set upon the detachment, and killed Captain Overton and one man of the Fifteenth Cavalry and wounded another soldier.

The uprisings in this province were ended by the 1st of July, the chief, Flores, was a prisoner, and the white troops returned to their former stations.

In response to a call from the Adjutant-General of the Army for report respecting any practicable reduction in numbers of the troops serving in the archipelago, the undersigned on July 5 cabled a recommendation outlining a change in the organizations and numbers of soldiers which had in view the settlement and legalizing on a permanent, practical basis the provisional organization which now exists for the native troops. Briefly, the project is: The civil government to maintain such number of constabulary as may be thought necessary, the same to be commanded by a Regular Army officer and aided by a few regular officers of the grades of major and captain, all under the civil governor, this force to maintain the peace if possible, and when unable to do so the regular troops to be called in and take charge of the disaffected region or province. The regular force to be reduced to 12 regiments of infantry and 3 of cavalry, the white enlisted men of 6 infantry regiments and 1 cavalry regiment to be replaced gradually by natives, and the native scouts enlisted and absorbed in place of the whites. This regular force, which would still contain more whites than natives, to be supplemented by such number of American engineers, artillery, and telegraphers as should be required, the aggregate to be about 13,000 of all arms, of which considerably less than half would be natives of the islands. The desirable scout officers, after examination, to be taken over by transfer into the regular establishment with present dates of commission. All officers of native regular regiments to be officers of the Regular Army.

The project outlined above contemplates the continuous service in the Philippines of 6 regiments of infantry and 1 of cavalry, whose enlisted men would be exclusively natives of these islands. The same desiderata, i. e., efficiency and economy, could be secured in another way, and perhaps it would be found to better serve the purpose. It consists in substituting natives of these islands for enlisted Americans in the third battalion of a certain number of cavalry and infantry regiments, aggregating in all, say, twenty or twenty-five battalions, etc., these to be assigned to permanent Philippine service and officered by details from those commissioned in the regiment. The regimental headquarters with the remainder of the companies would be available for service in the United States or in our exterior possessions, just as now.

The theory of this proposition is that whenever the disorder in any locality or province should become so great as to make the intervention of the regular forces desirable the governor would call upon the commanding general for help, specifying the locality. It is supposed that he would observe in his call for the army the rules laid down in section 14 of the organic act for creating the Philippine constabulary, where it is specified that when the peace of any municipality shall be so disturbed that the local police was unable to restore it the presidente would report the fact to the constabulary representative in charge, who thereupon would temporarily take command and direct

the operations of the police force of said municipality in conjunction with the constabulary. In framing General Orders, No. 152, Headquarters Division of the Philippines, wherein are laid down the conditions that had to be observed before troops could respond to a call for assistance, it seems probable that section 14 of the constabulary law (act 175) furnished the guiding thought, yet the phrase of General Orders, No. 152, that required the civil authority asking for troops to state his inability to cope with the emergency, just as the municipal presidente was required to report his inability to do the same thing, in order to secure armed assistance, was not acceptable to the governor and the chief of the Philippine constabulary; a dissent which, in view of the precedent established by the Commission, seems to be without justification, as the cases are parallel.

It was supposed that when troops, at the instance of the civil authority, should intervene in any scene of disorder the constabulary serving there would fall under the control of the army commander for the time being; just as was done in the remote Surigao and Misamis provinces in March and April last, where native troops, constabulary, and the Regular Army troops all worked with the utmost harmony for a common purpose and accomplished it speedily.

The governor, in his report to the Secretary of War, dated November 1, 1902, mentions that in a certain contingency it might be necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in a disorderly province and turn it over for the army to deal with. It is certain that this disposition under all ordinary conditions would attain the desired result—that is, peace and good order, in the most speedy and least expensive manner.

It is respectfully suggested that a very great advantage to the service would result from longer tours of duty in the Philippines, and, as an inducement and incentive to such stay here, it is suggested that Congress allow a continuous service increase of pay to officers who should remain on duty here for more than the stated customary tour of duty. If an 8 or a 10 per cent increase were allowed for the third and each subsequent year of continuous Philippine service, but not to extend beyond a 25 per cent increase in all, the result would be that fully half of the officers ordered to these islands would be glad to remain. The transitory stay of officers, which is now the rule, is a very great detriment to efficient insular service, and besides is a cause of constant expense to the Government.

NATIVE SCOUTS.

The employment of natives of the Philippines in a military capacity and for combatant purposes by the United States authorities appears to date from September 16, 1899, when General Otis authorized Lieutenant Batson, Fourth Cavalry, to raise 100 Macabebe scouts, and on October 18, 1899, when General Lawton was authorized to organize two additional companies, each 128 strong, and to employ them in clearing the swamps and esteros about the head of Manila Bay of robbers and insurgents, and as scouts, guides, and detectives for General Lawton's column.

Lieutenant Batson, Fourth Cavalry, commanded the battalion. Subsequently this force was increased to 478 officers and men. Its organization was completed on June 1, 1900, and was styled "The Squadron of Philippine Cavalry, U. S. Volunteers," with Maj. Matthew A. Batson, squadron commander. The officers were United

States volunteers and paid from army appropriations, while the men were contract employees and paid from revenues of the islands.

General Otis, in his report to the Adjutant-General on May 14, 1900, mentions the circumstance of the recall of a detachment of Macabebes from Tayabas Province, because "their methods of dealing with rebellious subjects or with natives from whom they wished to extract information were in most instances attended with inexcusable harshness."

The raising of the scouts was not limited to the one tribe of Macabebes, for in the division roster of July 15, 1900, there is mention of "Ilocos scouts" and "Ilocano scouts." The adjutant-general of the division, on June 30, 1901, reported that the number of native scouts in service on January 1, 1901, reached an aggregate of 1,402, while by the date of his report these numbers had grown to 5,500 and were organized into 53 companies. The pay of the men was fixed at \$15 per month for the first sergeants, while the duty sergeants received \$10.80, the corporals \$9, and the privates and musicians \$7.80, and all received a uniform allowance of \$1.50 per month for clothing.

The subsistence of the native cavalry was the same as that issued to white troops, while the ration of the other scouts was the same as the native ration issued in Manila, but on the 12th of April, 1901, the ration for all native troops, scouts, and employees was fixed by the commanding general, Division of the Philippines (G. O., No. 70, series 1901, Div. Philippines), and this ration, with very slight modification, was subsequently approved by the Secretary of War (G. O., No. 12, A. G. O., series 1902). The clothing allowance for all grades of \$1.50 per month was continued until the publication of the order last cited, when it was fixed for all enlisted men at \$2.70 per month, while the rates of pay fixed in 1901 still prevail.

On the 27th of September, 1901, the commanding general, Division of the Philippines, ordered that all classes of native scouts be reorganized into fifty companies, each to conform as respects numbers of the different ratings to a company of infantry of 104 men and 1 or 2 officers, preferably lieutenants who had belonged to the former organizations, but department commanders could in cases of necessity assign subaltern officers for duty with these companies. The soldiers were not enlisted, but were to all intents and purposes civilian employees, and they were armed with the Springfield carbine and wore khaki uniform of the regular infantry. The companies were numbered from 1 to 50, of which 11 were composed of Macabebes, 13 of Ilocanos, 4 of Cagayans, 4 of Tagalogs, 2 of Bicolis, and 16 of Visayans. All were paid from insular funds.

On September 28 the War Department ordered that all scouts then employed and theretofore paid from insular revenues be discharged as such and enlisted and paid, from October 1, with funds appropriated for the support of the Army. Effect to these telegraphic orders of the Secretary of War was given by General Orders, No. 310, Division of the Philippines, series of 1901. By that order the regular army ration was restored to the scouts and so continued until the receipt of General Orders, No. 12, 1902, above cited, which with very slight modification restored the ration fixed by General Orders, No. 70, headquarters Division of the Philippines, series 1901, its money value being about 6 cents less than that of the regular army ration.

In pursuance of this order the 50 companies of scouts were fully organized, and all of the officers were commissioned provisionally for four years, while the soldiers were all enlisted for three years. Three

natives of the Philippine Islands were appointed second lieutenants, but one of them has recently resigned, and his place has been filled by an American. The aggregate strength of the scouts on October 1, 1902, officers and men, was 4,935, while the present strength is 4,868.

From October 1, 1902, to February 1, 1903, the scouts were all performing the same duties as the regular troops, namely, guards, fatigues, etc., but it was very seldom that two or more companies were assembled at the same station. There has been an effort made to concentrate the troops, and with respect to the regulars there has been considerable progress, but beyond the assembling of a battalion of scouts at Caloocan and another at Camp Jossman, near Iloilo, the native troops have generally occupied one-company stations.

On the 30th of January, 1903, the following act of Congress was approved by the President:

AN ACT To promote the efficiency of the Philippine constabulary, to establish the rank and pay of its commanding officers, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That officers of the Army of the United States may be detailed for service as chief and assistant chiefs, the said assistant chiefs not to exceed in number four, of the Philippine constabulary, and that during the continuance of such details the officers serving as chief shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of brigadier-general, and the officers serving as assistant chiefs shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of colonel: *Provided*, That the difference between the pay and allowances of brigadier-general and colonel, as herein provided, and the pay and allowances of the officers so detailed in the grades from which they are detailed shall be paid out of the Philippine treasury.

SEC. 2. That any companies of Philippine scouts ordered to assist the Philippine constabulary in the maintenance of order in the Philippine Islands may be placed under the command of officers serving as chief or assistant chiefs of the Philippine constabulary, as herein provided: *Provided*, That when the Philippine scouts shall be ordered to assist the Philippine constabulary, said scouts shall not at any time be placed under the command of inspectors or other officers of the constabulary below the grade of assistant chief of constabulary.

Approved, January 30, 1903.

At the date of this legislation the status of the portion of the Army of the United States serving in this archipelago was fixed by the instructions of the President, dated July 4, 1902, as follows:

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington, D. C., July 4, 1902.*

The insurrection against the sovereign authority of the United States in the Philippine Archipelago having ended and provincial civil governments having been established throughout the entire territory of the archipelago, not inhabited by Moro tribes, under instructions of the President to the Philippine Commission, dated April 7, 1900, now ratified and confirmed by act of Congress approved July 1, 1902, entitled "An act temporarily to provide for the administration of affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes," the general commanding the Division of the Philippines is hereby relieved from further performance of the duties of military governor and the office of the military governor in said archipelago is terminated. The general commanding the Division of the Philippines and all military officers in authority therein will continue to observe directions contained in the aforesaid instructions of the President, that the military forces in the Division of the Philippines shall be at all times subject under the orders of the military commander to the call of the civil authorities for maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of their authority.

By the President:

ELIHU ROOT,
Secretary of War.

It will be observed that these instructions are in effect but a reiteration of the earlier instructions of the President to the Secretary of War of April 7, 1900, that were ratified and confirmed by act of Con-

gress, approved July 1, 1902, providing for the administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippines.

At date of this legislation no request had been presented for military intervention in respect to disorders and none was made until long afterwards.

During the period of four months ending February 1, 1903, there were a few changes of stations of scouts made at the request of the civil officials, for the reason that the presence of the troops in certain named places was considered to be desirable on account of the beneficial influence upon the good order and peace of the neighborhood their presence would have.

The division commander was inquired of once or twice by officials of the civil government as to the practicability of placing one or more companies of scouts at the disposition of the chief of constabulary for field operations against disturbers of the peace. The reply was that troops would be sent to any scene of disorder immediately upon receipt of request therefor, when such request conformed with the requirements of General Orders, No. 152, Division of the Philippines, series of 1902, wherein were laid down certain conditions to govern the call for troops in aid of the civil authorities. The governor was told that if the last clause of General Chaffee's order, defining the conditions to be fulfilled, was deemed objectionable by the Philippine Commission as requiring too sweeping an admission, the division commander was quite ready and entirely willing to revoke so much of the paragraph as required that the request for assistance of the troops contain the declaration "that the civil authorities are unable to cope with the emergency at the scene of the disorder."

It is understood that this legislation was asked for by the officials of the civil government, but at this time no mention had ever been made to the military commander of a desire that the troops be used in any disturbed district, although they were at all times entirely ready to move at a moment's notice, nor had any member of the Philippine Commission made any allusion to the inadequacy or narrow scope of the instructions of the President that enjoined the subjection of the military forces under the commanding general to the call of the civil authorities for maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of their authority.

The first section of the law to increase the efficiency of the constabulary authorized the doing of several things that were either being lawfully done at that time or were entirely within the capacity of the Philippine Commission to do. The second section authorized the detachment of a part of the forces serving under the orders of the general in chief in the Philippines, the command over such detachment to be exercised by the nominees of the civil government.

The division commander greatly regretted that political considerations seemed to require the captains, field officers, and generals of the forces here to occupy the mortifying position which the execution of this law involved, viz, to be forbidden to lead into action the troops of their commands whom they had organized, instructed for years, brought to a high state of efficiency, and whose material wants, under other leadership, they must still supply.

Generals Moore and Lee lost command of one-third of the troops in their respective brigades—forces which had been distributed for ready response to a call of the civil authorities "under the military commander."

On February 10 the following telegram, dated February 9, was received from the Adjutant-General of the Army:

Act of Congress approved January 30 authorizes Philippine Scouts to be placed under command of chief of constabulary when ordered to assist in maintenance of order. The Secretary of War directs you to give assistance necessary to dispose of ladrones in Bulacan as required by William H. Taft.

On the date of receipt, and in anticipation of the calls of the governor for scouts to carry on hostile operations against the lawless element, department commanders were instructed that whenever organizations were furnished and placed under orders of the constabulary chiefs the companies continued to be dependent upon the Army for their pay, rations, medicines, and attendance, also arms and ammunition; continued to be amenable to the rules and Articles of War, and that they should be furnished with such animals and means of transportation as were available.

On the 11th of February, 1903, the first request for military assistance ever made on the military commander by Governor Taft was received from him. He asked for the services of eight companies of scouts to be employed in the provinces near Manila, where the constabulary had been contending with the disturbers of the peace; also in the province of Batangas and in the island of Mindoro. The same day the commanding general, Department of Luzon, was ordered to furnish the companies asked for, and on the following day they reported.

On July 25, 30 of the 50 companies of native troops had been transferred from the command of the undersigned and his subordinate commanders to that of the civil governor and were employed in active operations in the field against the element which is variously styled "ladrones," "tulisanes," or "insurrectos."

As a full and detailed report of the operations of the native troops serving under the orders of the governor will doubtless be submitted to the War Department by him, any further mention of their operations by the undersigned will be inappropriate.

It seems certain that there must be a native contingent in the Regular Army serving in the Philippines. Reasons of economy and policy both point to the wisdom of availing ourselves of the excellent native material here available. The civil government will need a police force, of course, but the Army contingent should be available for duty anywhere, just as is now the Porto Rican regiment. Under the caption "Public order" is an indication of a project for organization of such a force.

At one time it was believed that the negro regiments in the Regular Army must not serve out of a warm country, but we have seen that those serving in Montana were as strong and stalwart as those who served in Louisiana; so it will be found with the Filipinos, for should the necessity exist to throw a large force into any eastern country these islands could furnish several regiments.

The following is submitted respecting the pay, rations, clothing, etc., of natives in the military service:

As far as concerns pay, the present rates are ample. We would have no difficulty in recruiting a hundred thousand soldiers at the same rate. Why should more be paid? Any excess would be a bonus, a gift, and would insure no more efficient service than now. There is but one kind of clothing ever worn by troops in the Philippines—the cotton khaki. The present allowance for clothing is \$2.70

per month, or \$32.40 per year. The same is ample, and there should be no change. As respects subsistence, it is remarked that there has been a constant clamor to have the native soldier ration restored to what it once was, the same that is allowed to white troops.

The fact that the Philippine cavalry scouts first organized were allowed the full army ration; that this gave place to the present native ration, and later was changed to the army basis, and finally was again changed to the native ration first allowed, is the principal cause of these appeals to have the army allowance restored. It is always easy to increase public allowances that affect personal interests, but to decrease them is more than difficult and is always resisted. There is another fact that probably has its influence in causing these appeals. There are many ex-soldiers of the Regular Army holding commissions in the scouts. These are men who have been accustomed to look upon a ration as an allowance in the nature of a vested right, and they take up the cause of their men and favor their appeals to secure the same allowance these officers have themselves enjoyed while they were in the ranks. The junior officers, generally, are not concerned in any military administration beyond what affects the men under their immediate command. They know that if the subsistence allowance is increased, the savings will be greater and the funds for expenditure in messing, recreations, etc., will be abundant. The public interests are forgotten, but the family interests, so to speak, of the men under their personal command are ever before them.

If the Filipino had begun his military career in our Army with a ration such as he was accustomed to, if he had not luxuriated on an allowance that comprises a quantity of food far and away beyond his hygienic needs, and if the commanding officers had refused to entertain appeals for an increase, then these clamors would not have been heard at all.

It is probable, indeed almost certain, that these scouts never in all their lives until they enlisted in our Army tasted bread or coffee. Of meats they had but very little, if any at all. Their food and that of their ancestors has always consisted almost exclusively of rice, fish when obtainable, and sweet potatoes, the same food that the thousands of Chinese in these islands subsist on, men who perform the very hardest labor and who thrive notwithstanding.

An American officer recently visiting the garrisons of the British and native army in India said he inquired particularly as to the native ration of the Sikhs, Gurkas, Dogras, Sepoys, and Pathans, men averaging taller than Anglo-Saxons. In the commissary stores of these native regiments he saw only rice, lentils, oil, and a very little dried fish, which constituted their only food, and there were no kitchens or mess rooms. Animal food is not permitted to many of the East Indian races, and hog meat is forbidden absolutely to the Mohammedans.

The average weight of an American soldier is about 150 pounds, while the average weight of the Fourth Company, Macabebes, all in excellent health, was found on July 5 to be 128 pounds; in other words, the American soldier in weight stands to the Filipino as 100 to 86.6. If the Filipinos were of equal weight and physical power to the Americans, they would require for nourishment and health an equal amount of food. Considering the man as a machine and his ration as fuel, the two machines of same size, weight, and power require equal amounts of fuel; but it is self-evident that the wiry little Malay does not require for his physical well-being as much food as the husky Anglo-

Saxon. In this respect he resembles the native ponies as compared to the American horses, the former getting fat on half or two-thirds what the latter require. It seems that the quantity of food the men, respectively, require will be directly proportionate to their size, weight, etc.

The nature of any food, as fuel, is commonly expressed in terms of calories, and the American soldier's ration measured by its calorific value is found to be from 3,956 to 4,999, depending upon its components. The average of rations issued to the American troops in the Philippines measured as above will be found to be about 4,300 calories. The proposed Filipino ration expressed in the same units varies from 3,795 to 4,511, the average being about 4,000. This shows a difference of but 300 calories, but when the two rations are measured by their money value the difference is very much greater.

The average ration issued to regulars costs 18.9 cents, while the proposed Filipino ration would cost 12.61 cents, or one-third less; indeed, the difference is greater than this and reaches to much more than one-third, because the rice component is bought in Manila and costs nothing for transportation, while nearly all the articles of which the regular ration is composed are transported at very heavy cost to the Government from the United States. Rice is the most important part of the food of all tropical people, and it should be so in the ration provided for the native troops in the Philippines. The components of the native ration should be adapted to his experience and environment. When these Macabebes and other Filipinos were in the Spanish army they received not quite 2 pounds of rice each man per day and nothing else from the Government, while their pay was about one-fourth what the United States now allows them and was usually far in arrears. This fact is not put forth as an argument against the issue of any food but rice, but it is cited for the purpose of illustrating a phase of character and to show how successful we have been in Americanizing these Malays in one respect—that of teaching them to get all they can from the Government, and there is no lack of officers of high rank to assist them. No necessity exists for conceding the demand for more food; neither should they have the same pay, the same clothing allowance, nor the same ice allowance the white troops receive.

Americans in the Philippines have not so far been an unmixed blessing to the native inhabitants. We have raised their hopes and expectations to a level far above the possibility of realization. We have paid extravagant wages, rents, and prices for commodities at a few places, but we have not yet succeeded in doing anything that has raised the general social, industrial, and economic level. To concede pay and allowances out of all reason to a few thousand native troops would to a certain extent debauch the recipients and only excite the envy and unrest of the vast mass of the population, who must still depend on agriculture for their subsistence. The prices of rice, sugar, hemp, and copra are still regulated, and will always be, as in the past, by supply and demand; but as yet we have done nothing that has raised the value of these staples or has increased the profits by decreasing cost of production. The Filipinos flock to the cities, where army quartermasters hire some natives at four times the pay they formerly received. The waiting list for these jobs is always a long one, while the fields in the country remain uncultivated, public roads projected by the government are unconstructed, and labor at living rates by industrial employers is unprocurable. If the army could

cease the employment of natives, they would have to return to the fields and resume their former employments, for these people must compete with other tropical peoples in producing tropical products at oriental prices or they must succumb.

It has been often stated that an American soldier costs \$1,000 a year, but native soldiers do not cost England, Holland, and France in the Orient more than about one-sixth that amount. There is no reason known why they should cost us more. If we pay more than others, the increase is a bounty which really helps only the few and leaves the mass unhappy and discontented.

To increase the native ration would be, in the opinion of the undersigned, an act without reason or excuse and a waste of money. The present ration would cost in Manila stores not less than 15 cents per day, while the "chow" of a native carpenter or cargadore, who performs the most severe labor, does not cost to exceed 6 cents gold, or about 15 cents Mexican, per day, and there can be found nowhere in the world more vigorous and stalwart men.

The question is occasionally asked, Can the natives be trusted as soldiers? The answer is that all men are usually faithful to their own interests. The native regiments were not unfaithful to Spain in the rebellion of 1896 so long as they were properly treated. One or more of these regiments were comprised of "disciplinarios," or convicts, drafted into the army. It is notorious that in 1896 the pay and allowances of the native soldiers were long in arrears. These amounts allowed to the Spanish native private soldiers were: Pay, 56 pesos; clothing, 3 pesos; total, 59 pesos per year; which, converted into gold at the rates then current, would give them about \$30 per annum, or \$2.50 per month. The pay and clothing allowance of a native soldier in the United States Army is \$10.50 per month.

The ration of a Spanish native soldier was very nearly two pounds of rice per day and nothing else, which cost about 2½ cents gold, while the ration the United States issues to our native soldier costs the United States delivered to the troops about 15 cents gold. Bringing all the figures together, it results that the native soldier cost Spain about \$3.18 per month, while the same man costs the United States about \$15 per month, both amounts being in gold. Notwithstanding the ill treatment and abuse these troops received, some of the native regiments remained true to Spain to the last.

The Indian mutiny has been often referred to as an event to take warning from in incorporating the natives into our local army, but the causes which led to that revolt are thoroughly understood now, but were not in 1857-58. Another mutiny in India is now as impossible as it is to believe that there ever would have been a revolt of the American Colonies in 1775 if England had governed them with the same liberality and justice which now characterizes her rule in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

The student of history of the conquest by the dominant races of countries inhabited by black, red, yellow, and brown races will not fail to observe that those conquests were almost always effected by armies which were composed in part and sometimes principally of these same black, red, yellow, and brown races, who had no compunction in fighting and destroying their own people. The native Filipinos under American officers will be as true and faithful as any troops could be, provided they are well treated and are paid promptly.

MORO AFFAIRS.

At the date of the last annual report of the division commander the army was still responsible for the maintenance of order in all the Moro and Pagan country in Mindanao and Sulu; this for the reason that the army was the only police force available in all that territory. By October 1, 1903 [sic], civil government had been proclaimed in all parts of the Philippine Archipelago save the regions above referred to; but in this vast territory, embracing 28,000 square miles, there was but one group of inhabitants who had availed themselves of the privilege of establishing municipal government under the municipal code act. This group inhabited the southern extremity of the Mindanao panhandle, where three or four villages were united in 1891 under the name of the municipality of Zamboanga. The town governments of Dapitan, Dipolog, Davao, Mati, Baganga, Caraga, and Cateel are carried on as provided in orders issued in 1901 by the military governor.

The total number of Christian inhabitants of the Moro country is, by the recent census, ascertained to be 65,741. They are in three principal groups: Zamboanga, with 20,982; Davao and the east coast of Mindanao south of parallel 8, with 20,458, and Dapitan, with 17,331. In the island of Basilan there are 1,331 Christians; in Cotabato and vicinity, 1,716; in the Sulu group, 1,928, and at Malabang, 518. The Moro population has not yet been reported upon, but the military officers who were charged with the enumeration or estimation of the Moro inhabitants reject wholly the Spanish determinations or guesses, ranging from 700,000 to 1,000,000, or even more.

According to General Parrado, who commanded in Mindanao, 1894-1897, and who in 1898 published a work on the historical, geographical, and statistical features of Mindanao, General Blanco estimated the Moro population of the Lake Lanao country at 300,000, while the American officers who have spent a year or more in military operations, campaigning and reconnoissance, do not place the lake population and that of the contiguous country at more than 100,000. General Parrado assigns 100,000 Moros to Cotabato, Sarangani, Davao, and the Mati country, while American officers do not admit numbers one-half as large.

Of the Pagan inhabitants we have received no reliable information in addition to that collected and reported by the Jesuit missionaries before the Spanish-American war, nor are the results of the recent American census yet reported respecting these wild people. The Jesuits claimed that there were 262,000 of these wild hill tribesmen in Mindanao. Americans have come into no contact with them other than that due to visits of individuals of these tribes to the seacoast towns for trading purposes.

At the breaking out of the Spanish war the Catholic missionaries were making rapid progress in the conversion of these heathen to Christianity, but the withdrawal of Government aid to the church, which resulted from the change of sovereignty, has compelled the missionaries to discontinue their proselyting efforts save at a few centers of Christian Filipino settlements where the priest can now secure a support. One or two Protestant clergymen have visited the Moro country since the Spanish evacuation, but none has commenced any missionary work. Indeed, a more discouraging field of effort to Christianize could not be found. That Christianity in competition

with Mohammedanism has never made any progress is a fact well known to all. The Jesuits worked for more than twenty years in the Moro country, but failed absolutely to effect any conversions save of children who at a tender age came under the complete control of the priests and sisters, nor has Protestant missionary effort in any Mohammedan country been more successful.

In the appendix will be found a paper written in 1901 by the superior of the Company of Jesuits in the Philippines, the Rev. Pio Pi, who has passed twenty years of his life in missionary effort in Mindanao. This paper, which has never been published before, contains a critical analysis of Moro character and a discussion of their habits, customs, traditions, and aspirations. It is replete with sensible observation respecting the magnitude of the task that confronts Americans in the Moro country, and therefore deemed to be worthy of appearing in a public document. The data it contains should be valuable to representatives of other creeds who may wish to undertake the conversion of the Moros to Christianity.

The first step for the establishment of a civil government for the Moro country has just been taken by the Philippine Commission, and this is the enactment of a law for the organization of such a government in the Moro province.

In the past the situation of the military in controlling Moro affairs and as well in supervising the municipal affairs of the native Christian Filipinos has given rise to much embarrassment because there were no standards or rules for the guidance of the military authorities in the disposal of administrative questions save those which related to criminal and civil prosecutions. By the terms of an agreement made with the Sultan of Sulu by General Bates in 1899, the Sultan was recognized as possessing so much of sovereign power as would permit him and his colleagues or advisers to dispose of cases of capital crime of Moros upon Moros. He was recognized as being possessed of so much sovereign power as would sanction him in compelling his own people to obey his mandates, even though they resulted in confiscation of property. The Sultan claimed the right to grant franchises for sale or lease of land, for cutting of timber, for controlling fisheries and for licensing of boats, and the American authorities have not interposed definitely or vigorously to restrain his actions or prevent his collecting their proceeds. It is hoped and believed that under the new law much can be accomplished in correcting these abuses and establishing a government under which the Moros, the Filipino Christians, the Pagans, and the Caucasians can have free and equal opportunity to work out their future. The undersigned was consulted by Governor Taft in the drafting of the new Moro law, and such assistance as he could render was freely given in elucidation of all features of the measure.

As respects military considerations, the Moro country and the Moro people are grouped into three subdivisions, viz, the Sulu Archipelago, the Rio Grande Valley, and the Lake Lanao district.

Among the inhabitants of the Sulu Archipelago there has been preserved a limited and qualified respect for sovereign power. The dominion of the sultan at the time of the conquest of Malaysia by Europeans, which included the whole of the sixteenth century, was a real substantial dominion. The sultanate of Sulu included the whole of the group of islands of that name and, besides, a considerable stretch of country extending along the coast of northeastern Borneo.

Sulu then included the large island of Basilan and its dependencies, while the Moro inhabitants of the Zamboanga panhandle were also subjects of his highness the Sultan, and, as well, the inhabitants of Cagayan Sulu and Paragua also owed allegiance to him.

At this time the number of Mohammedans in Mindanao and in the Visayan Islands to the north was probably three times the number of those of Sulu, but there was not in the larger aggregation any one chief who made good his pretension to universal and effective dominion. When the first Spanish campaign commenced in Mindanao, in 1578, Cachil Corralat appeared to be the principal overlord, but his authority was not effective nor real, although there are found historic references to his claimed or pretended sovereignty in the Malanao country. Whatever may have been the vigor or rigor of his sway, he appears to have been the last of the Maguindanaos to have received any extensive recognition as an overlord throughout Mindanao.

There is still a so-called sultan of Mindanao, whose seat was formerly at Buhayen, in the Rio Grande Valley, but his claim has no recognition. Uto was the last claimant to chiefship of this royal line, but he died in 1902, and no successor has yet appeared, while a former slave of Uto, Piang by name, is now the most powerful dato in the Rio Grande Valley, but has no claim to royal descent. Pedro Cuevas, of Basilan, is a Tagalog born in Cavite, a former Spanish convict at the penal colony of San Ramon; but Pedro, so long as he can wield a kris, will be real sovereign over all the Moros in Basilan. Mandi, of Zamboanga, is simply a Spanish mestizo, fairly well educated, and put upon his feet by the Spaniards, who favored him with their support and gave him a trip to Madrid, but he has no royal prerogative. In the center of Moro population about Lake Lanao there is no individual dato, sultan, or overlord who is recognized as such; but there are hundreds of datos and sultans, all of equal title and pedigree, but no one having conceded or pretended power over others.

The Bates agreement with the Sultan of Sulu, which it appears was advised by the Schurman Commission, is an obstacle to the establishment of good government; but there have been many instances of failure on the Sultan's part to observe the requirements of the compact, and the bargain is voidable on the part of the United States, in its discretion. The Philippines legislation by Congress of March 2, 1902, makes no mention of this agreement, although it is expressly provided in the conditional approval of it by the President, notice of which was communicated to General Otis by the Secretary of War on October 27, 1899, that the agreement was made subject to the action of Congress under the Paris treaty; also that the Sultan and his datos be made to distinctly understand that this agreement was not to be understood as in any way to authorize or give the consent of the United States to the existence of slavery in the Sulu Archipelago. As slavery has been continually practiced there and is now common, and as the Sulu Moros are known to have continued to purchase slaves from outside the Sulu group and themselves to have engaged in the slave trade continuously and persistently, the United States has further justification for declaring the agreement as null and void.

It was apparently the understanding of those who favored the negotiation of this instrument that its making would probably prevent an uprising of the Moros, and so spare the United States from another war with a fanatical and savage people. The fact is that there never has been a time for three years when a force of 500 soldiers

in Jolo and two or three small gunboats could not preserve the peace or suppress any uprisings; but this was not known or not fully understood when this agreement was entered into.

With the Bates agreement out of the way the Government will have to deal only with the chiefs or the village headmen, called *datos*. There should be no great difficulty in establishing a satisfactory relation with these village chiefs. Each one who is loyal and true to the General Government should be the head of his little village, which would be governed and administered according to law, and there would be no sultan overlord to keep his people stirred up or semi-hostile.

With the sultan out of the way the conditions would be the same as those which exist in Mindanao. After Moros are taught trades and have some instruction in the public schools the new generation will become useful members of the community. They have been found to be fairly good laborers and eager to gain cash wages, a means of securing money which is quite new to them; nor do the *datos* interpose and appropriate the earnings of the individuals as they did formerly. There are two courts of first instance in the Moro Province, and there is authority under the new legislation for the appointment of justices of the peace.

The first governor of the Moro Province was detailed to that duty by the division commander of the Philippines, on request of the civil governor and approval of the Philippine Commission. The officer detailed was the commanding general of the Military Department of Mindanao, and he will have the authority to name most of the subordinate civil officials. The government will be civil in all respects, except that the agents for conducting it will be largely military, and there will always be a military force close at hand to be used, if necessary, in maintaining the authority of those who are charged with the responsibility of conducting the government. It will, in fact, be a form of civil rule controlled and regulated by the military and always in conformity to the Philippine legislation, the governor of the Moro Province reporting to the civil governor of the Philippine Islands, as respects all civil matters, and to the commanding general of the division touching civil matters that involve or require the supervisory executive action of the commander of the army of the Philippines.

The governor of the Moro Province will be assisted by a council, composed of executive administrative officers, who possess limited legislative powers. Taxation as respects customs, duties on goods landed at and exported from the ports of entries, forestry taxes, and *cedula* taxes are regulated by general Philippine law, but the net proceeds of these sources of revenue, as well as all the income drawn from general taxation of whatever source, inure to the provincial treasury, and are available for disbursement under the supervision of the legislative council, but must be accounted for in accordance with the general laws of the islands that govern matters of audit. The legislative council may establish municipal government throughout the province in conformity with the municipal code of the Philippines, or that code may be modified by the council and adapted to meet local conditions. The revenues of the territories will not at first be adequate to the fiscal needs, but in a few years the province should be self-supporting, if the cost of the military and the coast-guard vessels be excluded.

A map of Mindanao and Jolo is submitted herewith, which contains

all the latest information and shows the subdivision of the new Moro Province into districts.

The Moro inhabitants of the lake country, like all others of their race in the Philippines, are pure Malays, but they are taller and better formed than others of their race in these islands, such as the Tagalos, Visayans, and other Christian Filipinos. Unlike these last, the adult male Moro frequently has a very light mustache and goatee. Tradition says that these people were converted to Mohammedanism by missionary priests from Arabia and Persia, but none of them can tell anything of their early history. A few can read and write—always in Arabic characters—but they have no other books than the Koran and some genealogical records extending back a few generations, and there are no dates in such accounts. The Moros of the Sulu group of islands and Paragua speak a different tongue to that of the Mindanao Moros, yet both are written in Arabic characters. For a further account of these people see the monograph of the Rev. Pio Pi, Society of Jesus, who spent twenty years among them. (Appendix V.)

The works of Spanish authors respecting the Spanish conquest of this Moro country and its colonization have been carefully studied in the preparation of the historical account of this conquest, etc., by Lieutenant MacKinlay, First Cavalry, an officer of military information division. As no narrative of these operations can be found in the English language that makes any pretension to completeness, and on account of the great interest which a study of these people now has for Americans, and considering also the fact that we are now brought face to face with this very important question of the future of these Malays who still adhere, and probably always will, to the teachings of Mahomet, it has seemed to be highly desirable that there should be made available to English readers an account of the Spanish efforts to conquer and civilize the Moros, which lasted for more than three hundred years. (This account is presented in Appendix VII.)

In the Lake Lanao region of Mindanao military operations were in progress at the date of the last annual report. It has been found necessary to continue the work then begun, which had taken the character of punitive measures in respect to part of the Moro population of the lake country. The reason why the troops were obliged to move to the region was stated in the last report of the division commander and that of the commanding general of the Seventh Brigade, and the reason why the expedition had to be converted into an occupying force has also been already reported.

On the 1st of August, 1902, there were stationed at Camp Vicars near the lake shore a battalion of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and a battery of mountain guns. Employed in road making and guarding communications to the base at Malabang were about 600 men, and at the base were about the same number. The wagon road was completed to Vicars by October and the force of road workmen and guards reduced to a single company, which now affords needed protection and guards a sawmill in the forest. The frequent attacks by parties of Moros upon the outposts and small detachments, the occasional killing and wounding of a soldier and capture of his rifle by Moro assailants forced the authorities to action. It was never difficult to ascertain whence came and who were the individual assailants, and it was easy to know where to look for the criminals. In some instances the sultans and datos were told that they must arrest and

deliver over for judicial trial and punishment those of their people who were known to have attacked the camps and outposts or travelers on the road, their names having already been furnished by them as the guilty ones. In one instance the dead bodies of the two culprits were brought to Vicars and delivered. In another case the man wanted was not produced while a subordinate member of the attacking party, a slave, was brought in. He had resisted arrest and been mortally wounded in the struggle, but lived long enough to reveal the fact that he was not what the sultan had represented him to be, the leader of the robber band, but simply a member of the party and a slave of the sultan's. He survived only a few hours. The sultan himself was taken into custody, but a few days later made a struggle to escape and was shot in the mêlée.

In September, 1902, the rancherias and forts of the Moro datos, whence came those who had made many attacks upon the outposts, were taken and destroyed, and thereafter those villages gave no more trouble.

During the autumn and early winter there was comparative quiet at Vicars, but the strong cotta of Bacolod on the northwest shore of the lake and about 10 miles from Vicars still continued to fly war flags and frequently replied by defiant letters to messages of peace and good will. It was not believed by many Moros that this place could be taken by the Americans, and so long as this sentiment prevailed it was evident that there could be no general acceptance of our control and consent to our presence in the Lanao country; and therefore that this challenge of long standing be noticed was incumbent on us.

All rancherias on the west shore of the lake and all on the north end were peaceable except the followers of the chiefs of Bacolod. There were a dozen friendly villages and two hostile, but these two barred the way to an acceptance of an invitation by the well disposed for the troops to visit them. The division commander ordered the west shore of the lake explored and mapped and that if hostile Moros barred the way to overcome the opposition. These instructions were followed and the Bacolod fort was captured together with another at Calahui, about a mile farther north. (Plans and sections of these two cottas are forwarded herewith.)

On the east shore was another strong place, the seat of a Moro chief, who was also defiant. His home had never been visited by white men and he resented our presence in the lake country. On the 4th of May the Vicars column started, and on the 6th was fired on as it attempted to traverse the east shore. An action resulted, and the Taraca forts were reduced, the resistance crushed, and the pride of the sultan humbled.

Under date of May 11 the division commander received the following telegram from the Secretary of War:

I congratulate you and Brig. Gen. S. S. Sumner on the work done in Mindanao. Express to Capt. John J. Pershing and the officers and men under his command the thanks of the War Department for their able and effective accomplishment of a difficult and important task.

It will be remembered that the date of the action which resulted in the subjugation of Bayang was May 2, 1902, while the last hostile combat was at Taraca almost exactly one year later, to wit, on May 6, 1903; but there was no time during this year when the commander of the forces would not have gladly avoided hostilities, if only the

Moros would have accepted peace and recognized our right as a sovereign nation to explore and survey the country and make a census of the inhabitants. (A map of the Lanao country, from Malabang to Iligan, is submitted herewith.)

A Spanish priest and some soldiers of Spain visited Lake Lanao as early as 1639, but were driven away. Spanish forces returned to the lake in 1894 and remained there until the war came on with the United States, but they only occupied one point on the lake shore, relying on steam launches to control the military situation. The United States after one year's operations and without use of launches has occupied the Malanao country on both sides of the lakes, has constructed practical wagon roads to the lake, both from the north and south, has visited every important village, has punished twenty or thirty hostile groups and destroyed their forts, and has made such progress with these same Moros in an industrial way that they now do all the work about the camps, they build and repair all roads, cut timber, fetch green forage, and relieve the draft animals of much of the work of hauling supplies.

It now remains for the new politico-military government to start these same people, who a little more than a year ago were hostile, in the ways of civilization; and to teach them by degrees that the kris, rifle, and spear are not necessarily the only badges of manhood and respectability. In six months there should be in service on the lake two launches, for which authority of the War Department has been granted; and then it will be practicable to reduce largely the force employed in holding the Malanao region. Now there are 2 regiments of infantry, 2 squadrons of cavalry, 1 mountain battery, and a company of engineers employed between Illana Bay and Iligan Bay. In the course of six months this force can be reduced by 1 regiment of infantry and 1 squadron of cavalry. Quite likely it will be practicable to give up Malabang as a base and turn over the Malabang-Vicars road to civil control, the garrison on the bay being reduced to a company or two.

Appendix III consists of a letter of Brig. Gen. S. S. Sumner, recently commanding the Department of Mindanao, transmitting a report of Capt. John J. Pershing, Fifteenth Cavalry, reviewing the Malanao operations for the past year. This officer's work as commander at Camp Vicars and in the field deserves special mention. He has displayed rare good judgment, infinite patience in dealing with these suspicious people, wise foresight in preparing for every emergency and contingency, and, finally, when nothing remained but to crush the resistance, to so dispose his force as to accomplish the result with the least possible loss.

In the Rio Grande country there were no important military operations. All the Moros continued to be well disposed and helpful in many ways to the military. Uto, the most important hereditary chief in the valley, died during the year, and his ex-slave, Piang, who is a Chinese half-breed, is now the most powerful and influential Moro in the valley. He has always been well disposed toward the Americans. A company of soldiers divided between Reina Regente and Pikit, supplied by a flat-bottomed river steamboat, with one or two companies at Cottabato, are all the troops needed in the Rio Grande country. A good wagon road now joins Cottabato and Parang, which is a fine site for a post and a harbor which certainly must ultimately be an important seaport and center of trade. Last year a good wharf for vessels

of 20-foot draft was built there. As soon as a cable can be laid across the lake between the military posts at Marahui and Vicars the telegraph line across the Tucuran Isthmus can be given up. Then the two companies stationed at Tucuran and Misamis will be no longer needed.

In the Sulu islands the Moro conditions have not been altogether satisfactory, but there has been no resistance to the United States. While Mohamed Jumalul Kiram is acknowledged by his people as the true and lawful Sultan, yet his orders to some of his datos, if they require payment of taxes and fines, are treated with neglect and even contempt. During the year 1902, several of the most powerful of the Sulu datos were at war with the Sultan; at all events they arrayed their armies in close proximity to each other and discharged firearms, but the casualties were almost nil. The Sultan's royal revenues are very small. He collects a license tax from the Chinese who trade in the group and with the Moros who constitute his personal following. He lives at Maibun, but he can collect no taxes or license fees from other parts of his dominion. He imposes and collects a certain tax on boats engaged in pearl fishery. He collects from Siassi, Bongao, Cagayan-Jolo, and Tawi-Tawi some taxes, the aggregate of all may reach to \$10,000 or \$15,000 Mexican a year; but he is always poor and in debt. He has anticipated for several years the annual payments of \$5,000 from the government of North Borneo, which is given in compensation for a cession of certain royal prerogatives respecting lands and people in Borneo that were recognized as belonging to an ancestor, sold then for the yearly payment stated. While the free-entry privilege lasted the Sultan was an interested partner in a commercial house that imported Moro goods, but now that duties must be paid before the goods are delivered to consignees, the Sultan has gone out of the business of trade.

It is apparent to everybody that the Sultan's power has departed, his ancient rights and privileges are intangible and can not be enforced against his own people. The civil government still pays him a monthly subsidy, but this amount must now cease unless he gives a quid pro quo, and that he can not do. Very soon the Sultan of Sulu will be only a character in history and no one will regret his exit, not even his own people and race.

ADMINISTRATION.

In the reports of the division staff officers is much statistical matter which is summarized and commented upon under appropriate heads in later pages.

It is the duty of the division commander to enforce the laws and regulations that require an honest and economical administration of the public funds, but it has not been possible to accomplish a great deal in respect to economical reforms during the past year.

As the Americans are the most lavish, even the most wasteful people in the world, and as the government is the most costly of any in proportion to the population, it should not be surprising to find that the army is also much more costly, man for man, than that of any nation, and that the tendency constantly is toward a more and more costly establishment. In respect to this tendency it is admitted that an increase in the cost of armies and equipment is universal; for the constant changes in arms and equipment made necessary by the improvements and discoveries in weapons and means for attack and

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defense are constantly forcing the governments to make new and unusual expenditures; but the increase for the American army is not all of this character.

Since the commencement of the war with Spain additions to pay and allowances have been many, and it would seem that a constant and persistent clamor for some concession is almost certain to be acceded to in whole or in part by the Government. If the increase stopped here there would be no just reason to criticise, but with the lavish expenditures of public money seems to come a letting down of the bars of conscience, and it is not unusual to find officers permitting or neglecting to notice abuses in matters that affect the use of public money in a manner that is either forbidden by law or was certainly not contemplated by those who voted the appropriations. The task of those who attempt reforms in this respect is a very difficult one indeed, and it is not surprising that the results accomplished are small.

With every colonizing power it has ever been the rule to make the colony self-supporting if possible. The cases where the sovereigns have advanced funds to assist their exterior possessions have not been frequent. During periods of insurrections, the home governments have frequently met charges by appropriations from the central treasuries, but the rule has been in time of peace to make each colony self-sustaining. The South African war cost a vast sum, but a considerable part of it will be assumed by the inhabitants of the country, and now that peace has been secured the whole expense of administration and of material improvements will be defrayed locally. The only colonies now recalled which are financially bankrupt are those belonging to the English, French, Danish, and Dutch in the West Indies. Some of these receive subsidies from the home governments, but Trinidad, Demerara, and one or two others have so far been able to get along without help.

But the United States has shown the most boundless liberality in its course of imposing no limitations on the expense incurred by the local governments of Porto Rico and the Philippines, even to making up by donations, etc., any deficit that might exist in the local budgets. Besides, the United States has assisted those governments in a very material manner by the use of its army transports in carrying persons and property to and from these possessions. The United States also imposed no part of the burden on the local governments that grew out of the military and naval occupation of these countries, said forces being maintained so that means may be always at hand to uphold the authority of the civil officials and prevent disturbances of the peace. These military and naval expenses reach a vast sum. If the share of them pertaining to the Philippines were to be assumed by the local treasury there would be nothing left with which to carry on civil government. If the exterior possessions of the United States were as extensive as are those of Holland, or were equal even to those of France, and we should undertake to administer the affairs of their people in the same generous manner that prevails here, the drain upon the resources of the United States would be appalling, producing a financial crisis in our affairs.

The fact that the General Government is willing to relieve its dependency of many financial burdens, including the cost of its military and naval protection, and is willing to make very large donations for its benefit, is a most fortunate circumstance for the Filipinos, for the

expenditure in their country of all these millions which are raised by taxation in the United States may even exceed an equivalent for the money losses the Filipinos have sustained—such as are charged to the war, rinderpest, surra, locusts, plague, cholera, and drought.

Mention has frequently been made of the fact that the value of the imports at the custom-house in the Philippines largely exceeded that of the exports, a state of affairs proving that on account of the hoarding of gold, made possible by military expenditures, it is possible for these islands to import each year some millions in value more than they export. The investment of foreign capital here has been suggested as an explanation of the source whence came the funds to purchase these excesses of imports over exports, which amount to several millions each year; but whatever these investments may have been, their aggregate will be but a bagatelle compared with the United States expenditures for the army and navy and the donations.

The following is derived from the reports of disbursing officers in the Philippines, and shows the extent to which Congressional appropriations have been drawn upon for expenditures in these islands.

Expenditures in Philippine Islands for fiscal year 1902-3, Congressional appropriations as reported by staff departments.

Adjutant-general	\$1,600.00
Quartermaster	7,412,383.14
Commissary	2,101,381.63
Pay	8,283,821.84
Medical	62,974.00
Engineer	7,193.74
Ordnance	75,853.09
Signal	23,238.28
Total	17,968,445.72

If to the above amounts be added the naval expenditures here and the Congressional donation, the total will probably reach \$24,000,000, and if it be granted that one-third of this sum is promptly sent out of the country in payment for supplies and goods bought in foreign countries and in remittances home by officers, soldiers, and employees, there yet remains a sum added to the wealth of the people, or which has gone into circulation, that is equal in amount to the entire local revenues of the islands.

Of course the policy of the United States respecting the civil administration of the Philippines is not a proper subject of discussion in this report, but this administration is so closely allied to that of a military character that an exposition of the latter required this reference to the former so as to show the immense importance to the islands of the military expenditures.

The building in Manila where the Spanish general staff had its offices has since been designated as the "estado mayor." When the offices of the division commander were moved from the "ayuntamiento" building, within the walled city, in order to make room for the Philippine Commission and the civil governor, they were accommodated in the estado mayor building, situated on the south bank of the Pasig River and adjoining the suspension bridge. The space was sufficient for only a part of the offices; the remainder continued in the same quarters they had occupied since the American occupation. The dispersion of offices was very inconvenient; it was nearly a mile from the office of the commanding general to that of the chief com-

missary, chief paymaster, chief signal officer, chief engineer officer, and chief ordnance officer.

Fort Santiago was at one period the citadel of the Manila fortress, and at the period when the heaviest guns of attack and defense were 32-pounders this fort was the dominating feature of the city defenses; but its importance as a military work has long since disappeared save as an object of curiosity, presenting a type of fortifications of the sixteenth century. The Spaniards had quarters within this work adequate for some 500 soldiers, but, measured by modern American standards of necessities, we could find space for but three companies. The buildings were of masonry and in a good state of repair; roofs of earthenware tile.

In pursuance of the authority of the Secretary of War, this old fort has been adapted to the office needs of the division commander and his staff. There is also a dormitory and messing facilities for most of the clerks, orderlies, messengers, etc., on duty at division headquarters. The change which has been effected has been a very great advantage in facilitating a quick dispatch of business; for any one of the staff officers can in a moment respond to a call of the commanding general or the chief of staff. The rooms are of ample size, light and airy, and all are now lighted by electricity. From his office the commanding general overlooks the business portion of the city; the Pasig River, which is as busy a water channel as any in the world; the harbor; the bay; and the coming and going of every vessel is under his observation. As soon as the estado mayor was vacated by the division, the headquarters and offices of the Luzon Department were removed to this place from rented buildings in a remote part of the city that were occupied at a cost of \$4,200 a year.

Some of the advantages gained, other than economy and better facilities for transaction of business are the easy access to the offices of the civil government near by, ease of protection, cooler and more comfortable rooms, and, while a little more remote from the quarters of the officers, when the new bridge from the Malecon to Calle Principe is constructed, will be much more conveniently placed than before respecting the railroad station and the business houses. Besides, ample space is available for all office requirements for years to come, and with room for enlargements.

Much progress has been made and much yet remains to be done in fully installing the military prison at Malahi Island, in the Laguna de Bay. There are not quite 200 convicts—all ex-soldiers—at the place. A battalion of infantry guards these men. The quarters and storehouses are yet primitive, but they are being constantly improved, the prisoners doing all the work. The island has 100 or more acres and is over 100 feet high. The mass of the island is basaltic rock of considerable hardness, which supplies good concrete material and road metal. The quarters, barracks, prison pavilions, and all the buildings should be made of concrete or beton in molds, the roofs of galvanized iron. The water of the lake will have to be pumped to a distributing tank, and for drinking and cooking it will have to be boiled or condensed. In four or five years this establishment should be complete and maintained at very small cost.

GENERAL-SERVICE CORPS.

The number of American employees serving with the Army in the Philippines is very large, and the number of natives of these islands

employed with the troops is much larger. The following table will give a fair idea of the magnitude of this force:

Civil employees serving in the Philippines.

	Over \$150 per month.	\$150 to \$125.	\$125 to \$100.	\$100 to \$75.	\$75 to \$50.	\$50 to \$37.50.	\$37.50 to \$25.	\$25 to \$20.	\$20 to \$15.	Total.	Remarks.
Civil service ..	2	16	28	---	3	---	---	---	---	49	All clerks. Clerks, 405; mechanics, 132; laborers, packers, teamsters, 931.
Temporary ...	2	100	261	307	222	569	5	1	1	1,468	
Total.....	4	116	289	307	225	569	5	1	1	1,517	

NOTE.—In addition to above there are 126 civilians serving in the Third Brigade whose wages have not been classified.

Besides the above, who are employed at monthly wages, there are several thousand native employees at day wages, as laborers, stevedores, helpers, etc. In the Manila quartermaster depot there are 3,348 employees. The total number of day laborers temporarily employed converted into what would be a permanent employment of, say, twenty-five days per month can not be less than 5,000.

The proposition to discontinue this practice of hiring clerks, overseers, mechanics, and laborers and substituting for them a corps of trained enlisted men has often been proposed, but it has never yet received favor except at the Military Academy, where there are a hundred or two, and in Washington, where there is a corps of general-service clerks, but the latter class is not enlisted. In the Philippines the course pursued in securing civil help has been to bring out men from the States who were hired for the particular work to be performed or to secure the discharge of soldiers and employ them. At the same time the civil government needed employees and was not obliged to observe the limitation as to salary which controlled the employment of civilians for the Army.

The very urgent need for persons in civil capacities and the delay that occurred in fetching them from the United States led to the adoption of a method for filling these places which was quite effective and satisfactory from the point of view of the civil government and equally so to the persons employed, but it led to an abuse and the army was the sufferer. A soldier would apply for his discharge from the army and file evidence with his application or submit other proof respecting an offer of clerical employment in a civil capacity with some civil or military officer, or it would be shown that he could better himself in a civil business position. The company commander never wished to interpose an obstacle to the advancement of a good soldier, and he would approve the application for discharge.

At first the War Department was quite disposed to favor these applications, and the result was that there are some hundreds of ex soldiers living in these islands who were discharged by way of favor or had purchased their discharges; but the confident expectations of quick profits in private business or of rapid advancement in civil positions were not realized in a great many cases, and it has resulted that many of them have failed utterly—some on account of bad habits and on account of deficiencies, moral or mental. Some

of these have taken up occupations and pursuits that reflect no credit upon them and that disgrace Americans in these islands. Wherever there is a military camp or station in the Philippines, there is always to be found from one to a dozen Americans—very often discharged soldiers—who are saloon keepers, or worse, living in the purlieus of these posts.

But another phase of this condition of affairs is the bad effect it has had on the enlisted men who remained in the companies and the condition of general dissatisfaction that it engendered. Discharges by purchase and by way of favor have done a great deal of harm in the Philippines to the morale of the army, and we can never have any well ordered military service here until we discontinue all discharges by way of favor, save in those rare cases where a real hardship would result from a denial of the request. The civil government should import such employees as it needs, or take soldiers after they have completed their army engagements. When there is a permanent corps of trained general service men there will be no place for these discontented, restless, soldiers, and they will have no recourse but to serve their terms.

In the different headquarters in the division are now serving about 150 enlisted men as clerks and messengers, of whom 100 are of the former category. Many of these men are dissatisfied because alongside are civil clerks who receive from \$1,000 to \$1,800 per annum, while the enlisted clerks receive in pay, rations, and clothing only about \$35 per month. There was a practice of placing such clerks on a status of "commutation of rations," so that they could have their income supplemented by \$22.50 a month from the subsistence department—clearly an illegal proceeding, but such was the practice—which has been discontinued, of course. The regulations allowed 75 cents per day in lieu of rations at places where subsistence was not supplied. A case was reported in Manila two or three years ago where several soldiers who were detailed as clerks were receiving commutation of rations, but they messed with the company that was quartered in the same building where the clerks worked and to which company they belonged. They did not draw rations, but paid \$9 per month for their board, supplied in their own company mess room, which left them the substantial sum of \$13.50 per month as extra pay. Another case was more recently reported where three signal corps soldiers, stationed at a remote point and on a commutation basis, purchased their subsistence from the commissary and had it shipped to them by a special Government launch sent monthly a hundred miles for no other purpose than to deliver these groceries. Of course this launch service was stopped.

All European regiments serving in the Tropics have a large number of camp followers who are really native servants. They perform all the drudgery about camp or quarters and follow the troops in campaigning. The soldiers are exclusively reserved for fighting and are relieved from all duty not tending to further that end. For all general purposes connected with laboring work around posts, such as kitchen police, scavengers, cutting grass, weeds, etc., a certain number of laborers should be allowed for American company and band organizations, either in garrison or in the field. Natives should also be employed in such numbers as the necessities of the service require, in the discretion of the division commander, and at rates of pay fixed by him. They would be employed in loading and unloading military

freights, except supplies actually issued to troops for immediate consumption; in packing, unpacking, and moving military supplies or property in reserve or storage; and in making roads, bridges, wharves, and buildings.

Extra-duty pay should not be allowed here, but there should be organized and maintained a trained corps of army service employees, and they should be enlisted soldiers, so that they may be controlled and disciplined. Very strict prohibition should be made in the law authorizing such army service corps against their employment in any menial capacity for officers, such as personal servants, cooks, orderlies, etc.

This is a work for the general staff to take up and carry into being. It will be of immense benefit to the service and will stop an abuse which is a growing one.

INSULAR DEFENSES.

Surveys and recommendations have been made looking to the reduction of the area of the Mariveles and Kalumpan Point military reservations, so as to conform with the recommendations of the former division commander in his report of May 1, 1902; but a sufficient area has been retained for the location of all the batteries proposed by the board on defenses, that was appointed in pursuance to paragraph 24, Special Orders, No. 223, series 1901, Headquarters of the Army. As a result there will be many thousand acres restored to the public domain, and several considerable towns and villages will revert to civil administration and control.

Sites for the location of all needed batteries at the entrance to Manila Bay and for the protection of Cebu have been surveyed and projects for emplacements prepared, while the surveys at Iloilo for defensive sites will soon be completed. So far as is known to the undersigned, everything has been done that is needed to permit a beginning of the work, but of course nothing can be accomplished in installing the defenses until funds have been made available for the purpose. Full reports with estimates have been forwarded, and the Department is in possession of all requisite data. A considerable number of siege guns and howitzers that will be useful adjuncts for defense are now en route to Manila.

The carrying out of any extensive plan for the construction of defensive works will require a large number of laborers in building emplacements and their accessories. The unfortunate results that have attended efforts to secure efficient labor for construction of roads is not tended to encourage the belief that it will be easy to find here suitable labor in sufficient abundance for the installation of these batteries.

The division commander visited Olongapo and Subig during the year. No naval establishment of importance now exists or is being installed in Subig Bay that requires land defense. The fortification of this point should not be undertaken until Manila is well protected, for if this port is captured the Philippines are lost. The defense of Manila against a naval attack will be a very serious proposition, as the entrances are broad and the water deep, and heavy batteries will be required with accessory means of defense. To the undersigned it seems manifest that Cavite, where is now property of considerable value to the Navy, is a very important strategic point for a naval base; certainly this will be the most important naval arsenal in the Philippines until Olongapo is thoroughly fortified.

During the present situation of affairs in the defense of Manila and the Philippines, the Army should be principally relied upon, for a naval force adequate for the defense of the islands against a strong power would require a very large number of vessels, a greater number, it may be, than could be spared without neglecting home defense and fleets needed to take the offensive. The land defenses should be begun and rapidly pressed at Manila, Iloilo, and Cebu.

SHELTER OF TROOPS.

On October 1 there had been a good deal accomplished in the way of concentration of the small garrisons, but the number of occupied stations on that date was more than 200, while on June 30 the number had been reduced to 128, but some thirty of these were only temporary halting places of a few troops who were engaged in field service. On the date of this report property accessory to the churches and buildings belonging to the religious orders are being used without payment of rent at thirty stations. At some places this occupation was limited to a single room in a convent, while at other places the buildings in use were of considerable extent. In no case is a church edifice now occupied by troops.

The appropriation of \$1,500,000 for shelter of troops and acquiring sites in the Philippines became a law on the 30th of June, 1902. On October 1 work had been commenced at San Fernando, Union, and Salomague in providing shelter for a squadron and two companies of native troops at each place. Considerable work had been done in the Cagayan Valley in providing shelter for native troops. In Mindanao shelter made with native materials was well advanced at Malabang, while that for two companies stationed at Bongao and Siassi was completed. At Calocan the old nipa barracks were being put in order, and same at Santa Mesa, while the storehouses at Malate were being converted into barracks for shelter of a battalion.

The question as to what should be the material used in construction of shelter received careful consideration. There were three kinds available, and these were:

(1) Native lumber for floors, siding, doors, and windows, with galvanized-iron roofs.

(2) Native-wood posts and plates or girths, with grass or palm roofs and siding, secured to bamboo rafters, partitions, and ribs. The floors of these houses were sometimes made of split bamboo on native-wood poles serving as joists, and sometimes the floors were made of sawed lumber. In barracks, storehouses, and stables of this construction the doors and window shutters were frequently made of the same materials.

(3) Puget Sound rough lumber was available; the roof of galvanized iron, or of a kind of thick tar paper of recent invention that went by trade-mark names, such as "rubberoid," "paroid," etc.; but the basis of all these stuffs was paper, saturated with coal tar or asphalt.

At the date of American occupation the native materials, such as poles, nipa, bamboo, and rattan for lashings, were all very cheap and abundant; but with the advent of Americans the prices went up until it resulted that a nipa house which in 1898 would cost but \$50 had come to cost \$500. This was true of all localities where many Americans, and especially troops, had established themselves.

To construct shelter of native lumber throughout was out of the question, as the expense would be prohibitive. The native woods were never cheap as compared with Puget Sound material, and in

1902 they cost two or three times the prices that ruled in 1898. About all this kind of lumber had to be dragged to the seashore by the carabao, then rafted on bamboo to keep it afloat, and towed to the place where it was to be used. It was usually sawed into boards and scantling by hand, and by the time the ordinary woods of a good class were sawed and ready for use the lumber cost from \$60 to \$100 per 1,000 feet. Of course shelter for troops made of this expensive material was out of the question.

The subject was carefully gone over, and, taking into account the high cost of the nipa-bamboo construction in many places and the uncertainty when it would be possible to procure the vast quantity needed, it was finally decided to ask the War Department to have the necessary lumber bought in Puget Sound and shipped to these islands. The preparation of typical plans was begun, but as time was pressing the first order for 11,000,000 feet was sent before plans had been completed. This was on September 13, but it was not until January that the first cargo of this lot arrived.

It was quite clear that the appropriation of \$1,500,000 would not suffice to supply shelter for 20,000 troops in the Philippines, after making due allowance for existing shelters of Spanish origin that were to be utilized. Again, the Congressional appropriation was to suffice for all purposes except rental of the cold storage and for erection of some storehouses for the Manila quartermaster depot. It was evident that rentals and minor repairs would absorb approximately the half of the whole sum.

The lumber and other building material, including new roofing material recommended by the chief quartermaster, was available for issue in Manila from January to May, 1903; but the handling, unloading, transportation to a lumber yard that had to be hired, and the transfers involved passing the four city bridges made it impossible to fill any requisition until the lumber had all been transferred to the yard, sorted, and piled; and if the material was to be used at some other point than Manila, or the Laguna country, this lumber had to make again the transit of the bridges and be reloaded on transports or other vessels for shipment to its destination.

As soon as the plans for 4-company, 8-company, and 12-company posts were ready they were distributed, and the costs of the buildings were carefully computed, so that commanding officers could know what they could expect to accomplish with a given sum of money. The Puget Sound lumber cost on board transports at the mills about \$15 per 1,000 feet board measure. Its transportation to Manila on private steamers cost from \$5 to \$7 per 1,000.

At the last session of Congress there was appropriated \$750,000, one-third of said sum having been made available for the last fiscal year and \$500,000 for the current year, whereupon an order for an additional 11,000,000 feet of lumber was sent forward several months since and commenced to arrive in July.

In view of the intended reduction of the force here and the considerable use that has been made of nipa and bamboo and the use being made of the produce of two government sawmills that are now in use in Mindanao, the money allotted and the building materials on hand or due to arrive should suffice to make the troops fairly comfortable.

The question of water supply has not been an easy one to satisfactorily solve at some of the new stations, a matter that has always been very carefully studied; but in view of the fact that no troops in the Philippines now use any other than condensed or boiled water, the dangers from a polluted supply are almost entirely eliminated.

Office, Chief Engineer, Officer,
Division of the Philippines
Manila, P. I. July 1903

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
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There has been considerable progress in the construction of Fort McKinley (map of which post is herewith submitted). The first lumber for this post, which was received in September, arrived in January. Barracks for 8 companies are under construction and will be ready for occupation in two or three months. Materials for 16 more barracks are on the way or are being shipped. One of the three artesian wells was bored some months ago, and under test supplied 125 gallons or upward of water per minute. Another well is being completed and a third will be bored. The three are expected to supply 500 gallons per minute. The water comes from a gravel stratum about 700 feet beneath the surface, and rises to within some 15 feet of the top. Plans for a complete sewer system and water supply are matured and will be pushed. The macadam road completed is about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles in extension, but several miles more will be needed. The broken stone used in making this road was quarried and crushed by the prisoners on Malahi Island.

A contract has just been made by the municipal government of Manila to install a modern electric system for the city. This road could very well extend about 4 miles and reach the site of this post. The time required to ride from the center of the city to the site of this post at an easy pace of the horse is about an hour.

The appropriations for this post have been—

Fiscal year 1903.....	\$500,000
Fiscal year 1904.....	1,000,000
Total.....	1,500,000

which should be sufficient to complete it for a brigade, in accordance with the plans of the former division commander.

Shelter of troops in Philippines.

MONEY STATEMENT.

June 22, 1903.

Appropriation 1902-3.....	\$1,500,000
Deficiency 1902-3.....	250,000
Appropriation 1903-4.....	500,000
Total.....	2,250,000

ALLOTMENT.

Division headquarters.....	50,000
Department of Luzon.....	871,250
Department of the Visayas.....	417,114
Department of Mindanao.....	421,636
Available for allotment.....	500,000
Total.....	2,250,000

Brigadier-General Wint brought from Java a set of plans of barracks and quarters constructed and occupied by the Dutch troops at Tjimahi. These were so entirely different from any buildings occupied by our troops, and the plans so completely and carefully worked up, that it is deemed advisable to submit copies of two of the principal drawings. The plans submitted show the quarters for sheltering a battalion of troops, 4 companies of 160 men each, 2 companies being Europeans and 2 natives.

MILITARY RESERVATIONS.

Section 12 of the act of Congress approved July 1, 1902, places the control of all public lands and buildings in the Philippine Islands within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Commission, except such areas as are reserved by the President for military, naval, or other public purpose.

The act of Congress of June 30, 1902, made an appropriation for the purpose of constructing shelters in the Philippines and for acquiring sites for the same, and the division commander has full power to act in all matters within the scope of his authority; but no money can be paid for any public land until the Attorney-General has reported that the proffered title is sufficient to vest ownership in the United States. The division commander can select the lands needed for erection of shelter; investigate the evidence of private ownership, if any; and if the land has no private owner the papers are forwarded so that the President may have the data on which to base an Executive order reserving the particular tract from sale or entry and assigning it to the proposed object.

Of course it was desired that the places chosen for erection of shelter for the troops should be easily reached by means of land or water transport, and also should be so situated with respect to the surrounding country and the inhabitants that the troops could, with facility, be brought to the points most likely to be disturbed by the law-breakers, for the only reason that exists for maintaining troops in the Philippines is that they may be used in maintaining order and supporting the authority of the civil officials who are charged to administer the government of the archipelago.

It was evident, almost from the beginning of the inquiry as to sites, that the government would but rarely find any vacant public land that was suitable to the use to which it was to be put, but there were many tracts of such land that had squatters upon them. Sometimes the occupants could show what appeared on the face to be good titles; some could show papers which could, in a certain number of years, be converted into good titles under the Spanish law; and sometimes the squatter could show no evidence of title at all except possession.

At first it was thought to be the best course to make leases with those persons in actual possession and make contracts with them which would give the Government the right to acquire the titles at an agreed-upon price within a specified period of time; but it was soon evident that such a course could not be legally followed, for it might happen that the person claiming the lease money had no title or even an equity at all in the land. In all cases where practicable the War Department has occupied the sites desired with the consent of the real or pretended owners, but in several cases the Government could come to no understanding. Seeing that nothing effective could be accomplished except through condemnation proceedings, and noting also that it was next to impossible to carry through such proceedings unless it was known who all the parties interested were, the civil government was appealed to for assistance, so it might be known who the real owners or claimed owners were. After many conferences with the governor and by the judge-advocate of the division with the attorney-general, it was finally arranged that the civil government would enact a law creating what was called a land-registration court, the procedure being for the United States through the division commander to request action, so that it might be definitely known in whom the title to a particular tract of land described by metes and bounds was

vested. Upon receipt of such notice the court, through its fiscal, gave public notice to all who were interested to come into court to produce their muniments of title. The procedure is all laid down in this act.

Many tracts of land desired for military occupancy, some of which are probably owned by the State in toto and others in part, have been referred to this court. The proceedings in any case may require six months' time before a decision is reached as to who the owners really are. When the military authorities have that knowledge they can negotiate to purchase the private title, and in the event that an understanding is reached the papers can be submitted to the attorney-general. If the owner of these lands, or those having equities in it, can not come to an understanding with the military authorities as to price, then condemnation proceedings can be instituted.

On several of these tracts of land the shelter for troops is being erected; this on the theory that the buildings are temporary and may be removed should the Government decide to vacate the property.

The points where proceedings have been taken into the land court, or where the papers have been prepared with that end in view, are Salomague, San Fernando, Union, Bayambang, Angeles, Los Baños, Batangas, Lucena, Nueva Caceres, Legaspi, Sorsogon, all on Luzon; also Laguan and Calbayog, on Samar; Tacloban and Ormoc, on Leyte; Jossman, on Guimaras; Nonucan, Malabang, and Zamboanga, on Mindanao.

It is certain that some of these sites are public land, and that in very many others the whole or part is probably public. Requests have been forwarded to the War Department in respect to many of the places named above, asking that the President set aside and reserve all the public lands included within the described limits.

The effect of such action is advantageous, for it is the best form of a public notice in which to announce the intention of the Government with respect to the whole tract. The Government encounters the same difficulties here as in the United States in attempting to acquire land; when it is known that the Government officials are considering the advisability of establishing a garrison in a named locality, instantly the value of all eligible realty in the neighborhood increases several hundred per cent, and so remains until the Government has reached a determination as to its plans, and acted accordingly.

The needs of the Government with respect to the public lands in Manila have been presented to the Department. Of course the lands in this city are very valuable, and if private parties had any claim to them, valid or otherwise, a long controversy with respect to them might be expected. Fortunately there is no claimant except the city of Manila, but, as there is a clear case of exclusive military occupation for many years or even centuries, there should be no real difficulty in settling the matter.

When Fort McKinley is completed, as it should be in the course of twelve months, the necessity for extensive areas in Manila for barracks, etc., will have passed; but for depots and hospitals, and for quarters for a guard of adequate size for pressing local needs, some of the buildings now occupied will be needed for a long time, and the Bagumbayan camp ground should be retained permanently in military control.

MILITARY DEPOTS.

The existing physical and business conditions are such that for the military forces serving in Manila there is and can be but one central

magazine of supplies for the troops. During the period when active campaigning was in progress and the number of troops serving here were three times as great as now there were so-called depots—i. e., small accumulations of supplies at various points, such as Aparri, Vigan, Dagupan, Calumpit, Calamba, Batangas, Legaspi, Tacloban, Cebu, Iloilo, and Zamboanga. At one time there was a proposition on foot to make Cebu a great central distributing point for the southern islands, and it was even suggested that vessels freighted in San Francisco for the Philippines should call at Cebu and discharge cargo before coming to Manila, and on the return voyage the vessels were to make Cebu the port of departure for San Francisco, but this proposition never got beyond an inchoate project, which has never been realized. Iloilo has been the so-called department depot for the Visayas, as Zamboanga has been for Mindanao, but the accumulations of quartermaster, subsistence, ordnance, and medical supplies and other property kept at these places has been very greatly reduced and is now quite small.

As Manila is the commercial and political capital of the islands, so must it be the military center and the entrepôt of all military business and exchanges. When the new harbor, now making, is completed, permitting deep-sea vessels to discharge at the wharves in all weather, the facilities for receiving and reshipping freight will be equal to those at any seaport.

Whether the interisland service will be continued by the Government or carried on by commercial steamers will not affect this question. The troops to be supplied outside of Manila will be stationed at points accessible to the interisland boats, and at these stations there will be adequate landing, handling, and storage facilities. The boats will make weekly or biweekly trips, and the necessity of large accumulations at the outstations will not exist.

The Manila subsistence depot should not be an extensive affair. The deterioration of subsistence stores of almost all kinds is very rapid in this climate, however packed. Even stores contained in glass jars secured by caps of wax have greatly deteriorated if in storage for a year or more. If the Pacific and Atlantic transports give place to private vessels, as they probably will, the purchases of commissary stores to supply the troops should be made in Manila; the deliveries to be so timed that there will never be on hand, of any article, more than a six months' supply, and it should be practicable to limit this stock to four months in respect to almost all goods. The contractor for supplying fresh meats and vegetables should make deliveries of those articles to all the points where they are to be consumed, and he should have his own cold-storage plant for keeping the required reserve supply. The space needed for depot purposes in Manila will therefore be very much less than has been found necessary in the past.

The large accumulation of medical supplies now requires a good deal of space; but as this surplus is worked off either through general deterioration or through consumption or expenditure the space needed for storage purposes will be very much less than now.

As the telegraphs and telephones will ultimately go over to the government of the islands, or to a private company, there will be no reason to hold here any large stock of signal supplies, and the considerable space now used can be given up.

The space assigned to the ordnance depot is not sufficient for what is in store, but it is doubted if a large part of the property now accu-

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culated has much value for military purposes. A special report has been made on this subject.

The accumulation of quartermaster supplies and property of all kinds is very large, and of necessity had to be, but there has been a constant and very large shrinkage, and with the reduction of the number of troops now contemplated and with a completion of the building operations, which should take place in a year, the need will not exist for so much depot space as formerly. If all water transportation is done by private vessel owners, and the quartermaster has no further need for a very large lighterage service, a further reduction of storage area will be possible through the elimination of transport supplies and coal storage. The present area of the depot proper, which adjoins division headquarters at Fort Santiago, is about 20 acres, but this does not include part of the subsistence stores, nor any medical, signal, or ordnance supplies. When the new port works are completed, about 170 acres of land will become available for commercial purposes which are now submerged or are not used to best advantage. Request has been submitted to the War Department asking that an arrangement be made with the civil government for the permanent assignment to the Army for depot purpose of 20 acres of this reclaimed land. Such area will include a large part of the most valuable storehouses now owned by the Government and will supply only what will be indispensably necessary if the troops remain in the Philippines.

The consumption of coal during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1903, reached about 92,000 tons, and cost \$505,000, not counting expense of handling and cost of freight on the portion reshipped. This coal was delivered from time to time as required, the accumulations beyond daily needs being stored in three coal hulks, having a storage capacity of 9,200 tons, and at Sangley Point, near Cavite. The ground where this coal was piled is under the control of the Navy Department, and objection has been made by the Navy to a continued use of this place. It will embarrass the military authorities very much to find ground accessible to deep-sea vessels or even lighters and suitable for the deposit of the 15,000 tons of coal that will have to be taken care of at times. The contract for coal for the ensuing year calls for 70,000 tons, and it is hoped that a Philippine coal deposit may be developed in the course of a few months and shown to be capable of supplying all Government needs here. Work is now in progress in developing the coal measures found on Batan Island, in Legaspi Province. It will soon be known what are the capabilities of these veins and the quality of the product.

The storage of hay has presented very considerable difficulties, as there was no forage shed available, nor could any be hired that was suitable. It has been necessary to lighter the hay to a vacant lot above the city, and there to store it, covered only by paulins. There has been considerable loss from damage by rain, for it is not possible with canvas alone to properly protect hay from driving rains. If the 20-acre lot, referred to above as desired for depot purposes, is set aside, there will be no difficulty in utilizing a part of the space for a forage shed.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

The reports of the division staff officers are summarized or otherwise utilized in the report of the division commander, as required by General Orders No. 47, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's

Office, 1902, but the original reports of these officers are on file at division headquarters.

Col. Charles F. Humphrey was the chief quartermaster of the division from October 1, 1902, to March 31, 1903, and his report, to the latter date, has already been printed, and copies of same can be secured from General Humphrey's office, as he is now the Quartermaster-General of the Army; only a single copy of his report is on file at division headquarters.

The heads of the division staff during the command of the undersigned have been:

Adjutant-general, Col. H. O. S. Heistand, October 1, 1902, to date.

Inspectors-general, Maj. R. D. Potts, October 1, 1902, to October 15, 1902; Maj. Frank West, October 15, 1902, to November 30, 1902; Col. P. D. Vroom, November 30, 1902, to April 15, 1903; Lieut. Col. Frank West, April 15, 1903, to June 8, 1903; Lieut. Col. J. L. Chamberlain, June 8, 1903, to date.

Judge-advocate, Lieut. Col. H. C. Carbaugh, October 1, 1902, to date.

Chief quartermaster, Col. C. F. Humphrey, October 1, 1902, to March 31, 1903; Col. E. B. Atwood, April 1, 1903, to date.

Chief commissary, Col. Henry G. Sharpe, October 1, 1902, to date.

Chief surgeon, Lieut. Col. G. W. Adair, October 1, 1902, to November 30, 1902; Col. Charles Smart, November 30, 1902, to date.

Chief paymaster, Col. C. H. Whipple, October 1, 1902, to February 19, 1903; Maj. G. R. Smith, February 19, 1903, to date.

Chief engineer officer, Lieut. Col. C. E. L. B. Davis, October 1, 1902, to date.

Chief ordnance officer, Maj. A. H. Russell, October 1, 1902, to date.

Chief signal officer, Maj. W. A. Glassford, October 1, 1902, to date.

The adjutant-general calls attention to the reorganization of his office force and a subdivision of duties which he thinks has economized labor, simplified duties, and made mistakes almost impossible. There are five divisions, viz, commissioned, enlisted, miscellaneous, mail and record, and information.

In respect to the office force employed at division headquarters, the undersigned notes a constant rapid growth, which it seems to him is far away beyond what should exist. If all the clerks on the rolls are needed to do the work, then some means ought to be found to reduce or simplify the work itself.

In the report of the adjutant-general in Manila, dated August 12, 1899, the clerical force was stated as 22, made up of 9 civilians and 13 enlisted men; aggregate strength of officers and men, 34,651; total number of original papers received and sent, 60,000; papers handled in the adjutant-general's office, 375,000.

The adjutant-general, in his report of August 1, 1900, stated that his force consisted of 15 civilian clerks and 45 enlisted clerks, or 60 in all; total force in division, officers and men, 63,845; total number of communications received and sent, 73,500, and 220,000 indorsements made and entered; total number of occupied stations, 423.

The report of the adjutant-general on June 30, 1901, does not mention the number of clerks or the volume of business, but the aggregate strength of the division on the date given, including the force withdrawn and sent to China, and thence returned to the Philippines, was 47,732; and if the scouts and military police be included, the numbers are 55,279 officers and men.

The adjutant-general reported June 30, 1902, that his clerical force numbered 69, of whom 43 were civilians and 26 enlisted soldiers. The maximum strength of the division was 49,568, and the minimum was 33,929 officers and men.

At the date of this report the number of civilian clerks is 32, and enlisted 42, an aggregate of 74, against 60 of a year ago, while there

is a messenger force of 22, some of whom are employed as clerks, against 11 a year earlier. The number of stations has been reduced from 211 to 128. The adjutant-general remarks on the accuracy and dispatch with which the records of the division have been handled and also remarks that last year 127,296 communications passed into and out of the office in a year, against 73,500 mentioned by one of his predecessors. This is cited by the adjutant-general as illustrating the fact that with the return to peace a reduction of force does not mean a corresponding decrease of clerical work.

The whole office force of the division and three departments is as follows:

Headquarters.	Clerks.		Messengers.	
	Civilians.	Enlisted.	Civilians.	Enlisted.
Division	32	42	7	15
Department, Luzon	8	30	2	19
Department, Visayas	4	17	2	8
Department, Mindanao	5	8	3	1
Total	49	97	14	33

Grand total, 198. There are besides a few enlisted clerks and messengers at the second and third brigade headquarters.

At another place in this report will be found a recommendation that it is believed would, if carried into effect, reduce the clerical force by one-third or even one-half. In the opinion of the undersigned, there are now employed a sufficient number of civil-service or civilian clerks and messengers to attend to all the work of the adjutant-general, judge-advocate, and inspector-general for all the troops in the Philippines, but the undersigned has been so much occupied with various and pressing duties, and his continuation in command was of so brief duration, that he has not felt that he could spare time to, or find justification for, entering upon and completing a reform in this matter.

The adjutant-general calls attention to the ill effects of discharging enlisted men in the Philippines, especially those who are discharged without honor, for the good of the service. A great many of the undesirable characters who are now drifting about the Philippines are discharged soldiers, and they are a very great detriment to this community, where all Americans are viewed as representative citizens, and their misconduct becomes a serious embarrassment. This observation has the full and unqualified indorsement of the division commander, who considers that the very worst people in these islands, those whose influence is worse than three times the same number of the worst natives, are the blackguard Americans, largely ex-soldiers, who have either been discharged here on one pretext or another or who have returned here after their discharge; but there are in civil life other ex-soldiers who would be a credit to any community.

The cost of making known by telegraph to the Paymaster-General the facts respecting the allotments of pay of enlisted men reached \$3,171.93, and it is probable that the amount of money involved did not much exceed the sum stated. There ought to be found some way to avoid such an outlay; the adjutant-general's recommendation is concurred in, which in effect contemplates the deferment of an allotment until sixty days after same is due; all correspondence to be transacted by mail.

The proposition of the adjutant-general that he be furnished with a secretary, who shall be a personal appendage, is not favorably indorsed; but another suggestion is favorably considered; it is, that the National Air have an official arrangement of its music, and all military bands be required to adhere strictly to the score, permitting no latitude to band leaders as respects variations. The music should be printed in the drill books or some other War Department publication. A further suggestion respecting this matter is a good one, and that is that the military men present at the playing of the National Air stand at attention, or, if mounted, sit facing the music, and while the score is being played have hand at the salute throughout the playing. While this air is being played at evening concerts it is not unusual to see officers with their hats off, engaged in loud conversation with ladies and others.

The adjutant-general has ascertained from the records that the total number of trials by court-martial during the year reached 13,815, of which 4,088, or almost 30 per cent, were due to overindulgence in intoxicants, a condition of affairs that is deplorable.

The recommendation of the adjutant-general is concurred in that the clerical force, after having been classified under the civil-service law, be exchanged with those serving in the United States. This will insure a rotation of duties.

As soldiers and officers receive an increase in pay for foreign service, it would seem but right to allow this to civil-service clerks also.

The following-named general officers who were serving in the division of the Philippines on October 1, 1902, have been relieved and returned to the United States: Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, Brig. Gen. Frank D. Baldwin, Brig. Gen. S. S. Sumner (now major-general).

The following-named general officers have reported in the division and have been assigned to duty: Brig. Gen. George M. Randall, Brig. Gen. Leonard Wood (now major-general).

Col. Francis Moore, Eleventh Cavalry, was promoted to be brigadier-general and was assigned to duty in the division.

Brig. Gen. Joseph P. Sanger, formerly the inspector-general of the division, was detailed on special duty with the civil government as director of the census; and several other army officers are also performing civil duties with the civil government; besides, 30 companies of native troops, with their officers, are under the governor's orders, and are helping the constabulary preserve order.

The work in the adjutant-general's office has been promptly done, considering the inexperience of a part of the force.

Colonel Heistand's services have been eminently satisfactory.

INSPECTIONS.

During the year no less than 6 different officers have occupied the office of the inspector-general or acting inspector-general of the division, and 19 officers have acted in same capacity.

While serving in the division, Col. Peter D. Vroom was promoted to be the Inspector-General of the Army and at the same time retired from active service.

The following is a summary of inspections made during the year by officers on duty in the office of the division inspector or of reports which have passed through that office:

Military posts..... 117

SUPPLY DEPARTMENTS.

Commissary depots	4
Quartermaster depots	6
Medical depots	3
Signal depots	1
General hospitals	3
Base hospitals	1
Army transports (involving 9 transports)	31
Military prisons	4
Money accounts	386
Unserviceable property	3,723
Special investigations	32

The 386 inspections of money accounts involved disbursements of \$62,878,155.61, the reported balances aggregating \$11,652,253.33.

The total property inspected for condemnation aggregates \$2,382,439.

A recent division order provides for the regular inspection of owned or chartered transports, which work has already been taken up.

The inspector-general makes several recommendations for changes and improvements in matters affecting the service. Respecting the scouts, he observes that they should be trained in rifle firing; that the clothing allowance for first six months should be increased, and that their ration be increased. The division commander some time since gave orders that the scouts be instructed in target practice, particularly the Macabebes. The second and third recommendations are not concurred in. The views of the undersigned respecting the clothing allowance and ration of the native troops have been fully stated in previous pages.

Colonel Chamberlain's statement, that an establishment under military control where the troops could buy pure beer and wine at a reasonable price would be a blessing, is heartily concurred in, and statistics furnished by the adjutant-general, cited on a previous page, are a proof of the wisdom of this recommendation.

The suggested discontinuance of the detail of special inspectors of property should be observed except in certain special cases and emergencies.

The summary court officer is proposed for investigation of all property losses and damages that are now inquired into by boards of survey. This is an excellent suggestion, for the board of survey has quite outlived its usefulness. The officer detailed for this duty should have the authority to administer oaths. There should be no formal order required to set this officer at work; instead there should be a reference to him of the report by accountable or responsible officer of any loss or damage. He should be required to be present on the spot as soon as possible after the loss or damage occurred. There should be no "proceedings" at all; the record of action should be a blank form, of foolscap sheet size, in triplicate, with record evidence attached when the survey covered a long list of articles concerning some of which a correspondence becomes necessary; the report should be handed in at once concerning all articles regarding which the evidence was complete, and the report would come later concerning other articles. Everything should be recorded in a book kept at the post, like report of summary court trials, so that in case of sickness or removal of an officer pending an investigation the case could be taken up and completed by his successor. A good name for this officer would be "surveyor" or "survey officer."

Use of canvas for shelter of men and property is properly advised against and concurred in save under circumstances of necessity, but

it has been found that nipa-bamboo shelters are not cheap nor economical in some places.

Dry earth closets to be completely inclosed is a good suggestion; but the conditions that generally exist now with respect to these devices are excellent as compared to the disgusting sink of the past. In the Philippines water-closets at temporary posts are a long way off.

Khaki clothing now in use is of divers colors, but should be uniform. Uniformity respecting cut and observance of orders respecting maximum height of collar and make of shoulder straps should be insisted upon. This recommendation is concurred in by the division commander.

Campaign hat and shoes not good enough. This is disapproved by the division commander as to the hat. The shoes of new pattern soon to be issued will, it is said, be a great improvement over the old ones.

A khaki stock for the neck is proposed. This is not concurred in, as it adds another article to the equipment list, which is now too long.

Insignia of arm of the service and coat of arms too large. In the opinion of the division commander there should be nothing whatever on the collar, the coat of arms should be omitted altogether on khaki coat, and the insignia of arm of service should be put on the shoulder loop.

Coal-oil boxes too frail and easily punctured. This is concurred in.

Distilling, ice, and cold-storage plants recommended at all permanent posts occupied by white troops. As the policy of the Government appears to be to supply these luxuries generally, it seems to be obligatory that we should classify the proceeds of these establishments as necessities.

The ration is spoken of as generally satisfactory, the exceptions being certain kinds of bread, bacon, flour, and sales stores. Considering the remoteness of these islands from points of supply and the fact that the surplus left from former accumulations had to be disposed of as required by law, the troops generally have been well supplied; and anyone who notes the stalwart appearance of the men and their healthy complexions will not willingly believe that they have been underfed. The issue of the emergency ration which the inspector-general objects to has been suspended. The sealing up of the flour in tins as proposed is unnecessary if the subsistence department sees to it that the stock of flour on hand does not exceed three or four months' supply. The recommendation that expert bakers be hired and sent out here is not concurred in.

The recommendation that the troops be paid in local currency is not concurred in, as the local money now ready to go into circulation is practically a gold currency like the yen of Japan and the rupee of India.

The recommendation respecting the Lugar automatic pistol is concurred in. This is not suited to our military needs. When an assailant has approached near enough to be hit with reasonable certainty by an ordinary pistol shot, the man defending himself wants to stop his assailant. This the 38-caliber bullet will not do unless it hits a vital spot or breaks an important bone. The inspector-general's personal observation in this respect corresponds with that of the division commander.

MILITARY JUSTICE.

During the year four officers have been tried by general courts-martial convened by division orders. Of these, three, Major Glenn,

Fifth Infantry, Captain Hartmann, Signal Corps, and Lieutenant Lee, Tenth Infantry, were acquitted, and one, Captain Rogers, Twenty-seventh Infantry, was found guilty of "disrespect to his commanding general" and sentenced to be reprimanded. Lieut. Hamilton Foley, Fifth Cavalry, was also tried by division general court, and the proceedings in the case have been forwarded to the War Department for final action.

One hundred and twenty-two cases of general courts-martial of enlisted men have been promulgated from division headquarters, in which 127 men were tried. Of these, 115 resulted in convictions. The offenses were charged under articles of war as follows:

Two cases under sixteenth, 4 under seventeenth, 2 under twentieth, 19 under twenty-first, 1 under twenty-fourth, 3 under thirty-first, 10 under thirty-second, 7 under thirty-third, 1 under thirty-fourth, 10 under thirty-eighth, 19 under thirty-ninth, 5 under fortieth, 17 under fifty-eighth, 6 under sixtieth, 154 under sixty-second. These cases all came to division headquarters from discontinued commands, the division commander being the superior in command, and as such promulgated the cases.

The records of trials of general courts-martial involving dishonorable discharge that were received from the several department and brigade headquarters numbered 489, and all were forwarded to the Judge-Advocate-General of the Army.

There was one case of trial by military commission wherein the trial was commenced and concluded before the proclamation of July 4, 1902, the sentence having been approved by the convening authority on July 2; the sentence was ordered to be executed on August 25, 1902.

The judge-advocate of the division remarks as follows:

Wherever the Army of the United States is stationed there necessarily arise interests of the United States to be prosecuted or defended in courts of justice, such as violations of contract, bonds; breaches of ordinary contracts; damages to the United States; suits against its officers arising out of the exercise of their Federal duties, and condemnation of land for military purposes. It is thought that in the Philippine Islands there is a failure by Congress, in reference to these interests, to establish courts of competent jurisdiction, to designate who may bring suits in the name of the United States, and to provide for the expenses incurred in and through such actions.

The division commander concurs in this observation.

At the close of the period of military government on July 4, 1902, there were many natives of the Philippines confined in the various prisons throughout the archipelago who had been sentenced to confinement by various military tribunals who were not of the class to secure a release under the President's amnesty proclamation. Applications for pardon or mitigation of sentence were constantly coming up, and there was at first doubt and uncertainty as to where the authority lay for acting on these appeals and petitions. The matter was referred to Washington by the civil governor, and he was consulted respecting the matter. Finally an understanding was reached in writing, and is as follows:

All applications for clemency by persons now confined in civil prisons in these islands finally convicted of the crimes of murder, arson, rape, and robbery by provost courts of military commissions during the period of insurrection ending July 4, 1902, which crimes were committed by the applicants against members of the United States Army, or against persons in some way identified with the Army while engaged in suppressing the insurrection; or which said crimes, though not so committed, were actually found by the court to be in violation of the laws of

war, will be forwarded by the commanding general, Division of the Philippines, to the War Department for action of the President.

All other such applications by persons so convicted and confined—of said crimes or lesser ones—will be finally acted upon by the civil governor, or be forwarded by him direct to the War Department.

This rule of action has no reference to trials by general court-martial.

This arrangement has well served its purpose.

There was no change in the incumbency of the division judge-advocate's office during the period covered by this report. The work pertaining to this staff office was always promptly and efficiently performed. The number of questions coming up from day to day upon which the division commander needs legal advice or a brief setting forth the law and facts is very large, and appears to be constantly increasing, and the judge-advocate is every year becoming a more and more important and useful staff officer.

QUARTERMASTER AFFAIRS.

The chief quartermaster remarks that the work of supply of this department has been rendered much easier by the reduction in force of the division, and still more by the concentration of troops in larger garrisons. During the year the number of garrisoned stations has been reduced in number from 211 to 128, about half of which are either on lines regularly visited by owned or chartered transports or are on the Manila and Dagupan Railway. This concentration, which it is intended to further continue, will greatly facilitate the supply of the perishable components of the ration, especially the supply of fresh beef and the supply of forage for the animals.

During the year the supply of fresh beef to the troops has been greatly improved. The refrigerator transports *Seward* and *Wright* have been actively engaged in the work, and ice boxes have been placed on some of the chartered transports and commercial vessels. Cold storage has been provided at a number of stations and large ice chests at others, so that most of the posts are at frequent intervals supplied with frozen beef and mutton. Two refrigerator cars have been prepared for supply of the troops on the railroad, who receive the full allowance of fresh meat. The great improvement in supply is shown by the fact that the quantity of fresh beef and ice forwarded from Manila to stations not on the railway, in the city, or on the Laguna, has been as follows:

Average per month, 1901:	Pounds.
Meat	12,081
Ice	2,100
Average per month, 1902:	
Meat	61,941
Ice	49,785
Average per month, 1903:	
Meat	229,559
Ice	241,720

At the present time ice machines are in operation or are being installed at the following stations:

Camp Wallace, Batangas, Calamba, Calbayog, Cebu, Corregidor, Iligan, Iloilo, Legaspi, Malabang, Nueva Caceres, Tacloban, Salomague, Zamboanga, Camp Jossman, Laguan, Cotabato, and Ormoc. Cold-storage rooms are to be built for operation in connection with such of these machines as are not already provided. A monthly report by postal card is required to be made at the close of each month to division headquarters.

Possibly the most important work under charge of the quartermaster's department has been the construction of cantonments and storehouses for the troops at places selected for occupation. Congress has appropriated \$2,250,000 for this work, and present indications are that this sum will be ample. The general type of the building selected is simple and roomy and suitable for the climate—one-story construction, elevated above the earth surface, provided with verandas on all sides, and with overhanging roof to protect against sun and beating rains, with a roof or sheathing covered by ruberoid, a new sort of tar or asphalted pasteboard. The material of construction is Oregon fir (excepting doors and main posts) shipped from the United States; about 11,000,000 feet B. M. having been received between January 18, 1903, and the close of the fiscal year.

The following-named stations have been selected: Fort William McKinley, post for 2 regiments of infantry, 2 squadrons of cavalry, and 2 batteries of light artillery; Camp Stotsenburg, near Angeles, Pampanga, for headquarters, band, and 12 troops of cavalry; Camp Gregg, near Bayambang, Pangasinan, for 1 battalion of infantry; Camp McGrath, Batangas, for regimental headquarters, band, and 6 troops of cavalry; Los Baños, Laguna, for 1 battalion of infantry; Camp Wallace, San Fernando, Union, 6 companies; Camp Morrison, Ilocos Sur, 6 companies; Nueva Caceres, Ambos Camarines, 2 troops cavalry, headquarters, band, and 4 companies of infantry; Bacon, near Sorsogon Province, 4 companies of infantry; Lucena, Tayabas, 4 troops cavalry; Daraga, near Legaspi, Albay, 4 companies infantry; Santo Tomas, Batangas, headquarters, band, and 4 troops cavalry; Baguio Benguet, for detachment temporarily; Camp Hartshorne, Laguan, Samar, 4 companies infantry; Camp Connell, Calbayog, Samar, 4 companies infantry; Camp Bumpus, Tacloban, Leyte, 8 companies infantry; Camp Downes, Ormoc, Leyte, 4 companies infantry; Cebu, 1 battalion infantry, being prepared by conversion of old Spanish barracks and fort; Camp Jossman, Guimaras Island, regiment infantry and 2 troops cavalry; Camp Vicars, Lake Lanao, battalion infantry, 2 troops cavalry, 1 battery mountain artillery; Jolo, headquarters, band, and 4 troops cavalry, and 1 battalion infantry, utilizing old Spanish barracks mainly as shelter for troops.

Construction at nearly all of these posts is under way, and progress has been very satisfactory, considering the difficulties encountered in supplying the lumber and the labor necessary for the work.

The rental paid for buildings occupied by the army in the division during the fiscal year outside the city of Manila amounted to \$178,270.03. There were allotted for repairs \$105,164.97, and for new construction (the greater part of which was in construction of new posts referred to above) \$22,884.30. In the city of Manila the same items amount to \$235,157.56, \$64,527.64, and \$159,457.70 (about a third of this last item being in new construction at Fort William McKinley). Rental items for the coming fiscal year will be largely reduced in the provinces through the gradual vacating of rented buildings in occupying new posts, while in the city of Manila, through the release of many rented storehouses and offices, a large economy has been effected during the year just closed.

Transshipment of stores and supplies at Manila from transports bringing them from the States to the interisland transports has been greatly improved upon during the year by the consolidation of the Manila supply depots in the new storehouses at the mouth of the Pasig River, which were completed in January.

During the fiscal year just closed, nearly 75,000 tons of supplies, exclusive of coal, were received by the department from the United States and over 5,000 tons received from coastwise ports; and shipments have been made from Manila of 5,000 tons to the States and of about 42,000 tons to coastwise ports.

The work of the burial corps during the year deserves mention. The work of disinterment of remains of soldiers and marines in China having been completed early in the year, work was undertaken in Luzon on the line of the railroad. In November the corps left Manila on the chartered transport *Proteus* and arrived back March 21, 1903. During the year 148 stations were visited. The remains of 625 officers, soldiers, marines, and employees have been disinterred and shipped.

A contract has been entered into for the supply in the division of 300,000 gallons of mineral illuminating oil at 14 cents United States currency per gallon, an increase of $3\frac{1}{4}$ cents per gallon over the contract price for the year closing, as there was no competition at the bidding.

A contract has been made with the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha to supply Kishima (Japanese) coal at \$4.87 United States currency per ton, a saving of 36 cents per ton over the price for the year just closed.

The investigation of the coal deposits of the islands is being continued. The Batan mines are being exploited by an officer of engineers, acting quartermaster, under an appropriation of \$15,000 United States currency. This work has just been begun. Should the output meet expectations as to quantity, quality, and cost, the Government will have a local supply of fuel for transport, pumping, ice, and distilling machinery. Arrangements have just been completed with owners of the undeveloped Balerma, Urgera, Ganalda, Perseverencia, and San Francisco deposits for such output of those veins as may be desired by the Government for a period of two years, with reservation of right to purchase within that period.

During the year at Manila 13,000 tons of hay have been received and 10,000 have been issued and sold; 12,000 tons of oats have been received and 8,000 tons issued and sold.

Native grass for forage has been contracted for the ensuing year at 48 cents United States currency per 100 pounds, a saving of 11 cents on the contract of last year.

Complaints of the issues of clothing and equipage are briefly as follows: Khaki uniform supplied for the soldiers is of inferior quality, fading rapidly. It is believed that the policy of the Department to patronize the American firms has been a mistake, as the English khaki formerly purchased, and still obtained by officers and soldiers from native tailors, is very satisfactory.

The present tan shoe is criticised as too light. The calfskin has been much used for field service. Experiments are recommended for a tan shoe modeled after, but lighter than, the English army shoe. It is unofficially reported that such a shoe has just been adopted by the uniform board in Washington.

All iron materials rust very rapidly, so much so as to make it inadvisable to use iron buttons, buckles, or hooks on any article of clothing, such as the buttons and hooks on blouses, eyelets, and buckles on leggings, etc.

All clothing and shoes should be packed in boxes thickly lined with petroleum paper as a protection against the white ants, and incidentally against mold.

Some of the complaints are doubtless due to the issues of surplus

stores retained here after the considerable reduction in forces which has taken place in the past year.

Some months since the transfer to the insular government of the quartermaster shops was under consideration. The value of the plant was appraised and reported to the civil governor. A counter proposition was made to pay less than half the cost of the machinery, tools, etc.; the division commander's intention was to establish shops of a less extensive character in connection with the wheelwright shops within the grounds of the land transportation corral; but the uncertainties respecting a continued occupation of this ground by the Government and the delay that attended the negotiations resulted in a dropping of the matter for the time being. At the present time these shops are the only property the quartermaster department has on the north side of the Pasig River. The establishment is inconveniently located, and all War Department shops ought to be brought together. The year's work in these shops cost, for material, \$63,975.46, and for labor, \$130,428.95, making a total of \$194,404.41; a cost which it is believed is far in excess of the value of the output.

The Manila depot was formerly divided into four parts or departments—water transportation, land transportation, property, and quartermaster shops—with an officer in charge of each, reporting direct to the chief quartermaster. During the incumbency of the present able quartermaster-general, then the chief quartermaster of the division, this plan was satisfactory until the illness of the chief compelled his temporary relief. He was soon after appointed quartermaster-general. The division commander considered it necessary to concentrate the depot work, and Major Aleshire was placed in charge of all; but the plan to move the quartermaster shops could not be carried out as planned, and these were restored to the charge of the chief quartermaster. The result of this concentration of all depot work under one head has been justified by the outcome. All rented storehouses have been given up, and there has been a considerable reduction of the personnel and a saving in various ways, besides a more expeditious transaction of business.

The work of the quartermasters has been well done, and there have been no just complaints respecting alleged shortcomings. The cost of this work is, however, enormous, and in the opinion of the division commander the business should be done in future with a very great saving over the cost for the last year. The expense of the quartermaster service ought to bear a close relation to the number of troops to be supplied, but it appears that when there were over 60,000 men in the division the cost was not nearly double what it was last year, with about one-third the force maintained and served at the earlier date.

There is a large surplus of machine oil on hand, left over from the time when the requirements of transports were greater. The protection the barrels receive is not the best, and there is a considerable wastage. Recently the suggestion was made to the department that the San Francisco transports be required to take their oil supply at Manila, so the stock could be used in service.

The number of employees in the depot is 3,348, and their monthly cost is \$92,930.56.

The invoice value of the property on hand is reported at \$8,594,216, which includes the transport service.

Other important matters treated of by the chief quartermaster will be discussed under other headings.

WATER TRANSPORT.

The chief quartermaster remarks that handling the army freight by utilizing the commercial steamship companies instead of the regular and chartered transports has been investigated, but no change has yet been made.

The movement of surplus regiments to the States and of surplus property, the sending home of 2,000 soldiers discharged in December to effect a reduction in the force, the exchange of stations of regiments between the States and the islands, and the shipment of large quantities of stores required for shelter constructions have kept the Atlantic and Pacific transports busy. This state of affairs will doubtless continue until the transfer of troops is completed. The necessity for cholera quarantine during the greater part of the year and the accident by grounding to the *Sherman*, December 26, 1902, have also operated to hamper the operations of the department. The supply of outstations has resulted in the development of schedules for the owned and chartered interisland vessels. These are now running on carefully prepared time schedules and give excellent satisfaction to all. One minor advantage worthy of note is the facility given to the postal authorities in providing mail service.

The list of accidents to owned transports during the year and to July 25 was as follows: *Ingalls*, grounded November 22, 1902, near Legaspi, floated at high tide without serious damage; *Liscum*, collided February 24, 1903, with junk at Shanghai, China, no damage; *Trenton*, steam lighter, lost December 22, 1902, at Oroquieta, Mindanao, engine and boiler saved by crew; *Rafaelito*, small launch, beached December 30, 1902, on coast of Samar, hull abandoned, engine saved. The *Sumner* struck a reef near Antimonan, July 4, 1903; was floated and sent to Hongkong for repairs, which involves the removal of 52 plates and several frames.

Seventeen launches were turned over to the civil government in February, 1903, as no longer required by the Army.

There have been numerous statements presented from year to year by the chief quartermaster giving certain data respecting the cost of operation of vessels owned by the Government and of those which were chartered; but none of these reports or statements went to the bottom of the subject or presented all the figures of cost of all the vessels of any stated class. In this year's report the chief quartermaster supplied further data of the same kind, but it was unsatisfactory because incomplete.

The interisland transport service falls under the administrative supervision of the division commander, and toward the close of the fiscal year he set himself to the task of obtaining the official figures of cost of this service and reports were called for from all officers of the quartermaster's department who had possession of data that could elucidate the subject. To collect the statistics has been slow and difficult, for it was necessary to have returns from every vessel owned or hired if of 10 tons capacity or over.

With respect to all the chartered cargo boats, the data was required to be supplied with respect to each vessel, under five heads, as follows: Tonnage, time in service, rate per day, cost of personnel, cost of coal and supplies; while with respect to the vessels of same class owned by the Government the data had to give for each vessel its tonnage, value of coal and supplies, cost of repairs, cost of crew's service, and cost of subsistence issued to crew and others. As this is the first time any

complete official data has ever been compiled in the Philippines showing the entire cost of the interisland transport service it is all here submitted, so that anyone interested in the subject may see at a glance what the charge is against the Treasury for distributing the troops and their supplies in these islands.

Cost of operation and maintenance of interisland army transports, Division of the Philippines, fiscal year ended June 30, 1903.

[Table includes all craft of 10 tons freight capacity and over owned by the Government.]

					Steward's depart- ment and rations.	Total.
Burnside	2,190	\$27,084.81	\$98,228.64	\$59,738.00	\$20,485.56	\$208,580.00
Ingalls	891	6,131.95	21,924.83	87,342.04	22,117.46	87,516.28
Wright	871	18,557.82	82,714.53	80,024.00	8,801.92	187,896.27
Liacum	1,070	6,717.65	115,415.27	26,636.04	7,720.15	156,489.31
Seward	1,297	8,888.48	7,157.24	21,671.96	9,039.41	44,267.09
STEAM LIGHTERS.						
Custer	82	3,679.80	8,784.98	7,800.96	506.76	20,882.00
Sacramento	350	2,096.12	19,897.19	10,452.86	1,579.97	34,025.64
Omaha	272	1,419.28	15,980.24	9,929.57		27,339.04
Kansas City	159	4,884.17	21,211.90	8,480.44		32,526.51
Syracuse	140	8,977.26	12,298.85	8,424.00		22,700.61
Indianapolis	272	1,984.68	5,618.01	4,908.84		12,400.88
Trenton*		482.50	1,158.50	2,108.60		3,727.60
LAUNCHES.						
Guy Howard†		1,040.00	95.88	2,516.00		8,651.86
America		1,987.98	4,987.28	2,228.34		9,108.60
Blanche		614.79	1,570.00	1,123.50		3,508.20
Boston		2,089.59	880.24	2,742.42		5,732.25
Buffalo		802.09	1,809.76	2,855.67		4,767.45
Beatrice		296.58	903.07	400.50		1,600.15
California		1,388.04	1,614.89	2,431.88		5,431.76
Charleston†		857.23	120.08	2,340.91		3,418.17
Cleveland		2,610.00	1,259.89	2,708.50		6,773.89
Cartwright		1,290.41	781.40	2,732.15		4,808.96
Des Moines		872.20	8,914.91	8,961.25		8,147.36
Atlanta		618.62	8,262.66	1,473.83		5,355.81
Florida		3,216.41	2,295.95	2,718.34		8,290.70
Grace		62.48	655.59	885.38		1,108.45
Hercules		1,108.98	2,521.10	1,652.50		5,289.68
Relief No. 2†		297.58	469.56			767.09
Helena		1,944.05	2,124.79	2,236.18		6,304.96
Julia†		188.68	625.45	495.00		1,299.18
Johnny†				265.00		265.00
Logan		847.99	814.58	772.83		2,434.90
Lucille		426.77	242.12	524.16		1,192.05
Louisville		2,806.98	4,497.91	83		9,317.22
Mary†		638.88	1,179.10	67		2,776.63
Marietta		1,863.46	8,181.84	98		12,343.73
Maurice		680.98	691.10	66		2,523.18
Memphis		2,004.50	5,119.54	59		9,776.63
Napindan		2,323.66	5,143.65	42		12,041.73
Nashville		5,263.11	8,195.97	24		11,666.82
Natchez		5,190.08	2,290.82	49		10,871.84
Newport		2,807.99	5,647.98	84		10,832.11
New Albany		1,625.99	5,167.24	2,701.08		6,180.81
Missouri†		125.00		880.67		455.67
Peterson		2,534.28	3,123.69	2,062.34		7,520.41
Pittsburg†		963.47	823.28	1,884.67		8,671.42
Frankfort†		1,679.49		1,815.84		3,495.38
Powerful		1,683.47	1,785.35	8,852.01		6,820.83
Q. M. D.†		462.21	489.50	662.50		1,614.21
Relief No. 1†		76.16	888.80	438.74		898.70
Reilly		4,718.00	550.61	2,989.63		8,258.44
Rochester		1,892.00	1,524.83	2,004.51		4,921.84
Richmond		4,208.76	7,017.43	5,898.92		17,118.16
West Point		1,896.00	406.89	4,831.97		6,686.66
Spokane		602.21	203.67	1,112.40		1,978.28
Suerte†		208.08	1,210.61	1,319.97		2,738.64
Seattle		1,840.88	8,564.88	2,201.50		7,598.22
San Antonio†		1,275.75	788.27	8,622.54		5,636.56
St. Paul		1,865.48	5,183.58	2,099.59		9,068.65
St. Louis		2,883.76	798.08	2,780.18		5,961.94

Cost of operation and maintenance of interisland army transports, etc.—Cont'd.

Name.	Ton-nage.	Fuel and supplies.	Repairs.	Service.	Steward's department and rations.	Total.
LAUNCHES—continued.						
Walla Walla ‡				\$1,018.00		\$1,018.00
Leader †		\$1,489.05	\$4.61	2,002.90		3,496.56
New Orleans		1,129.80	1,749.83	1,610.92		4,490.05
Cheyenne		10,650.00	26.91	3,180.00		13,856.91
Ogden †		5,400.00	249.00	2,750.00		8,399.00
Taal		185.14	1,569.63	596.33		2,351.10
Philadelphia †		5,964.29	393.35	2,285.33		8,642.97
Lexington †			34.30	45.33		79.63
Sultana †		4,375.00	103.03	1,390.00		5,868.03
Denver †		666.00	139.82	787.81		1,593.63
Chicago		600.50	1,880.62	2,117.50		4,598.62
Columbia		2,397.62	1,123.70	2,783.79		6,305.11
Mobile		4,054.12	215.05	3,061.50		7,330.67
Rafaelito *		746.88		710.83		1,457.71
Troy †		6,864.00	72.62	2,246.00		9,182.62
Detroit		7,800.00	402.50	3,186.00		11,388.50
Baltimore		11,162.50	187.00	2,915.00		14,264.50
Raleigh †		714.50	869.13	2,301.75		3,885.38
Missoula		2,941.51	1,807.34	3,570.00		8,318.85
Scows and rowboats			1,083.56	80.00		1,163.56
Bangor		1,924.87	3,337.43	4,482.66		9,744.96
15 lorchas			10,635.09	8,356.20		18,991.29
Coal hulks ^a	9,200	7,412.00	17,261.41	9,556.33		34,229.74
Scows, lighters, cascos, row-boats, etc		464.33	2,724.45	4,205.99		7,394.77
Invoice value of rations issued to employees on launches, cascos, lorchas, etc					\$26,690.68	26,690.68
Total						1,269,276.78

^a\$15,454 of the amount of repairs on three coal hulks was paid for in July, but work was done previous to June 30, 1903.

Vessels marked thus * have been wrecked.
Vessels marked thus † were transferred to civil government.
Vessels marked thus ‡ have been condemned and dropped or are out of commission.

Cost of operation and maintenance of interisland chartered transports during fiscal year ending June 30, 1903.

Name.	Ton-nage.	Number days in service.	Rate per day.	Cost of service, repairs, pay of quartermasters, agents, and pilots.	Cost of coal, water, supplies, etc.	Total cost.
STEAMERS.						
Isla de Negros	250	365	\$125.00	\$1,207.36	\$6,615.70	\$53,448.06
Lal-Loc	375	851	137.50	1,232.57	8,805.54	48,300.61
Buen Vieja ^a	620	213	(a)	750.88	4,052.82	36,733.20
Ibadan	798	343	185.00	1,715.87	13,083.67	78,254.54
Columbia	500	273	137.50	1,350.38	6,575.13	45,463.01
Formosa	800	288	200.00	1,998.49	14,070.84	72,069.33
Hai-mun	1,311	274	275.00	1,260.31	13,767.30	90,377.61
Dr. Hans Jurg Kiaer	1,020	346	190.00	1,367.14	10,087.40	77,194.54
Legaspi	986	343	150.00	1,395.41	14,564.03	67,409.44
Castellano	322	127	125.00	422.91	2,634.54	18,932.45
Salamanca	1,885	82	190.00	450.39	945.86	16,975.75
Hai Loong	1,311	14	275.00	46.62		8,896.62
Proteus	1,020	256	190.00	1,234.89	9,390.45	59,264.84
Sam Shui	269	349	100.00	1,629.66	7,686.58	44,216.24
Butuan ^b	502	128	(b)	9.00	625.77	19,749.77
Æolus	497	283	160.00		7,273.05	52,553.05
N. S. del Carmen	306	278	125.00	1,241.00	7,044.08	43,035.08
Borneo	150	365	50.00		6,546.17	24,796.17
Taganac	80	241	20.00		4,909.50	9,729.50
Don Engracio	185	3	200.00			600.00
Concord	248	103	70.00		1,097.27	8,307.27

^aThe Buen Vieja 2 days at \$140 and 211 days at \$150.
^bThe Butuan 89 days at \$160 and 39 days at \$125.

Cost of operation and maintenance of interisland chartered transports during fiscal year ending June 30, 1903—Continued.

Name.	Tonnage.	Number days in service.	Rate per day.	Cost of service, repairs, pay of quarter-masters, agents, and pilots.	Cost of coal, water, supplies, etc.	Total cost.
SCHOONERS.						
Mayo		117	\$45.00	\$5,285.00
Peerless		123	50.00	6,150.00
J. B. Leeds		120	45.00	5,400.00
Dolores		110	60.00	6,600.00
Mathilde		40	68.00	2,620.00
F. de Maria		15	55.00	825.00
Cecilia		14	45.00	630.00
Loyola		24	65.00	1,560.00
Lorchas from time to time during year					\$344.25	226,324.96
Cascos during fiscal year						74,299.08
Total						1,200,981.07

SUMMARY.

Cost of owned transports, launches, etc.	\$1,200,276.78
Cost of chartered transports, schooners, lorchas, cascos, etc.	1,200,981.07
Half cost price of vessels wrecked	16,182.75
Labor, loading and unloading interisland transports in Manila	24,970.69
Estimated labor, loading and unloading at outside stations	24,970.69
Grand aggregate	2,536,381.96

There are various other minor expenses that were not capable of segregation from other accounts and definite determination, such as part cost of the clerical force of the depot and the wages and keep of officers and enlisted men who were sometimes detailed on these boats. But these figures for the cost of operation of the vessel owned omits a very important item of cost that would appear in the statement of a private company operating the boats, namely, the interest on the money invested, deterioration, and insurance.

The 5 owned transports have an aggregate gross tonnage of 6,409, and these boats had spent on them last year \$323,435 for repairs, or at the average rate of \$50 per gross ton. Assuming the value of the ship to be \$100 per ton, the total valuation would reach \$640,900.

The 6 steam lighters have a tonnage of 1,275, and cost last year for repairs \$83,799, or at the rate of a little more than \$65 per ton; but, assuming the value of these boats to be only \$50 per ton, we get as the value of the steam lighters the sum of \$127,500. There are 40 steam launches still in the service, and these are worth \$10,000 each, or a total for the 40 of \$400,000. Counting the coal hulks (3) at \$5,000 each, adds to the total \$15,000. The lighters, scows, lorchas, etc., owned by the Government are certainly worth not less than \$2,000 each, and they are 60 in number—\$120,000. These figures, which are only approximate, give a total valuation of \$1,303,400. If 15 per cent be allowed for interest on capital, insurance, and depreciation, the resultant charge against maintenance is \$195,510. Adding this to the cost of operation as above stated—to wit, \$2,536,382—the total becomes \$2,731,892, which it has cost the United States to do the interisland transportation; and this does not include the service between Manila, San Francisco, and New York.

If Congress will confer upon the Secretary of War the authority to make a contract for five years covering the island service—perhaps three years would answer—and the Government will advertise for and make award of this transportation, the vessel owners can afford to put on better steamers than now and maintain regular schedules. The freight and passengers should be taken at the wharf in Manila, and the same landed at destination on the wharf or at the customary landing place; while vice versa, they should fetch to Manila and land on the wharf all the freight consigned to the latter port by all Philippine shipping quartermasters. This done, the quartermasters will not need lighters or launches.

There is no probability that the number of troops in the Philippines will fall below 15,000 in a good many years; and the Government can very well afford to make contracts for a long term. This is done by the engineers on river and harbor work, and is done by the Treasury Department in the case of public buildings whose construction covers two or more years. If some such plan as this is adopted, there is little doubt that the Treasury will save \$1,000,000 a year on transportation of troops and supplies within the Philippine Islands, and the service will be well but not luxuriously done.

A glance at the reports appearing from time to time of quartermasters in charge of transports will show that there is no lack of data to prove that the work is now done much cheaper than it could be by owners of private vessels; but it is believed that a compilation similar to the above with respect to the Oceanic transport service would give an object lesson as to what the Government is now paying to maintain a comparatively small military force in the Philippines. Great Britain once owned transports and operated them between home ports and her colonies; but after a very long and costly experience England went out of the transport business, apparently forever.

The transport service of the United States, as now conducted and as observed by the undersigned, is a most costly luxury; but it is defended or excused on the ground of inexorable military necessity, which in his judgment does not exist.

LAND TRANSPORT.

The chief quartermaster remarks that loss of horses and mules throughout the division has continued throughout the year to such an extent as to cause grave concern and to require him to recommend that shipments of draft animals from the United States be resumed at an early date. He calls attention to the fact in explanation of the losses that, while they are largely due to surra and glanders, many of the animals have been in use in this division for four years or more, subjected to severe work over roads almost impassable and on very bad mountain trails.

The losses during the year have aggregated 4,702 horses and mules, leaving an aggregate of 8,007 in the division for all purposes, among which losses still continue, though less in numbers, but in view of the proposed reduction of the force the undersigned suggests that the present supply of animals may suffice for some time to come.

The investigation of the causation and prevention, control, or cure of tropical animal diseases occupied during the year the principal part of the time of Maj. Ramsey D. Potts, inspector-general. Full reports of his investigation and of the action taken in respect to the matters presented have been forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

Upon the recommendation of the undersigned the War Department authorized the visit to India of a board of officers consisting of Brigadier-General Wint and Maj. Ramsey D. Potts, inspector-general, for the purpose of studying the conditions existing in British India with respect to the so-called disease of "surra" which affects horses, mules, camels, and some other animals. The board started in December, 1902, and returned the following April, having visited India, Burmah, and Java. The report of this board on a disease which in two years destroyed not less than 5,000 military animals in the Philippines is a valuable contribution. It was forwarded to the War Department seven months since. The board found that there did not exist in British India a military animal that was afflicted with the malady which in former years had carried off tens of thousands of cavalry and transport animals annually in the same country. The reason assigned for this exemption is that all know the regions infected, and all such territory is avoided; or the grass fed to the stock is brought from meadows that are known to be unpolluted. Great care is also taken to see that the stock has no access to stagnant or swamp water. There is no instance known of a cure where the presence of surra parasite had been demonstrated, one distinguished officer remarking, "the bullet is the only remedy." If an animal is suspected of being afflicted, it is immediately isolated, and as soon as the disease is certainly identified the victim is destroyed.

A form of report made on a postal card the size of an official envelope, itself to be sent in the mails without wrapper or letter of transmittal, has been printed and distributed to every responsible officer. It is required that when any public animal dies from any cause the officer will fill out one of these cards that will give the life history of the case and drop the card in the mail. It is addressed to the adjutant-general of the division, who sends the cards to the inspector-general, where there is a veterinary surgeon on duty, whose business it will be to make record of all the facts elucidated, and under the supervision of the inspector-general to make such further critical investigations as may be required with a view to ascertain, if possible, which are the regions where the surra parasite is present, and how best to guard against infection.

The type of army wagons issued here is various. It would seem that there should be but one type of army or escort wagon, one of low-bodied trucks, one of ambulance, one of spring wagon, one cart, and one water wagon; but it is certain that there are at least a half dozen kinds of some of these wagons in use, so when it comes to a question of obtaining spare parts for repairs, the variety of the materials seems to be almost infinite. There ought to be no more spare parts sent here after the present stock is expended save for the one adopted kind of each type.

The only railroad that serves an important military purpose is that extending from Manila to Dagupan. There are two important military stations being built on this line. The company owning the franchise is now engaged in extending the road to San Isidro and Cabaatuan, a distance of some 40 miles. This will be an important improvement and a great benefit to the military should the occasion arise for operating in that region or north and east of it. The railroad company very promptly responded to a request to put in a branch 5 miles long from the main line for the service of Camp Stotsenberg.

In the Lanao country there must be troops for a long time. At present there are no civilized settlers in this rich and valuable country about the lake, but it will not be long before this section is brought

under cultivation. The needs of the troops for transportation will probably be best met at first by means of the traction engine and later by the trolley, which will be a very valuable aid to the civilized settler. Such a road, starting from the coast near Iligan, should ascend the table-land to the lake, pass to the east of it, and continue on south to Port Polloc, which is bound to be the most important center of trade in Mindanao. Further extensions of this road would traverse the valley of the Rio Grande. There are water powers conveniently located to supply the motive power. The Moros would do the work of grading and supply cross-ties. The metal work and rolling stock only would have to come from the exterior markets of the world.

It is hoped that the Quartermaster Department will soon be ready to furnish traction engines of approved type, for they will be needed at two or three localities for supply of the troops.

SUBSISTENCE.

At the beginning of the fiscal year there were on hand at the depot in Manila and stations throughout the division subsistence stores largely in excess of the requirements of the command after the material reduction in number of troops during the year. Some action became necessary to dispose of a part of this excess by other means than regular issue. The surplus stores were submitted to action of an inspector and offered for sale in August and September, 1902. This and succeeding efforts in December, 1902, were unsuccessful. Finally, beginning April 8, 1903, auction sales were resorted to, and netted the Government the sum of \$16,397.89. At present but a small quantity of the old stores remains on hand. The gross weight of supplies shipped by the depot commissary during the year amounts to 4,360,650 pounds, while only 20,956,006 pounds were received.

The regular schedules arranged for interisland transports in October, 1902, greatly facilitated the supply of posts in the provinces. The installation of the refrigerator boat *Seward* in October, 1902, and the *Wright* later, has permitted the distribution of fresh beef to nearly all posts in the islands at intervals of about two weeks.

During the year there were purchased from the Insular Cold Storage and Ice Plant 9,826,384 pounds of ice at a total cost of \$49,144.76, the ice being used for issue to troops and preservation of subsistence stores. In addition to this the commissary department has been furnished, since February, with ice from machines at different posts, formerly operated by the medical department.

On July 1, 1902, four warehouses were abandoned, effecting a monthly saving in rental of \$3,625. During the year the force of employees at the depot commissary was decreased by 16 clerks and 106 laborers, effecting a monthly saving of \$2,976.69.

The losses during the year at the depot from deterioration have been \$80,047.37, principally in canned fruits. This was largely due to excessive quantities of stores on hand, some of which had been here for years, and inability to make sale of same. The average temperature in the storehouses during March, April, May, and June was 90° F. at 2 p. m. and 89° F. at 5 p. m. at the floors, and 5° higher at a height of 20 feet. Stores are not now piled so high as was necessary in former times. The depot commissary also issued 1,836,459 rations during the year.

Losses by damage and shortage, as determined by boards of survey and inspectors, aggregated \$103,512.32, of which reclamation was recommended for \$5,481.13.

This subsistence depot is practically the grocery and butcher shop of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps located within 15 miles of Manila. It is estimated that the average number of monthly purchasers is 4,500. This store also issues fresh meats to about 5,000 purchasers, commissaries to 7 chartered transports, and provides the special diets for 11 hospitals.

During the year losses by damage and shortage at the sales commissary, as determined by boards of survey, aggregated \$4,624.34, of which reclamation was recommended to the extent of \$1,690.77.

Sales during the year amounted to \$469,484.12, at an expense (including rental, salaries of commissary-sergeants, transportation charges, and all other expenses) of less than 6 per cent of that sum.

During the year issues were made to native employees paid from civil funds, native prisoners convicted of civil offenses, and Filipino destitutes. The total charges of this nature for the last three years amount to \$42,892.19, for which reimbursement has not yet been made by the insular government. A claim has been presented by that government for subsistence of military prisoners in Bilibid Penitentiary from April 1, 1901, to May 31, 1903, to the total amount of \$35,841.77. This claim has been forwarded to the Adjutant-General, United States Army, for decision of the Comptroller as to whether it can be paid from subsistence funds.

The department furnished 4,601,437 pounds of rice in July, August, and September, 1902, at a total cost of \$67,515.13, for distribution to destitutes in Batangas and Laguna provinces, and has been reimbursed for this amount. The division commander discontinued the issues of rice in Bantangas on October 1, 1902.

The losses of stores by deterioration, shortage, etc., during the fiscal year have amounted to \$344,279.03, largely due to the long storage of such articles. The principal losses from deterioration were in canned fruits, issue bacon, canned vegetables, and fresh potatoes.

The issue of the emergency ration has been suspended by the division commander. The large majority of these stores in the division are the "standard" ration, which does not seem to have good keeping qualities. The ration adopted by the board of officers appointed by the Secretary of War is on hand in comparatively small numbers. It is believed that the forced use of the ration will create prejudice against it.

Through the assistance of the Navy Department the fresh-beef supply of the division for the year was purchased in Australia and brought to Manila by navy supply vessels. The beef has been uniformly good, and except the last cargo was all furnished in hind quarters. In September, 1902, proposals were issued for purchase of beef in slings at ships' side in Manila of fore and hind quarter meat. A contract has been entered into for the coming year, the beef to be furnished from the Argentine Republic. The fresh-vegetable supply during the past year has been very satisfactory. Larger losses than usual have occurred during the warm weather near the close of the fiscal year, due to the fact that the potatoes were old and that the temperature was excessive. Contracts for fresh vegetables have been made for the ensuing year at slightly reduced prices.

Next year's contract for space in the cold-storage and ice plant is for a reduced area of one-fifth, but the unit price is the same, as it is also for ice purchased. The total expense for beef storage will therefore be one-fifth less than last year.

There have been presented a good many requests that the scout ration be increased. The matter was very carefully considered, and

the conclusions of the division commander on this subject will be found under the title "Native scouts."

The chief commissary's administration of his department has been entirely satisfactory to the undersigned, but his acts have been criticised by some officers because he was not disposed to violate the law and regulations in respect to the condemnation of stores that were not perfectly fresh.

The subject was very carefully investigated and the action of the chief commissary was sustained. Colonel Sharpe's efforts have been untiring to produce the highest efficiency of his department and to supply the command with suitable food in the most economical manner.

The following was filed on July 24, 1903, by the undersigned, with one of the many complaints, the writer urging that all stores on hand six months be condemned regardless of the condition.

MEMORANDUM.

It goes without saying that food supplies of any kind a long time in store will deteriorate. Sometimes the loss is in nutritive value, or when chemical changes have resulted in decay, oxidation, or fermentation; but sometimes the injury only touches matters of taste or flavor; i. e., acceptability, without any material impairment of the value of the food as a nourishment.

Bacon may be rancid, i. e., decayed and offensive to the taste or smell, or both—and have thus become noxious as food—or it may be infested with parasites which injure only special parts, leaving the remainder unimpaired in nutritive value and in taste. Flour and rice may be moldy, or what is called musty, and really bad, or simply unacceptable. It may be infested with insects, but after cleaning by sifting, etc., will often make as good and wholesome food as when just from the mill.

Canned goods may be decayed and noxious, or merely off in appearance, etc., but not in nutritive value. Some persons prefer moldy cheese to that which is fresh; and in the cold-storage warehouses in the States are constantly kept thousands of pieces of meat that are covered with green mold, and this because such meat is preferred by users to that taken from fresh carcasses.

Stores that are actually bad or impaired in nutritive value are always segregated from the others by the commissaries and condemned by the inspectors; but as to the stores of the other class, those referred to by General Lee as not positively bad, but simply deficient in freshness, the duty of the commissaries—the captains, colonels, and generals—is to issue them as required by Army Regulations and law. If unfit stores are issued, the doctors and others will quickly interpose.

Frequently in the past a bad sack of flour, box of bread, piece of bacon, or can of something has been found among the stores issued, but this has excited no special remark, and has never been the basis of wholesale denunciation of the ration; but here in the Philippines it is not surprising that the proportion of stores which are not perfectly fresh is greater than the troops have been accustomed to in the past at home. To that extent their complaints have a certain justification.

In eleven months last year the money value of the stores issued to troops was \$1,239,086. During the same time the money value of surplus stores sold and those condemned as unfit reached \$389,256. The Government paid for ice to preserve fresh meat in transit and for issue to troops the sum of \$63,172, or an average of \$315 per company and band organization, white troops. The above figures measure in a graphic way the result of the effort of the Government to exclude what is noxious from the sales and issue stores and to issue only wholesome food.

Another reason for complaint is, in my opinion, due to a disposition not infrequently seen to scold, find fault, and force the Government, if possible, to concede unreasonable demands. The complainants, or some of them, appear to consider that it is not for the Government to consider the cost at all of the army subsistence.

Not a word is said in Army Regulations, 1901, about the allowance of ice to the troops. General Orders, No. 129, and cable instructions of February 4, 1903, from the Secretary of War require that when ice machines are furnished the product may be issued to troops and others after the hospital and commissary are supplied. This is the only mention of ice found in the Regulations or in general orders since the publication of the edition on May 1, 1901, yet the clamor for issues according to a lavish scheme seems to presuppose a belief in the existence of some vested

right or fixed allowance. This is unreasonable, and commanding officers should put a stop to the clamor.

The Government favors the troops in the Tropics by allowing the surplus made by ice machines, after hospitals and the commissaries are supplied, to be issued to organizations. Some of the complainants about rations seem to have the idea that no matter where the troops are—at Camp Vicars or Aparri, for instance—the Government must supply ice to those garrisons to cool water for drinking, no matter what the cost or trouble. It would probably be possible to put enough teams on the road to actually deliver a hundred pounds of ice each day to each of the seven companies at Camp Vicars. It is not doubted that it would be possible to haul frozen beef daily to Camp Vicars and to keep it iced en route, so that the full allowance could be daily issued to the troops there; but it is unreasonable to expect the Government to do that.

There are now two transports running exclusively for the purpose of supplying fresh beef, and there are very few posts that do not receive at least six days' issue monthly.

The commissary beef stew is used constantly in Manila, where we have no difficulty in obtaining fresh beef every day. The troops can have the stew *ad libitum* at every post. The troops have never been so well fed in the Philippines as they were the last fiscal year; but there have been hundreds more of complaints about the ration this year than there were ever before, and none of these have come from the troops in the field in Mindanao. It would appear that the more done to improve the ration the more complaints.

It is the exception for the troops to be without fresh vegetables, yet a perusal of some of these complaints would warrant a supposition by one not well informed that to supply vegetables was the exception. If the troops were worked more—were drilled, say, four hours a day—if they had to do what the Germans and Russians and Italians and Japanese soldiers and the Dutch in Java do, as respects drill and physical exercise, they would be hungry three times a day, and the food which they now find fault with would be acceptable.

Many of the troops here are idle nearly all the time, their drills on the average only reaching an hour or two a day, and sometimes only a half hour. The troops on the Lanao campaign hardly had a fresh vegetable from April 1 to July, 1902, and they were performing the hardest duty in mud, sun, and rain; and yet the commanding general, who was present in the field with the men on the march and in their camps and discomfort much of the time, hardly heard a murmur in way of complaint; but men at some other stations who have done almost absolutely nothing beyond guard duty and trifling drills are constantly complaining about rations.

P. S.—I have just seen, since the above was written, a copy of General Orders, No. 82, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, dated June 9, 1903.

HEALTH.

The report of the chief surgeon is thus summarized:

The establishment of larger concentrated stations throughout the archipelago and abandonment of most of the remote, small posts has had a salutary effect on the health of the troops serving in the division. The housing of the troops in commodious, well-constructed barracks, on well-considered sites, with good water, good drainage, and satisfactory disposals of the various waste products, will exercise a markedly beneficial influence on the health of the troops.

The health of the command during the last year does not show a gain over the preceding year, but rather a decline, the percentage of constant sickness being 7.37, as compared with 6.90 the preceding year. This higher rate is in part due to the epidemic of cholera which has raged throughout the archipelago during most of the year and in part to the exposure and hard field service of the troops in Mindanao, the sick rate in that department averaging about 1 per cent higher than in the other two departments.

The comparison of the death rates during the two years shows a gain over the preceding year, aside from the cases of cholera, deaths per thousand being for this year from all causes 21.86, as compared with

20.56 for the preceding year; but excluding deaths from cholera the rate per thousand becomes for the year just closed 12.86, as compared with 18.90 for the preceding year.

The cholera epidemic began in Manila March 20, 1902, and spread rapidly despite prompt efforts toward prevention and control, as reported in last annual report. By June 15 there had occurred among the troops 68 fatalities in 116 cases; among the civilians and natives, 5,390 fatalities in 7,317 cases. During the preceding year the total number of deaths was 224 from 361 cases, and by months, beginning with the month ending July 15, 1902, the deaths were as follows: 54, 51, 19, 8, 20, 13, 24, 8, 1, 6, 11, 13. In August Panay was invaded; in October, Mindanao at Iligan; and later the entire island and the Sulu Archipelago. In Manila the disease subsided in October, and in February the quarantine was removed; but the disease broke out again soon after, though not in such violence. In nearly every instance in which cholera has appeared among troops it has been possible to trace the outbreaks to neglect or direct disobedience of standing sanitary orders. Ninety-one of the deaths occurred among the Philippine Scout companies.

The reports of the board of health of Manila show that up to June 15, the reported cases and deaths from the outbreak of the epidemic were as follows:

	Cases.	Deaths.
Manila.....	4,987	3,825
Provinces.....	136,075	86,572
Total.....	141,042	90,379

The disease was, however, more prevalent and fatal than these figures indicate.

Smallpox has prevailed to considerable extent among the natives throughout the archipelago, but the troops have suffered only slightly, 5 deaths being reported. In March, the issue of General Orders, No. 17, Headquarters of the Division, enforced vaccination on all incoming troops before landing in the islands.

Typhoid fever is given as the cause of 23 deaths during the year, of which about one-half occurred during the four months December to March, inclusive.

PERIBERI.

During the year the Philippine Scouts have suffered severely from this disease, which is not so well known as it should be, and doubtless will be shortly, under the careful studies that are being made by those officers under whose observation it comes. Most of our medical officers attribute its onset to a defective dietary, with excess of carbohydrates in the form of rice and deficiency of proteids, and recommend a lessening of rice in the ration, addition of wheat and corn flour, and increase in meat and bean components. Lieutenant-Colonel Adair, chief surgeon, department of Mindanao, expressed the opinion, derived from observation of an outbreak of beriberi at Zamboanga immediately following the cholera, that the exclusion of fruits and vegetables from the native dietary was an important predisposing cause of the disease. This observation is corroborated by the experience of the Thirty-ninth and Forty-fourth companies of scouts at Iloilo, in which companies, in about a month after the cholera quaran-

tine was put into effect, cutting off the supplies of vegetables and fruit, about a third of the force was affected by beriberi.

It seems also to be infectious, more through infection of a locality than from man to man. Removal to a new locality frequently is all that is required, while occupation of or return to an infected barrack, where no fault existed except that in some places the floor was too close to the ground, caused outbreak or recurrence of the disease. This case occurred at Cauayan, Isabela, in March, 1903.

The board of officers, General Wint, president, which investigated surra and other tropical diseases in India during last winter reported June 8, 1903, from which report are extracted the following notes on beriberi here quoted in full:

Beriberi has been known from early times, being first introduced into medical nomenclature by Bontins in 1645. There are numerous sources from which the name possibly is derived, the most likely being the Singalese word "beri," or "weakness," "beriberi" meaning "great weakness." It is also termed the "bad sickness of Ceylon" and "the sleeping sickness of Africa," although the authorities seem doubtful whether the last mentioned is the same disease.

Beriberi prevails endemically in India, Burma, and the whole of the Malayan Peninsula, though there have been no cases amongst the troops in several years in that portion of India or Burma visited by the board, nor had the medical officers now stationed at those garrisons had any experience with it. In Java, however, the board found the disease existed among the troops as epidemic. Great difficulty was experienced in eliciting the necessary information from the Dutch officials, who generally were unable to speak English. Doctor Fock, in charge of the Base Hospital at Batavia, and a thesis by Doctor Bentley, furnished the following data: That the causes of beriberi are not generally understood; that as a rule the number of admissions to hospital in rainy season is augmented; that certain length of residence in a prison was essential for its production, but as the disease developed this period became more curtailed; that damp and moisture unquestionably were a strong auxiliary to the disease; that any influence which tends to depress or lower the vital or resisting powers of the system, impoverish the blood, etc., may be among the causes of the disease; that it was a very rare thing for a woman or a boy under 20 to be attacked with it; that it was very much more common amongst the natives than among Europeans, and a certain period of residence in an infected locality appears to be necessary for its production. Overcrowded and badly ventilated rooms, the condition of soil, physical exhaustion, and mental depression are alleged predisposing causes.

Doctor Bentley is of the opinion that the six agents chiefly considered in the production of beriberi in recent times are: Diet, impure water, damp and moisture, exposure to cold and great alterations of temperature, and malaria.

Further he states "that this disease is not caused by any particular diet is clearly proven by the fact that all classes of individuals are liable to contract it, natives or Europeans, whether under favorable or unfavorable circumstances as regards food. It has occurred to persons when exposed to its influences who have had the same diet all their lives; in free men who have had a choice of diet; in European officers as well as men, and in natives working on their own account, living in quarters of their own selection. Yet the history and progress of the outbreak of the disease in the prison in Singapore in June, 1880, shows conclusively that the diet has been a cipher in its production. That the most satisfactory results were obtained by largely increasing the amount of nitrogenous foods and decreasing the carbohydrates. In Java no rice is supplied the patients, but wheaten flour, steak, and a kind of black bean are the principal food furnished."

The authorities there are of the opinion that while the diet has nothing to do with the cause of the disease, it is possible that its poverty in respect to its nitrogenous constituents may predispose the blood of the native soldiers to the reception of the poison, whatever the peculiarity of that virus may yet be discovered to be.

Of the five causes mentioned above, Doctor Bentley is of the opinion that all may be eliminated as having any direct bearing on the disease except "damp and moisture" and "exposure to cold." Damp and moisture in the Tropics are conditions synonymous with malaria, there being few instances where the two are not found together. for in well-drained districts malaria is almost absent. There can be but little doubt that without these conditions (damp and moisture) the existing cause of beriberi could not exist, hence the authorities hold that this is

a strong proof of the malarious origin of the disease. But as the presence of a parasite similar to malaria has not yet been discovered, this theory is purely speculative. Observations show that exposure to cold or night air may be the cause of bringing on an attack of beriberi in those who are already in a low state of health, but whether this could be brought about and a case of true beriberi produced without the presence of the poison is a doubtful question.

The board was informed by Doctor Fock that it was almost invariably true when the patients were sent to the Hill Hospital and a nitrogenous food supplied to them they began to improve immediately, and, provided that they reached there when the disease was in its early stage, recovery in a few weeks was almost sure. Some, however, being attacked in remote districts, and the authorities being unable to transport them before some time elapsed, had fewer chances of recovery.

In addition to the foregoing, the following data was obtained from the "Report on Beriberi by Dr. George M. Giles," published in Assam in 1890. He is convinced from his experience with beriberi, or kala azar (as it is named in Assam), that, whatever the latter may be called elsewhere, the disease so called in Gauhat Assam was undoubtedly a chylostomiasis. This information was deduced from post-mortem examinations and cases under treatment over a period of eight months. He considers malarial complications as of secondary importance. That it is an epidemic disease and is due to the action of a parasite organism (anchoylostoma). Speaking in connection with the spread of the disease, another point remains to be considered, and this is the strong belief in its contagiousness, which belief is founded on the undisputed fact that when once a case appears in a village it is followed by another—in other words, the disease spreads. This tendency is often noticed in members of the same family, one after another contracting the disease, while a large family living close by the infected one would be entirely free from it, which fact certainly points to contagion. He is of the opinion that climatic influences have no effect upon the disease, because the outbreak does not attack a large number of people at once or nearly so, but that the disease always attacks a few inhabitants in a village and then spreads very slowly. No hearsay or instance of a European becoming infected in Assam.

Probably in no two cases is the rate of infection uniform or similar, and the spread from man to man in a village must necessarily be equally irregular and uncertain for the individual, though inevitable for a considerable proportion of a village population. The rate and method of spread are, in fact, just what we find in kala azar, and are necessarily entirely different from the phenomena to be observed in directly infective disease, such as specific fevers.

In anchylostomiasis the infection is indirect, and mere contact and association with a patient are quite incompetent to transmit the disease, whereas in ordinary communicable diseases the infection is direct and there is usually no difficulty in tracing its source. It was undoubtedly with the phenomena of direct contagion such as these alone in their minds that previous observers of kala azar, or beriberi, have so confidently stated that there was no evidence in favor of its contagiousness, and so limited their deduction was perfectly correct. In reality, however, anchylostomiasis for a people in a low grade of civilization is one of the most infectious of all maladies, taking the word in its broadest sense of communicability, and the methods of its spread coincide exactly with the facts observed in connection with the spread of kala azar. It is also noted that once the disease has made its appearance in a district it never leaves, the weekly returns of the prevalence of epidemic diseases showing it to be present to-day in every part of the country where it has been hitherto reported. During Doctor Giles's tour in Assam large numbers of specimens of drinking water were searched microscopically for dochmius ambros, but without success. However, after many experiments, Doctor Giles is convinced that the surface of the soil near dwellings offers by far the most favorable situation for the development of the parasite. Hence in entering his hut and moving about among his neighbors the inhabitant of the infected village must always be getting his feet covered with mud (Assam being essentially muddy), which is absolutely teeming with infective embryos. In the house there are many ways in which the parasite may gain access to the alimentary canal. For instance, food is always eaten squatting on the ground, with at most a bit of seldom-cleaned matting as at once table and tablecloth. Under these circumstances a certain amount of the dirt of the floor is certain to get into the dish at each meal. Thus, on account of the broadcast way in which the infective embryos are scattered about and the impossibility of often recognizing the place where they are to be found, the use of chemical infection is out of the question, but the three following facts are worth noting:

1. Prolonged exposure to the direct rays of the sun kills the embryos.
2. Same result may be had by exposing them to temperature exceeding 140° F.
3. Burying the embryos kills them.

Doctor Giles further states, with proper sanitary precautions and the measures recommended below, carried out with sufficient efficiency, there should be no trouble in stamping out the disease. The measures recommended are as follows:

1. The adoption and enforcement of some simple system of conservancy.
2. Migration from infected sites when practicable; the disinfection of infected sites when practicable; the disinfection of infected sites by measures above described when migration is not possible.
3. The improvement of water supply where this is at present unsatisfactory.
4. The clearing and drainage of ground included in village sites wherever practicable.

DYSENTERY.

One hundred and twelve deaths from this disease occurred during the year, of which nearly three-fourths originated in the camp and road guards of workmen from Malabang to Camp Vicars.

Experience has demonstrated that amoebic dysentery, once chronic in the Tropics, can rarely be cured, and that unquestionably it is for the best interests of both the Government and the patient to make an early transfer to a Temperate Zone, where convalescence is more rapid and the prospects of an ultimate cure are increased.

MALARIAL FEVERS.

These fevers have been troublesome, but not dangerous. Their influence has been reduced by systematic campaigns against mosquitoes where this pest is numerous, and use of mosquito bars for the same purpose. Attention is invited to Circular No. 14, Headquarters of the Division, March 26, 1903, to the above effect.

PULMONARY TUBERCULOSIS.

Nine deaths during the year are attributed to this disease, 7 occurring during the first six months. All recently diagnosed cases have been at once transferred to the United States, as the chances of favorable ending in this climate are so small.

ALCOHOLISM.

The effect of alcoholism on the sick report seems to be less in this division than in the stations in the States, and it is hoped its influence will be less under the act of the Commission passed March 28, 1903, in enforcing the removal of saloons from the vicinity of large posts.

VENEREAL DISEASES.

It is believed that no marked change has occurred in the prevalence of these diseases. They hold the first place among all diseases as regards relative prevalence. The semimonthly inspections of the men have been of marked value in effecting an early recognition of the disease and an early treatment. The affected women are reached with difficulty, for all efforts to effect their removal from the locality rests with the municipal authorities, who are not always as energetic as they might be.

The monthly report of sick and wounded from Dagupan attracted the attention of the chief surgeon of the division on account of the large number of venereal cases reported. Sixty-nine were treated in hospital during the month, and 41 of these were venereal cases. On February 12, 1903, a letter was sent to the post surgeon, inquiring concerning

the excessive prevalence. He replied that the inspections directed by General Orders, No. 101, Headquarters Division of Philippines, series 1901, were carefully made on the 5th and 20th of each month, and any soldier found seriously infected was placed promptly under treatment.

On reporting for duty at this station on December 30, 1902, he was struck by the unusual prevalence of these diseases, and on investigation he found the town filled with women of the lowest orders—natives and Japanese. He learned the names and residence of many of the infected women, and called upon the municipal presidente, through the commanding officer of the post, to have these women sent away from the town. After the inspections of February he found a few cases, and again communicated with the presidente, urging him to carry into effect the town ordinances with regard to these prostitutes. The commanding officer issued a post order forbidding soldiers from entering native shacks, and 20 convictions by summary court were shortly afterwards made for violation of this order. Nevertheless the disease continued to prevail, and the report of May showed 29 venereal cases remaining from April and 27 new cases admitted during the month, making a total of 22 per cent of the command infected. The mean strength for the month was 252 men, and the constantly sick from venereal diseases was 9.09 per cent of this strength.

From the report of a board of officers, Brig. Gen. T. J. Wint, president, appointed by Special Orders No. 297, December 4, 1902, to examine into and report upon various subjects pertaining to the military administration in India, Burma, and Java, the following concerning venereal disease is submitted:

The board has referred to a number of official and other reports and publications bearing upon the subject of the prevalence of venereal diseases in the British army in India, and the following data was collected: It is estimated that 13,000 soldiers return to England from India annually, and of these, in 1894, 60 per cent had suffered from some form of venereal disease. It has been shown that in 1894 only 37 per cent of the British troops in India had never suffered from any form of venereal disease; that 28 per cent had been treated for syphilis, and of late years there has been a rapid increase in the frequency of both the primary and secondary forms of syphilis. The latest statistics obtainable by the board were taken from a report of a committee appointed by the secretary of state of the English Government to examine the returns and report what changes, if any, had taken place during recent years in the prevalence of such disease in India. The report discloses the most deplorable state of things.

In the year 1895 an average of 45 men per 1,000, or 3,300 in a force of 71,031 British soldiers in India, were constantly in hospital for venereal diseases. Even these figures, striking as they are, do not include many cases which have been treated out of the hospital and which therefore do not appear in the returns. Again, a large number of men who are nominally cured are only fit for service under peace conditions and would break down on field service. Among 5,822 men detailed for field service with the Citral Relief force, 462, or nearly 8 per cent, had to be rejected for venereal diseases; 279 more, or an additional 4½ per cent, had to be transferred from the field hospitals to the base for the same cause. On the basis of 8 per cent rejected before starting on field service and 4½ more subsequently invalided for disease, 8,800 men out of a total force of 71,031 would have to be put down as useless from this one cause for field operations.

Of the enormous total of 522 venereal cases per 1,000 troops, syphilis contributed nearly one-half; that is, 259 cases per 1,000, a figure many times greater than the highest record in the statistics of continental armies of recent years, either at home or abroad.

Among European forces the average ratio of admission during the three years 1890–1892 for the graver form of disease varied from 5.5 per 1,000 in the German army to 14.8 in the Dutch army. In the British army in India it was 175.4, and has since risen to 259 per 1,000. In the Dutch India force it was 47 per 1,000; but this is a diminishing rate, whereas in the British army in India the rate has very greatly increased.

In summing up their inquiries as to the year 1895 the committee reports: "Venereal diseases directly caused more than 113 of the total amount of sickness; 15 deaths in India, 348 invalidings, resulting in 130 cases in final discharge from the service; the constant and total disablement of 3,200 out of a force of 71,000, and a vast amount of partial disablement and unfitness for any but routine duties indirectly increased the amount of sickness and invaliding under the head of many other complaints. That the military efficiency of the army was most seriously impaired, and that the increasing prevalence and intensity of contagious and inheritable diseases among a body of 71,000 men, of whom many mingle with the civil population, was a growing danger to the health of the community, and concludes by calling attention to the terrible effect on the public health of the United Kingdom which the absorption of such a force among the civil population at home must tend to produce."

The report of the chief surgeon of the division does not contain a statement of the ratio which the number of sick with venereal disease bears to the whole command. He does, however, give the percentage for one post, the appalling figures of 9.09 per cent. If this rate applied to all the troops serving in the Philippines, then there must be about 2,000 constantly sick.

That the disease is much more prevalent among the inhabitants of the Philippines than before the American occupation is frequently remarked.

During the six months October, 1902, to March, 1903, inclusive, no battle casualty of a fatal character was reported. From fatal accidents, including gunshot wounds, homicides, and drowning, the casualties number 30 for the year; and those reported as suicides numbered 12.

Considerable repairs have been made to the First Reserve Hospital in the city of Manila. During the year the movement of sick through this hospital is shown in the tabulation following:

	Patients.
In hospital July 1, 1902	255
Cases received	3,587
	<hr/> 3,842
Returned to duty	1,727
Died	72
Transferred to other hospitals	736
Transferred to United States	973
Discharged	14
Otherwise disposed of	38
	<hr/> 3,560
Remaining	282

Personnel.

	Medical officers.	Hospital Corps.	Nurses.		Civil employees.
			Female.	Male.	
July 1, 1902	9	109	38	2	38
May 31, 1903	8	106	32	1	36

In ward No. 1 were treated 378 cases of eye, ear, nose, and throat troubles, besides 1,172 outpatients in the same troubles.

In ward No. 2, the surgical ward, 571 cases were admitted, and in 199 of them surgical intervention was necessary. Seven of these cases died, 2 from liver abscess, and 1 each from appendicitis, gunshot wound of the intestines, sarcoma of the intestines, tuberculosis, and tetanus.

In ward No. 3 cases treated reached 863, with 14 deaths.

Ward No. 6 was the convalescent ward, and wards 7 and 8 the officers' ward. In the latter two wards 217 cases were treated.

The hospital has continued its pathological and bacteriological work, and also the work of the sanitary chemical laboratory.

The convalescent hospital, Corregidor, is excellently situated. During the eleven months ending May 31, 1,229 patients were here treated. Of these, 511 were returned to duty, 25 transferred to other hospitals and 531 to the United States, 21 were discharged, 9 died, and 132 remained for treatment June 1. The personnel consists of 3 officers, 50 hospital corps men, and 6 female nurses.

The Nozaleda Hospital, established December 18, 1901, for venereal diseases and pulmonary tuberculosis, was broken up January 21, 1903.

Hospital No. 4 was established April 3, 1902, in some unoccupied buildings at Santa Mesa Barracks, but was later transferred to hospital tents near the smallpox hospital, the two constituting a military pest hospital. The cases treated during the eleven months ending May 31 were 4 officers (with 1 death from cholera); 119 enlisted men, with 38 deaths (37 from cholera and 1 from variola); 20 enlisted men, with 7 deaths (all of cholera).

The high mountain plateau of Benguet Province, visited by the division commander, offers sites somewhat close up admirably suited to the establishment of a hospital where the conditions of the temperate zone will be found all the year through. This locality will meet the same necessity for these islands that Dahrgeeling and Simla do for India, or that Buetenzorg and many other hill stations do in Java.

The Baguio weather reports show that the mean, as well as the maximum and minimum, temperatures are about 20° F. lower than prevail at Manila, although for a part of the year there will be more dampness in the mountains.

A reconnoissance was made of Mariveles Mountain, which is in plain sight of Manila, in the hope of finding a suitable locality for a hospital or sanitarium that would be more accessible than Baguio. The party found the mountain top to be over 4,000 feet elevation, but there was no water supply above 2,000 feet and no suitable ground for the buildings at any level.

ENGINEERING.

A considerable quantity of new map work has been accomplished during the year in the offices of the chief engineer and of department engineers. New maps have been made of the entire archipelago; Mindanao; lake region in Mindanao; Malahi Island; Cuyo Islands; Jolo Island; each of the three departments; of Cebu Harbor approaches; Iloilo Harbor; Cagayan River, Luzon; province of Ambos Camarines; province of Bataan; province of Rizal; five sheets of inch map of Luzon. Many corrections and additions have been made to old maps, bringing them up to about the following state of progress:

Luzon.—West coast south of Lingayen, the central portion extending east to the divide, and Cavite, Laguna, and Batangas provinces mapped accurately on scale of 1 inch to mile. Southern peninsula and Cagayan Valley fairly mapped, and remainder of island poorly mapped.

Mindoro.—Northeast coast and Palauan Bay, also the southwestern part from Mangarin to Bula Cacas (an area of about 250 square miles made by the Second Battalion Engineers) well mapped.

Panay.—Entire island accurately mapped, but not contoured.

Cebu.—A map, extending across the island and embracing about one-third of territory, recently made by Company F, Engineers, contoured at 200 feet intervals, made very accurate. Remainder of island mapped very poorly.

Samar.—New map has been started; nothing being used except such as is obtained from American sources.

Bohol, Leyte, and Negros.—Poorly mapped. Existing maps reported as wholly unreliable.

Mindanao.—New map spoken of in last year's report has been divided into five sections, and has been greatly added to from notes and sketches made by officers and men of Second Battalion of Engineers, other officers of the Army, and Coast and Geodetic charts. Outlines of island seem reliable, but main topography, except such as above derived, quite unreliable.

In addition, numerous maps have been made by engineer officers and soldiers of military reservations for new posts, for fortifications, of old fortifications, and Spanish ports or harbors, etc.; and special reports have been secured from the same sources on coal deposits of Bataan Island, projects for river and harbor and fortification works.

During the year several thousand blueprints have been made and issued, over 1,500 of which were census maps prepared for General Sanger, in charge of that bureau.

The entire Second Battalion of Engineers was on duty in the division throughout the year until June 6, when Companies G and H were relieved by Companies I and K, of the Third Battalion.

During the entire year two companies have been on duty in the present Department of Luzon, and two companies in the present Department of Mindanao until November, 1902, since which date one company has been on duty in each of the two departments of Visayas and Mindanao. The duties of the troops have consisted in road and bridge building, exploration and location of trails, reconnoissance, road sketching, map making, hydrographic, topographic, and land surveying, photography, wharf building, superintendence of building of posts, barracks, and quarters, and other engineering work. Such troops as have not been engaged in actual field work have been instructed in infantry and engineer duties and photography.

Some of the most important work done under direction of engineer officers and men during the year is as follows:

Lieutenants Pillsbury and Caples, with 30 men, road and bridge work, surveying, and laying out new post sites in Batangas.

Lieutenant Lukesh, with 4 men, superintending road and bridge work in Cagayan Valley.

Lieut. Lytle Brown, with 11 men, surveying mouth of Cagayan River and preparing plans and estimate for improvement of port of Aparri.

Lieutenants Markham, Lukesh, and Rand, with 30 men, surveying and laying out post, building roads, wharf, and storehouse at Fort William McKinley, under direction of Captains Hart and Cosby.

Lieutenant Hannum, with 10 men, surveying for fortifications at Cebu.

Lieutenant Pillsbury, with 12 men, surveying for fortifications at entrance to Manila Bay.

Lieutenant Woodruff, with 13 men, exploring Mariveles reservation with view to securing a site for a high-level recuperation station.

Topographical surveys for military reservations at following sites: near Los Baños; Santo Tomas; Calamba; Angeles; Arayat; lands in

Manila; near Bayambang; Malahi Island; Calbayog; near Santa Cruz; Corregidor Island; Mariveles; Iloilo; Guimaras Island; near Laguan, Samar; at Jolo; at Zamboanga; at Malabang; at Iligan; at Camp Overton, near Iligan; at Camp Vicars; Dumaguete; Ormoc.

• Lieutenant Otwell, engaged in construction of wharf at Calbayog.

Lieutenant Dent, with Company F, surveying and laying out post of Camp Jossman and constructing road from that post to bay.

Lieutenant Spalding, with 3 men, supervising construction of wharf for new post of Camp Jossman.

Lieutenant Peek, with 15 to 21 men, constructing road from Cotabato to Parang and building wharf at Parang.

Lieutenant Fries, with 30 men, completing wharf at Zamboanga.

Lieutenants Fries and Hannum, with 12 men, constructing wharf at Jolo.

Lieutenant Mitchell, with 4 men, constructing wharf at Camp Overton.

Captain Morrow, Lieutenants Brown and Dent, with F and G Companies, supervising construction of Malabang-Vicars road.

Captain Morrow, Lieutenants Rand, Pillsbury, and Mitchell, with about 40 men, supervising construction of Iligan-Lanao road and erection Pantar suspension bridge.

Captain Jervey has served as superintendent of light-house construction under the civil government, and Captain McGregor until his death as sanitary engineer for the archipelago and city engineer of Manila.

The work of these troops has been of a high grade and valuable to the civil government as well as to the military.

Improvement of the port of Manila is under way as follows, in brief:

First. Completion of (old Spanish) breakwater and its extension to 30-foot contour (about 750 feet of extension).

Second. Construction of detached breakwater 3,000 feet long, extending in a southwesterly direction from a point near the outer end of the west breakwater.

Third. Construction of water-tight bulkhead along the 12-foot contour, approximately parallel to shore west of walled city, and extension of short breakwater (about 875 feet extension) to intersection with this bulkhead. This will reclaim about 148 acres, to be filled with dredged material to $7\frac{1}{2}$ feet above mean low water.

Fourth. Dredging of 18-foot channel parallel to west breakwater, and small inner basin affording connection from deep water in harbor through a canal to Pasig River.

Fifth. Dredging of an area of about 350 acres, between breakwater and bulkhead, to a depth of 30 feet, to afford an anchorage for deep-draft vessels.

The amount available is \$4,029,000, United States currency, under act 22, United States Philippine Commission, and two later amendments. The work is being executed under contract with the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company, of New York and San Francisco.

During the year 3,096 linear feet of timber bulkhead were completed and protected by 85,239 short tons of rock. Eighty-one thousand one hundred and five long tons have been placed on the west breakwater and 12,311 tons on the east breakwater.

An hydraulic dredge of capacity of about 1,000 cubic yards per hour was installed in February, and since that time it has dredged and deposited behind the bulkhead 1,550,233 cubic yards of material.

Total expenditures during the year have been \$802,243.13.

IMPROVEMENT OF THE PASIG.

The project proposes maintaining an 18-foot channel from the Bridge of Spain (which bars large vessels from the upper river) to the bay, about 6,000 feet, and a 6-foot channel from this bridge to the lake.

During the year 696,264 cubic yards of material have been dredged with government plant by hired labor, so that a channel between 400 and 500 feet wide exists from the Bridge of Spain to the bay. The depth across the bar at entrance of bay is only 300 feet wide, but 20 feet deep.

The old wall at canal entrance has been removed to depth of 12 feet. Preparations have been completed for beginning work on the upper river.

The work performed as reported above in constructing a new harbor for Manila and in improving the navigability of the Pasig River was paid for with civil funds appropriated by the United States Philippine Commission, and while its successful prosecution was of great military interest, the work itself in no way came under the administrative control of the division commander.

The division commander expresses his entire satisfaction with the earnestness, intelligence, and effectiveness that have characterized the work of the chief engineer and his officers and men. The work of the battalion in Mindanao and in a great variety of other duties has been very valuable to the service.

ARMS AND EQUIPMENT.

The operations of the ordnance department were confined chiefly to the Manila depot, of which the division chief ordnance officer is in command. During the year the depot's chief efforts have been toward repairing and supplying arms, ammunition, and equipment for the troops, unifying their equipment, and gathering into the depot surplus serviceable stores. The civil government, the Marine Corps, and the Navy have been supplied also with some stores.

During the year quantities of unserviceable property that could be repaired, unreliable small-arms ammunition, and experimental stores that had been tested and reported on, aggregating in all 416 tons, were shipped to the various arsenals in the United States. During the same time regular issues aggregating 676 tons were made to the troops in the division, the total number of requisitions honored being 1,528. During the year the depot has received unserviceable stores inspected and condemned by inspectors, numbering 402,402 items, and having a total cost of \$97,997.93.

The most difficult problem in supply seems to be that of ammunition maintained in good condition. The trouble is due to moisture and mainly with the primers. The only apparent remedy is to keep all the ammunition in zinc-lined boxes. Straw, excelsior, or any other material able to absorb and retain moisture should be avoided in packing. Deterioration of the unpacked and exposed ammunition is unavoidable, and such ammunition should be replaced frequently enough to insure reliability. The depot has always had a sufficient supply of good ammunition.

The Springfield carbine, issued to scouts, has given rise to frequent complaints. The arms are old and not perfect; but a good part of the difficulty is due to the fact that the native lacks familiarity with his weapon, and its proper care. Complaints in regard to the firing

pins, most of which are of steel, are frequent. These are rapidly being replaced by bronze pins, which are satisfactory.

The department has disbursed from ordnance appropriations during the year \$76,503.09, and under quartermasters' appropriations \$1,150.

The shops comprise an armory, harness shop, machine shop, carpenter shop, foundry, blacksmith shop, and tin shop, all of which have been repaired and some of which have been improved by installation of new machinery during the year. All shops have been kept busily employed.

The commanding officer examined all returns of ordnance property in the division before forwarding them to Washington. This system has worked well, allowing correction of errors without the great loss of time necessary in case they are forwarded direct.

Twelve ordnance sergeants have been on duty in the division, besides a detachment of 36 enlisted men in the depot. Six additional ordnance sergeants could be utilized to good advantage.

Up to the close of the fiscal year the civil government is indebted to the ordnance department in the sum of \$124,787.95 for arms and equipment sold to the civil authorities for use of constabulary and officials at reduced rates, as arranged, for which payment has not been made. As a credit against this sum the civil government has turned over to the department military stores, paid for from funds of the civil government, to the value of \$178,340.54, which sum does not, however, represent real values, as in most cases the articles received were valueless to the military government, purchased, for the most part, by the civil government during the insurrectionary period in the interests of peace, and turned over to the military, as the civil government had no place or arrangements for their care. A list has been prepared which shows that stores amounting to \$149,002.17 have been condemned and either returned to the civil officials or were available for such return, leaving stores to the value of \$29,338.37, which the department needs. The matter of the settlement of this account has been made the subject of a special report to the department. The civil government still holds a quantity of stores not included in the above account, which, it is understood, will be turned over at an early opportunity. There have been captured from ladrone bands by the constabulary and turned over to the department 22 magazine rifles, 7 gun slings, and 1 canteen strap.

The depot ordnance accommodations are not sufficient, and when work is begun on the seacoast defenses the plant will be quite inadequate. On this subject a special report, at considerable length, was made quite recently by the undersigned. This matter should receive prompt attention. It is also very important that there be a settlement of the property account between the ordnance department and the civil government.

The ordnance service has been very satisfactorily performed.

PAYMENTS.

During the year 22 paymasters have served in the division, the average number continuously on duty being 16. Payments to the troops have been bimonthly at some stations and monthly at others. In the Department of Luzon up to the May 31, 1903, muster, all payments have been bimonthly excepting to the troops in the post of Manila. Commencing May 31 monthly payments have been extended

to include all troops on the Manila and Dagupan Railroad. In the Department of the Visayas it has not been practicable until quite recently to pay any troops monthly except where paymasters have been stationed. The monthly service is now, however, extended to the larger coast ports. In the Department of Mindanao monthly payments have been extended only to the post of Zamboanga.

A paymaster was stationed at Tacloban, Leyte, from August, 1902, until April, 1903, in order to pay the posts around that station. This arrangement greatly facilitated these payments, and was dropped only on the abandonment of nearly all the smaller stations.

The establishment of the treasury of the archipelago, and its designation as a United States depository, which occurred November 1, 1902, has been of the greatest help in transacting the business of the pay department.

The statistics of the work of the pay department during the year are given in brief below:

United States funds received during the year and on hand at the beginning of year	\$12,789,641.82
Received:	
Soldiers' deposits	1,027,911.97
Paymasters' collections	334,943.56
Total	14,152,497.35

DISBURSED.

Pay of army	8,246,481.69
Mileage	37,340.16
Deposited to credit Treasurer United States	3,205,187.19
Transferred to paymasters outside of division	10,000.00
On hand	2,653,488.31
Total	14,152,497.35

PUBLIC CIVIL FUNDS.

Balance on hand July 1, 1902	7,559.73
Disbursed, pay of scouts	2,143.63
Deposited to credit treasurer archipelago	5,416.10

Col. Charles H. Whipple was the chief paymaster until February 19, 1903, on which date he was succeeded by Maj. George R. Smith, who still continues in charge as chief paymaster.

TELEGRAPHS.

The signal corps at present consists of 7 officers and 421 enlisted men, with 4 detailed line officers as assistants, and operates and maintains 3,105 miles of land lines and 1,472 miles of cable, in addition to handling messages that pass over 2,250 miles of branch lines and 142 miles of cable that have been turned over to the civil government for maintenance.

The chief signal officer remarks that there are only 16 stations occupied by United States troops that are without telegraphic or telephonic communication, and only one of these is of much importance. It is projected to connect this one (Camp Hartshorne, Samar) by a land line from Sorsogon to Matnog, thence a cable across San Bernardino Straits via Capul light to Barobaybay, thence by land line to Laguan, incidentally giving telegraphic connection with Capul light for the reporting of vessels passing through San Bernardino Straits.

These lines furnish communication with 297 points in the archipelago and connect 341 telephones comprising local systems at 23 military stations. There were 100,000,000 words sent during the year and cost the United States \$320,000, exclusive of the cable vessel *Burnside*, which, as will appear in another part of this report, cost for operation, maintenance, and repairs \$203,530, and was of little service for any other purpose. The telegraph service cost the civil government nothing, while lines that cost the United States \$118,704.18 were turned over without charge to the government of the Philippines.

One officer of the corps is assigned to the division staff, 1 is an accounting and disbursing officer, 4 are on telegraphic duty in departments, and 5 are inspectors of telegraphic stations.

In maintenance of the lines iron poles have been substituted for wood as far as possible; 9,000 such poles have been purchased and will shortly be installed. When all present land lines are provided with these poles, the continuity of communication will be improved and the strength of the maintenance squads will be reduced by fully 100 men.

The maintenance of the cable lines during the year has been greatly interfered with by the absence of the cableship *Burnside* for about half the year. The Tukuran-Zamboanga cable was interrupted for about three months, and the Zamboanga-Jolo cable became interrupted in March and is still out of service. The date of the return of the *Burnside*, now in Alaska, is still uncertain, and the necessity of a cable-repair ship, available at all times for this work, has been demonstrated.

The department maintains in Manila the telephone line (of 176 telephones, with 1 central and 2 subcentral offices); a machine and repair shop, which furnishes the electric energy for the 14 circuits of telegraph radiating from Manila; and a signal station at Corregidor to report all vessels passing into the bay during daylight hours. Every officer of the military government of considerable rank and a good many of the officials of the civil government have telephones in their residences, free of cost to them.

During the year the department sent messages as follows: War Department, 431,910; Navy Department, 5,533; United States Government departments, 11,999; civil government, Philippine Islands, 190,838; commercial, full rate, 127,163; commercial, half rate, 30,648; total, 798,091 messages, and has handled a total of 3,130,098 messages.

During the year the department has expended \$23,238.28 of United States funds, and about \$65,582.26 that was appropriated from the insular treasury, of which it is estimated that about \$3,400 will be refunded to the Philippine treasury as an unused balance, making the cost to the civil government for the year not more than the refund to the civil treasury from receipts on paid messages, \$62,194.64. Respecting this deposit in the Philippine treasury, instead of the United States Treasury, of the line receipts on commercial messages, a special communication was recently forwarded to the War Department.

The division commander remarks respecting the telegraph and telephone maintenance and operation, which has occupied the undivided attention of the signal officers and men, that the service has been generally well performed, though there have been cases of carelessness and neglect, complaints respecting them having largely come from officials of the civil government.

The causes of cable breaks have been those due to seismic disturbances in the ocean depths (this cause it is claimed is responsible for

the two breaks in comparatively deep water), and those due either to carelessness or ignorance in laying or to the use of unsuited cables.

To traverse a harbor with a land end of a cable line and place it exactly where vessels must anchor if they use the harbor at all, as was done at Parang-Parang, is but to have the service interrupted; and this is exactly what happened more than once at this port until it was relaid in such way that the anchors of ships did not find it.

Some light and poorly armored cables were laid in very strong tidal currents over a coral bottom. This is the case with the cables in and out of Zamboanga, the Basilan line, and the Jolo line throughout a considerable part of the distance. The currents in their ebb and flow sweep these wires over the sharp rocky bottom, and in a few months the insulation is destroyed and the line is useless.

The instructions of the Secretary of War, communicated to the civil governor by the Chief Signal Officer of the Army in letter dated July 7, 1902, required that the telegraph lines be transferred to the civil government as soon as possible. The matter was taken up and some 2,392 miles have been turned over; but there has been some shortage of operators, and the civil government for some time past has not received any of the many lines recently offered for transfer.

It must be evident to the civil officials that an efficient cable service will be very expensive, for it is apparent that it will be necessary to maintain a steamer and have her always at command for the repairs of breaks in the many cable lines and a great many land ends, some one or more of which are almost all the time in trouble. A suitable vessel with proper deep-sea equipment will cost at least \$150,000, and will cost for maintenance and operation not less than \$100,000 a year, and to maintain the land service on the extravagant American basis which prevails in all branches of the public service in the Philippines will cost probably \$250,000 a year at least. It would not be strange if the civil government preferred to avoid this expense and leave the burden to be carried by the United States Treasury as now.

Two cable companies are now doing business in the Philippines, although it has been suggested that they represent one business interest. Their wires reach America on the east and China on the west.

There are now in use some 500 miles of interisland cables owned by one of the cable companies, by means of which the three largest business centers in the southern islands are reached, and the War Department has paralleled this private line and transmits commercial messages in competition with the private company.

The commercial cable interests now in business here can care for and operate these cable lines at one-half the outlay the Government will incur. Consideration of economy points to an arrangement with these interests that they may take over these lines and the land lines also and be paid such sum as the service is worth over and above the line receipts; or a subsidiary company to the cable interests could be organized to own and operate these telegraphic connections in harmony with the cable lines.

When the wireless telegraph system shall have been established as a practicable going concern, the Philippines will afford an ideal field for the use of this method of communication. There is now no interisland connection more than 200 miles long. When the land lines are strung on iron poles and the wireless system is in use, their maintenance and operation should in private hands come well within the receipts, and the service be without cost to the Government save for usual tolls.

Now the operators are soldiers, but a company that had a regard for the dividends of its stockholders would substitute native operators and linemen exclusively for the expensive American, in this respect but carrying out an invariable practice in the Orient, where all telegraphers and linemen are natives save a very few overseers and superintendents.

DEPARTMENT REPORTS.

Herewith are printed the reports of Brig. Gen. T. J. Wint, U. S. Army, commanding the Department of the Visayas, and Brig. Gen. S. S. Sumner, U. S. Army, commanding the Department of Mindanao. No report has been received from Maj. Gen. J. F. Wade, U. S. Army, commanding the Department of Luzon, but as this officer assumed command of the Division of the Philippines on the 25th day of July, 1903, he may intend to supply the Department of Luzon report later. General Wade commanded the department throughout the period covered by this report.

The troops in the Department of Luzon are grouped into three commands, as follows:

Those north of the Pasig River (except those in the city of Manila) are in the Second Brigade. During the year the commanding officers of this brigade have been Brig. Gens. T. J. Wint and Francis Moore, the latter still in command.

Those south of the Pasig River (except those in the city of Manila) and including the island of Mindoro constitute the Third Brigade. During the year the commanding officers of this brigade have been Brig. Gens. J. F. Bell, J. M. Lee, and Col. Constant Williams, Twenty-sixth Infantry, and again General Lee, the last named still in command.

The troops in the city of Manila, including Pasay, under the senior officer present, report directly to the department commander, who, on the 25th day of July, was Brig. Gen. George M. Randall, this officer having relieved General Wade on the date given.

During the year there was no call made upon the military commander in the Philippines for the assistance of troops in preserving the peace, except as reported under the title "Native scouts." The military operations of these men, who were nearly 3,000, were directed by the civil governor.

Brig. Gen. Frank D. Baldwin commanded in the Department of the Visayas until February 22, 1903, when he was succeeded by Brig. Gen. Jesse M. Lee, and on the 11th day of May, 1903, Brig. Gen. T. J. Wint succeeded General Lee and has remained in charge. There has been no occasion during the year to use the troops aggressively against the disturbers of the peace in the department, but the constabulary under the governor have been quite active. There was no call by the governor for assistance except to have a company sent for station to the forks of the Gandara River in Samar "for moral effect." The disturbances that occurred in March, April, and May in the provinces of Surigao and Misamis, and of which a full account appears under "Public order," were taken in hand first by General Lee, of the Visayas, and he was succeeded by General Wint; this notwithstanding the fact that the disturbances occurred in territory that pertained to another department. At this particular time the cable between division and Mindanao headquarters was down; besides General Sumner at this time had full need for all the troops in his department. For this reason the department lines were ignored so far as concerned the military operations in these two Mindanao provinces, and the forces

from Iloilo, Tacloban, and Cebu restored the peace under the department commander. The work assigned to Generals Lee and Wint, both of whom went to the scene of disturbance, was very creditably performed.

In Mindanao the only military operations were against the Moros in the Lanao region, and these are fully reported elsewhere.

In Sulu the conditions have at times been critical. There has been abundant cause for punitive action of the troops with respect to the disorderly Moros, but the policy has been adhered to of avoiding by every honorable means an occasion for conflict and bloodshed.

There has been but one case of assault upon a soldier, this in the town of Jolo, the soldier being killed by a "Juramentado," who was instantly killed by other soldiers, while onlooking Moros assisted. Now that there is to be a politico-military government for Sulu, it is probable the authorities and some of the fanatical and suspicious natives will come to blows; but the destruction of these people, save under the inexorable stress of necessity, would be unfortunate.

The affairs of the Department of Mindanao have been ably administered by the department commander, who has received the well-merited promotion of major-general of the Army. General Sumner was relieved from command of the department on July 1, 1903, and was succeeded by the senior officer present, Col. William M. Wallace, Fourteenth Cavalry.

In the Appendix will be found the last annual report of Colonel Wallace, who commanded at Jolo during the year. There is also a copy of his last quarterly report, which goes somewhat more into details than the other.

FINALLY.

DIVISION AND BRIGADES.

In the interest of economy and benefit to the service in very many ways, an administrative change of very great importance should be made, a change which will be of immense value also in an executive way.

The time when it was necessary to segregate the command of the troops into departments has passed, if, indeed, the necessity ever existed. As there is but one depot for supply, so there can be and actually is but one military command concerned with the larger questions of military administration. The present arrangement of a territorial commander really accomplishes nothing beneficial beyond what a brigade commander may do, except that the former has the legal capacity to convene general courts-martial; but so long as he is assigned to a control which is recognized by the articles of war, and in deference to custom, it is felt to be necessary, it seems, to give each such officer a larger staff than he has any use for. These officers are a chief quartermaster, chief commissary, chief surgeon, chief signal officer, chief ordnance officer, and a chief engineer officer. These men make work and increase the importance of the commanding general, if his importance is to be measured by the number of officers and clerks at his headquarters and the number of papers that daily pass over his desk.

The change which is suggested is to give to the designation "division" a meaning entirely foreign to what is usually conveyed by the word as now applied to a geographical command. It is proposed to let it have the same significance as when applied to the subdivision of an

army corps called a division. The general officer assigned by the President to command the troops serving in this archipelago would command the Philippine Division and not the Division of the Philippines.

The troops serving here should be divided into about four brigades, at the head of each a brigadier-general. The troops in North Luzon would be called the First Brigade, headquarters at Fort McKinley; those serving in South Luzon to be designated as the Second Brigade, headquarters at Batangas or Lipa; all troops in the Visayas to be designated as the Third Brigade, headquarters at Camp Jossman, and those in Mindanao and Sulu, the Fourth Brigade, headquarters at Zamboanga, until the Illana-Iligan Railway shall be finished, when a new headquarters would be established on the central Mindanao Plateau. The words "division" and "brigade" are military, but "département" and "district" are not.

Each brigade commander should be his own inspector, and be required to spend one-half of his time with the troops in their exercises and supervising their instruction. He would need an officer of the general staff, an adjutant-general, a judge-advocate, and one or two aids-de-camp, but no other staff officers. His troops, wherever situated, would be supplied from Manila depots, and he would have no use whatever for any administrative staff officers except at posts. The law should be changed so as to empower him to convene general courts-martial for trial of enlisted men, and all officers, except those who may be charged with conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman, and embezzlement, in which cases the order for trial should be made by the division commander. It is not, however, indispensable, no matter how desirable, that the law be changed as suggested; for the judge-advocate at division headquarters, with the help of an assistant, could critically examine all court-martial proceedings and the chief of staff present them for signature. The additional work would be no great burden.

The reform would release many staff officers and clerks, and save public expenditures which now give no useful result; and would leave the brigade commander foot loose to be what a brigade commander is in every army in the world but the American, a field officer. Now a great deal of his time is consumed in office work and very little of it spent in the saddle.

When this is done it is to be hoped that the responsibility of assisting the civil government in preserving the peace and unholding the authority of civil officials will be left where it always was until the 30th of January, 1903.

If the same plan were extended to the United States territory a great stride in advance as respects the training of soldiers would be accomplished. The Atlantic Division, the Mississippi Division, the Gulf Division, and the Pacific Division come naturally, and then two or more brigades in each; but these brigadiers need not concern themselves with administrative matters, for in the United States there are practically no subsistence depots. The quartermaster depots are at New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis, Jeffersonville, and San Francisco, and the medical depots are but two or three in number, while all are controlled from Washington. The supplies and materials are usually sent direct by the merchant or contractor to the post where they are to be consumed. The brigade commanders would visé requisitions and estimates and ought always to have their quarters in one of their own garrisons.

These are some general ideas that are submitted as treating of conditions that are quite unsatisfactory now and should be remedied at once. Those, like myself, who have spent a lifetime in the Army know that there have been general officers commanding departments who never wore a uniform, save at social functions, or mounted a horse while they exercised general officer's command. Their "inspections" were perfunctory affairs and of very little military consequence.

MILITARY HYGIENE.

The chief surgeon calls attention to the fact that the sick rate which has prevailed, and still prevails, is approximately 7 per cent, but he does not mention the mortality rate specifically and by itself. There is a difficulty in stating accurately the sick rate for the Philippines, for the reason that a considerable number of officers and men are invalided home, and as soon as the patient on convalescent leave leaves the islands he is at once dropped from the Philippine statistical health records. It would perhaps be possible for the surgeon-general to state his data with more absolute accuracy than is now practicable, but it is quite certain that the report of the chief surgeon does not give the whole story.

The diseases which have worked most injury are dysentery and other ailments of the digestive organs; so it has ever been in the Tropics. In the first fifty-seven years of this century the European troops serving in India lost 6.9 per cent of the whole force by death—in other words, the death rate in India was nearly the same as has been the sick rate in the Philippines—but in India the conditions have improved, for since 1882 the mortality rate has never reached 17 per 1,000.

When Luzon is traversed by a railway from Aparri to Manila, with branch lines to San Fernando Union, Baguio, and the eastern provinces, with another line of rails reaching into Cavite Province, and still a third carried up the Pasig and along the Laguna shore to Pag-sanjan, with further extensions to Batangas, Balayan, and Lucena; when Daet, Nueva Caceres, Legaspi, and Sorsogon are all connected and have a port outlet at Pasacao, there will be no occasion to maintain more than about four stations for white troops in Luzon, namely, Forts McKinley, Stotsenburg, Batangas, and Legaspi, and these troops should all spend a good part of the year in the Benguet Mountains, whence they could reach any place in the island in a day or two. In the Visayas there will be no station needed for Europeans except Camp Jossman, and in Mindanao one large post for two regiments will suffice to be situated on the high tableland of Mindanao, either at the head of the Rio Grande or near Lake Lanao. This, of course, presupposes the existence of a railroad traversing the country, permitting quick movements to either the north or the south coast. The road, the route of which was sketched in another chapter, might be carried from Lake Lanao via the valley of the Taraca River to the great plateau where the eighth parallel of latitude crosses the Rio Grande, thence south to the lower valley, and so on to Cotabato and Port Pollock. With such an arrangement of stations the white troops ought to have as good health as they would enjoy in the States. The native troops would, however, be more widely dispersed and relied on for responding to first calls of the civil authorities. But such a system of roads, which would have a very great military value, can not

be relied on to earn appropriate recompense for capital at first. The state must finance these undertakings in some way, either by advances for construction or by guaranteeing earning on invested capital.

THE WALLS OF MANILA.

In Appendix VIII will be found a paper, possessing some interest for the general reader, and perhaps for the antiquarian also, respecting the fortifications that surround the spot where stood the original Malay city of Manila, and which has given a name to the organization of districts of wards that, collectively, are now designated as Manila, but which is really composed of the separate municipal districts of Tondo, Binondo, Santa Cruz, Quiapo, Sampaloc, Pandacan, Santa Ana, Malate, Ermita, San Fernando de Dilao, and, lastly, Manila, or, as it is often designated, Intramuros, or, in English, "within the walls."

Maj. Joseph C. Bush, Artillery Corps, has collected many interesting facts concerning the fortress of Manila, and has traced the development of the defenses and supplied the names of all the important designers and constructing engineers; while Capt. A. C. Macomb, Fifth Cavalry, in charge of the office of military information, has supplied translations and historical sketches respecting the different gateways and an account of the English attack and capture of the place in 1762. The walls themselves are as complete an illustration of the designs and defensive methods of the times as were those of Carcassonne, but for a much longer period, that Viollet-le-Duc has described so charmingly.

But the walls of Manila, including those designed by the priest who followed Ponce de Leon and was lost in Florida, but extricated himself and came to Manila, or those built but a little more than a half century ago, are all doomed to destruction and must disappear, save those that are still held sacred and protected by the military.

Old Fort Santiago, that dates from 1590, is secure and will not be molested. Indeed, there is no occasion for its molestation. But the rest are obstructing the commercial and sanitary development of the city. The United States authorities may interpose to save them for a time, but the Filipinos care absolutely nothing about the fortifications. They wish to have them demolished, and if the plans of the United States respecting the future of the Filipino people are realized, they will abate the nuisance as soon as they have control of the government and the power to do so, and the walls will go the way the ancient and modern city walls and forts have gone all over Europe.

The illustrations with the paper of Major Bush will give a good idea of the proportions and magnitude of these defenses and their present condition. The stone of which the masonry is made, volcanic ashes that have become consolidated, is so soft and the workmanship so poor that they are all overgrown with weeds and shrubs and must be grubbed, mowed, and cleaned off every six months, so as to prevent them from disappearing in a jungle. In several of the photographs this aspect of the walls is well illustrated. In one photograph the north and the west fronts of Fort Santiago are shown and the office building that has been constructed there on the terre-plein of Battery Santa Barbara. The carriage entrance was built a few weeks ago.

The earliest drawing or map of the old city of Manila that has been consulted is one made about the year 1735. It was captured by the English in 1762, and is now deposited in the British Museum. A photograph of this map is with Major Bush's article.

A map has been prepared, based on official records, showing the position of the breaching battery planted by the English general in his siege operations.

SPANISH CAMPAIGN OF 1896-1898.

There does not exist in the English language any connected and complete account, or even a good synopsis of the Spanish operations against the Filipinos in 1896-1898. This campaign was but the beginning of the hostilities which continued until 1902, and it has seemed to the undersigned to be well worth while that an account of those military operations should be told somewhere in English.

The material relied on for data is unfortunately all of Spanish origin. Every possible effort was made to secure a Filipino account of the fighting, but there does not appear to have been any such account written, nor so far as can be ascertained were there any carefully kept diaries. It therefore follows that the compiler was obliged to rely largely upon Spanish works. Maj. John S. Mallory, First Infantry, has spared no pains to present a fair résumé of the works he consulted, all of which are cited. There is a map of the provinces of Cavite, Batangas, and Laguna, the principal scenes of insurrection.

POLITICO-MILITARY SITUATION.

Just exactly what is the status of government in these islands, in respect to the Army, is not easy to understand. It certainly is not the same as that which exists between a State and the military organizations that chance to be quartered in it, nor does it seem to be exactly the same as that which exists in a Territory, for in these political subdivisions the troops may not be used except that certain conditions of Federal statute law be fulfilled by those asking for assistance to preserve or restore the peace. The governor of a State or Territory is not required to report to the Secretary of War, nor can this officer give any orders to the chief executive, or in any way influence or negative legislation, while in the Philippines the formalities required to be observed in securing the assistance of the land forces of the United States are simplicity itself compared with those that must be observed in the Union, and the governor must render an account of his stewardship respecting finance to the head of the War Department; indeed, it would appear to be justifiable and legal for the President, through the Secretary of War, to veto legislation enacted by the Philippine Commission. The chief executive in the Philippines is designated in the act of July 1, 1902, as a civil governor. There does not appear in this act any definite statement of his powers and responsibilities, only that he is authorized to exercise the powers of government as provided by Executive order of June 21, 1901, but when that order is consulted it appears that the powers devolved upon the civil governor were the same as those that were being exercised by the military governor. Here search for a definite schedule of powers ends, as the responsibility and authority of the military officer who administered civil affairs in the Philippines were never specified in any statute, nor do they appear to have been enumerated or defined in any Executive order of the President as Commander in Chief.

If the above assumption is correct as to the power of the Secretary

of War to practically control legislation, and considering that the chief executive of the islands must render to the Secretary certain reports, the government of the Philippines would not be inappropriately styled "A politico-military government;" that is, a government in which civil and military attributes are combined.

At the present time there are some twelve or fifteen army officers holding office in this government, many of their offices created by local legislation; and if the government was strictly civil and the offices of a strictly civil character, section 1222, Revised Statutes, would preclude employment of the military in these islands.

At this date very nearly 3,000 troops belonging to the armies of the United States are serving in field operations aggressively under the orders of the governor against the enemies of peace and good order; besides, the Philippine constabulary has a character much more closely resembling an army than a peace force. At its head is a general officer, and all its officers are described by purely military titles.

In no English Crown colony, except the purely military ones like Gibraltar, Malta, and Aden, do the military, as a rule, take any part. In India the military are more numerous, in the character of "Residents," "Political agents," etc.; but the government proper is composed of civilians. It is a fact that the government of the Philippines now is more military in the make up of its personnel than any British Crown colony.

It is self-evident that the Army is very much closer and more essential to the civil government here than it is in any of our States and Territories, and very much closer than in Porto Rico. For the present the Army would seem to be essential to the maintenance of orderly government, and no one can say for how long a time this will continue to be the case.

The Philippines are about as far away from the capital of the United States as it is possible to get. The governor of these islands has a very grave responsibility put upon him—a much heavier burden of responsibility than that which rests on the chief executive of any of our States. For these reasons he should exercise very wide and far-reaching powers. If he is not already possessed of the powers to control and direct the use of the land forces, if he is not in fact the commander in chief of the military in these islands, then it is respectfully submitted that such authority ought to be vested in him.

The President's order of June 21, 1901, said the governor's powers should be the same in respect to civil affairs as that exercised by the military governor. Since the military governor could order the distribution and use of the troops and respond to his own conception of necessity for armed intervention in civil affairs, it is suggested that the authority is now vested in the civil governor by the act of July 1, 1902, which has confirmed and legalized the orders of April 7, 1900, June 21, 1901, and July 3, 1902; but if the result suggested above has not been accomplished entirely, it is evident that something approximating to it has been accomplished.

If the relations between the government of the Philippines and the military be the same as that between the government of a State and the army quartered therein, then it would not be legal for the military commander to respond to a call of the governor for assistance, unless the call were made in conformity with the statutes; but in the Philippines the military commander was ordered on July 3, 1902, to respond to the direct call of the civil authorities made in a form quite different from that prescribed for observance in the Union.

If the call of the civil authorities communicated directly must be observed, the governor is in effect the commander in chief; and this is as it should be. If it be admitted that such is his relation to the United States troops serving in the Philippines, the local government itself of to-day seems to be a very close copy of that of an English Crown colony:

A governor who is the commander in chief of the police, militia, military, and naval forces.

An executive council, to aid and assist the chief executive, composed exclusively of nominated members, a part native, a part American.

An elected legislative assembly of from 50 to 100 members to be allowed at a later date.

The power to legislate committed to the governor and his council, or later on to the governor and the two houses.

An "order in council" of a British Crown colony is the same in fact as an act of the Philippine Commission when approved by the governor. When the assembly shall have been formed it will participate in legislation; but if the lower house fails to bring in a bill voting money to carry on the government that is satisfactory to the upper house the former appropriation continues until an agreement is reached.

The Secretary of War may veto legislation, just as may the minister of the colonies in Great Britain, or the King, by an "order in council." The similarity of all this to the basis of Crown colony procedure is very close indeed.

But there is an important difference between the two, and all that has been submitted above under the caption "Politico-military situation" is stated for the purpose of illustrating this difference.

The commander of the British troops in every Crown colony, including India, is a member of the executive council and participates in its deliberations and votes on the measures under consideration. He usually stands next to the governor in rank and is his military advisor; in fact, he might be called the secretary of the military department. He is in fact, as well as in name a member of the government, and has just as much at stake in it and as keen an interest to see it successfully conducted as any person connected with the government.

The sequel to this is a recommendation that if the governor can not now be legally called a commander in chief, that the law authorize such a designation, and second, that the commanding general of the forces be ex officio a member of the council, and under the governor, in charge of all matters connected with the maintenance of order and suppression of disorders. It is not contemplated that the governor would interfere in any matter of military discipline or of administration so long as the United States Treasury supplied the finances to meet the expenses; but the question of the number of troops to be retained in the islands and their general disposition should be in the capacity of the governor to dispose of.

With a general officer of the Army a member of the government, with strictly defined duties, there could not possibly arise any important question affecting the military service in a way to make friction or cause disagreements.

This is the British and Dutch way, and it was the Spanish method. It is the natural course to pursue in the government of a remote dependency that is, and must for a long time be, very slightly autonomous, but is mainly executive. It has been suggested that the Filipinos might regard the participation of a military man in the

government in an important station as savoring too much of militarism; but they see fifteen or more officers, from brigadier-general down, holding civil places and performing very important civil duties and it excites no comment. All intelligent natives know that peace and good order are essential to a prosperous existence, and that force must always be used to suppress brigandage and persistent wrongdoing.

It is well the military government is ended, and there should be no suggestion or thought of its return, but military men in considerable numbers are rendering valuable assistance to the civil authorities, and the general tendency is to increase rather than diminish these numbers. It is respectfully submitted that it is due to the Army that it be recognized as entitled to a representative in the executive council herein suggested.

If the intervention of an armed force should be necessary in suppressing disorders, the military member of the cabinet would, in pursuance of the governor's orders, employ such force as might be necessary, and he would utilize the native or the American troops, whichever might best serve the particular purpose, always under the proper officers, and for so long a time as might be necessary to secure the desired result—that is, peace and respect for law. The agency that should accomplish this in the most speedy manner and with the least possible bloodshed would deserve to receive the gratitude of all well-meaning, law-abiding inhabitants.

Very respectfully,

GEORGE W. DAVIS,
Major-General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Division of the Philippines.

APPENDIX I.

DEPARTMENT OF LUZON.^a

**REPORT OF COL. W. S. SCOTT, CHIEF PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY,
OF ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN MACABEBE SCOUTS AND LADRONES
UNDER SAN MIGUEL NEAR SAN FRANCISCO DEL MONTE, RIZAL,
MARCH 27, 1903.**

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DISTRICT,
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY,
Manila, March 31, 1903.

The ADJUTANT, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of an engagement between the First and Fourth Companies of Macabebe Scouts and a band of ladrones under Lucio (?) San Miguel, on the headwaters of the San Francisco River, at a place known as Corral Na Bato, about 3 miles north of San Francisco del Monte, Rizal Province, on the 27th instant. There is a section north and east of San Francisco del Monte covered with boulders and densely wooded, the brush being intertwined with vines. The trails going through this section wind through and around the boulders, and in many places the vines overhead necessitate crawling through. The ladrones have used this place as a rendezvous for a long time, and I am told that in the time of the Spaniards it was a favorite retreat. The constabulary and scouts have had four engagements with ladrone bands in this vicinity within the past two months. About one week ago it was learned that San Miguel was concentrating his bands at a barrio in the mountains north of Montalban for the purpose of going through Laguna Province, and about that time they were seen in that vicinity. A thorough scouting of the section proved that they had moved. For several days no trace of them could be found.

On the evening of March 26 I directed Lieutenants Reese and Nickerson to take their companies and search the Corral Na Bato country, taking all available men, and operate in conjunction. They left Caloocan at daylight on the 27th. The First Company consisted of Lieutenants Nickerson and Finlayson and 80 men; the Fourth Company, Lieutenant Reese and 90 men. Lieutenant Shea, of this company, was sick and did not accompany it. The companies were placed in line of sections with fairly extended intervals, the Fourth Company on right and First on left. The second section of First Company ran into the ladrones, other sections closed into right and left, and eventually completely surrounded the position. They were quartered within an old corral or fort, consisting of a stone wall on two sides and the San Francisco River, which had been dammed until the water had a depth of about 5 feet, on the other two sides. The immediate country around was thickly covered with bamboo. The wall on

^a Report of department commander not received.

one side was near a rice field, but a thick growth of bamboo completely concealed it from the open country.

The inclosed reports of Lieutenants Nickerson, Reese (signed by Lieutenant Shea), and Finlayson give many details of the fight, to which reports attention is respectfully invited.

Eleven rifles and 2 revolvers were captured, a telescope, pair of field glasses, Katipunan flag and seals, and a number of important documents pertaining to Julian Santos, Apelando Samson, Faustino Guillermo, San Miguel, and others, which are proving of much value in fixing complicity with these criminals of certain other people. Data more recent than the inclosed reports fixes the number of ladrones killed at between 50 and 60. Twenty-two have been buried at Caloocan, 6 at barrio of Balintoway, 5 at Malabon, and 26 covered up at the scene of the fight, or a total of 59. It was reported to me verbally that ladrones after being shot down continued to fire until killed. From captured correspondence it appears that this place was a sort of headquarters, which had probably been used as such for some time, and that most of the ladrone chiefs were assembled here with their respective bands at the time of the fight. The only one of note who was killed, so far as known, was San Miguel, who, from a document captured, was the commander in chief, he having been unanimously elected such last October. The document contained the signatures of all the subchiefs to this effect. The death of this man will probably have the effect of crippling the solidity of the organization and breaking them up into smaller bands.

There seems no longer any reason to believe that the Macabebe Scouts will not at all times prove loyal. Attention is invited to recommendations of scout officers that their companies be given Krag carbines. I therefore recommend that this be done with those companies of Macabebes now operating in the field, and that target practice be authorized when feasible.

I desire to call attention to the gallant way in which this band, estimated at 150, was rushed by the scouts led by Lieutenants Reese and Finlayson, by scaling a double stone wall in the face of a terrific fire. In this charge Lieutenant Reese and 5 scouts of his company were severely wounded and 3 killed. Six of the first company were wounded prior to this time. The engagement became a hand-to-hand fight after the scouts entered the corral, in which they fought with clubbed guns. Lieutenant Reese, in speaking of the affair, said that no one dared for a few moments to attempt to lead.

I do not believe that during the entire service of our armies in the Philippines there has been a more hotly contested affair or more gallantry shown than in this engagement. The officers and men concerned are entitled to the highest commendation for the gallantry displayed and intelligent control by officers and obedience of men in this fight.

Judging from inclosed reports and verbal descriptions of the encounter, Lieutenant Reese was really the leading spirit in the affair.

Very respectfully,

W. S. SCOTT,
Colonel and First Assistant Chief,
Philippines Constabulary,
Commanding First District.

Official copy respectfully furnished the adjutant-general, Division of the Philippines, with following recommendations:

First. That commanding officers of Ilocano and Macabebe com-

panies now in the field who apply for Krag carbines be allowed to exchange their Springfields for them and that target practice for them be authorized.

Second. That recognition be given Lieut. B. Reese, commanding Fourth Company Macabebes, for his services in the Philippines with the volunteers, with the squadron of native cavalry scouts known as Batson's Scouts, and his services with present organization, by allowing him the opportunity to appear for examination for a commission in the Regular Army. This officer is unmarried, 24 years old, intelligent, brave, and modest. I am convinced that he will make an efficient officer.

W. S. SCOTT,
*Colonel and First Assistant Chief, Philippines Constabulary,
Commanding First District.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DISTRICT,
PHILIPPINES CONSTABULARY,
Manila, April 2, 1903.

CALOOCAN, RIZAL, P. I., *March 28, 1903.*

Colonel SCOTT,
Assistant Chief of Constabulary, Manila, P. I.

SIR: In obedience to your instructions I had a talk with Sergeant Songa, Fourth Company, Native Scouts, in hospital last night. He said that shortly after the fight commenced he saw the man who is claimed to be "San Miguel;" that when he was in a short distance of him this man threw up his hands and hallooed "I am San Miguel;" that immediately afterwards he fell, and some soldiers of the First Company came up and got his revolvers.

In regard to the woman I spoke to you about as being his wife, I learned later that she lives with a Chinaman (her father) in a three-story building on Calle Haboniro, Manila; that she has two children. This information I got from the woman who came up to identify the body.

Very respectfully,

JAS. R. GILLESPI,
Post Quartermaster-Sergeant, U. S. Army.

FOURTH COMPANY, NATIVE SCOUTS, MACABEBES,
Caloocan, Rizal Province, P. I., March 30, 1903.

Col. W. S. SCOTT,
First Assistant Chief of Constabulary, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of engagement between this company and insurgents under one San Miguel on the 27th instant, viz:

Lieutenant Reese left Caloocan, P. I., at 5.30 a. m. March 27, with 90 men, Fourth Company, Native Scouts, Macabebes, accompanied by Lieutenants Nickerson and Finlayson, with First Company, Native Scouts, Macabebes. Command proceeded to San Francisco del Monte, arriving at 7 a. m.; distance 4 miles. At this place Lieutenant Reese separated from the First Company and deployed the company in line of sections, with about 1 mile interval between sections, to the southeast. First Company deployed in similar manner to the north. Section leaders were ordered to scout country in a northeasterly direction to San Mateo, distance about 14 miles, but if firing was heard either to the right or left they were to close in on that point. Lieutenant Reese accompanied the extreme right section toward Mariquina. The other three sections proceeded in the direction indicated until about 9.30 a. m., when Lieutenant Reese arrived at barrio Cruz-ne-Ligas, near Mariquina. Upon arrival at that place Lieutenant Reese heard firing to the west, about 2 miles distant.

Lieutenant Reese immediately proceeded in that direction with his section of 16 men, and upon the scene of action about 10 a. m. found Lieutenant Finlayson engaged with a small detachment of First Company with a large body of insurgents—probably 150 or 200. The insurgents were behind stone walls, which formed

a perfect square of about 50 yards in each direction. Their position seemed to have been the ruins of an old Spanish fortification. About 10 yards in front of this fortification there was another stone wall, which was loopholed, and which had evidently been constructed recently. Lieutenant Reese placed his men under such cover as he could find about 75 yards in front of their position, and then tried to find a way by which he could flank their position, but found that there was no possible way of doing so. Lieutenant Reese then returned to the command and found that two more sections of the company had come up and connected with the right. Lieutenant Reese's men all this time were exposed to a terrible fire from enemy, and it was impossible for Lieutenant Reese to return the fire, as the insurgents were firing through loopholes and crevices between rocks and not exposing any part of their person. About 10.30 a. m. Lieutenant Reese ordered the command, consisting of about 35 men, to charge the place, which was done on the north and east side and the position taken, but not until after a desperate hand-to-hand struggle inside the fortification, the men using the butts of their guns and rice pestles. As Lieutenant Reese on entering the fortification was wounded, he did not accompany the command any farther, but Lieutenant Finlayson, First Company, here took command, he having accompanied Lieutenant Reese in the charge. This company incurred the following casualties in taking the position:

Killed: Sergt. Albaro Lugtu, Corpl. Tomas Anicete, and Private Brailion Maninang (died of wounds).

Wounded: First Lieut. Boss Reese, Philippine Scouts; Sergt. Moyces Sunga, Artificer Cornelio Manansala, Privates Lorenzo Dizon, Simon Montano, Simon Yumang.

All of these men were killed or wounded within about 10 feet of the fortification or while going over the stone wall; no men were hit after entering the fort, although this is where the most desperate fighting took place. The enemy left 35 dead on the field, including San Miguel, who was killed, but their casualties were probably larger, as the country was very thick underbrush, and no doubt several crawled off in the jungle and died.

The following arms were also captured by this company, viz: 1 Krag-Jørgensen rifle, caliber .30; 1 Springfield carbine, caliber .45; 2 Remington carbines; 1 Remington rifle; also papers, trumpet, field glasses, etc.

After wounded were dressed command was assembled and marched to Caloocan, arriving 2 p. m., distance about 6 miles. Total distance marched, 20 miles. This command labored under a great disadvantage, by reason of being armed with Springfield carbines, with black powder, the enemy at the same time having a great many magazine guns with smokeless powder, and it was almost impossible to locate the fire from those arms, while the men of this company afforded an excellent target.

If this command had been armed with magazine carbines in this engagement they would have practically annihilated the entire insurgent force.

For a more exact position of troops attention is invited to the sketch of scene of fight submitted by Lieutenant Nickerson.

Very respectfully,

A. SHEA,
Second Lieutenant, Philippine Scouts,
Commanding Fourth Company Native Scouts, Macabebes.

FIRST COMPANY NATIVE SCOUTS, MACABEBES,
Caloocan, Rizal, P. I., March 28, 1903.

Col. W. S. SCOTT,

First Assistant Chief Constabulary, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of operations of the First Company Native Scouts, Macabebes, since March 22, 1903:

Complying with your verbal instructions, I left Caloocan with Lieutenant Finlayson and 80 men of my company, with Fourth Company Native Scouts, at 4.30 a. m., March 27; marched to San Francisco del Monte, where the command was divided into sections and distributed in line with about 1 mile interval between sections. Chiefs of sections were instructed to scout toward San Mateo. I accompanied my right (first) section and Lieutenant Finlayson the left (fourth) section.

After marching about 4½ miles in this formation, my second section located and engaged a band who were intrenched behind a stone wall and large rocks near the head of the San Francisco del Monte River. Upon hearing their fire, the sections to the right and left closed in that direction. I formed a line of the first section

from the river to the right and connected with the left of the Fourth Company. Lieutenant Finlayson, with the fourth section of my company, connected with Lieutenant Reese, with right of Fourth Company. On account of several men of the left of the company being wounded, I reenforced Lieutenant Finlayson by sending him all of my section except 15 men, which left my line from the river very thin. This line could not return the fire of the enemy for fear of firing into the men on opposite side of the river and fortifications.

Lieutenants Reese and Finlayson charged and took the fortifications from the north side. The insurgents fought desperately and remained in their intrenchments until a part of the command had charged over same.

The enemy retreated across the river and through the right of my line, losing 6 killed and several wounded in getting through. I followed them with the 15 men on my side of the river and noticed several men taking along an officer in uniform, who appeared to be wounded. I directed my fire upon them, killing one. The others broke for the brush, leaving the wounded man, who fired at the first man who approached him, who in turn shot him through the head.

Knowing by this man's uniform and general appearance that he was an officer, I caused him to be brought into Caloocan, where he was identified as "General San Miguel."

My casualties were 4 wounded, also the Hospital Corps man who accompanied my company.

The company returned to Caloocan at 2 p. m., having marched about 18 miles.

I am confident that had my men been armed with magazine carbines and smokeless ammunition much better results would have been obtained.

Very respectfully,

FRANK NICKERSON,
First Lieutenant, Philippine Scouts, Commanding Company.

FIRST COMPANY, NATIVE SCOUTS, MACABEBES,
Caloocan, Rizal, P. I., March 30, 1903.

Col. W. S. SCOTT,

First Assistant Chief, Philippine Constabulary, Manila, P. I.

Complying with verbal instructions of First Lieut. Frank Nickerson, Philippine Scouts, I have the honor to report the following:

I left Caloocan about 5 a. m. March 27 with a command consisting of 80 men of First Company Native Scouts, Macabebes, and about 90 men, Fourth Company Native Scouts, Macabebes, and marched to San Francisco del Monte, where the above command was advanced in line of sections with San Mateo as objective point, to search the country lying between San Francisco del Monte and Mariquina River to the northeast for insurgents or bandits. I accompanied the fourth (left) section of the First Company Native Scouts, Macabebes. After having marched about 4 miles in a northeasterly direction toward San Mateo, I heard firing to my right and front and closed in in that direction, finding that the second section, first company, had struck a band of insurgents to their front, who were intrenched behind a rock wall and in the tumbled-down ruins of a stone structure. I placed my section (16 men) to their left in line of skirmishers, under such cover as was afforded (rice paddies), and awaited reenforcements, knowing that the troops to my right and left would close in upon hearing my fire.

In about one-half hour Lieutenant Reese, with a section of his men (Fourth Company) joined my left, also a section from Lieutenant Nickerson on my right, and in front of said stone wall. After I had informed Lieutenant Reese of the position of the enemy, which was screened by heavy underbrush, he had his musician sound "forward," and a minute later "charge." The line of Lieutenant Reese and my own responded to the command, and, after storming the wall and first foundation, found that there was a second fortification, a tumbled-down stone wall in the shape of a square, in close proximity to the first, which was charged and taken also.

After vaulting over the walls of the second structure, Lieutenant Reese was shot through the upper part of the right thigh by one of the insurgents who were in the fortification at the time. Three of these insurgents were killed by Lieutenant Reese; one by a shot from his revolver, and the other two with the butt of a carbine which he had picked up in the charge; this was the rifle of one of his men, who fell wounded near the wall.

Lieutenant Reese being wounded, I assumed command and followed the enemy in their retreat to the river, on south side of fortifications (attention invited to sketch furnished by Lieutenant Nickerson with his report), about 200 yards.

About the time Lieutenant Reese's and my men entered the fortification, Lieutenant Nickerson with 15 men, who were holding a line on the south and opposite side of the river from the fortifications, commenced firing upon the retreating enemy. The fact that Lieutenant Nickerson had only 15 men with him on south side of the river was caused by his having sent all but the 15 to reenforce my line. I requested him to send me this reenforcement on account of the fact that the private of the Hospital Corps and 4 of the 16 men of my line had been wounded.

From the river I returned to where Lieutenant Reese was lying (inside the fortification), and sent details and gathered up the dead and wounded of the command.

The private of the Hospital Corps, Otto Herter, who was with my section, was hit while firing at the enemy with a carbine of one of my men who had been wounded.

After having chased the retreating band until they had scattered and disappeared in the brush, Lieutenant Nickerson came over to the fortification and sent a detail in to Caloocan with a request to Major Cooke for transportation for dead and wounded, which met the command as near as it was possible on account of the roughness of the trail. Litters were improvised on which the dead and wounded were carried for about 2½ miles, to where the wagons were which had been sent out by Major Cooke, commanding officer of Caloocan.

The body of an officer killed by Lieutenant Nickerson's men was brought in to Caloocan and identified as that of "General San Miguel," the insurgent leader.

Casualties to our forces: Three killed and 6 wounded of Fourth Company Native Scouts; 4 wounded, First Company Native Scouts; 1 wounded, Hospital Corps.

Casualties of the enemy: About 35 killed; wounded not known.

Captured 11 rifles and 2 revolvers, the official and private correspondence of San Miguel, together with official stamps, seals, etc.

The conduct of our men during the entire engagement was most excellent, every man fighting with that utmost coolness and obedience to every command which assures success.

The fact that our men were armed with Springfield carbines and black powder ammunition placed them at a disadvantage. Had they been armed with Krag-Jørgensen carbines and ammunition of smokeless powder, I am confident that better results would have been obtained.

Very respectfully,

J. S. FINLAYSON,
Second Lieutenant, Philippine Scouts.

APPENDIX II.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
Iloilo, Panay, P. I., July 2, 1903.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report for the Department of the Visayas for the year ending June 30, 1903:

The Department of the Visayas was established with headquarters at Iloilo, Panay, P. I., October 1, 1902, pursuant to General Orders, No. 96, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, September 3, 1902. Its geographical limits are specified in that order, as amended by General Orders, No. 106, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, October 22, 1902. Brig. Gen. Frank D. Baldwin, U. S. Army, formerly commanding the Fifth Separate Brigade, was designated department commander. General Baldwin continued in command until February 22, 1903, when he relinquished command, being succeeded the same day by Brig. Gen. Jesse M. Lee, U. S. Army, who in turn relinquished command May 11, 1903, Brig. Gen. Theodore J. Wint, U. S. Army, assuming command immediately.

Brig. Gen. Jesse M. Lee, U. S. Army, was relieved from command of the Sixth Separate Brigade (which included the islands of Samar and Leyte and the small islands adjacent thereto), headquarters at Tacloban, Island of Leyte, and was ordered to Manila, P. I., per General Orders, No. 207, Headquarters Division of the Philippines, dated October 21, 1902. He left his brigade October 27, 1902. From the date of General Lee's relief from command until the discontinuance of the Sixth Brigade, December 31, 1902, the brigade was commanded by Col. Walter T. Duggan, First Infantry.

At the time of the establishment of this department the command was composed of Company H, Signal Corps; detachment Hospital Corps; Headquarters Second Squadron, and Troops E and F, First Cavalry; First Infantry (entire regiment), Twenty-ninth Infantry (entire regiment, less companies I and K); Companies 35 to 47, inclusive, Philippine Scouts, garrisoning 40 towns in the various islands. Company F, Second Battalion, Corps of Engineers, arrived in the Department November 25, 1902, taking station at Iloilo, Panay; March 24, 1903, Company No. 41, Philippine Scouts, left Department of Luzon; March 25, 1903, the Fourteenth Infantry arrived in the Department, relieving the First Infantry in the island of Samar, the latter organization leaving the Department March 28, 1903, for Manila, P. I., en route to the United States; April 26, 1903, Companies I and K, Twenty-ninth Infantry, arrived at Camp Jossman, island of Guimaras, from Puerta Princesa, island of Paragua (Department of Mindinao); May 2, 1903, the entire Eighteenth Infantry arrived in the department, relieving that portion of the Eleventh Infantry in island of Leyte, the latter leaving May 8, 1903, for station at Manila, P. I.

The annexed table, marked "A," shows the movements of troops within the department during the year.

The appended list, marked "B," shows the dates of abandonment of stations since the present department came into existence, together with a list of all stations newly occupied during the year.

It being the policy of the administration to concentrate the forces in the Philippines as much as possible and consistent with the interests of the United States Government and the welfare of the resident inhabitants, as well as for the sake of economy, very soon after the inauguration of this department the command was notified to make necessary preparations for a general mobilization at permanent posts. Near the close of 1902 the permanent posts at Camp Jossman, Buena Vista, island of Guimaras; Camp Downes, at Ormoc, island of Leyte; Camp Bumpus, at Tacloban, island of Leyte; Camp Connell, at Calbayog, island of Samar; Camp Hartshorne, at Laguan, island of Samar (all named in honor of officers killed in action in the Philippines), and Cebu, island of Cebu, were established, providing for the accommodation of 18, 4, 8, 8, 4, and 4 companies, respectively.

Almost immediately the removal of the minor garrisons (one company and less) to the permanent posts just selected was begun, and within a comparatively few months all the outlying stations were abandoned and the troops quartered in tents at the new cantonments. Location of the several proposed cantonments having been approved by the division commander and the allotment of funds for construction at the cantonments having been made, work was immediately commenced thereon, and since then has been pushed as rapidly as circumstances would permit, there being considerable delay incident to the continual changing of stations of troops and the slowness in delivery of lumber from the United States. Native material, such as hardwood poles, bamboo, and nipa, was contracted for and delivered with considerable difficulty, owing to the lack of necessary means of water transportation. Notwithstanding these hindrances and drawbacks, the work of construction has progressed very satisfactorily. The untiring efforts of the camp commanders and constructing quartermasters toward the completion of this very important work is commendable.

November 24, 1902, the cable ship *Burnside* completed the laying of the cable from a point on Panay Island, near Iloilo, to the island of Guimaras, thus placing that important cantonment in direct communication with Manila.

The Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army visited several stations in the department during his tour of inspection of the Philippines in the month of December, 1902.

Throughout the department there have been almost continuous disturbances caused by the lawless operations of the so-called *ladrones* or outlaws, who glory in falling suddenly on isolated villages and haciendas, plundering and pillaging everything within sight and easy reach. The depredations of these bands are not confined merely to the devastation of property and stealing of stock and valuables, but murder in its most atrocious form is very frequently resorted to. The constabulary has apparently exerted every effort and means to exterminate these outlaws, but their (the outlaws') perfect knowledge of the topography of the localities in which they operate and their ability to secrete themselves in the mountains and jungles have practically enabled them to continue their nefarious business with impunity.

Ladrones and banditti having become somewhat troublesome in central Samar, upon the request of the civil governor of that island and the recommendation of the governor of the Philippine Islands a company (Thirty-fifth) of Philippine scouts was sent, on December 16,

1902, for moral effect only, up the Gandara River with instructions to go into camp at the site of the former town of Gandara at the main forks of the river. Upon arrival at this point it was learned by the commanding officer that the majority of the supposed agitators were quietly engaged in legitimate business and apparently well disposed toward United States sovereignty, yet the underlying sentiment was against the presence of the native troops. This state of feeling culminated in a fight between a few members of the scout company and municipal police and residents of the town. The affair is now under investigation. This company is still stationed at Gandara and apparently tranquillity reigns in the Gandara Valley, which has always been conceded as the most troublesome section in the island of Samar. Numerous meetings with these roving bands of outlaws have been reported from all through the department, frequently with casualties on one or both sides. At present all appears quiet.

On April 8, 1903, the commanding officer, Camp Bumpus, Tacloban, island of Leyte, reported that ladrones were assembling in the hills back of Basey, Island of Samar (near Balangiga), and terrorizing the people, and requested authority to have a company of scouts cooperate with the constabulary in dispersing the disturbing element. General Orders, No. 152, series 1902, Headquarters Division of the Philippines, prohibited such a procedure, and the matter was referred to the division commander. The department commander opened communication with Governor Llorente, of Samar, regarding the situation and announced his readiness to act on the official call of the governor. In reply Governor Llorente reported that ladroneism in his province, according to his investigation, had little significance, that the ladrones had no firearms, and that several had been taken by volunteers and municipal police of Basey. His telegram concluded with: "Many thanks for your kindness. I will request you for troops as soon as I need them." Here the matter was closed. No disturbances have been reported from that locality since that date.

SURIGAO EXPEDITION.

On March 23, 1903, a band of about 30 insurgents, under a leader named Concepcion, entered the town of Surigao, Mindanao, at noon, the band being quickly joined by some 100 natives, many other of the townsfolk being in strong sympathy with them. The combined forces then proceeded to constabulary headquarters, knowing the barracks would be empty at that hour and the men at dinner. The one sentinel on duty was easily overpowered, Inspector Clark of the constabulary killed, and the barracks and constabulary storehouses sacked. The insurgents secured in all 56 Remington shotguns, 40 Colt revolvers, 10 Springfield carbines, 20 Remington rifles, 5,000 rounds of ammunition, and 5,400 pesos, civil funds. The remainder of the day and that night they stayed in the town, remaining at constabulary headquarters and leaving early the succeeding morning, the padre of the town having warned them of the coming of an American gunboat (?). To meet in open combat with their enemies not being the natural tendency of the insurgents, the band, numbering about 100, with probably 130 firearms and abundant ammunition, fell back to the village of Placer in an organized band. The day following the attack on the town, two officers and a detachment of 30 men, Company M, Tenth Infantry, arrived on the scene of the trouble from Iligan, Mindanao, and were followed the same day by Companies G and H,

Twenty-ninth Infantry, from Camp Jossman, island of Guimaras, under command of Capt. H. R. Perry, of that regiment, to whom had been transmitted the instructions of the division commander, which were, briefly, as follows:

Troops will occupy town, drive out insurgents, restore and maintain order in town of Surigao, and protect people and property from violence.

By this time constabulary reinforcements had arrived, and scouting parties of both military and constabulary immediately set out in pursuit of the insurgents. As a military necessity, for the convenience of supply, and on account of its close proximity to and easy approach from Iloilo, the province of Surigao was temporarily detached from the Department of Mindanao by the commanding general, Division of the Philippines, and attached to this department, but the civil commission decided that for the time being martial law would not be declared there, holding that the province was no more in a state of warfare than the majority of others in the islands. The department commander, Brig. Gen. Jesse M. Lee, U. S. Army, repaired personally to the seat of trouble, individually directed the movements of all troops and constabulary in the province of Surigao until the arrival of Col. Albert L. Myer, Eleventh Infantry, with the headquarters and two companies of his regiment from Camp Bumpus, Tacloban, island of Leyte. Colonel Myer was then placed in command and continued to exercise command until the formal breaking up of the Surigao expedition, June 29, 1903.

On the 28th of March, 1903, information was received that Concepcion, the insurgent leader, was at Mount Magayaco, province of Surigao, but by the end of that month he had not been discovered, neither had any of his followers, who had now divided into small parties, been encountered by the military forces. Much scouting was done by the troops during the week following the outbreak, and by the 29th of March 3,300 of the 5,400 pesos secured by the insurgents had been recovered from natives in Surigao and vicinity who took part in or aided and abetted the attack, over 30 of these being at that time under arrest in the hands of the civil authorities. The scouting parties continued their pursuit of the outlaws everywhere, killing, wounding, and scattering them in all directions and bringing many prisoners. During April, 29 Remington shotguns, 14 Colt revolvers, 7 Springfield carbines, and 9 Remington rifles, a total of 59 firearms, together with large quantities of ammunition, were recovered out of that originally secured by the outlaws. The scouting was pushed just as vigorously during May and June, and by the end of the latter month there remained in the hands of the outlaws only 38 revolvers, caliber .45; 19 shotguns; 1 Springfield carbine, and 5 Remington rifles.

Considerable hardships were experienced by the troops operating in this province during the entire disturbance, due principally to their limited knowledge of the country, the rains, etc., but vigilance was not relaxed on this account, and scouting was maintained continuously by all detachments, with excellent results.

The greatest force taking part in the Surigao expedition at any time, including both military and constabulary, aggregated 29 officers and 693 enlisted men. All these organizations were divided into detachments scattered throughout the affected district.

Investigation into this affair revealed the fact that various provincial and municipal officials had been implicated in the attack of March 23; these were placed under arrest and promptly removed from office.

Civil proceedings were instituted against all persons charged with complicity in the raid and the stealing of the 5,400 pesos, and all awarded sentences of divers degrees—two were sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment each, two to twenty years' imprisonment each, and many others received lesser sentences. In all, 62 persons were tried and sentenced according to the gravity of the offense committed. The presidentes of Tigamana and Mainit were deposed May 5, and placed under arrest, charged with being among the most enthusiastic of the instigators of the attack on the constabulary, the evidence against them being quite conclusive. The unremitting vigilance and hard pressing of the insurrectos by the military forces and the heavy sentences of the civil courts did much to bring the unruly element to a realization of the futility of armed resistance against the United States Government, and they have now apparently submitted to the inevitable.

June 28, 1903, Colonel Myer, commanding the expedition, reported by wire from Surigao that he was confident that the band of outlaws against whom he and his command had been operating were all either killed or captured, with the exception of the leader, Concepcion, and a few stragglers unarmed and disorganized, most of the arms recovered, and the condemned prisoners sent to Manila. The Surigao expedition was broken up and ordered disbanded June 29, 1903, with the exception of two companies of Philippine Scouts to be left at Surigao, Placer, and Mainit for temporary duty until a state of unquestionable peace had been declared. It is believed that these outlaws have been well punished and taught a profitable lesson, and that their next outbreak will be given weightier consideration; also that a precedent of what they may expect in the future has been firmly established.

CAGAYAN EXPEDITION.

Early in April, 1903, Governor Corralles, at Cagayan, Mindanao, reported that the people were organizing into bands under one Flores, formerly a commission agent in that town. Cagayan being beyond the territorial bounds of this department, no remedial action could be undertaken. Later, about the middle of the same month, the governor again reported that conditions in his province were in a much worse condition and fast becoming alarming, and entreating that a force of 100 soldiers be sent there post haste, as the people of the town were leaving for the mountains, declaring themselves rebels.

April 29, 1903, Captain Overton, with his troop (D, Fifteenth Cavalry), left Iligan, Mindanao, for the purpose of making a scout to Cagayan and Tagaloan and return to Iligan, to ascertain definitely the real condition of affairs existing in that locality, and with instructions to strike any parties of outlaws with whom he might come in contact. Captain Overton arrived at Cagayan, after an uneventful overland march, May 1, the garrison at that time being one company (Forty-ninth) Philippine Scouts, which in a few days was exchanged for the Forty-third company, Philippine Scouts, from Dapitan, Mindanao.

The cavalry troop remained at Cagayan for more than a week, protecting life and property and offering the insurgent leader, Flores, every possible opportunity for a brush, but nothing worthy of note transpired. Finally Captain Overton, May 12, left Cagayan with his troop for a scout in the vicinity of Agusan, on the east coast of the island. Here he learned that Flores and his band were in a village

up in the Suclatan Mountains. Arriving at Flores's reported rendezvous with a small detachment, he disarmed the people of their bolos, placed about 40 prisoners in a house under a guard of one man, and proceeded with one other man through the town, aiming to intercept anyone who might attempt to warn Flores of his presence. Before Captain Overton had gone far the prisoners escaped from the improvised guardhouse, secured the bolos previously taken from them (they had been piled in a heap in an adjoining lot), and a desperate conflict ensued. The result was that Captain Overton and one private were killed and one man badly wounded, the third man succeeding in withstanding the ferocious onslaught of the enraged prisoners until the return of a detachment reconnoitering in another direction. The troop, with its dead and wounded, thereupon returned to Cagayan.

At this juncture the department commander, General Wint, pursuant to instructions from division headquarters, went to Cagayan, made a thorough investigation, and decided that the situation was not serious. The people had to some extent been organized, and although some twenty-five rifles were presumed to be "out," it was apparent that their possessors were without ammunition for them. The department commander, however, recommended the withdrawal of the cavalry troop and the substitution of a company of infantry and one company of scouts to assist in running to earth the outlaws, and that the section in which they were to operate be attached to this department, temporarily at least. Accordingly, May 24, 1903, the affected section was temporarily added to this department and the department commander assumed command of all troops and constabulary in and around Cagayan, province of Misamis, these forces having previously been under the control of the chief of the Philippine constabulary. The territorial limits of this section were defined thus: On the west side of Iligan Bay, all territory belonging to the province of Misamis lying north of a line 5 miles from and practically parallel to the north shore of Panquil Bay; on the east side of Iligan Bay, all territory of Misamis Province lying east of a line 10 miles from and practically parallel to the Agus River and the shore of Lake Lanao.

Troop D, Fifteenth Cavalry, was relieved and returned to Iligan and replaced by Company A, Eighteenth Infantry, from Cebu; Company No. 40, Philippine Scouts, from Camp Jossman, Guimaras, was also transferred to that point. Lieut. Col. Walter S. Scott, Eighteenth Infantry, was placed in command. These troops continually and carefully scouted the surrounding country, frequently striking small scattered bands of outlaws, and succeeded in bringing in arms, prisoners, and small quantities of ammunition. Flores continues to roam at large with a following of only about six men, but is being closely pursued, and his capture or death may be expected soon.

CAMAGUIN EXPEDITION.

The people living on this island, as stated by Governor Corrales, are exceedingly ignorant, so much so that they would not permit the taking of the census. Notices were sent explaining its object and they were warned that opposition would result in punishment. The people, however, proceeded to arm themselves, whereupon Captain Green, of the constabulary, went there to aid the presidentes in taking the census. Resistance being offered, the constabulary opened fire,

but owing to unfamiliarity with their pieces did no damage, and two of their number being wounded, they retreated to Cagayan. Upon the departure of the constabulary the rebel chief picked up all the empty cartridge shells, and showing them to the people, said: "All these cartridges were fired at me, but they could not penetrate me." The people then pronounced him a saint and many recruits joined his ranks. The constabulary made a second trip to that section, but returned, accomplishing practically nothing.

May 12, 1903, Lieutenant Frank, with Company No. 43, Philippine Scouts, and Governor Corrales, left Cagayan for the island of Camaguin. They disembarked at Catarman, the principal town on the island, and upon landing found the people had fled on learning that troops were coming. The rebel leader had assumed the title of "Chief of the Arisen Forces." The governor entered into communication with him and asked what was meant by the people being armed. The reply was that they did not care to pay land tax and were going to fight the soldiers and were resigned to die. Having seen that the shooting of the constabulary had done no harm they were not afraid of the scouts, so the governor, finding that he could not change their determination to fight, informed Lieutenant Frank that he had better attack them, which was done, with results as follows:

The scouts charged the band, about 300 bolomen, led by Valero. The enemy put up a stubborn and determined defense and made several desperate assaults, arriving several times within a few feet of the scouts' lines. The fight lasted one hour and a half, when the band was broken up and driven from their intrenchments. Later they reassembled, about 100 strong, in a cane field 3 miles northwest of Catarman. Here Lieutenant Frank struck them again and after about one hour's fighting again succeeded in breaking up the band. The scouts' casualties were 2 wounded. The enemy's loss in killed was between 70 and 100. They carried no firearms, but were all armed with two or more bolos.

After the fight one platoon of this company returned to Cagayan, leaving the other platoon to continue hunting down remnants of the band. On the 28th of May the platoon left behind also returned, bringing in 40 prisoners who had surrendered during the few days just preceding that date. The second platoon encountered on several occasions small parties of insurgents ranging in strength from 2 to 8, and reported 18 killed all told. The island of Camaguin is now quiet. A detachment of 21 scouts remains at Catarman, but has been ordered returned to Cagayan.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

The officers serving as adjutants-general at these headquarters were as follows:

Capt. Robert H. Noble, Third Infantry, October 1 to 16, 1902 (Captain Noble was also adjutant-general of the Fifth Separate Brigade from July 1 to September 30, 1903); First Lieut. Hugh A. Drum, Twenty-seventh Infantry, aid-de-camp, from October 16 to November 19, 1902; Capt. George H. Shelton, Eleventh Infantry, from November 19 to December 22, 1902; First Lieut. Hugh A. Drum, Twenty-seventh Infantry, aid-de-camp, acting assistant adjutant-general from December 5, 1902, to February 23, 1903; Maj. Walter L. Finley, U. S. Cavalry, assistant adjutant-general from December 22, 1902, to the

present time; Capt. George H. Shelton, Eleventh Infantry, acting assistant adjutant-general from December 22, 1902, to June 9, 1903; First Lieut. George V. H. Moseley, First Cavalry, acting assistant adjutant-general from March 19 to May 12, 1903, and Capt. Walter H. Gordon, Eighteenth Infantry, acting assistant adjutant-general from May 14, 1903, to the present time.

The clerical force of the adjutant-general's department consists of 3 civilian clerks and 2 civilian messengers and 17 enlisted clerks and 3 enlisted messengers. Various efforts have been made to secure an increase in allowance of civilian clerks, but without avail. The system of utilizing enlisted men as clerks is highly unsatisfactory, because they are continually being relieved. Generally by the time they have become reasonably familiar with the work of the office their relief becomes imperative, requiring the detailing of others, who must also be instructed in the work, consuming valuable time of the permanent clerks. The work of the adjutant-general's office is of considerable magnitude, and more civilian clerks should be allowed. A tour of two and one-half years of duty in the Philippines would appear to be a reasonable length of time for United States civil-service clerks. More than that works on their constitution and diminishes their capacity for work.

INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

The usual inspections of troops, stations, staff departments, and accounts of officers charged with the custody and disbursing of public funds have been made by the various officers of the inspector-general's department who have been on duty at these headquarters. During the year 592 inventory and inspection reports were disposed of, the approximate value of property and stores condemned being \$172,730.13 and of that continued in the service \$12,946.41. Ten special investigations were made and reports rendered. Two investigations are now in progress. Since March of this year all proceedings of boards of survey have been referred to the inspector-general for review, the total number so acted upon being 200.

The inspector-general's suggestion that a suitable bolo be manufactured and issued to scout organizations is noteworthy and deserving of a trial. The bolo is the most effective weapon that can be placed in the hands of a Filipino, and such an instrument would materially increase the efficiency of our native auxiliaries.

Inspections of affairs of post staff officers, who are often young and inexperienced, have frequently revealed a laxness on their part, and records and accounts are meager and improperly kept. This condition of affairs should be rectified by commanding officers giving their personal attention to this matter and seeing that the transactions of their several staff officers are strictly in accordance with regulations and existing orders. A complete set of requisite books and forms should be kept by all.

For detailed report of the inspector-general, see Appendix C.

JUDGE-ADVOCATE'S DEPARTMENT.

For the fiscal year 1 commissioned officer was tried by general court-martial (final action yet unknown), and 270 enlisted men, of which 22 were acquitted, 3 sentence disapproved, and 105 dishonorably discharged. Twelve men, while awaiting sentence, were discharged for

the good of the service in November, 1902, per cablegram from the War Department, dated November 4, 1902. At the time of the breaking up of the Department of South Philippines and Fifth Separate Brigade, 20 general court-martial proceedings were forwarded to the commanding general of the division for final review, per telegraphic instructions from division headquarters dated October 2, 1902.

In the Department of South Philippines for the period from July 1 to September 30, 1902, 90 enlisted men were tried by general court-martial, or about 1 per cent of the average present strength; in the Department of the Visayas for the nine months ending June 30, 1903, 180 trials, or about 4 per cent of actual present strength.

Trials by summary court during the year aggregated 4,595 (3,426 different men being tried), with 81 acquittals and 15 disapprovals.

For detailed report of judge-advocate of department see Appendix D.

QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

The clothing on hand and received during the year is sufficient in quantity and of good quality. The campaign hat without the corrugated sweat band and ventilator is most desirable. Tan shoes are preferred. Light woolen underwear is in demand. On account of the prevalence of white ants in the Philippines it is recommended that all clothing be put in boxes lined with petroleum paper. The present issue of khaki fades rapidly, which defect should receive attention with a view to being remedied. It is further recommended that two hip pockets be placed in trousers issued and that brass buttons be used, as they withstand both rust and the rough handling incident to laundry work in this country. The hooks of leggins should also be of brass and should be fastened more securely with a thin brass circle of plate.

Complaints have been received that the last of the shoes issued is too low, which defect should be rectified, as at present many enlisted men of necessity draw a larger shoe than needed in order to get a higher instep. The adoption of the mosquito bar issued by the medical department is recommended, as many mosquitoes are small enough to enter the holes in the bar issued by the quartermaster's department.

BUILDING OPERATIONS.

A building for quarters for teamsters and mechanics was erected on the beach in the rear of Cuartel de Infanteria, Cebu, Cebu, at a cost of \$275. Building operations are now going on at Camp Hartshorne, Camp Bumpus, Camp Downes, and Camp Jossman. At Camp Hartshorne 24 buildings were authorized, and good progress is reported, both in construction of buildings and in repair to roads leading to the site. At Camp Connell 40 buildings were authorized; excellent progress is being made, and all rented buildings will be vacated in the near future. At Camp Bumpus 31 buildings were authorized; work is progressing rapidly. Camp Downes was authorized 25 buildings; fair progress is being made. At Camp Jossman 67 buildings have been authorized, the construction of which has been considerably delayed, owing to the change made in site of the cantonment. The change made, however, was decidedly for the better and farther inland, in a better location with regard to water supply, soil, and general sanitary condition. An excellent graded road has been constructed from the wharf to the new camp. The wharf also is

fast nearing completion. At Cebu the old Cuartel de Infanteria is to be converted into barracks sufficiently large for the accommodation of one battalion of infantry.

All buildings rented have received repairs when necessary at owners' expense. Minor repairs have been made to Government buildings by material and labor on hand. Total cost of repairs made on public buildings for fiscal year approximates \$2,500.

For construction of buildings throughout the department, other than those mentioned above for new posts, \$3,287.60 have been expended. For rentals throughout the department the amount expended will approximate \$65,491. Great reduction has been made in order that the cost of rentals could be utilized for construction of shelter for troops. A number of buildings are still rented for storehouses.

WATER SUPPLY.

A 50,000 gallon reservoir has been completed at Camp Jossman at, which station a distilling plant is now in operation. Condensing plants are in operation at Cebu, Tacloban, and Iloilo. Forbes-Waterhouse sterilizers are successfully used at other posts. At Ormoc, Laguan, and Camp Jossman water is procured from springs; at Borongan, Calbayog, and Cebu from wells.

TRANSPORTATION.

Land transportation on hand is considered sufficient. Escort wagons would be more durable if bodies were banded on inside with iron held down by bolts and nuts, latter spread. Land transportation used for civil government will approximate \$225 in value, and that used for engineer work (roads) \$2,500. The following is a list of means of land transportation in department: 498 horses, 201 mules, 8 ponies, 22 bulls, 19 ambulances, 180 wagons, 70 carts, and 1 buckboard.

Under water transportation the following is a list of the vessels and classes in use in the department: 4 steamers, 10 launches, 15 lorchas, 14 lighters, 24 rowboats, 2 praos, 1 scow, 1 whaleboat, 1 casco, 1 cutter, and 2 cargo boats. All vessels should be provided with a sufficient supply of rope nets for the purpose of discharging or loading cargo. A number of times piles of boxes being hoisted have fallen to the hold and injured employees. This would be obviated if the nets were secure and sufficiently strong. The permanent posts in the department are badly in need of wharves, the cost of which would ultimately be offset by the lessening of the expense involved in the use of lighters for the purpose of loading and unloading cargoes.

ANIMALS.

The supply has been sufficient. Reports from Tacloban and Ormoc (Leyte), Calbayog, Samar, and San Joaquin, Panay, show very little sickness among animals at those stations. At Iloilo considerable sickness has occurred, glanders and surra, especially, having made great havoc among horses. Surra alone had caused the death of practically all of the horses of two troops of cavalry. At Cebu the sickness among animals has been psuedo-farcy, glanders, tetanus, catarrh, grease canker, dhobie itch, and nasal gleet. Animals killed in action and died of wounds, none; killed on account of sickness, 16 horses and 5 mules; died of disease, 71 horses and 41 mules; drowned, 2 horses and 2 mules; estimated value of animals above enumerated, original cost to the United States, \$28,560.

SUPPLIES.

Supplies have been sufficient and good in quality. Losses in transit would be materially reduced if boxes were reduced to a weight of from 50 to 100 pounds and strapped well with galvanized iron. Cans containing paints, oil, etc., should be of extra heavy tin. Naphtholeum should be used for destruction of insects.

COLD-STORAGE FACILITIES.

Since February 1, 1903, the ice plants have been operated by the quartermaster's department. During the month of May, 1903, 173,710 pounds of ice were manufactured at Iloilo at an average cost of 30.9 cents per 100 pounds. Cold storage is also in operation at Tacloban, where about fifteen days' supply of fresh meat can be taken care of. Cold-storage capacity at Iloilo appears ample. Ice plants are also in operation at Camp Jossman, Calbayog, and Cebu.

For detailed report of the chief quartermaster of the department see Appendix E.

SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

To this department (subsistence) is due much credit for its excellent system of supplying the command, even under the most trying circumstances, particularly lack of necessary means of transportation. Comparatively few complaints against either quality or quantity of commissary stores have been received, and apparent satisfaction exists everywhere. Occasionally some isolated post off the regular route of the supply boats reported lack of a few staple articles, but these cases were exceptional and all are amply provided at all times. The continual changes of stations and transfers of troops occasioned heavy work for the subsistence department. Since the breaking out of hostilities in Surigao Province and that immediate vicinity all the garrisons there have been supplied from the Iloilo and Tacloban depots.

Soon after the establishment of this department the abandonment of small stations and removal of the garrisons to the permanent posts was begun, necessitating the reshipment of large quantities of subsistence stores and supplies, a very large percentage of which were in a sadly deteriorated condition when received and absolutely worthless when received at the depots and permanent stations, showing a manifest neglect on the part of many concerned and causing heavy losses. This transfer in supplies occasioned heavy work at the supply depots, numerous boards of survey, and accounts for the heavy losses of subsistence stores reported in the first year of a new department.

The commissary depot at Cebu was discontinued shortly after the change of departments (from South Philippines to Visayas), materially reducing expenses in the subsistence department—approximately \$500 monthly.

FRESH BEEF.

The supply of fresh beef to the troops has ever been a serious problem. During the past year this problem has been fairly well solved by the regular trips of meat boats from Manila, and the inauguration of cold-storage rooms where practicable. At most stations at the present time ice "boxes" are used for the preservation of fresh beef. The cold storage at Iloilo has given entire satisfaction, and its capacity has been sufficient for the storing of fresh beef consumed at

Iloilo and Camp Jossman as well as the regular supply heretofore of small garrisons in the near vicinity. The issue of native beef is virtually impracticable, due to the difficulty in procuring it and the exorbitant prices charged; it is inferior in quality and sustaining properties, and in view of the vast difference in the prices and quality of it and the frozen Australian beef, the latter is much more desirable and by far the more economical, even could the former be obtained.

At present the supply of various stations is at times irregular, but as a general rule each station is twice a month visited by one of the two refrigerator steamers—*Seward* and *Wright*—excepting a few which are reached by small department boats or commercial steamers. The supply, though somewhat irregular, is effected in a very satisfactory manner, and but few complaints are registered against either the supply or the quality. Since October 1, 1902, 634,305 pounds of fresh beef and mutton have been received from Manila, the total losses reported by boards of survey amounting to 19,635 pounds, or a trifle more than 3 per cent of the actual amount received, indicative of great care and attention being displayed in its transit.

FLOUR.

The practice of packing flour in hermetically sealed tins has apparently failed in its purpose. From examination of the tins it is believed that their failure to resist the ravages of heat, moisture, and tropical insect pests is due in a large measure to faulty and defective sealing at the factory. It is recommended that all articles in tins be subjected to the water test before acceptance.

SODA CRACKERS.

The soda crackers are usually found in a perfect state of preservation, free from marks of deterioration, and the tins also in apparently perfect condition, but upon opening the tins a rank, distasteful odor is emitted and the crackers are bitter, unpalatable, and absolutely unsalable. Proceedings of boards of survey during the year show action on soda crackers amounting to 22,342 pounds, valued at \$2,167.17, and all, so far as ascertainable, the product of the American Biscuit Company and the Pacific Coast Biscuit Company.

TOBACCO.

Heavy losses of tobacco are reported, apparently due to the moist atmosphere of the islands. Most of the losses, however, pertain to tobacco long on hand.

LOSSES OF FUNDS AND STORES.

Proceedings of boards of survey show losses of subsistence funds to the amount of \$6,226.48 during the past year—at Cebu, \$526.33 alleged to have been stolen from the commissary building, together with the iron safe in which it was kept; at Calbayog, Samar, \$5,700.15 alleged to have been lost in the mail.

The money value of subsistence stores and supplies lost and destroyed in Department South Philippines and Department of the Visayas, during the period from July 1 to September 30, 1902, and the period October 1, 1902, to June 30, 1903, respectively, as reported by boards of survey, amounted as follows: Damaged, \$72,689.18;

shortages, \$3,547.66; stolen, \$765.09; lost in transit, \$348.23, making a grand total of \$77,350.16. Of these losses, the greatest were in bacon, potatoes, flour, canned vegetables, etc.

FILIPINO RATION.

The issuance of a larger amount of the regular army ration to Philippine scouts, say in proportion to his comparative size to the white soldier, is recommended, as he is expected to do practically the same work.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

The chief surgeon reports that the medical supplies furnished are of excellent quality and adequately sufficient in quantity, and that all stations are amply supplied at all times with necessary medicines. The ordinary diseases prevailing have been well handled by the medical officers, and the mortality has been much less than at any time since the arrival of United States troops in this section of the Philippines. At the time of the organization of the department cholera raged in almost every island, but with the assistance of the civil boards of health the medical department was able to cope with the situation with surprisingly favorable results. This disease has now practically disappeared excepting in northern Mindanao, where it is making considerable headway, and a few sporadic cases generally. The troops sustained a loss of 47 men from cholera during the year.

The present strength of the medical department is 36 officers (26 being contract surgeons), 32 noncommissioned officers, and 113 privates. About 6 surgeons and 30 corps men are needed.

Dental treatment has been dispensed generally to the troops. A base dental station has been established and maintained at Iloilo.

Base hospitals had been in operation at Iloilo, Panay, and Tacloban, Leyte, until December 31, 1902, when the latter was discontinued.

Total number of deaths in Department of South Philippines and Department of the Visayas at end of fiscal year, 110 among troops, and 11 among civilians attached to the army, caused by wounds, cholera, smallpox, malaria, beriberi, alcoholism, etc.

The valuable services of the medical officers have been faithfully and efficiently rendered, and their strict attention to duty is commendable.

The health of the troops in general has been good.

For detailed report of the chief surgeon of the department, see Appendix G.

PAY DEPARTMENT.

The troops in the department are paid bimonthly, with the exception of those stationed in Iloilo and Camp Jossman, Guimaras. Until recently a paymaster had been stationed at Tacloban, Leyte, who was charged with the payment of troops on the islands of Samar and Leyte, but it was found that owing to a dearth of water transportation at Tacloban payments on the islands mentioned could be as easily, if not more easily, made from Iloilo, and the paymaster there stationed was ordered to Iloilo for station. The stations on the east coast of Samar are paid from Manila.

For detailed report of the chief paymaster of the department, see Appendix H.

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT.

During the year the engineer department has carried on road bridge work throughout the department, as well as making all necessary repairs on such.

The Philippine Commission having appropriated \$5,000 United States currency for raising wrecks in the Iloilo River, proposals for the removal of such were submitted, contract awarded, and work pushed with all possible speed. By February 14, 1903, the wrecks had all been removed.

In August of last year the survey of the Iloilo Harbor was completed and recommendations of the needs of the port of Iloilo submitted, but no appropriation has as yet been made for improvements.

Company F, Second Battalion of Engineers, has been steadily occupied in making surveys of the various cantonments, and on road, bridge, and repair work.

For detailed report of the engineer officer of the department see Appendix I.

SIGNAL DEPARTMENT.

There are in this department 22 telegraph and telephone stations operated and maintained by the signal corps, distributed by islands as follows: Panay, 6; Leyte, 4; Cebu, 4; Negros, 5; Samar, 2, and Guimaras, 1. During the year 3 telegraph stations were opened while 19 telegraph and 19 telephone stations were closed by reason of withdrawal of troops from those stations and transfer of lines to the insular government. One telegraph station is maintained in Iloilo as a "test" station for enlisted men of the line detailed for instruction in telegraphy. There are in operation 6 local telephone systems with a total number of 142 'phones, and this number will probably be increased when all structures at the permanent cantonments have been completed, but which will not be for some time yet to come.

The following table shows the telegraph and telephone mileage in the Department:

Island.	Telegraph.	Telephone.
Panay	232	20
Negros	189
Cebu	74	20
Leyte and Samar	86
Total	581	40

Total miles of military cable, 358,267.

During the year 87 miles of telegraph and 208 miles of telephone line, and 47,931 miles of deep-sea cable were transferred to the civil government.

For the eleven months terminating May 31, 1903, 163,737 messages were sent, 169,878 received, and 509,452 relayed, making a total of 841,019 messages handled. The tolls for the same amounted to \$18,876.75.

Company H, Signal Corps, has been charged with the operation and maintenance of the lines of communication in this department in the past year. Its work has been done in a very efficient and commendable manner.

For detailed report of the department, see Appendix J.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

An adequate supply of ordnance and ordnance stores is always kept on hand for immediate use. Surplus stores, old ammunition, and unserviceable ordnance capable of being repaired are turned in to Manila depot. Few stores are on hand in excess of needs of department. Target material is about exhausted.

Detailed report of acting ordnance officer attached, marked K.

FORT SAN PEDRO 22.

The following statement shows the number of prisoners confined, released, etc., for the year:

Confined:

Americans (general)	122
Native military (general)	4
Native civil (sentence provost court)	27
Total	153

Released:

Americans	69
Native military	0
Native civil	24
Total	93

Transferred: Americans	12
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Deaths:

Americans	1
Native civil	3
Total	4

Total in confinement, June 30, 1903	44
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Since October, 1902, 20 to 25 prisoners have been employed daily on the construction of a government pier at Camp Jossman Landing, and returned each evening to the prison. Other work performed by prisoners has been ordinary police duty in and around post and prison. During the year 10 escapes were attempted, but none was successful, the prisoners generally being returned within a few hours. The health of the prisoners has been good; 75 per cent of the deaths during the year were due to beriberi.

Prisoners are permitted to purchase stamps and tobacco to the amount of \$1 per month and allowed reading matter under reasonable restrictions. (A small library was presented to the prison by the secretary of the Iloilo branch of the Young Men's Christian Association.)

For detailed report of the prison officer, Fort San Pedro 22, see Appendix L.

For list of stations occupied and distribution of troops, see Appendix M.

For statement of army and chartered transports in the department for the year July 1, 1902, to June 30, 1903, see Appendix N.

Respectfully submitted.

THEODORE J. WINT,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

(Appendices not printed.)

REPORTS OF CAPT. GEORGE BELL, JR., FIRST INFANTRY, OF CAPTURE OF LUCBAN AND OPERATIONS IN VICINITY OF LAGUAN, SAMAR, FEBRUARY 12 TO MARCH 15, 1902.^a

HEADQUARTERS SUBDISTRICT LAGUAN,
Laguan, Samar, P. I., February 23, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of military operations during the week ending February 22, 1902.

February 12, Lieutenant Miller with 20 men left Catubig to locate and capture Capt. Victor Muricio, but being delayed by darkness and rough trails did not reach position until about 5.30 a. m. on 13th. The cuartel, which was intrenched, was abandoned without a shot being fired. Four natives of Catubig, with 9 caribao, captured three days before by the insurgents, were released and 3 tantakos taken. About 11 a. m. of 13th the detachment was fired on from a hill about 200 yards distant by 5 rifles, and Private Henry Schlaker, Company A, First Infantry, was wounded in calf of left leg at the first volley. The hill was at once charged and volleys fired at insurgents, but with the wounded man it was impracticable to continue the chase very fast, so it was abandoned and detachment returned to Catubig about 11.30 p. m. on 13th. Two cuartels and 10 houses were destroyed, and 3 tantakos and 6 prisoners taken. Lieutenant Miller's report herewith.

February 15 Lieutenant Parker, with a detachment of 30 enlisted men of Company K, Twenty-sixth Infantry, left Pambujan in the endeavor to capture Capt. Restituto Jasmin, but owing to obstinacy of guides was unsuccessful, and returned next day to his station. Lieutenant Parker's report herewith.

February 15 Lieutenant Clearman, with a column of 10 men, Company B, First Infantry, 15 Philippine Scouts Thirty-ninth Company, and 1 private of Hospital Corps, left this post and attempted to capture an insurrecto sergeant and 10 rifles, who was reported as being at a cuartel about seven hours' hike distant, but upon reaching cuartel it was found the insurrectos had been gone for several hours. Cuartel and houses were burned, also quantity of palay destroyed. Lieutenant Clearman's report herewith.

Lieutenant Strebler's column of 40 Philippine Scouts, Thirty-ninth Company; 9 men of Company B, First Infantry; 1 hospital corps man, and 4 civilian scouts left Laguan February 12 and returned the evening of February 22, 1902, having been completely successful in the object of the expedition, which was the capture of the insurgent chief. Believing the best method in capturing Lucban, of whom no one knew the exact location, although rumors of all kinds were in the air, was to start from the point where he was positively known to have been. Four columns were put in motion on January 23 last, one to capture Joli Joli, a man who was known to be in constant communication with his leader, and who, if caught, could lead the column directly to him, and three others whose objective was the sitio of Suba on the Pambujan River, in the vicinity of which Captain Jackson surprised Lucban's party last August, and from which point a beginning could be made and Lucban traced.

Two of the columns reached Suba; both captured some of his correspondence, and one, with which was Lieutenant Strebler, his scouts, and myself, also definitely located the man we were after, but found it would take less time to reach him from the post than it would from where we were. Besides, nearly every white man and some of the scouts were so disabled as to necessitate their being left behind. Three days after our return Lieutenant Strebler, with other white soldiers and a few new scouts, started on an expedition which, with white troops alone, would have been impossible of execution, for his scouts, when out on such a trip, do not fire a shot. As with Sergt. Pedro Lora with the advance guard, nothing escapes his observation, and no outpost of the enemy ever saw our men before he was on them and had them prisoners. His knowledge of the native and his woodcraft, together with training received from Lieutenant Strebler, renders him the most efficient scout I have seen; and his energy is tireless, for as soon as camp is reached, with a small party of five or six scouts, he leaves and is usually gone several hours examining the neighborhood thoroughly and bringing in all natives as prisoners. Lieutenant Strebler's orders were to follow Lucban anywhere, and if any men played out to send them into any post along his route, to disregard all other parties, and avoid fighting if possible until he had Lucban, and to bring in the latter alive, as otherwise no one—either American or Filipino—would believe him. In order to

^a Received too late to be included in report for 1902.

avoid possible accident, he gave orders that no scout should load his rifle, so that, even when one was attacked by a bolero, his orders were strictly obeyed. My orders were also strictly followed, for Lieutenant Strebler, a short time before getting track of the man he sought, crossed the trail of a captain, lieutenant, and 5 rifles, which was sufficient to make a man with a party like his hesitate, for in a few hours it meant a certain capture of his command; but he resisted the temptation, fell in with a native carrying a letter, and accomplished his work.

Having most of these men under my direct observation in the field, and seeing the noiseless and rapid method they have of getting over difficult places, it was a foregone conclusion that if any men could catch the insurgent leader Lieutenant Strebler and his command could do so. With a command like Lieutenant Strebler's, which withstood and overcame every hardship or exertion it was called upon to put forth cheerfully and with alacrity—although in one place it left a path of blood, caused by the numbers of leeches that infested it—almost anything could be accomplished, and its work is beyond praise, although the determination, judgment, ability, and skill displayed by Lieutenant Strebler and the tireless energy and wonderful woodcraft of Sergt. Pedro Lora stand out above all the other. Full report of Lieutenant Strebler herewith.

On February 18 Captain Kilburn, with 30 enlisted men of his Company K, Twenty-sixth Infantry, left Pambujan and scouted the country south of that point in an endeavor to find and capture Captain Restituto, but did not succeed in finding him; a number of houses were destroyed and about 100 miles passed over. Captain Kilburn's command returned February 22, 1902.

On February 14 Captain Lacey, with 30 men, Company A, First Infantry, started out from Catubig to be gone seven days, but his report is not yet received.

On February 20 Lieutenant Jordan, with a detachment of 24 men, Company B, First Infantry, and 6 hired Filipino scouts, left this post to be gone six days to burn or destroy some cuartels. Report not yet received.

Usual road patrols were sent out to Pambujan, and several parties were sent out by the presidente of Laoang to secure information.

Very respectfully,

GEO. BELL, Jr.,
Captain, First Infantry, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS SUBDISTRICT LAGUAN,
Laguan, Samar, P. I., March 2, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of military operations during the week ending March 1, 1902, and also of a trip of Captain Lacey, whose report had not been received last week.

On February 14 Captain Lacey, with 30 men of Company A, First Infantry, and 1 hospital corps man, left Catubig to scout down the Pambujan River in order to locate and strike, if possible, the insurgent presidente of Pambujan and to clear up that section of those insurgents who have been firing on persons passing down the Pambujan River. He succeeded in burning 43 houses, among which were 2 cuartels, but did not find any armed insurgents. Returned to his post by steam launch February 20, having marched about 65 miles, exclusive of distance covered on launch. Report of Captain Lacey herewith.

On February 20 Lieutenant Jordan, with 23 men of Company B, First Infantry, 1 hospital corps man, and 6 armed natives, left Laguan to destroy 3 insurgent cuartels, which had been located, and also, if possible, to strike any body of insurgents that might be found. He was successful in destroying the cuartels sought, also 48 houses, in killing 9 carabaos and 4 insurrectos. Twenty men, including 1 sergeant of insurrectos and a number of women and children, were brought in on February 25, after a journey of about 54 miles. Lieutenant Jordan also found 1 cartridge belt, caliber .30, 10 rounds of original Krag ammunition, and all the metal parts of a Remington rifle except the barrel and reloading tools. Lieutenant Jordan's report herewith.

On February 24 a detachment of 1 sergeant and 20 men of Company K, Twenty-sixth Infantry, left Pambujan with dispatches for Catarman and to familiarize themselves with the country, and ascertain, if possible, what natives were in that section. The party returned February 25. Captain Kilburn's report herewith.

On February 26 a detachment of 27 enlisted men, Company K, Twenty-sixth Infantry, including First Sergeant Sharp, who was in command, was dispatched in bancos from Pambujan, on the river of that name, to scout thoroughly along

the vicinity for about 20 miles south of the post. Eight houses were destroyed, including 1 large cuartel, 6 insurgents killed, and a number of prisoners taken. Country examined was found to have a quantity of palay and camotes. On the 28th received orders to return to post immediately, the insurgent leader in the vicinity of Pambujan having asked for a cessation of hostilities for three or four days in order to enable him to collect his forces to bring them in and surrender. Captain Kilburn's report herewith.

On February 25 Lieutenant Miller, with party consisting of 20 men of Company A, First Infantry, 10 men of Thirty-ninth Company Philippine Scouts, and 5 armed natives, left Catubig and proceeded in search of insurgents under Captain Mauricio; struck them at Jiguinta, and captured 1 Spanish Mauser rifle in good condition and 1 prisoner. An attempt to capture entire insurgent force was frustrated by incompetent guides. On 26th the enemy was again encountered; 2 of his men killed and another prisoner taken. About 5 pounds of powder, 6 pounds of sulphur, and 150 pounds of reloaded ammunition were destroyed. The escape of one of the prisoners rendered further surprise out of the question. Lieutenant Miller and his force returned to Catubig on February 28, taking with them 29 natives of Catubig and 7 carabao. Lieutenant Miller's report herewith.

On February 28 Teniente Arcales, with 3 Remington rifles in serviceable condition, some reloaded ammunition, and 6 soldiers, came into Palapag and surrendered to Corpl. John Lynch, Company K, Twenty-sixth Infantry, who was ranking noncommissioned officer commanding the detachment of 14 men, Company B, First Infantry, 9 of Company K, Twenty-sixth Infantry, and 1 hospital corps man. On March 1, 10 more of his force, boleros, presented themselves. The oath of allegiance was administered to all those men on March 2, 1902, by Lieutenant Knight, and they were released from custody and allowed to remain in town. One of Abuke's soldiers also, who gave himself up, was treated the same way. These rifles, with that captured by Lieutenant Miller, will be shipped at first opportunity to chief ordnance officer Division of the Philippines, in Manila.

On February 27 a party of 10 armed natives was sent out in an endeavor to kill or capture the insurgent presidente or vice-presidente of Pambujan, or to get their rifles.

On February 28 a letter was received from Captain Kilburn, at Pambujan, stating that Capt. Restituto Jasmin, the insurgent presidente of that place, had asked for four or five days' cessation of hostilities, in order to bring in his entire force of 12 rifles, 2 cannon, and his lantakas, in obedience to General Lucban's orders. Restituto also sent a letter to Lucban, which was handed to him and read aloud. Its contents, however, created consternation in the latter, who immediately requested to see the commanding officer in order to say that he had given no orders and written to no one. He was assured that General Smith should be informed he had communicated with no one, as far as known, and was perfectly innocent in this case of intentional help to the Americans. Lucban had been asked by some of the men who captured him for his autograph and had written a remembrance, with date, his signature and that of his secretary, on a number of slips of paper, which were given to the commanding officer to hand to the men and officers. His request was complied with, but some of the slips, with his official seal on them, were also sent to all insurgent chiefs in this district, and at least one has regarded it as an order to surrender and thereby saved much useless work.

Very respectfully,

GEO. BELL, Jr.,
Captain, First Infantry, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS SUBDISTRICT LAGUAN,
Laguan, Samar, P. I., March 9, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of military operations during the week ending March 8, 1902:

On March 4 detachment of 10 armed natives returned, having captured 2 rifles (or shotguns, although ball cartridges are used, and they are serviceable weapons). On February 28 the detachment surprised and wounded an insurgent guard, capturing his rifle, near Monte Manajao, and next day at Caglited, west of the Pambujan River, captured the other rifle and 1 lantaka, killing the sentinel and an "hombre," who was making a balatik. The guide, a native picked up in that section, was badly wounded by insurgents and left where he was shot. On March 2

Lucerio Sosing, the insurgent vice-presidente of Pambujan, to whom the rifle belonged, presented himself to the party with his 3 remaining rifles, some reloaded ammunition, and 2 lantakas, and started for this place, reaching here on the 4th. Sosing, with his 5 rifles, were a portion of Capt. Restituto Jasmin's force of 12 rifles, which the latter was collecting to bring in. It had been impossible to communicate with this armed party from Lagan when Restituto's request for a cessation of hostilities was asked, but he was told of this party being out. The work of detachment was excellent and the captures were all well made. Sosing and his 5 soldiers were released after taking the oath of allegiance. Lieutenant Jordan's report of the detachment is herewith. These men are entitled to the reward of 30 pesos for each of the 2 captured serviceable rifles or guns, as before leaving they were told that all serviceable rifles or guns turned in by them would be paid for.

On March 5, 1902, Capt. Restituto Jasmin, with 23 men, surrendered 7 rifles, 2 cannons (1 brass, other iron), 6 lantakas, 150 rounds of rifle ammunition. On February 28, 9 men came in with 3 so-called shotguns, but none of these or the one surrendered by Jasmin are mentioned in my telegram, because they are home-made, of tin, and it would need a stretch of the imagination to call them serviceable, besides requiring a vast amount of courage or lack of sense to fire one of them, as they look as if more formidable to the persons using them than to an enemy. Captain Kilburn also reports that one Fernando Balanquit, calling himself a *teniente* of *boleros*, with his entire organized force of 100 *boleros*, had come into Pambujan and presented themselves. These men are all required to take oath of allegiance. Captain Kilburn's report herewith.

On March 7 Lieutenant Clearman, with a force of 45 men, Thirty-ninth Company, Philippine Scouts, 5 white scouts, and 1 private, Company B, First Infantry, left this post for the vicinity of Suba in an endeavor to strike either Lieutenant-Colonel Abuke or Captain Garfin (Dodong).

Very respectfully,

GEO. BELL, Jr.,
Captain, First Infantry, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS SUBDISTRICT LAGUAN,
Lagan, Samar, P. I., March 16, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Tacloban, Leyte, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of military operations during the week ending March 15, 1902:

On March 7 Lieutenant Clearman, with 45 men of Thirty-ninth Company Philippine Scouts, 5 civilian white scouts, and 1 private of Company B, First Infantry, left this post to scout the country between the Catubig and Pambujan rivers and as far south on the latter river as Suba, in an endeavor to find some track, if possible, of the insurrecto commands of Colonel Abuke and Captains Dodong and Mauricio, but only succeeded in learning that Captain Mauricio and his force of 9 rifles had been ordered by Comandante (formerly captain) Garfin (or Dodong) to meet him near Tamay to report to Colonel Gurvara, in the vicinity of point where Lucban had been captured. Lieutenant Clearman returned on March 15 with a portion of his party. His report is herewith.

On March 9 Lieutenant Miller and 30 men of Company A, First Infantry, left Catubig for the vicinity of Poponton to search for Captain Mauricio and his party in their usual haunts, but found nothing and returned to Catubig March 15.

On March 10 a party of 21 men, Company K, Twenty-sixth Infantry, and 1 hospital corps man were sent in barrotes up the Pambujan River from Pambujan, with ten days' rations, to go as far as Suba and open communication with Lieutenant Clearman's party, and also to scout along banks of river.

On March 10, 11 armed natives were dispatched to section of country between Oleros on Catubig River and Pambujan River south of Tula, in an endeavor to capture Captain Garfin (Dodong) and his force or his rifles. They returned on afternoon of 14th, bringing in about 79 natives—men, women, and children—but only two were of importance, one being a sergeant of Dodong's and the other a man of this town who was wanted because of having caused some trouble formerly in his leadership of a band of outlaws. They also destroyed a large cuartel. Lieutenant Jordan's report herewith. This band has been most useful, because all, having been ex-insurgent soldiers in this vicinity, know the country and natives thoroughly, and are thus enabled to make surprises that the troops could not. They have all so committed themselves as to render it impossible for any of them to leave us even if they so desired.

Upon 14th, near Catubig. Private John E. Pierce, Company A, First Infantry, who had on a straw hat, was mistaken for an insurrecto while running in the brush and was shot and mortally wounded by Private White, also of Company A, First Infantry. The two men were great personal friends, and White is nearly crazed over Pierce's death, which occurred shortly afterwards. Captain Lacey convened a board of officers at once, but it seems to be one of those unfortunate affairs that are almost impossible to prevent in the excitement caused in attempting to make a surprise. Full report has not yet been received.

On March 15 the armed natives were again sent out for six days. They will scout thoroughly the section east of the Catubig River, into which it is reported a band of 3 rifles and several lantakas crossed the Catubig River last week.

On March 15 Captain Kilburn reports that a reloading outfit and an apparatus for resharpening bolos were brought into Pambujan, in accordance with promise of Fernando Balanquit when he presented himself. Report of Captain Kilburn herewith.

Very respectfully,

GEO. BELL, Jr.,
Captain, First Infantry, Commanding.

[Reports referred to not received.]

REPORT OF BRIG. GEN. JESSE M. LEE, U. S. ARMY, COMMANDING THE SURIGAO EXPEDITION, MARCH 24 TO MAY 11, 1903.

BATANGAS, BATANGAS, P. I., *August 10, 1903.*

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the Surigao expedition during the period operations were conducted, from March 24 to May 11, 1903, the latter date terminating my command of the Department of the Visayas:

Surigao is the northeastern province of Mindanao, and the capital, of the same name, is at the northern peninsular extremity of the province. The town proper has a population of about 5,000 and the province 90,000, approximately.

This was an organized province under civil control and belonged to the military department of Mindanao. No troops nor scouts of the Army were stationed in the province, a small force of constabulary and local police being deemed sufficient to maintain peace, give security, and execute the laws.

The people live mainly along the coast on the east and west and in the country adjacent thereto. The interior is rough and mountainous, covered with forests and underbrush, exceedingly difficult of access, with no good roads and but few well-defined trails traversing the interior; the general features of this region affording safe hiding places for criminals.

The inhabitants are generally poor, and their principal source of revenue is from hemp.

On March 23, 1903, telegraphic notice was received at department headquarters at Iloilo, from headquarters Division of the Philippines. "Insurrectos have possession of town [Surigao] have killed Inspector Clark [of the constabulary] and others." "Upon request civil governor" division commander directed department commander Visayas to at once send two companies infantry to Surigao "to occupy the town, drive out insurgents, restore and maintain order in the town of Surigao, and protect people and property from violence." (See Exhibit 1.)

This order was at once complied with by sending from Camp Jossman, Guimaras, P. I., two companies, G and H, Twenty-ninth Infantry, under command of Capt. H. R. Perry, Twenty-ninth Infantry, a medical officer, hospital corps and signal service men, all fully equipped for active service.

The command arrived at Surigao at noon of March 25. Relief, however, had previously arrived same day of a company of constabulary, under Lieut. Col. W. C. Taylor (Philippine Constabulary), and 2 officers and 30 men of Tenth Infantry, commanded by First Lieut. W. F. Brown, on launch from Iligan, Mindanao.

At 10.45 a. m., March 24, I left Iloilo, Panay, with First Lieut. G. V. H. Moseley, First Cavalry, aid-de-camp, and Dr. H. R. Winslow, of the constabulary, who volunteered his services, on U. S. C. T. *Formosa*, arriving at Surigao 7.30 p. m., March 25. I at once took direct charge of all operations (see Exhibit 2), and, after conferring with Colonel Taylor (Philippine Constabulary), made immediate disposition of the forces to intercept the enemy, who had gone south.

The effective command at this time consisted of Company G, Twenty-ninth

Infantry, 2 officers and 79 men; Company H, Twenty-ninth Infantry, 2 officers and 80 men; detachment Tenth Infantry, 2 officers and 30 men; medical department, 1 officer and 4 men; signal service, 3 men; constabulary, 9 officers and 132 men (including Doctor Winslow of constabulary, but excluding 40 constabulary whose arms had been captured); total effective, 16 officers and 328 men.

Pursuant to the instructions of the division commander, contained in Exhibit 3, an investigation was made as to cause of outbreak, conditions, and necessity, if any, of suspending writ of habeas corpus and placing the province under complete military control. Full reply thereto is set forth in Exhibit 4.

At noon March 23, 1903, about 25 outlaws, armed with bolos and led by Adriano Concepcion, an escaped criminal, entered the town, and, being joined by others, captured and looted the constabulary buildings.

The constabulary were scattered over town getting their dinners, having but one on duty. The surprise was complete, well planned, and quickly executed, resulting in the capture of about everything the constabulary had, consisting, as afterwards tabulated, of 138 arms, 5,361 rounds of ammunition, \$5,532.79 (pesos), clothing, subsistence stores, etc. A gallant constabulary officer, Capt. L. M. Clark, was killed while facing and fighting these outlaws, single handed.

A few Americans and some others, poorly armed, took refuge in a provincial building, and under the cool gallantry of Capt. L. R. Kelley, provincial treasurer, held the outlaws at bay. The latter had been joined by from 75 to 100 natives in the town. Concepcion held the town until some time in the night of March 23-24, when he and his followers departed south.

The absolute secrecy and complete success of the conspiracy show that they had the sympathy and cooperation of a considerable number of the natives in the town of Surigao and on the outside.

It soon became evident that the best way to restore peace and confidence, restrain the evil disposed, prevent the spread of discontent, steady the wavering, and insure effective protection to the peaceably inclined would be by the direct and forceful methods of the military arm, by a strong and active force that would quickly end the trouble. The civil authorities could not readily cope with the situation. The recommendation for prompt and decisive action was so far approved that the constabulary were placed under military control: and the provincial authorities, and some of those of the municipalities, gave full cooperation in the work at hand. (See Exhibits 5 and 6.)

On March 26 Lieutenant Brown and his detachment, Tenth Infantry, returned to Iligan.

Knowing that the average native and some of the native officials had not clearly understood the policy of Americans, that they were distrustful of our motives and their confidence in us was uncertain, it was deemed necessary to issue an order in the nature of a proclamation, setting forth our purposes, and then let them judge our words by our acts. This proclamation was translated into Spanish and Visayan and distributed as widely as possible, with the hope that it might reassure the well-disposed and convince them that we had come for their good, and not to oppress, abuse, or torture; and that our operations would be within the plain rules of civilized warfare.

While the effect can not be definitely known, this course certainly did no harm.

The fact was patent to impartial and unprejudiced observers that mutual confidence was sadly lacking, and these people probably had as little faith in our sincerity as we in theirs. (See proclamation order, Exhibit 7.)

Detailed telegraphic instruction, dated March 27, as to methods to be pursued were received from the division commander and replied to same day. (Exhibits 8 and 9.) Formal orders were issued for the guidance of the troops operating in the field. (Exhibit 10.)

The civil commission finally decided to delay resort to martial law. (Exhibit 11.) This outcome was somewhat disappointing, because it would probably result in a longer campaign of much hardship.

Pursuant to my recommendation and upon authority of the division commander, Col. Albert L. Myer, Eleventh Infantry, with the headquarters and two companies (K and L) of his regiment, was ordered from Tacloban, Leyte; also the Forty-fourth Company Philippine Scouts from Camp Jossman, Guimaras, P. I.

Colonel Myer arrived with his command at 7 a. m. March 30, and was placed in immediate charge of operations. (Exhibit 12.)

For detailed account of progress and field operations prior thereto see Exhibits 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17.

The constabulary forces were ordered by their chief to report to Colonel Myer for duty. (Exhibit 18.)

Pursuant to instructions from the division commander, I left Surigao with

Lieutenant Moseley, aid-de-camp, at 11 p. m. March 31, and arrived at department headquarters at Iloilo, Panay, 2 p. m. April 2, 1903, via Tacloban, Leyte—the latter station being the base of supplies for the expedition.

At this time the effective troops and constabulary under Colonel Meyer's orders were as follows:

Headquarters and Companies K and L, Eleventh Infantry, 7 officers and 150 men; Companies G and H, Twenty-ninth Infantry, 4 officers and 159 men; Medical Department and Signal Corps, 3 officers and 10 men; constabulary, 9 officers and 132 men; total effective, 23 officers and 457 men. This excludes about 40 constabulary at Surigao whose arms had been captured.

From the town of Surigao and from stations on the east and west coasts detachments were sent in every direction into the interior to hunt down, kill, or capture the outlaws, who would scatter and hide themselves in the almost impenetrable jungles and mountain fastnesses.

There seemed to be general and hearty cooperation between the regulars, scouts, and constabulary, the only exception noted being in the reported case of leaving at Lake Mainit, and thus keeping out of an engagement, a detachment of 25 men of Company G, Twenty-ninth Infantry, under Lieutenant Goodwyn, when an attack was made by the outlaws on the constabulary under Captain Marshall on March 30, at Magtayaco, with the resulting loss to the constabulary of "1 killed, 2 wounded, and 1 rifle. Captain Marshall reports 3 outlaws killed" (this was increased to 5 killed by subsequent report or rumor), "but no arms recovered. Natives who were with the outlaws at the fight and who later were captured or presented themselves reported that none of the outlaws were killed and but 1 wounded. Captain Marshall withdrew his detachment to Mainit without following up the outlaws, whom he reported had retreated."

Colonel Myer further states in his report that "it is to be regretted that the detachment of the Twenty-ninth Infantry under Lieutenant Goodwyn was sidetracked at Mainit, while, as it appears, the constabulary who had located the outlaws were sent by Colonel Taylor to win the victory and glory they failed to get. Lieutenant Goodwyn is of the opinion, in which I (Colonel Myer) concur, that he was purposely left out of this engagement so that the constabulary could get the glory of it. Had his detachment been present the result would have been entirely different."

This appears to have been the only case where any feeling of jealousy was engendered.

It was realized that all organizations were anxious to achieve success, and while it may be that it is generally recognized that under the conditions existing constabulary organizations were not expected to be fully the equals of regular troops and scouts in drill, discipline, and efficiency, yet it was the earnest endeavor to encourage and insure the most cordial cooperation without cavil, question, or friction of any kind, and give in official reports to any organization just recognition and commendation for good results without, however, indulging in exaggerated and fulsome praise.

On April 2, 1903, Colonel Myer's command was increased by the addition of the Forty-fourth Company, Philippine Scouts, under First Lieut. Anton Seemann, from Guimaras Island, P. I., 2 officers and 81 men, besides 2 contract surgeons, 1 hospital corps, and 2 signal corps men.

On April 27 another company of scouts, the Forty-fifth, under First Lieut. Allen Walker, Philippine Scouts, 2 officers and 73 men, reported to Colonel Myer from Guimaras, P. I., and on April 29, 1903, a further addition was made to Colonel Myer's command from Cebu of Company E, Twenty-ninth Infantry, under Capt. J. E. Woodward, 2 officers and 87 men.

On May 1, 1903, Colonel Myer's effective command consisted of: Headquarters, Eleventh Infantry, 4 officers and 2 men; Companies K and L, Eleventh Infantry, 3 officers and 148 men; Companies E, G, and H, Twenty-ninth Infantry, 6 officers and 238 men; Medical Department, 5 officers and 14 men; Signal Corps, 5 men; Forty-fourth and Forty-fifth Companies, Philippine Scouts, 4 officers and 154 men; Philippines Constabulary, 7 officers and 132 men (40 men constabulary noneffective at Surigao not included in above)—total effective, 29 officers and 693 men.

These forces occupied 14 different stations and were constantly engaged in active field work of the severest character.

A personal visit to Surigao with Lieutenant Moseley, aid-de-camp, April 27-29, fully confirmed the expectation that Colonel Myer was carrying out in spirit and letter every instruction he had received, besides initiating wise and effective methods of his own which brought the most gratifying results.

Having relinquished command of the Department of the Visayas May 11, 1903,

all data as to the Surigao expedition included that date, but nothing thereafter. Up to this time the following résumé shows results as reported by Colonel Myer:

"March 30, 1903: Engagement of constabulary under Captain Marshall with outlaws at Magtayaco. Constabulary loss of 1 killed and 2 wounded. (Natives report 1 outlaw wounded.)

"April 5, 1903: Lieutenant Hibbard, Philippine Constabulary, commanding constabulary with detachment Company G, Twenty-ninth Infantry, struck outlaws at Gamoton, killing 1, capturing 3 rifles and 1 revolver.

"April 5, 1903: Lieutenant Schreiner, Philippine constabulary, with detachment Company E, Twenty-ninth Infantry, and constabulary, in scouting through the Magatayaco country, killed 3 outlaws and recovered 1 rifle and 1 shotgun.

"April 8, 1903: Lieutenant Seemann, Philippine Scouts, with detachment Forty-fourth Company Scouts, struck the outlaws on the Mamcas River. No casualties reported on either side. Lieutenant Seemann was slightly wounded in the engagement in the shoulder with buckshot; but, to his credit, he has not mentioned it. One revolver captured.

"May 9, 1903: Detachment Company E, Twenty-ninth Infantry, exchanged shots with outlaws at Tubog. No casualties.

"Five other engagements occurred subsequent to May 11, 1903, the date I relinquished command of department."

The work of recovery of arms, arresting outlaws, their aiders and abettors, continued with unabated vigor, and with marked success—so much so that by May 11 the greater part of the arms and the stolen money had been recovered, and the majority of the miscreants were in the hands of the civil authorities for trial. The hardships endured and obstacles encountered and overcome were probably as severe as any of previous campaigns, and the success achieved quite as complete.

Though but little has been said about this expedition, the patient endurance of the forces engaged, the good and far-reaching results accomplished, and the methods used reflect the highest credit upon the officers and men actively participating in the important operations.

It is believed there will be no aftermath of complaints of wanton destruction of property, looting, water cure, and other abuses to annoy superior authorities.

While the officers and men, almost without exception, performed excellent service under the most trying conditions, one officer, First Lieut. Anton Seemann, of the Forty-fourth Company, Philippine Scouts, deserves special mention. When gallantly leading his men to a charge against the enemy on the Mamcas River on the 8th day of April, 1903, he was wounded, but regarding the wound as not severe he did not even mention it in his official report, but kept right on duty as though nothing had happened. Such modesty is one of the highest attributes of a gallant soldier, and Lieutenant Seemann is well worthy of special commendation.

Colonel Myer and his command have been thanked by the department commander for "the zeal, energy, and efficiency which have been manifest in the hard work incident to the campaign."

In further recognition of "the high capacity and marked efficiency" of this officer, it was a pleasure to recommend him, on June 12, 1903, for appointment as brigadier-general. This recommendation, I am glad to say, was fully concurred in by the division commander, Maj. Gen. George W. Davis, by indorsement of June 17, 1903.

As illustrating the character of the campaign from March 25 to May 11, 1903, the following selected reports and correspondence are submitted, marked Exhibits 19 to 39, inclusive; also map of the theatre of operations (Exhibit 40). Colonel Myer has submitted a full report, under date of July 15, 1903, of all operations from the commencement to the conclusion of the successful campaign.

OTHER OPERATIONS—PROVINCES OF DAPITAN AND MISAMIS. MINDANAO.

Some threatened troubles from ladrones and insurrectos in these provinces having been reported, instructions were received from the division commander to send a company of scouts to Dapitan, Dapitan Province.

The provinces of Misamis and Dapitan lie, in the order named, from Surigao along the north and northwest coast of Mindanao.

The Forty-third Company, Native Scouts, Lieut. Hans Frank commanding, was sent from Camp Jossman, Guimaras Island, as ordered, and arrived at Dapitan April 22, 1903.

As shown in letter of April 19, 1903, from the division commander to Brig. Gen. S. S. Sumner, the Forty-ninth Company Philippine Scouts, at Cagayan, Misamis, was assigned for duty under the chief of constabulary upon the request of the civil governor, Philippine Islands; that the Forty-third Company Philippine

Scouts, at Dapitan, was to remain under my command, and the status of province of Dapitan would be the same as Surigao. This information, however, did not reach me until May 4, 1903, per telegraphic instructions from division headquarters, in reference to my request for definite instructions.

Upon arrival at Dapitan of the Forty-third Company of scouts some unfortunate and probably unnecessary trouble occurred, resulting in the killing of a native by a scout sergeant.

Upon the request of General Sumner and in obedience to orders of division commander of May 6, 1903, the Forty-third and Forty-ninth Companies of scouts, at Dapitan and Cagayan, Misamis, respectively, changed station and status.

Capt. Clough Overton, Troop D, Fifteenth Cavalry, was at Cagayan and vicinity, having been sent out from Iligan on a scout, for moral effect principally.

I was ordered to supply Overton's troop (which had been previously supplied from Iligan to May 15, 1903); also to supply the scout company under constabulary at Cagayan and the scout company at Dapitan, with that province, Dapitan, under my command the same as Surigao.

With the province of Misamis intervening between Surigao and Dapitan, the two latter under my command; with Misamis and the scouting troop of cavalry under department commander Mindanao; with the scout company at Cagayan under the chief of constabulary, and with orders charging me with supplying commands under such conditions, there were for a time somewhat perplexing difficulties, which, however, were soon gotten in hand.

Maj. Frank L. Dodds, judge-advocate Department Visayas, was sent to change the scout companies at Cagayan and Dapitan, to investigate the killing of the native at Dapitan on April 22, and then to proceed to Surigao and return to Iloilo.

As there was considerable disaffection in Misamis, which was in easy communication with any unapprehended outlaws and insurrectos in Surigao, and as the trouble might seriously affect Dapitan Province, Colonel Myer was directed to investigate the situation and insure such cooperation as might be necessary to prevent or suppress any uprising—my intention being to place this efficient officer in full charge of all operations, if so authorized.

Being relieved from command of department on May 11, 1903, the responsibilities devolved upon General Wint, my successor.

Within a few days thereafter I received the sad intelligence that the gallant Captain Overton and one of his men had been killed and one wounded while guarding native prisoners.

The full history of these transactions up to and including May 11, 1903, is set forth in Exhibits 41 to 70, inclusive, hereto attached.

Without any spirit of criticism, it is remarked in concluding this report that, in my opinion, the most effective way of suppressing the uprisings of ladrones and insurrectos and insuring protection to the lives and property of well-disposed natives is for the military to take complete control in any disaffected districts. In other words, put such districts under martial law.

Any attempted dual control under such conditions always contains the element of friction and failure, and with divided responsibility the results are liable to be unsatisfactory.

In the province of Surigao the military were in paramount charge, and the rare tact, sound judgment, and vigorous action of Colonel Myer insured cooperation and success.

The fact is that the spirit of ladroneism and insurrection, wherever prevalent, should be suppressed and crushed out with a strong hand to prevent the recurrence of outrages similar to those in Surigao and Misamis provinces.

Very respectfully,

J. M. LEE,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.

EXHIBIT 1.

ILOILO, P. I., March 23, 1903.

The COMMANDING OFFICER,
Camp Jossman, Guimaras, P. I.:

Following telegram repeated for your information and immediate action:
Headquarters division, Manila, March 23, to General Lee, Iloilo.

Following telegram received from Iligan: "Kelly, treasurer, Surigao, wires to-day as follows: Insurrectos have possession of town. Have killed Inspector Clark and others. Send relief quick; we are holding provincial building. The Reilly only transportation at Iligan: will send her 5 o'clock, hope, with detachment 30 men Company M, Tenth Infantry, Lieutenants Brown and Patterson.

No communication with Zamboanga. No other possible help can be sent from here. Can not Cebu or other places send over and at least keep up supplies and communication? Wire instructions quick. Williams, lieutenant-colonel." "Upon request civil governor division commander directs you send two companies infantry most available, to be commanded by judicious captain or field officer, to Surigao, Mindanao, in shortest possible time. If necessary, charter any transportation available. Troops to take tentage, ten days' rations, 200 rounds ammunition per man. They will occupy town, drive out insurgents, restore and maintain order in town of Surigao, and protect people and property from violence. Thirty men Company M, Tenth Infantry, will leave Iligan this evening for same point, commanding officer sent by you will retain or return them to Iligan, as he deems best, bearing in mind that troops are much needed at Iligan and should be returned as soon as practicable. In view telegraphic interruption with Zamboanga, troops sent by you and those from Iligan and theater of their operations will be under your command. Report troops sent and time departure. Copy of this telegram sent General Sumner and commanding officer, Iligan. Heistand, adjutant-general." The department commander directs that you select two companies your command, well officered, under two of your best captains, to proceed at once on *Carmen* for scene of trouble and to carry out fully foregoing instructions. Report by wire how soon troops can be at Buena Vista landing. *Carmen* will be there with ten days' field rations for 200 men, and also tentage from there. General Lee will be over on *Carmen* or on launch. Acknowledge receipt, and furnish copy of these instructions to officer in command of troops.

By command of Brigadier-General Lee.

FINLEY, *Adjutant-General.*

EXHIBIT 2.

FIELD GENERAL }
ORDERS, }
No. 1. }

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
IN THE FIELD. SURIGAO EXPEDITION,
Suriago, Island of Mindanao, P. I., March 25, 1903.

Pursuant to telegraphic instructions from headquarters division of the Philippines, dated March 23, 1903, the undersigned hereby assumes command of all troops and the Philippine constabulary, with their transportation, in the province of Suriago, Mindanao, P. I.

J. M. LEE,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.

EXHIBIT 3.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *March 25.*

General LEE,

Commanding Department of Visayas, Surigao:

Governor has made formal request for troops to assist the local authorities in maintaining law and order, and he wishes to know if I deem it necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. I want to know the exact situation from you and your opinion as to the necessity for martial law in controlling the situation. I would prefer to have the troops operate in accordance with the civil officers of the law if we can secure the restoration of peace and the punishment of the guilty. Senior constabulary officer has been ordered to report to you and act under your orders. The *Palawan* has been placed subject to my orders for moving troops from Tacloban or any other point you may wish to draw from. As there are, or soon will be, 200 constabulary at Suriago, I hope it will not be necessary to call on more white troops, but if you need a large force you will of course use the Eleventh Infantry. Myers is now full colonel of the regiment. Report fully respecting conditions and your dispositions, and wait there until you hear from me. It appears that two companies of the Twenty-seventh Infantry have been sent in from Malabang by Colonel Forbes to Zamboanga en route to Surigao in absence of General Sumner, who is in Jolo. If by any chance these troops reach Surigao, which I deem unlikely, you will order the command to immediately return to their proper station. Should you leave, it will be best to have a full colonel in command. The Thirtieth Infantry, from Iligan, should be returned per launch as soon as they can be spared, and the launch is much needed there.

DAVIS, *Major-General, Commanding.*

EXHIBIT 4.

Telegrams.]

SURIGAO, March 26, 1903.

General DAVIS, Manila:

Arrived here 7.30 p. m., 25th instant, on *Formosa*. Detachment 30 men from Iligan had arrived at 8 a. m. same day after rough voyage in small launch. Two companies Twenty-ninth Infantry, under Captain Perry, arrived noon same day. I met launch returning to Iligan in afternoon. At 2 a. m., this date, sent detachment Tenth Infantry back to Iligan on *Formosa*.

Following is disposition of troops and constabulary: Colonel Taylor, constabulary, left here with 18 men in boat going down east coast Surigao. Inspector Marshall with 50 men left here at 4 a. m. 25th instant, marching to interior, following insurrectos. Captain Perry with 80 men left here at 2 a. m. this morning on *Car-men* for Tubay and vicinity to intercept insurrectos. Inspectors Borseth and Hibbard arrived here from Cebu at 10 a. m. with 40 constabulary and were immediately sent to Tubay and vicinity to cooperate with Captain Perry in intercepting insurrectos. One hundred and eighty-eight men in the field.

There are also 50 men of constabulary at Cagayan, Misamis Province, which is in close touch with Iligan, but not under my orders. I will advise them of reported movements of insurrectos south. Have suggested to commanding officer Iligan that if company could be sent to Cagayan they might strike insurrectos in that vicinity, unless they dispersed before reaching there, which seems probable. A wire from governor at Cagayan repeated here to Colonel Taylor by Allen gives unconfirmed rumor of some threatened attack by Moros in that vicinity. Do not attach much importance to this just now, but wired the information to Iligan, requesting them to repeat to General Sumner.

History of situation here is that about noon Monday, the 23d instant, a party of ladrones and insurrectos, from 20 to 30, under Adriano Concepcion, an insurgent who escaped from prison last January, entered the town. They had but few if any guns, but were armed with bolos. Evidently as result of prearrangement and conspiracy with natives here, including Cebuanos from Cebu and others hired by local companies to handle freight, joined Concepcion while constabulary were at dinner. Single sentinel at constabulary headquarters easily overpowered, building looted, 100 arms taken, including 25 Krag-Jørgensen rifles, 3,000 rounds ammunition, 7,000 pesos of civil funds, and a number of constabulary uniforms. Surprise was complete. Inspector Clark, a brave, gallant officer, being at dinner and hearing the trouble started for scene with pocket pistol and was cut to pieces, being the only man killed and none wounded. The few provincial officers and teachers, with only a few short-range shotguns, a couple of revolvers, with very little ammunition, took refuge in provincial building. Insurrectos occupied trenches near town, demanded surrender of arms this party had and release of prisoners. Being refused, they made no attack, but remained here until 6.30 p. m. Monday, when it is reported that they left, 150 strong. About 50 of these, who had joined them either under pressure or through fear or voluntarily, deserted, leaving 100 in party of insurgents and well armed and with much loot. Reported they proceeded south for Lake Mainit and thence for Cagayan, via Cababaram, Butuan, and Tubay, expecting larger reinforcements en route. Am convinced that many natives here and vicinity knew of attack in advance and aided and abetted the same. Governor has been away for three weeks and appears to be out of reach of communications. Currently reported that one or more officials are playing a double game. Fifteen natives have been arrested for joining insurgents and more are being brought in.

While situation is not regarded as especially serious, I am convinced that the majority of these people are wavering in their loyalty to United States authorities, and but little needed to carry them into active insurrection if opportunity offers with arms, etc. This province has estimated population of 80,000, and I believe necessity exists to hunt down these criminals and bring them to speedy punishment. A good lesson is needed, and the sooner administered the better. After a careful survey of situation and making due allowance for exaggeration, recommend that the province be placed under military law, writ of habeas corpus suspended, and that Colonel Myer, Eleventh Infantry, with two companies of his regiment from Tacloban, be sent here to organize expeditions to hunt down these murderous bands, in connection with such constabulary and scouts as may be found necessary. While result might be reached with local civil authorities, think quickest and most effective method best. Local authorities are in some instances weak and some more or less in sympathy. I believe, through fear or other cause. My two companies have ten days' rations, to include April 3. Supplies should be sent from Tacloban, nearest point, or Manila. Surigao to be base for present. If Col-

onel Myer comes he should have good-sized launch and *Haimoon* or other fast-going vessel, with three or four good small boats, to carry and load troops promptly.

Owing to rough country and sparse settlements inland, packs can be used if necessary to following trails into mountains.

LEE, *Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.*

SURIGAO, *March 26, 1903.*

General DAVIS, *Manila:*

Desire to correct losses in arms mentioned in telegram of this date. The following arms were taken by insurgents: Fifty-six Remington shotguns, 40 Colt revolvers, 20 Remington rifles, 10 Springfield carbines, and about 5,000 rounds ammunition. Insurgents remained in town until about midnight Monday.

LEE, *Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

EXHIBIT 5.

SURIGAO, *March 26, 1903.*

Brig. Gen. J. M. LEE, U. S. ARMY, *Surigao, Mindanao:*

SIR: Pursuant to telegraphic instructions received this day from the chief of constabulary, I have the honor to place at your disposal and subject to your command for field operations the constabulary as follows:

At Tubay, Lieutenant Hibbard and 36 men.

At Guigaquit, Lieutenant Zapanta and 20 men.

At or near Mainit (in the field), Captain Marshall, Lieutenant Hunt, and 53 men.

At Butuan, Lieutenant Adams and 23 men.

At Surigao, Lieutenant Kindler, supply officer, is not available for field, but will respond to any necessity not requiring his absence of more than a day.

Lieutenant Caswell is on special duty in connection with the work of reestablishing the supply office, and likewise is not subject to regular detail on field duty, but, like Lieutenant Kindler, can respond to any necessity that will not seriously interrupt the work in hand.

Very respectfully,

C. TAYLOR,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Chief Constabulary.

EXHIBIT No. 6.

[Telegram.]

MARCH 26, 1903.

General DAVIS, *Manila, P. I.:*

Following extract from Colonel Taylor's dispatch: "Surigao, March 26, 1903. Chief constabulary, Manila, P. I. Believe lawlessness will be confined to those only who possess arms, as there is no one of prominence connected with them nor appears to give them their sympathy. The band is as yet together, and when they entered Placer some were carrying 2 revolvers, which indicates inability to recruit men for every arm. If troops and constabulary can strike them and gain early success, no serious consequences to be feared. If present movements are successful in breaking up bands or capturing some of the arms, the work will require use of many small detachments, and I shall continue to increase force of constabulary with a view to the retirement of troops when deemed advisable. Taylor." Above is certainly sanguine view of situation, which I hope may be fully realized. Fact remains that about 30 of this band came here and left with fully 100 men and 128 arms and abundant ammunition. Believe their successes will encourage every malcontent and tend to increase sympathy for their cause. If military are to be in charge, such charge should be full and complete and no divided responsibility, though we have heartiest cooperation of constabulary, and civil authorities feel somewhat more vigorous. Am sending Lieutenant Galleher, Twenty-ninth Infantry, on boat daylight to-morrow morning, 27th instant, with 40 men of Company G, Twenty-ninth Infantry, and 20 constabulary down eastern coast to Guigaquit and vicinity to fill up gap and prevent enemy from getting out that way. Troops and constabulary sent to Tubay no doubt reached there ahead of insurgents, so latter may have turned back and made for eastern coast of Surigao. Hope for some news from the three columns operating in the field.

LEE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

EXHIBIT 7.

PROCLAMATION.

FIELD GENERAL } HDQS. DEPT. OF THE VISAYAS, IN THE FIELD,
 ORDERS, No. 2. } SURIGAO EXPEDITION,
 - Surigao, Island of Mindanao, P. I., March 28, 1903.

It is hereby proclaimed for the information and guidance of all concerned that "the military are now in the province of Surigao for the suppression of bandits and alleged insurrectos. The military are the friends of the people and will in no way interfere with the ordinary pursuits of business and employment," as so clearly set forth in a circular of this date to the presidentes from the acting governor and other provincial officials.

The military and constabulary are conjointly putting forth every effort to support every civil official who is interested in maintaining peace and order, to bring to punishment by the proper civil authorities every one who has been guilty directly or indirectly of voluntarily participating in or aiding and abetting the atrocious crimes of Monday the 23d instant, and insure protection to the peaceful and law-abiding inhabitants of this province.

Careful instructions have been given that the rigors of war will be visited only upon the guilty bandits, outlaws, and their supporters, and even this will be in strict accordance with the laws of war. The innocent will be afforded the amplest protection consistent with successful military operations of the United States troops and constabulary.

The military forces and the constabulary expect and require the full and hearty assistance in every possible way of every civil official and of every well-disposed person who has a heart interest in what is for the general good and wants to have the murderers, thieves, and looters punished, and by a lesson never to be forgotten prevent the repetition of this disgraceful act perpetrated in the capital of the province.

All participants and suspects arrested by United States troops and the constabulary will, after necessary investigation, be turned over to the civil authorities to be dealt with under the law, and it is hoped that no guilty person may escape.

The names of the majority of the bandits and outlaws and their aiders and abettors are known and all will be found out. They will be hunted down collectively and individually. If not found to-day, the work will go on to-morrow; if not found to-morrow, they will be hunted and watched for in the weeks and months to come until every living miscreant shall stand at the bar of justice to receive deserved punishment.

If two companies and the constabulary are not enough, we will have a battalion; if a battalion is insufficient, then a regiment, and so increasing, if needed, until there will be a company in every town, a platoon on every trail, and a squad on every mountain and hilltop, wherever the ladrones, outlaws, and insurrectos may seek refuge.

These are no idle words. The work may be hard, but it will surely be effective. The shorter we can make it the better; the sooner the United States troops can finish their part of the work and go back to their permanent stations the better. To that end and for the public good we call upon every official and every other well-disposed inhabitant of this province for all possible help and information, and we will thus be able the more quickly to punish the guilty and assure protection to the innocent.

Anyone who voluntarily screens these bandits or hides away their arms and loot or who does not give timely notice of any information he may have as to the whereabouts of these criminals or their arms or other stolen property becomes a criminal himself, and aider and abettor, and will be dealt with as such under the law.

In conclusion, we say to one and all, "be up and doing" and let us make quick work of these murderers and thieves who committed such terrible crimes right in your midst last Monday.

The names of all persons who render proper assistance will be recorded for just recognition and commendation; the names of those who can do something but do nothing will also be recorded; and the names of those who practice deception will be taken, and if deemed necessary they will be arrested and held for trial and punishment as aiders and abettors.

The educated and influential can do much in the right direction. The poor and ignorant who are well disposed will follow and do all they can. Let us pull together and act in harmony for the good of all who desire protection, peace, and prosperity.

The presidentes and other officials throughout the province can send out and

get information or get it from those coming in. This information should be at once given to United States or constabulary officials, and the forces should be guided to any hiding places. The guides, presidentes, and other local officials who do this will be remembered and recommended. Those who fail to render assistance will also be remembered, but will not be recommended.

These bandits and outlaws are public enemies, and their capture or extermination should be hailed with delight by every law-abiding citizen, rich or poor, great or small. If we can not get them through this needed help, we will get them anyway, though it may take longer, and the fact will not be forgotten wherever no proper assistance was given us.

We do not want promises, but earnest, honest, and active work. We want you to do this by all lawful means, not for us alone, but more for yourselves. These outlaws are your enemies and are trying to stop every good work in your behalf.

By command of Brigadier-General Lee:

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,
First Lieutenant, First U. S. Cavalry,
Aid-de-Camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

EXHIBIT 8.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, March 27.

General LEE, *Surigao*:

Reference your telegram 26th. Philippines Commission will probably to-day turn over Surigao Province to military and suspend writ habeas corpus. Following in paragraph is based on presumption that martial law will be authorized. Order Myer to take charge operations in province. Give him such troops from your department as you deem necessary, with free use Panay scouts, but not those natives recruited in Cebu and Leyte. Put in sufficient force to occupy all important centers of population in disaffected region and quickly end this outbreak. Hope you will be able to hire or impress, if necessary, native pack ponies for movement inland, for I have very few pack mules that are not constantly used, and these few much scattered in Luzon. Pack ponies, as used by natives, are better than our heavy mules, and besides they need no grain; even carabao are in some cases. If property of any kind is seized, be careful that we do not go beyond imperative necessity. No property will be destroyed, save such as captured from outlaws and removal impracticable. Let there be no water-curing or other cruelty or severity that is not plainly authorized without strained interpretation laws of war. Provost courts and military commissions may assist commanding officer administering justice and punishing those guilty of crime and violation laws. Appointment military commissions and officers for provost-court duty will be only by department commander. Coast-guard steamer *Palawan*, now at Tacloban, has been placed disposal army, and may be used in operation as you may order. *Samshui* should also be available next week. Beef boat will call regularly at Surigao. Pay reasonable rent for any private buildings occupied by troops, including church buildings. You ought to be able to hire bancas and barotas to meet needs landing parties. What do you want from Manila in the way of tents and paulins? As you have abundant supplies at Iloilo and Tacloban, nothing except beef and vegetables will be sent from here unless asked for. Province Surigao has been temporarily attached Department Visayas by division orders. Nothing report about Moro trouble near Cagayan will affect you. Think it would be well for Colonel Taylor, constabulary, to have his men in Cagayan watch out for trouble in that province.

DAVIS.

EXHIBIT 9.

SURIGAO, March 27, 1903.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S DIVISION, *Manila*:

Reference your telegram this date, as soon as civil commission decide to place this province under military law will order Colonel Myer here with two companies of his regiment from Tacloban and a company of scouts most available. In selecting scout company will follow instructions division commander received this date.

LEE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

EXHIBIT 10.

FIELD GENERAL }
ORDERS, No. 3. }

HDQRS. DEPT. OF THE VISAYAS, IN THE FIELD,
SURIGAO EXPEDITION,
Surigao, Island of Mindanao, P. I., March 29, 1903.

The following instructions will be observed and carried out by troops operating in the field in this province:

First. Commanders on the spot will use every possible facility in strict accordance with the rules of civilized warfare in obtaining accurate information of the whereabouts of the outlaws and insurrectos.

Presidentes and other local civil officials will be called upon for all possible assistance. Scouting will be vigorously pursued to locate the enemy.

Second. Natives will be employed as guides, couriers, and to carry rations on the trails when necessary. Bancas and barotos will be hired as required. Runners with important news will be sent to these headquarters from time to time when there are no other ready means available.

Third. When necessary, supplies may be purchased. Pack ponies or carabaos may be impressed if necessary, payments being made for such service in all cases or certificates given to present to the proper officers at these headquarters for payment.

Fourth. In cases of absolute necessity guides and native carriers may be impressed, but it is believed that there will not usually be any occasion to do so, as it is expected that local civil officials will cooperate with the military forces in the operations for the common good. Should any of these be lukewarm or indifferent, their names, office, and residence will be recorded and reported.

Fifth. Indiscriminate arrests will not be made, but confined to those who were participants or aiders and abettors in the recent outrages.

Commanders will carefully note and report the feeling and bearing of natives toward the forces engaged in field operations. In cases of arrest, due investigation will be made and noted for report, and if guilt probable, the parties, evidence, and witnesses should be turned over to nearest civil authorities or sent to these headquarters, to be dealt with under the civil law.

Sixth. The division commander directs that "if property of any kind is seized, be careful that we do not go beyond imperative necessity. No property will be destroyed save such as captured from outlaws and removal impracticable. Let there be no water-curing or other cruelty or severity that is not plainly authorized without strained interpretation of laws of war." The foregoing instructions will be strictly carried out. Looting of any and all kinds is absolutely prohibited, and anyone who disgraces our uniform by engaging in such barbarous practice will be punished on the spot.

Seventh. But officers must not for a moment relax vigilance nor fail to push operations with all possible vigor against the outlaws. They will pursue, head off, and strike these outlaws wherever they can be found, capture or destroy them; in short, let the blows be so effective that any survivors will never forget the lesson. The detachments should always be strong enough to take care of themselves and administer crushing defeat to any of the enemy they may meet.

Eighth. Commanders of the various columns will keep these headquarters fully informed of events, necessities for supplies, when and where they should be sent, in order that nothing may be left undone to make the operations successful.

If the enemy scatter they must be followed relentlessly to their hiding place and destroyed or captured. One cool-headed good American soldier is equal to at least four or five of these outlaws, and a brave constabulary can readily give them odds.

Ninth. It must be borne in mind that the United States troops and constabulary are operating for a common end—to insure protection, peace, and prosperity to every well-disposed inhabitant of the province. All must cooperate—pull together without cavil, question, or friction of any kind.

Tenth. It is impossible to go into matters of detail and instruct each officer just what he should do in all cases, nor is it desirable to do so, the purpose being to leave each officer with a free hand to vigorously pursue the work as his judgment tells him will be best to achieve results, but such results must be obtained by such lawful means that success will not be marred by any well-founded complaints of undue severity and flagrant misconduct to vex and annoy superior authority.

Keep clearly within the plain laws of war, using the severities when necessary, but not forgetting the humanities enjoined upon civilized nations.

By command of Brigadier-General Lee:

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,
First Lieutenant, First U. S. Cavalry,
Aid-de-Camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

EXHIBIT 11.

DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES, *March 27, 1903.*

LEE, *Surigao*:

Commission has decided to delay suspension writ habeas corpus until Colonel Myer has made an attempt to capture and bring in men in arms, and reports absolute necessity to suspend writ and resort to martial law. *Sacramento* now at Calbayog has been ordered to report to you by telegraph to act under your orders.

By command of Major-General Davis:

HEISTAND, Adjutant-General.

EXHIBIT 12.

FIELD GENERAL } HDQRS. DEPT. OF THE VISAYAS, IN THE FIELD,
ORDERS, No. 4. } SURIGAO EXPEDITION,
Surigao, Island of Mindanao, P. I., March 30, 1903.

I. Col. Albert L. Myer, Eleventh Infantry, is hereby placed in charge of the military operations in the field in what will be designated as the Surigao expedition against all outlaws, ladrones, and insurrectos in this province, and he will assume command of all forces within the theater of military operations.

Until otherwise ordered the constabulary forces under Lieut. Col. W. T. Taylor, assistant to chief constabulary, engaged in operations against the common enemy, will be subject to Colonel Myer's supervision and control for cooperative work against the enemy in this province.

II. Colonel Myer will render all practicable support and assistance to the provincial and local civil officials, so long as they facilitate in good faith, as now, the detection, arrest, and punishment of those engaged in the recent outbreak, as well as their aiders and abettors.

Any arrests made by the United States troops or the constabulary will, after due investigation, be turned over to the proper civil authorities for trial and punishment under the civil law.

III. The United States forces operating in this province will be supplied as far as practicable from or through Tacloban, and for that purpose the supply departments at that station will be subject to the orders of the commanding officer of this expedition and will promptly respond to any and all calls or requisitions.

It is understood that supplies of fresh beef, if needed, and vegetables will come direct from Manila. In cases of necessity or emergency call will be made direct upon the chiefs of supply departments at department headquarters, and they will promptly respond as far as they have supplies on hand or procurable.

To the end that nothing may be left undone to facilitate operations, department headquarters at Iloilo will be kept fully advised as to needs, supplies, and movements.

The commanding officer of the expedition will take control of all transportation, land or water, which may in any wise be available for the transportation of troops or supplies.

IV. Any instructions received from division headquarters will be replied to direct and copy of such correspondence wired or mailed to department headquarters at Iloilo. Complete record of all transactions, orders, etc., including rough sketches and other data pertaining to operations, will be kept, and upon the conclusion of the work here and the withdrawal of troops all the records will be sent to department headquarters for file.

V. The commanding officer of the expedition is authorized to hire such land and water transportation as may be necessary, to employ guides, detectives, interpreters, purchase supplies, and incur all necessary expenses in furtherance of the work in hand. Necessary funds therefor will be supplied on application to department headquarters.

It is desired that payments be made in cash to avoid outstanding debts as far as possible, in order that there may be no claims coming in after the conclusion of operations.

VI. Second Lieut. Wilford Twyman, Twenty-ninth Infantry, is hereby relieved from duty as quartermaster and commissary of this expedition and will transfer all funds and property pertaining to these duties to Capt. William Weigel, quartermaster Eleventh Infantry.

Captain Weigel will pay all outstanding debts incurred since the recent occupation of this province by the military upon proper certification by those concerned.

VII. The commanding officer will be guided by such instructions as may have been heretofore issued and by such further instructions as may be received from division or department commander; but he is vested with full responsibility to take all necessary action pursuant to existing orders as in his judgment the circumstances may warrant, being careful to give the civil authorities, both provincial and local, the fullest support consistent with the success of military operations.

VIII. The department commander takes this occasion to thank the constabulary, the provincial officials, and the local officials, as well, and of the latter, Hon. Santos Cedro, presidente of Surigao, for their marked energy, efficiency, and hearty cooperation in ferreting out and arresting those guilty of participating and aiding and abetting the miscreants in the recent outrage of murder and robbery.

He congratulates them and the constabulary upon these arrests and the recovery of public funds and property, and he hopes and believes they will not relax their earnest and vigorous work until every surviving guilty person, no matter who, shall have been brought to the bar of justice to be punished under the law.

The department commander's special thanks are due Dr. Harry R. Winslow, Philippine constabulary, who volunteered his services at Iloilo to accompany the expedition, and who is now doing efficient work in the field with Captain Perry's command.

The department commander feels assured that the same assistance which has been given by the constabulary and the civil officials will be extended to Colonel Myer, who now takes immediate charge of military operations against the common enemy, by whatever name they may be called, whether ladrones, outlaws, or insurrectos, as each and all these terms designate and describe their atrocious crimes.

By command of Brigadier-General Lee:

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,
First Lieutenant, First U. S. Cavalry,
Aid-de-Camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

EXHIBIT 18.

[Telegram.]

SURIGAO, *March 28, 1903.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DIVISION, *Manila:*

Your dispatch 27th received midnight concerning delay of commission to suspend writ habeas corpus and delay establishment of martial law. My plan was to bring this matter to speedy close in most direct way. As this is not adopted, we can work it out as now understood by having civil authorities lean upon us for support until they can successfully manage their own affairs. Have ordered Colonel Myer to come here with two companies of his regiment from Tacloban and the company scouts at Binatac, if available. If not available will bring best company scouts from Camp Jossman, all with fifteen days' rations. Am satisfied if Colonel Myer has anything like free hand he can settle matters in three or four weeks, unless outlaws should scatter in mountains, when it will take longer, and probably constabulary can run them down at intervals. Have names of about 43 of outlaws and am getting more. Civil authorities have now under arrest here 21 who are implicated and 6 suspects. At 7 o'clock this morning sent out Lieutenant Goodwyn with 25 men on *Luzon* to Bacuag, about four hours down east coast Surigao, to operate there and in that vicinity. Colonel Taylor of the constabulary accompanied detachment. Under whatever contingencies that may arise request that this vigorous and efficient officer, Colonel Taylor, operate with constabulary force in conjunction with United States troops, and under the orders of Colonel Myer.

To avoid any hair-splitting questions, think it best for good results that when any forces come together in field, whether United States troops, scouts, or constabulary, that the senior take temporary command to push work vigorously. I depend upon Tacloban for all supplies except beef and vegetables, and have given instructions accordingly. Have now only detachment 15 men here, also some constabulary; latter unarmed.

LEE, *Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

EXHIBIT 14.

[Telegram.]

SURIGAO, *March 29, 1903.*General DAVIS, *Manila, P. I.:*

Carmen returned last night from Tubay. Captain Perry reports no enemy there or in that vicinity. They were evidently headed off and have scattered in mountains, or gone to east coast. Country very rough. Perry scouting vigorously to locate any in hiding. Pursuing column of 50 constabulary under Inspector Marshall reports outlaws seen near Ybonga near west coast on 28th with force 200 well armed. Believe overestimated, and 2 scouts who got through to Perry from there neither saw nor heard of enemy. Sending *Carmen* back to Perry to-night with supplies and detailed instructions. Outlaws being headed off and I believe will vibrate between east and west coasts, or hide away in small bands in mountains. Probably latter. I have four columns in field; 80 soldiers and 40 constabulary on west coast under Captain Perry. Fifty constabulary on stern chase under Marshall. Forty soldiers and 20 constabulary under Lieutenant Galleher at or in vicinity of Guigaquit on east coast, and 25 soldiers at or in vicinity of Placer on east coast under Lieutenant Goodwyn. Also Colonel Taylor of constabulary with this detachment. Have only 15 soldiers now here, but we are all right. Also have some unarmed constabulary. Thirteen arms and 3,300 pesos out of 5,400 pesos stolen civil funds recovered from natives here and near here who took part, or who aided and abetted in the outbreak. There are a number of these here and in vicinity; over 30 now in arrest in hands of civil authorities, guarded by my men. Civil authorities active and zealous here. Provincial Treasurer Kelly, ex-captain volunteers, has rendered me most valuable assistance. He is a tower of strength and in full accord with us. Also Colonel Taylor and other officers of constabulary.

Reported that number of natives in interior and near Tubay not cordial toward our forces, but think we can handle all of the disaffected. This business should be wound up in three or four weeks. Colonel Myer will be here probably to-morrow with two companies from Tacloban with fifteen days' rations, and will put him in full charge of operations with hope he can make a winning in settling this business. There will then be no necessity of my remaining here, and if it meets your approval will take *Carmen* and return to Iloilo in few days to look after much pressing work there needing my attention. Intended bringing 50 scouts from company at Binatac, near Tacloban, but Myer finally wired me that company was recruited in Leyte. When Myer comes will arrange, if necessary, to bring a good suitable company from Jossman. If scout company takes the field, I urgently recommend they be issued full regular army ration of meat, sugar, coffee, vegetables, and soap. When hard worked in garrison, as many of them now are, I find they are underfed, and when harder worked in the field the present ration will not give them more than half enough to eat. I wish to prevent any excuse of their foraging and living off the scant products of poor natives, a pernicious practice indulged in heretofore under the specious plea of "military necessity." This matter appeals to me as of such humane importance that I hope that my request may be granted. I believe if Secretary of War knew all the facts as to the needs and service of our faithful scouts he would put all of them on the full rations same as the regular soldier. Have investigated this matter thoroughly with a number of scout companies and know I am not mistaken. Private Barczykowski, Company H, Twenty-ninth Infantry, accidentally shot and killed by our men on outpost duty yesterday morning, 25th instant, near Tubay; buried here to-day. Since writing above just received following field dispatch:

NEAR TIMAMAU, 5 p. m., 28th.

General LEE:

Word from Captain Marshall (constabulary) that Conception (outlaw leader) is at Mount Magtayaco, west (I believe it is south) of Lake Mainit. Marshall has crossed lake to attack. If possible, Tubay men should come by steamer to point opposite Jabonga. Acting governor or governor's son-in-law knows this mountain. Have informed Lieutenant Galleher.

TAYLOR,
Assistant Chief Constabulary.

Lieutenant Goodwyn pushed out with his detachment, 25 soldiers with Taylor from Placer at noon yesterday, 28th instant, going west, intending to cross over to west coast; at 5 p. m. had reached Timaman. Full instructions, guides, etc., under Inspector Coswell, constabulary, go by *Carmen* to-night and will reach Perry to-morrow in good time for effective cooperation, I hope.

LEE, *Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

EXHIBIT 15.

[Telegram.]

SURIGAO, *March 30, 1903.*ADJUTANT-GENERAL DIVISION, *Manila:*

Colonel Myer arrived at 7.30 this morning with *Sacramento* and *Palawan*, Companies K and L, Eleventh Infantry, the incoming force consisting of 6 officers, 157 men Eleventh Infantry, 2 medical officers, 5 men Hospital Corps, 1 man Signal Corps, a total of 8 officers and 163 men. I have placed him in immediate charge of all military operations in this province, including cooperative work with the constabulary under Colonel Taylor, assistant to chief. While no questions may arise, I request that this efficient officer, who has under his command 7 officers and 132 men of armed constabulary, be directed to report to Colonel Myer for instructions, the same as to me. From information received from Captain Perry on west coast and after conference with Colonel Myer have ordered a suitable company of scouts to come here from Camp Jossman on *Kansas City*.

LEE, *Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

EXHIBIT 16.

[Telegram.]

MARCH 30, 1903.

General DAVIS, *Manila, P. I.:*

Several days ago I wired for a swift-going launch for work here. We are very much in need of a safe launch drawing from 6 to 7 feet, similar to the *Reilly* at Iligan, or one better, which can skip in and out of bays and inlets with from 30 to 50 men on quick trips at a moment's notice. Every launch in my department is either laid up for repairs or hard worked on new post sites. Tacloban has not a boat of any kind to-day and won't have for several days. We now have here enough large boats with help of constabulary boats, but no small one. If quartermaster's department can not send launch here at once, can not civil government do so, or can not a good one be hired to report to Colonel Myer for immediate work? The military have a chance to make a winning, and a launch of this kind will help out greatly. Thus far not a principal outlaw has been killed or captured. We want to make a good capture or kill one or both of the scoundrels at large, and now is the time to strike for success. Please wire me whether this urgent request can be granted.

LEE, *Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

EXHIBIT 17.

[Telegram.]

SURIGAO, *March 31, 1903.*ADJUTANT-GENERAL DIVISION, *Manila:*

Unless I receive orders to the contrary, will leave here daylight to-morrow on *Carmen*, returning to Iloilo via Tacloban. Colonel Myer is in full charge of situation here, and important work waiting at Iloilo makes my return there necessary.

LEE, *Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

EXHIBIT 18.

Received 10.30 p. m., March 31. O. K. Acknowledged and repeated to Colonel Myer April 1, 1903.

PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, TELEGRAPH DIVISION,
Manila, March 30.

General LEE, *Surigao:*

Your two telegrams yesterday received. Your arrangements are satisfactory. Taylor has been ordered to report to Myer. Your suggestion that Taylor and our officers work harmoniously under one another, according to rank, is approved. Will send you launch if can spare one; meanwhile you are authorized to hire launch if practicable. Report.

DAVIS.

EXHIBIT 19.

PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY,
Surigao, Mindanao, April 5, 1903.

The ADJUTANT, SURIGAO EXPEDITION IN THE FIELD,
Surigao.

SIR: I have the honor to forward the following report of the engagement of the constabulary forces at Magatayaco, Surigao, P. I., at 6.30 a. m., March 30, 1903:

Captain Marshall, Lieutenant Hunt, and 53 men, Philippine constabulary, left Mainit at 4 p. m., March 29, and reached the landing at the end of the Matayaco trail at 9 p. m., same date, and camped there for the night.

Captain Marshall ordered Lieutenant Hunt and 12 men, Philippine Scouts, at 5.30 a. m., to proceed by baroto to Mainit and obtain rations and cooking utensils. This order was being complied with when the encounter started.

At 6.30 a. m. Captain Marshall, with a few of the constabulary, proceeded to go a short distance up the trail and was fired upon by the ladrones. Immediately a general fight took place. Lieutenant Hunt and party heard the firing and returned to Captain Marshall's command, but were met with such heavy fire from the ladrones, when within less than 100 yards of the shore, that a landing was impossible.

Lieutenant Hunt's party then drew off to about 250 yards and rowed around the flank of the ladrones and opened fire on them. This was kept up for about twenty minutes.

It being impossible to land, Lieutenant Hunt went to Mainit and took the trail for Magatayaco, hoping to come in their rear. In the meantime Captain Marshall had driven the ladrones from the field at about 11 a. m. He returned to Mainit at 6 p. m. Lieutenant Hunt returned at 5 p. m.

Loss, constabulary: Killed, 1; wounded, 2. Arms lost: One carbine and belt.

Ladrones killed, 5; wounded, 4; estimated force, 200. Nature of ground swampy, and can be reached only by banca from Mainit. Ladrones supposed to be in same neighborhood at this date.

Very respectfully,

H. J. HUNT,
First Lieutenant, Philippine Constabulary.

EXHIBIT No. 20.

SURIGAO, P. I., *April 5, 1903.*

Col. ALBERT L. MYER,

Commanding Expeditionary Forces, Province of Surigao, Surigao, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to render the following brief summary of events of the uprising in the province of Surigao on Monday, March 23, 1903:

I arrived at Surigao about daylight on the morning of the 24th of March with Captain Marshall and 25 constabulary of the general service.

The force of outlaws which attacked and looted the constabulary quarters had withdrawn from the city and were reported to have gone south. Leaving Captain Marshall and 7 men to guard Surigao, and furnishing arms to American residents here, I left with 18 men on the steamer *Luzon* at 10 o'clock a. m. for Placer, with intentions of intercepting the outlaws in case they reached that point that day. On my arrival at Placer I found that the people of that town were without any information of any band of outlaws in the vicinity. Believing that the band was still in the vicinity of Surigao, and for fear of another attack upon the town because of its small garrison, I left Placer about 3.30 p. m., returning to Surigao. The presidente of Placer was requested to send out runners in all directions to obtain information, and upon receipt of any to send same to Surigao. It afterwards developed that the outlaws reached Placer at about 8.30 p. m. the same evening, while the steamship *Mactan* was in the harbor, and robbed several Chino merchants in that town, the *Surigao* arriving at about 2 a. m. the following morning. The captain of the vessel failed to send anyone ashore or to report the entrance of the outlaws in Placer upon his arrival in Surigao, and the fact was not made known to me until about 9 o'clock, when the presidente of the town came ashore and gave me the advice.

At 5 o'clock that morning Captain Marshall and Lieutenant Hunt started south on the trail of the outlaws, in command of 53 constabulary of Oriental Negros and Bohol, who had arrived the afternoon previous. Had the captain of the *Mactan* or Mr. Dounee, their representative of the Maccloud Company, made known to me

or any other constabulary officer in Surigao their knowledge of the condition in Placer immediately upon their arrival at Surigao, I would have been able to send Captain Marshall by boat to that point, and they would have undoubtedly been able to get at the outlaws, as they would have been but one or two hours behind them. The failure of the captain of the *Mactan* or the representative of the Mac-loud Company to report the entrance of the outlaws in Placer immediately upon the arrival of the *Mactan* in Surigao was, in my opinion, a most unpatriotic act, if it does not constitute sedition; in all it keeps important information concerning the outlaws from the Government officials.

On the 25th I remained in Surigao, working up evidence and information, the location of arms hidden in this vicinity, and in the endeavor to recover some of the funds lost by Supply Officer Kindler. On that day a force of 30 soldiers arrived from Iligan with orders to protect the town of Surigao. About noon of that day Captain Perry with 2 companies of American soldiers arrived from Iloilo, and were likewise without orders to do more than protect the town of Surigao.

At 1 p. m., with 10 men of the constabulary, I went to Catilan for the purpose of bringing here 1 American teacher and his wife, and put in at Placer on the 26th, where I learned that the outlaws had been in Timamana at 3 p. m. the day before. On the 27th I reported the constabulary forces in this province to General Lee at Surigao. The day before General Lee sent Captain Perry with his force to Tubay to work up the river toward Lake Mainit, and a force of 38 constabulary under Lieutenant Hibbard, arriving from Leyte, proceeded to the same point, in accordance with orders previously given by himself.

On the 27th General Lee dispatched Lieutenant Galleher and Lieutenant Zapanta and 20 men of the constabulary to Gigaquit.

On the 28th I went to Placer with Lieutenant Goodwin and 25 men of the Twenty-ninth U. S. Infantry, arriving there at 11.30 a. m., and marched inland, arriving at Timamana 5.30 p. m. same day. At this point I received a communication from Captain Marshall, in which he stated that the outlaws were reported to be at Magtayaco and that he was endeavoring to cut off their escape to the south on reaching Lake Mainit. I immediately sent word to General Lee, suggesting that a portion of the forces at Tubay be sent up the coast and landed at a point opposite Jabonga. Arriving at Mainit on the morning of the 29th, I found that Captain Marshall had crossed the lake to Jabonga, where he met the force of Lieutenant Hibbard, and was returning to Mainit for the purpose of moving against the outlaws in Magtayaco. That same afternoon Captain Marshall and Lieutenant Hunt, with 50 men, were directed to cover the eastern coast of the lake to prevent the escape of the outlaws by water, while the force of Lieutenant Goodwin and Lieutenant Hibbard made a detour through the barrio of Hobason in the endeavor to get into the mountains and get down to the rear of Magtayaco.

I left that afternoon with Lieutenant Hibbard, and Lieutenant Goodwin was to follow the next morning. In the barrio of Hobason on the morning of the 30th we found, hidden near the river, some property stolen by the outlaws; also 3 Springfield carbines, 5 Remington rifles, 6 Remington shotguns. About 12 o'clock Lieutenant Goodwin arrived and reported having heard firing in the direction of Captain Marshall's forces. There also arrived Lieutenant Adams with a force of constabulary from Butaun. Lieutenant Adams was directed to return with his force to Jabonga and prevent the escape of the outlaws to the south, and with Lieutenants Hibbard and Goodwin I crossed the mountains to the barrio of Paya-pag, arriving there late that afternoon. I learned that Lieutenant Galleher with forces had crossed over toward Mainit the same morning.

The following morning we took the trail of Lieutenant Galleher, and we endeavored to find an old insurgent trail which would lead us directly in the rear of Magtayaco. The guides furnished for this purpose failed to indicate any trail, and we also found one, and arrived in the barrio of Magpayen on the afternoon of the 31st. Leaving Lieutenant Hibbard to cover that trail and scout that vicinity, I went to Mainit that evening with Goodwin, where I learned that Captain Marshall and Lieutenant Hunt had been in action the previous morning on the west coast of Lake Mainit. It seems that Captain Marshall, with about 35 men, landed opposite Magtayaco on the evening of the 29th and very close to the outposts of the outlaws without being aware of their presence. During the night Captain Marshall's guide escaped and undoubtedly informed the outlaws of his position, as he was attacked at daylight the next morning by the forces of the enemy. Lieutenant Hunt, engaged in bringing up the balance of the forces, was unable to make a landing to reenforce Captain Marshall owing to the heavy fire of the outlaws. Captain Marshall beat off the outlaws, and the fire continued until about 12 o'clock that noon, when the entire insurgent forces retreated. Because of Captain Marshall's small force, his small amount of ammunition, and because of his orders

to guard the coast line and prevent escape by lake of outlaws, he did not pursue them into the mountains.

He remained in that vicinity until dark, when, upon the nonarrival of the rations and the lack of shelter for his men, he returned to Mainit. He went again to the same place early the following morning in company with Lieutenant Galleher, who had arrived in the meantime, and the entire section was thoroughly scouted that day without further results than advices that the outlaws had escaped by boat to San Roque. Captain Marshall's losses were Jenario Emil, private, general service, killed; Private Felix Pacut, constabulary of Bohol, wounded in the face, serious; Private Domingo Seganez, constabulary of Bohol, wounded in the right hand and left wrist.

The insurgent losses were 3 killed, the dead bodies being seen by several of the constabulary, and 2 others reported killed by the natives and several wounded carried off.

The dead were also carried away.

On that day, April 1, I went to Magtayaco with Lieutenant Goodwin, leaving him there, relieving Lieutenant Galleher, who was almost blind from inflammation of the eyes. On the night of April 1, Lieutenant Goodwin and Captain Marshall, with force of about 45 American soldiers and a force of constabulary, went by boat to the barrio of San Roque, scouted thoroughly that section of country without finding any trace of the outlaws. Returning the 3d instant via Jabonga, and while opposite Jabonga, the banca was swamped and 5 Krag rifles were lost. The men threw off their clothing for fear of drowning, and Captain Perry was compelled to send the detachment to Tubay to be refitted.

On the afternoon of the 3d I started for Jabonga, but meeting Captain Marshall about 2 a. m. the following morning, returned with him to Mainit.

On the afternoon of the 4th I left Mainit for Placer in company with Mr. Duncan, special civil employee, and arrived at Surigao by banca from Placer at 11 p. m. to-day.

On the afternoon of the 4th Lieutenant Galleher, with 50 American soldiers, and Lieutenant Hibbard and Lieutenant Schreiner, with 50 constabulary, went by banca to Magtayaco for the purpose of scouting the entire section for several days to ascertain the exact movements of the outlaws, as it is believed that they are still in that vicinity. The disposition of the forces now is such as to make it very difficult for their escape.

The trip from Placer to Mainit can be made by troops in from seven to eight hours. From Bacuag to Mainit in from ten to fourteen hours, although it is not practicable for the purpose of transportation, Placer being the better base of the Mainit section. The section known as Magtayaco can be reached by land from Jabonga, although the trail is difficult, but from the town of Mainit it is necessary to go by banca, and so far as I have been able to learn it is impossible to get in from the north by trail.

It is known that the outlaws went in by bancas. The movements of troops in Mainit are entirely by bancas, and every expedition has been hampered by the dangers of that mode of traveling, the bancas very often swamping, and in several instances men have drifted clear across the lake and have been from twelve to twenty-four hours returning to their place of station. Fortunately up to the present time no lives have been lost by drowning. The natives inform me that it is practically impossible to pass from Magtayaco to Gagiquit or Catilan, and the only means of escape for the outlaws are to the south and by banca to the north.

Very respectfully,

W. C. TAYLOR,

Third District Chief, Lieutenant-Colonel, Philippine Constabulary.

EXHIBIT 21.

MAINIT, MINDANAO, P. I., April 6, 1903.

ADJUTANT, SURIGAO EXPEDITION, *Surigao*.

(Through Commanding Officer, Mainit.)

SIR: I have the honor to advise you that pursuant to instructions from Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, Philippine Constabulary, three columns left here as follows, to scout the country east of Lake Mainit:

Lieutenant Hibbard, Philippine Constabulary, 12 men Company G, Twenty-ninth Infantry, and 22 men Philippine Constabulary, at 4 p. m., April 4, 1903.

Lieutenant Schreiner, Philippine Constabulary, 8.45 a. m., April 5, with 12 men Company G, Twenty-ninth Infantry, and 17 men Philippine Constabulary.

Lieutenant Galleher, Twenty-ninth Infantry, 18 men Company G, Twenty-ninth Infantry, and 15 men Philippine Constabulary, with Subinspector Zapanta, Philippine Constabulary, 9 a. m., April 5, 1903.

All detachments were sent by boat across the northeast end of the lake (Mainit) and landed at Playa Magtayaco.

Lieutenant Schreiner marched northeast, and as yet no report has been received from him.

Lieutenant Hibbard marched south, and a statement in regard to his operations will follow.

The undersigned marched south and east for about 6 miles to the barrio of Gamoton, where were seen evidence of a large camp hurriedly evacuated and also evidence of a skirmish, vice one native shot through the head from behind with .30-caliber bullet, numerous empty shells, etc. It was evident that one of our parties had had a brush with the enemy, and an effort was made to pick up the trail, but without avail. Camp was made at Gamoton for the night. Early in the morning on April 6 the march was taken up over the most clearly defined trail leading from the place; same was followed for 2 or 3 miles and one man was seen and fired upon, but escaped. He was armed with a Remington rifle. It was thought at the time that he was part of an outpost, but subsequent investigation showed no evidence of any body of men. It is now thought that this man was one of those who had been at Gamoton, and was alone.

After following the trail as far as possible and finding nothing but impassable underbrush, the column returned to Gamoton at about 10.30 a. m., April 6, 1903.

Lieutenant Hibbard, Philippine constabulary, came up with the column at Gamoton at 10.30 a. m., and states that he arrived at Gamoton at about 9.30 a. m., April 5. He managed to get near enough to surprise the enemy, but was unable to cover all exits. While preparing his forces he was seen by the ladrones, and he at once attacked. Owing to the difficulties of the trail he was unable to bring all his men into action at first. At the first shot the enemy scattered in all directions, firing a few shots. They were completely demoralized, and Lieutenant Hibbard states that he believes that for the present their organization is broken up.

Besides the one man killed, Lieutenant Hibbard states that a number were wounded, as the ground showed numerous trails of blood.

The force of the enemy, as estimated by Lieutenant Hibbard, is from 100 to 150, with less than half armed with firearms. List of property captured by Lieutenant Hibbard herewith—3 Remington rifles, 1 Colt revolver, 50 rounds of ammunition, 25 rounds shotgun ammunition, number of bolos, spears, blankets, caps, etc., 2 swords, formerly belonging to Captain Clark.

Very respectfully,

PAUL C. GALLEHER,
First Lieutenant, Twenty-ninth Infantry.

EXHIBIT 22.

SURIGAO, April 10, 1903.

General LEE, *Noilo*:

Reference your telegram April 9, our idea change in scout rations in the field—increase meat component one-third, reduce rice component to 1 pound, and issue one-half pound hard bread, dry flour in lieu of this reduction; when possible issue both potatoes and onions, one-half pound to ration; double coffee ration, R and G—that is, instead of 2½ pounds to 100 rations, make it 5 pounds to 100 rations, increase sugar ration from 1 ounce to 1½ ounce and increase by 1 ounce jam; think they could use hard (?) in connection with coffee good advantage. Additional cost the above changes, approximately, 4½ cents per ration. Have made a little change for some of those here without expense, which will explain when write letter.

MYER, *Colonel.*

EXHIBIT 23.

SAN ROQUE, MINDANAO, April 10, 1903.

The ADJUTANT, HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITION IN THE FIELD.

Surigao, Mindanao.

SIR: In compliance with your letter of April 5, which reached me to-day, I have the honor to report as follows:

Having arrived at Tubay I communicated with Captain Perry, Twenty-ninth Infantry, as per instructions received from your office. Captain Perry directed me to proceed to Santiago; thence to Jabonga; from there to a point about 5 miles

south the San Roque Mountains to Gamoton, San Roque, I made my base where rations and ammunition are stored, guarded by 15 of my men. I arrived at Gamoton April 8, at about 3.30 p. m., with 27 men, Forty-fourth Company Philippine Scouts, and 1 constabulary. Having taken a five minutes' rest, after having crossed the mountains, I noticed the absence of my guide, Ramon Caigas, a resident of Surigao. A search was made for him, but he could not be found. Having waited for his return quite a long time, I lost patience and prudence, too, and ordered "Forward, march," which I had never done up to that time. Upon that the guide appeared and seemed all excitement. He stated that he ran into a gang of ladrones, that they had taken him for a friend just arrived to join them. "He was well known by them." That they had given him at once a constabulary revolver, a belt belonging to it, with a cartridge box with 5 rounds of ammunition, caliber .45. The story seemed plausible, but the man had these articles with him. He got away from the ladrones while they were looking for something to eat. I proceeded at once to the place and found the ladrones had taken position at the foot of the mountain. On the left flank was a large river called Mamcas, on the right flank an impassable thicket of underbrush.

I sent a detachment on either flank; but the noncommissioned officers were too slow, too much hesitation, no confidence without an American or white man. After a couple of volleys the ladrones ran into the hills. I followed them up about a mile, but had to give it up, as the men were too tired, owing to the march across the mountains that day. The following day I followed the trail, which completely disappeared in the mountains, and I lost all trace of them.

The strength of the gang I judged to be about 15, well armed, I saw several with rifles and revolvers. They must have sufficient ammunition according to the way they expended some, but I may be mistaken in that; they have no fire discipline.

No casualties on either side as far as is known, owing to the poor marksmanship on both sides.

The gain in the whole affair is the revolver, belt, box, and 5 rounds of ammunition for the same, brought in by the guide, 20 rounds of Remington rifle ammunition, a small dagger not amounting to anything, also a constabulary cap lost by one of the deserters during the fight. The guide's story sounds plausible and I do not trust him. I wish I could find out something about him. He is a relative of the governor of the province. I am sure to meet this gang again; they can not subsist in the mountains. According to information received from a mountain family, the ladrones are making for Bacuag near Placer; such were their intentions last Monday, Lieutenant Galleher, Twenty-ninth Infantry, Captain Marshall, constabulary, are operating between Mainit down to Magtayaco and Gamoton. I am working from a point about 5 miles south of here to Magtayaco. The scouts are good, excellent hikers, but poor shots; they behave fairly well under fire.

Very respectfully,

ANTON SEEMANN,
First Lieutenant, Philippine Scouts.

According to later information we killed 1 ladrone; he was found by a detachment of Mainit which we sent to the place the following day.

Lieutenant SEEMAN.

This report of native new. Not reported before.

EXHIBIT 24.

[Telegram.]

SURIGAO, April 13, 1903.

General LEE, Iloilo:

Had a heart to heart talk this morning with about 25 of the presidentes gathered here and tried to impress them with the importance of the responsibility to the towns they represented in gathering and imparting to the proper authorities all the information possible to obtain of the whereabouts of the outlaws, and to make arrest on their own responsibility. They all expressed an utmost desire to aid in every possible way the efforts of the authorities to secure the outlaws and reestablish peace within their part of the province, and had received and noted the proclamation and instructions sent them from time to time. Hope it may have good results.

MYER, Colonel, Commanding.

[Telegram.]

SURIGAO, April 13, 1903.

General LEE, Iloilo:

Report from Lieutenant Macklin, Jabonga, says Seemann returned to San Roque yesterday, 10th instant, after three days in mountains. Had running fight with ladrones, but they would not stand. Took 1 revolver, 20 rifles, ammunition, knife, and cap constabulary. Band went into mountains. Reports Seemann says impossible for outlaws to live there. No casualties. Macklin's opinion is that this band is all that is left together and that they must come to lake shore for food. He is going to same country with good force. There are two other columns out to-day. It is evident to me that the band is breaking up and hiding guns. I have a list of names, a roll captured a day or two ago. Have ascertained the towns they live in, and am making effort to find and arrest them if return home. Marshall reports that on the 11th Lieutenant Adams, Philippine Constabulary, found three shotguns and some ammunition. A patrol is now established at Magyataco also.

MYER, Colonel.

EXHIBIT 25.

[Telegram.]

ILOILO, April 15, 1903.

Colonel MYER, Surigao:

Reference my letter and kindred matters received by you, it seems evident that the outlaws must have spies in or near every town or place occupied by our troops, and keep the outlaws posted as to movements by runners or signals. I fear some local authorities may be lukewarm in assisting us, if not in sympathy with outlaws. Even if well disposed, they may fear vengeance at hands of outlaws when troops withdraw. This is a condition difficult to successfully meet, but resort to any measures within laws of war. To effect remedy by employing spies, if they can be trusted, or by causing arrest of parties suspected of sending information or rendering aid to outlaws. Give your officers full authority to act within their discretion in these matters, telling them, however, to always keep within the law. If possible, I may visit you at Surigao for a few hours within the next five or six days. Will wire you further. Am fully satisfied with progress made, and congratulate you and your officers for your hard and vigorous work.

LEE, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

EXHIBIT 26.

APRIL 15, 1903.

General LEE, Iloilo:

Have just returned from Placer and that coast; find nothing new. I am going down west coast to-morrow to investigate a rumor sent in by Twyman in talk with the presidentes. I dwell on the subject of your wire of to-day. It is possible, and I think probable, that some information is given out; but it can not be much, as we find a few once in a while and drive them to other cover. However, the matter will be given full attention. Six or 8 have been arrested on much suspicion in past week.

MYER, Colonel.

HEADQUARTERS SURIGAO EXPEDITION, IN THE FIELD,
Surigao, Mindanao, P. I., April 6, 1903.

To the ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
Iloilo, Panay, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith the following report of civil prisoners at this station:

Number of prisoners March 29	45
Arrested since	22
Total	67
Released since March 29	4
Remaining in confinement	63

Very respectfully,

ALBERT L. MYER,
Colonel, Eleventh Infantry, Commanding.

EXHIBIT 27.

[Telegram.]

SURIGAO, April 16, 1903.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Iloilo:

Following telegram received: "Cagayan, Mindanao, April 15, 1903. Colonel Myer, Surigao: I beg you to send me reenforcement of 100 soldiers to control increasing insurrection. Since I had the conference with Taylor I know that the situation is worse. The people of the pueblo are going to the mountains, declaring themselves rebels. Corrales, governor of Misamis." In my opinion situation here does not admit of sending this force.

MYER.

EXHIBIT 28.

PLACER, SURIGAO, MINDANAO, April 18, 1903.

ADJUTANT, SURIGAO EXPEDITION, Surigao, P. I.

SIR: Received information April 16 that a band of ladrones were in the vicinity of Mopatinbato. I proceeded to said barrio 8 p. m. same date, and reached there 12 m. 17th; found no ladrones, but plenty of evidence that they had used a building of nipa as quarters. On inquiring I obtained the following information: That said house has been headquarters for the ladrones in the field, and had a guard of about 25 men armed with Springfield carbines and 10 boleros and revolver men. Concepcion and 4 other officers. Found haversacks and canteens of native make, also papers; destroyed their quarters and effects. While some of the men went away from the body of my detachment an hombre was met with a bundle on his head. He was stopped and asked where water could be obtained. He stopped, laid down his bundle, and took 3 canteens to go to get water. He has not returned. I heard of this and went to the spot and examined the bundle; contents: New blankets, clothing, tools, 1 45-caliber constabulary revolver, belt, box, and holster, 14 rounds of ammunition, clothing. Clothing such as could be used by the constabulary was given to them, rest of the stuff destroyed; returned to Placer at 9 a. m. Concepcion's band left the place at 6.45 a. m. April 17, and we arrived at 11.30 a. m., or thereabouts. His band, I am told, is split up in small parties and are to meet near Magatayaco to-day. The ladrones do not have to enter any town for supplies, as the valley back of Bacuag can keep all the ladrones in food all the year round—very good trail. All they have to do is to come over the mountain trails and enter the valley. I am in doubt very much whether the people of Bacuag are for the Americans; I think they are on the side of the ladrones. The presidente is in Surigao and, I understand, has the police force of the town with him as his servants. Request this be looked up. I have kept the blankets, belt, etc., received and have given them to constabulary soldiers; turned over 1 revolver and belt to Lieutenant Kindler. Have turned command at Placer over to Lieutenant Adams, Philippine Constabulary, this a. m.

Very respectfully,

J. H. HUNT,
Lieutenant, Philippine Constabulary.

EXHIBIT 29.

JABONGA, SURIGAO, MINDANAO, April 21, 1903.

The ADJUTANT, SURIGAO EXPEDITION,
Surigao, Mindanao.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that in obedience to instructions from your office, dated the 11th instant, I left this place the morning of the 13th instant, with a command consisting of Lieutenant Goodwyn and 16 men Company G, Twenty-ninth Infantry; 1 private, Hospital Corps, U. S. Army, and Doctor Winslow, Philippine Constabulary; 1 sergeant, 14 men, Philippine Constabulary; 29 men Company K, Eleventh Infantry; total force, 3 officers and 61 men.

Doctor Winslow, though he had been relieved from duty in the field at his own request, immediately volunteered his services with my column. From this place it took all day to land the men and supplies on the east coast of the lake at or near

the Pyo River, which empties into the lake about one-half mile from the source of the Tubay. In order to reduce the carriers to a minimum, I only carried bacon and hard bread for my troops, in addition to coffee and sugar, but even this brought my number of cargadores over 30. As soon as a camp was established I sent out a scouting party, but no indications of the outlaws were noticed. Left camp at 5.30 a. m., morning of the 14th, and started for San Roque. The territory to this point, five hours' march, was limited on account of the lake on one side and mountains to north and east, so we were able to scout it thoroughly. The rations I had sent ahead with a small detachment by boat. Between San Roque and Gamoton is a high range of mountains, and as Lieutenant Seemann had spent six hours getting over it just a few days before and had found nothing, I decided not to make the crossing, but embarked in barrotos from Gamoton, where the entire party was landed after dark. Being short of barrotos it took two or three trips for each boat. Arriving at Gamoton, I found Lieutenant Seemann had established a camp near the lake covering the landing place and guarding the boats. As long as troops are out this camp should be established, and I recommend that 15 constabulary be immediately sent there.

Lieutenant Seemann himself was camped with a detachment of his men about a mile and a half from the shore, and had been in the Gamoton district scouting for four or five days.

On the 15th I sent Lieutenant Goodwyn out with one party to the north for a two days' scout. He covered about all the eastern half of the Magtayaco district.

Lieutenant Seemann joined with me and we went to the south, taking in everything to the San Roque Mountains. There worked to the east-northeast, covering the whole section to my satisfaction. The 16th, in addition to Lieutenant Goodwyn's detachment being out, I divided my Company K men and the constabulary into three detachments, averaging 10 men each. One I took myself, and gave the other to two of my sergeants. I gave them orders to go through the Gamoton district again, each in a different direction. Lieutenant Seemann, with his scouts, went over to the foot of the mountains and then worked through the Magtayaco section. With my 8 men I went west toward the lake; worked over the mountains in the north and then east again. The country is full of trails, so I crossed and recrossed sections, and for four hours was in one section or district that had been traveled, but my party was lost. It finally led out, and in the first house I found a wounded native who had been shot in the Mamcas fight April 8 that Lieutenant Seemann had. While he did not confine himself to the truth, he told me some things that I think some dependence may be put in; that in the fight of the 8th Concepcion himself was in command and over 40 guns were engaged. Fifteen natives were wounded that he saw, and that Capt. Eduardo de los Santos was shot in the neck and wounded. He says positively that he saw him carried off up the mountain side to be buried. This I will try to verify by trying to find the grave and taking up the body.

The wounded native further stated that most of Concepcion's men had left him; that he still had about 84 guns of all kinds, but only 15 men left to use them; also that the revolver ammunition was about out; that two days after the fight he was carried by the entire party to the house where I found him. I also found that this native had been visited by our troops on two or three different occasions in the past week, but when I saw him he was in a pitiful state of neglect. I had water and camotos given him, and also had his wound dressed with a first-aid package. Not having men to remove him, I sent to get him the following day and sent him to Mainit for treatment, as he may be of some assistance to my force when well.

The 17th I again scouted in this district, going farther to the east, and two parties were out from Gamoton.

The 18th I sent Lieutenant Goodwyn with his command to the east and north to try and cross the mountains to Bacuag, and cut off the southern retreat of the outlaws who had been seen in Bacuag.

Lieutenant Seemann left our section on the 17th, as his rations were all out. Early the 18th I embarked for San Roque, as I had decided to endeavor to get to Cabadbaran by the trails near the mountains. Soon after leaving San Roque by trail I surprised a lot of people in a house and found them to be mostly women of Concepcion's band, 2 bolomen named Esteban Bare, soldier, and Pabao (I believe his name should be Bonifacio) Diern, sergeant of ladrones. With them were their wives and mothers and also the wife and mistress of Eugenio Aquillar, of this town. One prisoner that I have turned over to Lieutenant Seeman says that Eugenio killed Captain Clark.

In the house I found a quantity of clothing (insurgent uniform) and linen and a constabulary khaki officer's blouse. The entire party say they have not seen Concepcion since Tuesday following the fight of the 8th. This I do not believe.

My idea in starting for Cababaran south was to follow Concepcion south. Three prisoners I had all insisted that he was going south for more men; besides I felt sure none were left in Magtayaco. On finding the party so near San Roque it strengthened my idea, and I sent a runner into San Roque, informing Lieutenant Seemann of my capture and telling him we had better scout the southern country immediately. He joined me that night on the Pyo River with 23 men. This brought my command up to a little over 60 men.

The 19th we made a long march of over 20 miles, passed around Santiago, and camped about half a mile from the river, about 2 miles above the ford. The 20th after four hours' marching, I went into Cadbabaran; remained there one hour and then left for Tubay, where I arrived at noon. That afternoon my entire command was taken aboard the quartermaster's launch, *Chicago*, and landed at Baguian Bay about 8 o'clock. The next morning I marched over the mountain to this place. Since leaving here on the 13th the only captures of note were those quoted above, but the parts of two shotguns were found near Mamcas where Lieutenant Seemann last saw the ladrones. Three prisoners I sent to Surigao on the *Chicago*. Of the women captured 3 now have the cholera, 1 is dying and the other 2 will surely be dead by Tuesday. The other women and children will probably take the disease. Throughout the entire section over which I marched, which was really a continuous trip from the head of the lake to Tubay, a remarkable fact was the few people in the country. All houses were deserted, not for the time, but had been for days or weeks. This I inquired into and found that in most cases where they had not joined the ladrones the presidentes of the larger towns had ordered them into the towns. This was particularly noticeable in the south around Cababaran, and I believe the order countermanded and the people made to go to their homes. In this way we will know who the friendly are and may be able to get some information of the ladrones. In the Magtayaco and Gamoton districts all houses are deserted, and I am informed all these people have gone with the ladrones, this more particularly with the women than with the men. One prisoner that I have lost his wife, as she, with two others, became the mistress of Concepcion. In fact, from the information obtainable it would seem he is rapidly establishing a harem and has promoted himself a general. I believe one of the results of my march has established the fact of an easy trail to the south and the uselessness of the 40 men on the river. I would therefore recommend that an officer and 25 or 30 men of the constabulary be put at Santiago, as the section is rich and that number of men can prevent supplies from going out. The detachment on the ford is on the opposite side of the river from the trail leading to Cadbabaran, a rich and prosperous district. I would also recommend, if there is none, a trail be immediately cut from the west over the mountain to the ocean. Captain Marshall, when here, three weeks ago, told me he could get 100 natives in Mainit. If this be so, a trail could be cut in two days, and I am sure the distance to the coast can not be over 12 miles. Mainit is closer and more handy to the Magtayaco district; this place for a base is too far. Again I believe carabao could be used from Mainit to foot of mountains and native carriers from there to ocean.

During the next week I would recommend that while the forces are operating in the north that a detachment of 35 constabulary and an officer be put on the Peyo River opposite here. They can carry rice easy by baroto and can get plenty of the native potatoes. This will surely cut off any march south. I have your last orders to go to the east side of the lake, and will leave to-morrow evening as early as possible. It is absolutely necessary for me to remain here to-day and to-morrow; my command is very much run down from their recent trip. Personally I do not believe I could walk 5 miles to-day, as I am suffering from rheumatism and dhobie itch, not to the extent of making me unfit for work, for rest is all I need. I would like to ask that I be given a command large enough to start in at San Roque Mountains with as many columns as I can form, and go slowly and endeavor to find the outlaws. For this purpose I would like to have my own men, 38, Lieutenant Seemann's entire company, Lieutenants Galleher and Goodwyn, with their detachments, and Lieutenant Delaplane, with 25 men of L Company. From this command I could let Lieutenant Seemann and his lieutenant each have 5 Americans, and with the number of officers I could put six columns into the field northward, and we could go over the mountains and into Bacuag Valley. In case they were not found before reaching there, I understand that there are some very large barotos at Butuan. If so, they should be sent up the river at once, as we are all handicapped for transportation. The *Chicago* could tow boats to Tubay. If I can not have the command I asked for I would like to have Lieutenant Seemann's entire company put under my command in the Magtayaco district. I would make my headquarters and base at Gamoton. Jabonga is too far off and the dangers in the lake from swamping too apparent to use this place. I desire

to invite your attention to the fact that since my arrival here there has been an officer and detachment of the constabulary stationed here. Only three bags of rice have been purchased for them, and on the recent trip I have supplied them with bacon, meat, and salmon, and also rice from other troops—American. Since Lieutenant Tuthill arrived they have fared better. I would prefer not to take them out with me again. While in camp one evening in Magtayaco I was 200 or 300 yards from a camp of the constabulary and Twenty-ninth Infantry, under command of Lieutenant Schreiner. They are there for permanent station, and during my short stay there three or four shots were fired, one of which was as late as 11 o'clock at night, and which I learned almost caused a stampede in camp. Lieutenant Goodwyn informed me that while he was there the day before this camp amused themselves by shooting at birds. If this continues it is useless for troops to go into that section expecting to do any good. Besides, the country is of such a nature some hiking party is liable to be hit, and, again, parties scouting are apt to be attracted by this shooting and averted from their proper course. This shooting can be heard for miles, even as far as Mainit, I am informed. So far as I can see this camp is of no value. I passed on the main trail, 300 yards from the house, and they did not know I was there. If their purpose is to watch ladrones they can not be found by sitting in a house as I found them, and learned they had been in two days—that day and the day before.

To-day Lieutenant Hunt, Philippine constabulary, reported to me to relieve Lieutenant Tuthill. I had orders telling me to leave Lieutenant Tuthill here, so asked Lieutenant Hunt what order he had for the change, and he said the verbal orders of the commanding officer, Mainit, and I told him I would not recognize orders for movements of officers or men unless coming from your office. Lieutenant Tuthill is now familiar with the place, and I told Lieutenant Hunt to communicate with you in regard to this. I trust that the commanding officer will not think from my remarks herein that there is any friction between myself and the constabulary. On the contrary, our relations have been most cordial, and I am ready at all times to do anything I can to assist them, etc. I have only tried to state conditions as I found them. The Magtayaco and Gamoton districts are only about 10 square miles in total, and if the country is policed the outlaws will have to go somewhere else to live. The tracing I have inclosed is poor, but will give you some idea of my line of march, besides making some corrections on old maps. I respectfully request that I be furnished with a new tracing as soon as possible. I had to give my late one to Lieutenant Seemann, as he had none. Before closing I would like to inform you a little on the fight of the 8th (Mamcas), had by Lieutenant Seemann, and which I have learned from his very modest statement, which I am sure he will not put in a report. When he first engaged the enemy, of rather was fired on, he was within 100 yards of their line. He tried to get his natives to make a flank movement, which they would not do. The constabulary detachment had hung back and fired through his line. He finally saw nothing could be done and, in his own words, "that the ladrones could not hit anything." He personally charged their line and drove them from position. When the scouts saw his brave act many followed him. The first to follow was a corporal, and when they had advanced to about 50 feet of the enemy's line, where a large tree stood, the ladrones turned all their fire on him, and it was then he and the corporal were hit by buckshot, the corporal in the leg and Lieutenant Seemann on the right shoulder, the shot going through to the bone. The wound is only slight and is now healed, but still pains a little. I have been on the ground and believe that his gallant and dare-devil act saved his men from a possible rout. The enemy's position was one that 20 Americans could have destroyed and killed five times their number without perhaps the loss of a man. The fight was beneficial, in that it caused the ladrones to break up, and many no doubt deserted Concepcion. When Lieutenant Seemann goes out again I will give him at least three picked men from my company and they will encourage the scouts.

Very respectfully,

E. A. MACKLIN,
First Lieutenant, Eleventh Infantry, Commanding.

EXHIBIT 30.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, April 24, 1903.

LEE, Iloilo:

Use your best judgment as to troops to be employed in Surigao. Only do not use any more of the Eleventh Infantry, which will be relieved by the Eighteenth

in a few days. Colonel Myer and companies his regiment now in Surigao will be relieved by Eighteenth when you can spare them.

By command of Major-General Davis:

HEISTAND, *Adjutant-General.*

EXHIBIT 31.

ILOILO, April 25, 1903.

Colonel MYER, *Surigao:*

Forty-seventh Company Scouts, between 80 and 90 men, under Lieutenant King, will leave on *Samshui* some time to-morrow for Surigao to report to you for field duty, with twenty days' supplies. If possible, I may make you the promised visit. Do you need another doctor and some more hospital corps men and medical supplies? If so, will send everything with this company. Are you needing any funds or anything else which can be supplied from here? If so, wire fully, and will endeavor to meet wants. Division commander wired me under date of 24th that "In a few days Colonel Myer and companies his regiment now in Surigao will be relieved by Eighteenth Infantry when you can spare them." I shall answer that I prefer you to remain in Surigao until trouble closed out and constabulary and civil authorities resume full control. This is due you on account of your hard work and that of your command, and I want you to have all the credit for the final smash-up of the outlaws, because you have been so vigorous so far. I also asked the division commander that when you and your companies leave Surigao you go by way of Tacloban, as you had previously requested. May your success continue to the end.

LEE, *Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

ILOILO, April 25, 1903.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Division Manila:*

Reply to your wire 24th, saying, "In few days Colonel Myer and companies his regiment now in Surigao will be relieved by Eighteenth when I can spare them," I request that Colonel Myer, with his present command, all familiar with the situation, continue their vigorous operations until constabulary and civil authorities can resume full control. Do not think it will take but few weeks longer, and desire that Colonel Myer and his hard-worked command receive full credit for the final smash-up of the outlaws. When Colonel Myer and the companies of his regiment are withdrawn, he asked to go by the way of Tacloban to get families and property, and unless otherwise instructed I will so order. Will send Forty-seventh Company of Scouts, Lieutenant King, on *Samshui* to-morrow to Surigao for field duty under Colonel Myer. May go there in person for a brief visit, and return by way of Tacloban.

LEE, *Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

EXHIBIT 32.

HEADQUARTERS SURIGAO EXPEDITION,
IN THE FIELD,
Surigao, Mindanao, P. I., April 30, 1903.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
Iloilo, Panay, P. I.

SIR: Since date of my last report (April 15) I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the Surigao expedition:

On April 15 Lieutenant Macklin's report of his scout, mentioned in previous report, had not been received, but later was received and forwarded to your office. A copy of this report is inclosed. Lieutenant Macklin's detachment scouted the country east of the lake to Bacuag and south to Cadbabaran, following a trail instead of the Tubay River. He did not succeed in locating the outlaw band, but he found their women (mistresses of the leaders), guarded by two bolomen, with a quantity of cloth, linen, constabulary officers' blouse, etc. These people were taken as prisoners, but most of them—the women—have since died of cholera. The outlaws next were heard from on the 16th, when Lieutenant Hunt, Philippine Constabulary, reported from Placer that the vice-presidente of Bacuag informed him that the outlaws were reported to be in a barrio of that town. Lieutenant Hunt immediately proceeded to that place where they were reported to have been, but

arrived too late. He recovered, however, 1 revolver and some constabulary clothing, etc. Copy of this report is inclosed. This is the last that has been heard of the outlaws, except from prisoners breaking away from the band, who report that the band is much reduced. The prisoner who saw them last, about the 22d instant, stated that there were not more than 20 men with Concepcion and that the band was in some mountain called "Chicharao," east of Lake Mainit. Parties have been and are still scouting this section and will continue to scout it, but so far they have not been able to locate the band. However, I hope by continually scouting some detachment will be rewarded by getting a chance to strike them.

Captain Blatchford having frequently reported the impossibility for the outlaws to get from the section around the lake to Cantilan, he, with his company, was moved on April 18, 1903, to Gigaquit. The Forty-fifth Company scouts, 73 men, Lieutenants Walker and Small, reported April 27 and was sent at daybreak the 28th to Placer and Gigaquit; forty-three men, under Lieutenant Walker, to Gigaquit, and the remainder of the company, 30 men, under Lieutenant Small, temporarily to Placer. This detachment has now been sent to Taganito to look after the valley between there and the mountains toward the lake. On the 29th Company E, Twenty-ninth Infantry, Captain Woodward and Lieutenant Beebe, 87 men, reported and was sent on the morning of the 30th to relieve Company G, Twenty-ninth Infantry, at Mainit, and G Company was ordered to Placer to recuperate. Since April 15 the following arms have been recovered: Three revolvers, caliber .45; 4 shotguns, Remington; 1 Winchester rifle. This leaves in hands of outlaws: Forty-five revolvers, 18 shoguns, 1 Krag rifle, 2 Springfield carbines, 13 Remington rifles.

Although the outlaws as a band have not been encountered since the 8th, yet a great many of the outlaws and people who were associated with them in the sacking of the constabulary quarters on March 23 have been arrested and most of them confined; some of them released on account of insufficient evidence; others, who without doubt were compelled to accompany the ladrones, released and used as secret service; others released on bail.

From all information at hand there were 195 members of the outlaw band and people associated with them both prior to or since March 23 last. There have been captured or have presented themselves 115, which leaves 80 men still at liberty. A list is inclosed showing as far as can be ascertained the names of all the outlaws, the towns from which they are accredited, showing those captured and those still at large, and the disposition made of those captured.

A roster of troops under my command is inclosed.

The energy displayed by all in attempting to capture these outlaws is to be commended. It has not been relaxed since last report, although the most adverse circumstances of weather and country.

Very respectfully,

ALBERT L. MYER,
Colonel, Eleventh Infantry, Commanding.

EXHIBIT 33.

List of all persons connected with the riot in Surigao.

Name.	Arrested or uncaught.	Disposition.	Remarks.
Abarca, Vicente	Arrested	Released	Was prisoner of ladrones.
Abrajan, Ganoto	do	do	Surrendered sack of ammunition.
Adano, Julian	do	Prisoner	Carried arms Mar. 23, 1903.
Agolson, Tiofista	do	do	Received stolen money.
Alberto, Jose	Uncaught	do	Accompanied ladrones.
Alcalde, Maximino	Arrested	On bail	Tried to succor ladrones.
Alcalde, Felipe	do	do	Gave information to ladrones.
Alpojando, Simeo	do	Prisoner	Joined ladrones.
Altoya, Maximo	Uncaught	do	Do.
Aning, Juan	Arrested	Prisoner	Looted cuartel.
Andrado, Pablo	do	do	Surrendered shotgun.
Armiso, Vicente	do	do	Philippine Constabulary; joined ladrones.
Atillo, Vicente	do	do	A leader of ladrones.
Atillo, Antonio	do	do	Compelled to give up revolver.
Atillo, Francisca	do	do	Perjury.
Atlojo, Cabino	do	Released	Suspect.
Balbuena, Milico	do	do	Safe-stealing deal.

List of all persons connected with the riot in Surigao—Continued.

Name.	Arrested or uncaught.	Disposition.	Remarks.
Bilumeya, Marciano	Arrested	Prisoner	Surrendering shotgun.
Binicio, Nicolas	do	Released	Was prisoner of ladrones.
Bitay, Alejandro	do	Prisoner	Safe-stealing deal.
Bitay, Eduardo	do	Released	Surrendered gun.
Caba, Victor	do	do	Surrendered revolver.
Cabana, Emiliano	do	do	do
Calang, Pedro	do	Released	Was prisoner of ladrones.
Calang, Pedro	Uncaught	do	Joined ladrones of Tambis.
Calang, Alfonso	Arrested	Released	Was prisoner of ladrones.
Calo, Victor	Uncaught	do	Leader of safe-stealing deal.
Calo, Basilio	Arrested	Prisoner	Perjury.
Cana, Candido	do	do	Was prisoner of ladrones.
Cantillas, Bonifacio	do	do	Concealed arms.
Carayag, Pablo	do	do	Perjury.
Castro, Igmidio	Uncaught	do	Joined ladrones.
Catorman, Rufino	Arrested	Prisoner	Concealed arms.
Catorman, Pedro	do	Released	Surrendered Clark's bolo.
Cayano, Eutiquino	do	Prisoner	Was prisoner of ladrones.
Ciclon, Leoncio	do	do	Joined ladrones.
Ciding, Juana	do	do	Perjury.
Clerino, Raymondo	Uncaught	do	Joined ladrones.
Cofu, Isidro	Arrested	Prisoner	Was prisoner of ladrones.
Comillas, Pedro	do	do	Joined ladrones; looted cuartel.
Cotianque, Proferio	do	Released	Was prisoner of ladrones.
Diocampo, Valentino	do	Prisoner	Joined ladrones.
Dolorican, Antonio	do	do	Suspect.
Escultura, Alijo	Uncaught	do	Joined ladrones.
Espirat, Sancho	do	do	Sergeant of ladrones.
Espirat, Daniel	do	do	Joined ladrones (killed).
Estoque, Vicente	do	do	Joined ladrones.
Fabula, Claros	Arrested	Prisoner	Suspect.
Garse, Francisco	Uncaught	do	Accompanied ladrones.
Gemena, Eleriso	Arrested	Released	Was prisoner of ladrones.
Gesta, Damaso	do	Prisoner	Joined ladrones (wounded).
Giplala, Prudencio	do	Released	Surrendered revolver.
Godito, Vicente	Uncaught	do	Joined ladrones.
Guanco, Victorio	Arrested	On bail	Do.
Idian, Marcario	do	Prisoner	Joined ladrones.
Inana, Florencio	do	do	Was prisoner of ladrones.
Jolvisano, Leoncilo	do	Released	Was prisoner of ladrones.
Jugo, Vicente	Uncaught	do	Joined ladrones.
Lacabra, Emiliano	Arrested	Prisoner	Concealed revolver and gun.
Laraque, Adriano	do	do	Surrendered gun.
Llenada, Paulino	do	do	Suspect.
Liquido, Maliton	do	do	Was prisoner of ladrones.
Lirio, Alfonso	do	Released	Suspect.
Lubog, Jacinto	Uncaught	do	Joined ladrones.
Lubog, Pedro	do	do	Do.
Manganan, Juan	Arrested	Prisoner	Do.
Martinez, Zacarias	do	do	Gave information to ladrones.
Murcio, Antonio	do	do	Was prisoner of ladrones.
Mojan, Zacarias	do	do	Accompanied ladrones.
Olvis, Cipriano	do	do	Do.
Olvis, Bernaldo	do	do	Do.
Olvis, Francisco	do	do	Wounded; joined ladrones.
Oomil, Cipriano	do	do	Suspect.
Orfino, Dalmacio	Uncaught	do	One of the leaders of ladrones.
Orillanada, Floro	Arrested	Prisoner	Was prisoner of ladrones.
Palaciego, Parcasso	do	Released	Surrendered ammunition.
Palarenta, Raymondo	Uncaught	do	Ladrone.
Pareja, Santiago	do	do	Do.
Parinas, Lorianio	Arrested	Released	Was prisoner of ladrones.
Parpan, Lupi	do	do	Ladrones camped in his house.
Paypan, Timoteo	Uncaught	do	Ladrone (killed?).
Pecho Alfonso	Arrested	Released	Surrendered revolver.
Pecho, Emiliano	do	On bail	Carried arms Mar. 23, 1908.
Peros, Pedro	Uncaught	do	Ladrone.
Plaza, Alejandro	Arrested	Released	Surrendered revolver.
Portuganz, Leopoldo	do	do	Was prisoner of ladrones.
Porsulo, Pablo	Uncaught	do	Ladrone.
Pulsalam, Pablo	do	do	Do.
Royna, Luis	Arrested	Released	Suspect.
Robilla, Macario	do	Prisoner	Do.
Rodillo, Hermingildo	do	Released	Philippine constabulary; was pris- oner of ladrones.
Rodriguez, Donato	do	Prisoner	Looted; intimidated.
Roferos, Ronancio	do	Released	Suspect.
Rolden, Ventura	do	do	Do.
Ronquilla, Gervascio	do	Prisoner	Captain of ladrones.
Ronquilla, Silvestro	Uncaught	do	Ladrone.
Rubi, Lucas	Arrested	Prisoner	Safe-stealing deal.

List of persons connected with the riot in Surigao—Continued.

Name.	Arrested or uncaught.	Disposition.	Remarks.
Sannarro, Victor	Arrested.....	Released.....	Was prisoner of ladrones.
Santos, de los, Eduardo.....	Uncaught.....	Second in command of ladrones.
Servolos, Pedro.....	Arrested.....	Prisoner.....	Joined ladrones.
Sigues, Vicente.....	do.....	Released.....	Was prisoner of ladrones.
Sillano, Domingo.....	do.....	Prisoner.....	Do.
Solomon, Pilo.....	do.....	do.....	Guided ladrones in Surigao.
Sillano, Simon.....	Uncaught.....	Ladrone.
Suangco, Lucio.....	do.....	Do.
Suangco.....	do.....	Sheltered ladrones.
Suaso, Ireneo.....	Arrested.....	Prisoner.....	Safe-stealing deal.
Suaso, Vicente.....	do.....	do.....	Released; suspect.
Tarpin, Luis.....	do.....	do.....	Accompanied ladrones.
Tabac, Pedro.....	Uncaught.....	Ladrone.
Tercil, Pedro.....	do.....	Do.
Vanentules, Juan.....	Arrested.....	Prisoner.....	Safe-stealing deal.
Fabian.....	Uncaught.....	Ladrone.
Subracarai, Suterio.....	Arrested.....	Prisoner.....	Safe-stealing deal.

OTHER LADRONES CONNECTED WITH RIOT IN SURIGAO.

<i>Ladrones of Mainit.</i>			
Agredete, Alberto.....	Uncaught.....	Ladrone.
Agredete, Angel.....	do.....	Do.
Badajos, Marcos.....	do.....	Do.
Cabaya, Angel.....	do.....	Do.
Galbi, Martin.....	do.....	Ladrone; deserted guide.
Macabudbud, Pio.....	do.....	Do.
Macabudbud, Cornello.....	do.....	Do.
Macabudbud, Fermin.....	do.....	Do.
Macabudbud, Agapito.....	do.....	Do.
Macabudbud, Victor.....	Arrested.....	Prisoner.....	Do.
Mayon, Angel.....	do.....	do.....	Do.
Montalban, Romaldo.....	Uncaught.....	Do.
Mosende, Filomeno.....	do.....	Do.
Resolar, Graciano.....	do.....	Do.
Armasa, Fabian.....	do.....	Ladrone; Manobo.
<i>Ladrones of Timamana.</i>			
Adlao, Domingo.....	Uncaught.....	Ladrone.
Balaquit, Carlos.....	do.....	Do.
Barondo, Juan.....	do.....	Do.
Biol, Lucio.....	do.....	Do.
Biol, Marcelo.....	do.....	Do.
Belsonda, Juan.....	do.....	Do.
Bontoy, Inocente.....	do.....	Do.
Dugmoc, Alfonso.....	do.....	Do.
Dugmoc, Donato.....	do.....	Do.
Dugmoc, Francisco.....	do.....	Do.
Elunda, Francisco.....	do.....	Do.
Empata, Estanislao.....	do.....	Do.
Galoneda, Pablo.....	Arrested.....	Prisoner.....	Do.
Galoneda, Calixto.....	do.....	do.....	Do.
Malimit, Tiburcio.....	Uncaught.....	Do.
Malimit, Ambrocio.....	do.....	Do.
Macabudbud, Victorian.....	Arrested.....	Prisoner.....	Do.
Paas, Clemente.....	do.....	do.....	Teniente of barrio; suspect.
Vacil, Santiago.....	Uncaught.....	Ladrone.
Vacil, Simplicio.....	do.....	Do.
Doretio.....	do.....	Do.
<i>Ladrones of Placer.</i>			
Casana, Pedro.....	Arrested.....	Prisoner.....	Ladrone; corporal.
Casana, Miguel.....	do.....	do.....	Ladrone; spy.
Casamoc, Pedro.....	Uncaught.....	Ladrone.
Dagaco, Ramon.....	Arrested.....	Prisoner.....	Ladrone; spy.
Dilovino, Juan.....	do.....	do.....	Cargador.
Dilovino, Gregorio.....	do.....	do.....	Ladrone.
Escollada, Francisco.....	do.....	do.....	Ladrone; wounded.
Elsusura, Pedro.....	do.....	do.....	Ladrone.
Osman, Severio.....	do.....	Released.....	Was prisoner of ladrones.
Gamana, Calixto.....	do.....	Prisoner.....	Ladrone.
Gusman, Severo.....	Uncaught.....	Do.
Reformina, Antonio.....	Arrested.....	Prisoner.....	Harbored ladrones.
Reformina, Doroteo.....	do.....	do.....	Ladrone; son of above.
Reformina, Manuel.....	Uncaught.....	Ladrone; son of above. (Killed?)

List of all persons connected with the riot in Surigao—Continued.

OTHER LADRONES CONNECTED WITH RIOT IN SURIGAO—Continued.

Name.	Arrested or uncaught.	Disposition.	Remarks.
<i>Ladrones of Gamoton.</i>			
Layno, Juan	Arrested		Died of cholera; escaped prisoner.
Liano, Agoton	Uncaught		Ladrone.
Siroy, Eugenio	do		Do.
Siroy, Agopito	do		Do.
Siroy, Eusebio	Arrested	Prisoner	Do.
Siroy, Eustaquio	do		Died of cholera; lover of A. Concep- cion.
Siroy, Fermin	Uncaught		Ladrone.
Siroy, Julian	do		Do.
Siroy, Martin	do		Boy ladrone.
Cayano	do		Ladrone.
<i>Ladrones of Gigaquit.</i>			
Legaspe, Juan	Arrested	Prisoner	Ladrone.
Legaspe, Ventura	do	do	Suspect.
Paqueo, Isidro	Killed		Ladrone.
Roaya, Pedro	Uncaught		Do.
Vengal, Zacarias	Arrested	Prisoner	Do.
<i>Ladrones of Tagana-an.</i>			
Belsondo, Isidro	Uncaught		Ladrone.
Isog, Felix	do		Do.
Lisondra, Isidro	do		Do.
(Oyonga), Gregorio	do		Do.
<i>Ladrones of Jabonga.</i>			
Bare, Estevan	Arrested	Prisoner	Ladrone.
Ocsim, Bonifacio	do	do	Do.
<i>Residence not known.</i>			
Golondrino, Clarico	Uncaught		
Narco, Sutar	do		
Mesias, Escolastico	do		
<i>Cantilan.</i>			
Alfonso, Royna	Uncaught		Ladrone.

EXHIBIT 34.

Roster of troops in Surigao expedition, May 1, 1903.

Col. Albert L. Myer, Eleventh Infantry, commanding; Capt. J. S. Battle, Eleventh Infantry, adjutant; Capt. William Weigel, quartermaster, Eleventh Infantry, quartermaster and acting commissary on detached service at Tacloban, Leyte, to settle his accountability as quartermaster Camp Bumpus, and constabulary quartermaster post of Tacloban since April 28, 1903; First Lieut. F. R. de Funiak, jr., battalion adjutant, Eleventh Infantry, in charge of office of quartermaster and commissary during absence of Captain Weigel; First Lieut. and Asst. Surg. R. F. Metcalfe, U. S. Army, surgeon.

Surigao:	Men.
Headquarters Eleventh Infantry	2
Detachment Company K, Eleventh Infantry	35
Detachment Company L, Eleventh Infantry	5
Detachment Company M, Eleventh Infantry	2
Detachment Company G, Twenty-ninth Infantry	2
Detachment Company H, Twenty-ninth Infantry	2
Detachment Forty-fourth Company Philippine Scouts	5
Detachment Signal Corps	5
Detachment Hospital Corps	4
Philippine constabulary, only partially armed, not accounted for in recapitulation; constabulary officers, Lieutenants Kindler (sick) and Caswell	40

Placer:

Company G, Twenty-ninth Infantry (Lieutenants Galleher and Goodwyn)	68
Philippine constabulary	5
Hospital Corps (C. S. Jordan)	1

Gigaquit:

Company L, Eleventh Infantry (Captain Blatchford)	46
Forty-fifth Company Philippine Scouts (Lieutenant Walker)	43
Detachment Hospital Corps (C. S. Pfaulkes)	2

Baguian Bay supply station:

Detachment Company K, Eleventh Infantry	4
Philippine constabulary	6

In field near Mainit:

Company E, Twenty-ninth Infantry (Captain Woodward, Lieutenant Beebe)	87
Philippine constabulary (Captain Marshall, Lieutenants Schreiner and Zapanta)	96
Detachment Hospital Corps (C. S. Hall)	2

Jabonga:

Detachment Company K, Eleventh Infantry	4
Philippine constabulary	6

Ford:

Company H, Twenty-ninth Infantry	20
--	----

Santiago:

Company H, Twenty-ninth Infantry (Lieutenant Twyman)	20
--	----

Tubay:

Company H, Twenty-ninth Infantry (Captain Perry)	28
Detached Hospital Corps (C. S. Hanson)	1

Gamoton:

Company K, Eleventh Infantry (Lieutenant Macklin)	29
Detached Hospital Corps	1

Taganito:

Forty-fifth Company Philippine Scouts (Lieutenant Small)	30
Detached Company G, Twenty-ninth Infantry	11
Detached Hospital Corps	1

San Roque:

Forty-fourth Company Philippine Scouts (Lieutenant Seemann)	50
Detached Hospital Corps	1

Timanana:

Detached Company L, Eleventh Infantry (Lieutenant Delaplane)	25
Detached Hospital Corps	1

Bugsucan:

Detached Forty-fourth Company Philippine Scouts (Lieutenant Stoneburn)	26
Detached Company K, Eleventh Infantry	1

RECAPITULATION.

	Officers.	Men.
Headquarters Eleventh Infantry	4	2
Company K, Eleventh Infantry	1	73
Company L, Eleventh Infantry	2	75
Company E, Twenty-ninth Infantry	2	87
Company G, Twenty-ninth Infantry	2	81
Company H, Twenty-ninth Infantry	2	70
Hospital Corps	5	14
Signal Corps		5
Forty-fourth Company Philippine Scouts	2	81
Forty-fifth Company Philippine Scouts	2	73
Philippine constabulary	7	132
Total	29	663

Since the date of this roster the Forty-third Company Philippine Scouts, at Dapitan, has been put under command of Colonel Myer, per telegraphic instructions department commander.

EXHIBIT 35.

Movements of troops in Surigao expedition.

March 24: Company G, Twenty-ninth Infantry (Lieutenants Galleher and Goodwyn and 76 enlisted men), and Company H, Twenty-ninth Infantry (Captain Perry and Lieutenant Twyman and 71 enlisted men), left Camp Jossman, Guimaras, for Surigao, where they arrived the following day.

March 29: Field and staff Eleventh Infantry (Colonel Myer, Captain Battle, Lieutenant de Funiak, and 1 enlisted man); Company K, Eleventh Infantry (Lieutenant Macklin and 75 enlisted men), and Company L, Eleventh Infantry (Captain Blatchford and Lieutenant Delaplane and 79 enlisted men), left Tacloban, Leyte, for Surigao, where they arrived March 30.

March 30: Company No. 44, Philippine Scouts (Lieutenants Seemann and Stoneburn and 80 enlisted men), left Camp Jossman for Surigao, where they arrived April 1, disembarking the following day.

April 21: Company No. 43, Philippine Scouts (Lieutenants Frank and Grennan and 78 enlisted men), left Camp Jossman, Guimaras, for Dapitan, where they arrived the following day.

April 25: Company No. 45, Philippine Scouts (Lieutenants Walker and Small and 73 enlisted men), left Camp Jossman, Guimaras, for Surigao. Embarked April 25; left Iloilo Straits April 26, and arrived off Surigao April 27.

April 28: Company E, Twenty-ninth Infantry (Captain Woodward and Lieutenant Beebe and 87 enlisted men), left Cebu for Surigao; arrived following morning.

May 7: Company No. 49, Philippine Scouts (Lieutenants Willits and Cooper and 94 enlisted men), left Cagayan; arrived and took station at Dapitan following day.

May 8: Company No. 43, Philippine Scouts (Lieutenants Frank and Grennan and 78 enlisted men), left Dapitan, arrived and took station at Cagayan following day.

[Extract from the record of events of the return of the Department of the Visayas for March, 1903.]

On March 23 a band of about thirty insurgents, under a leader named Concepcion, entered the town of Surigao, Mindanao, at noon, the band being quickly joined by some 100 natives, many other of the townsfolk being in strong sympathy with them. The combined forces then proceeded to constabulary headquarters, knowing the barracks would be empty at that hour and the men at dinner. The one sentry on duty was easily overpowered, Inspector Clark killed, and the barracks and constabulary storehouse sacked. The insurgents secured in all 56 Remington shotguns, 40 Colt revolvers, 10 Springfield carbines, 20 Remington rifles, 5,000 rounds of ammunition, and 5,400 pesos, civil funds. The remainder of the day and that night they stayed in the town, remaining at constabulary headquarters and leaving early the next morning, the padre having informed them that a gunboat was coming. The band, now numbering about 100 men, with 128 firearms and abundant ammunition, fell back on the village of Placer, remaining unbroken until its arrival at this place.

The day following the attack on the town Lieutenants Brown and Patterson, Tenth Infantry, and 30 men of Company M, Tenth Infantry, arrived by launch from Iligan, Mindanao, and were followed at noon of the same day by Companies G and H, Twenty-ninth Infantry, under the command of Captain Perry, of that regiment. To this officer had been transmitted the division commander's instructions, which were, in brief, as follows, viz:

"Troops will occupy town, drive out insurgents, restore and maintain order in town of Surigao, and protect people and property from violence."

By this time constabulary reinforcements were also upon the scene and scouting parties of both military and constabulary immediately started in pursuit. As a military necessity the province of Surigao was temporarily detached from the Department of Mindanao by the commanding general, Division of the Philippines, and attached to this department, but the civil commission decided that for the time being martial law would not be declared there.

The department commander, Brig. Gen. Jesse M. Lee, U. S. Army, accompanied by First Lieut. G. V. H. Moseley, First Cavalry, aid-de-camp, left Iloilo, Panay, March 24, and arrived at Surigao on the following evening, from which time until the arrival on the night of March 30 of Colonel Myer, Eleventh Infantry, with headquarters and Companies K and L of his regiment, he continued to exer-

cise immediate command of all troops and constabulary in the province. On the 31st instant the department commander turned over the command of the combined forces to Colonel Myer and prepared to return to Iloilo at daybreak the next morning.

On the 28th instant information was received that Concepcion, the insurgent leader, was at Mount Magtayaco, province of Surigao, but by the end of the month he had not been found, nor had any of the insurrectos, who had now split into small bands, been encountered by the military forces.

By the 29th instant 3,300 out of the 5,400 pesos taken had been recovered from natives in Surigao and vicinity, who took part in or aided or abetted the outbreak, over 30 of these being by this time in arrest in the hands of the civil authorities.

NOTE.—The following, with possibly some slight modifications, is an extract from what will probably appear in record of events on the return of the Department of the Visayas for April, 1903.

Excellent progress was made by Col. A. L. Myer, Eleventh Infantry, and the army and Philippine constabulary forces under his command in the province of Surigao, Mindanao, in breaking up the band of outlaws (or insurrectos) who had so successfully raided the constabulary barracks in the town of Surigao during the preceding month, with the result that by the end of the men (?), 65 prisoners were in the hands of the civil authorities (leaving only about 25 at large), and the following arms had been recovered, viz, 29 Remington shotguns, 14 Colts revolvers, 7 Springfield carbines, and 9 Remington rifles, a total of 59 fire-arms recovered out of 136 originally secured by the outlaws.

The following sets forth in detail the military operations and important occurrences in this province during the month:

April 1: Company No. 44, Philippine Scouts, arrived off Surigao evening of this date and disembarked next morning.

April 4: Garcia, the provincial governor, suspended, and Herman Gildenar-cisco, the secretary, appointed acting governor.

April 5: Constabulary detachment under Inspector Hibbard surprised band of outlaws near Gamoton. Band demoralized and, after firing few shots, scattered in all directions; had 1 killed and number wounded. Constabulary detachment had no casualties, and captured 3 Remingtons, 1 revolver, 50 rounds rifle ammunition, 25 rounds shotgun ammunition, some bolos, spears, blankets, constabulary caps and hats, and 2 swords of the late Inspector Clark.

April 8: Lieutenant Schreiner, Philippine constabulary, with a mixed column, encountered outlaws in small parties near Mount Magtayaco; captured 1 rifle and 1 carbine, killed 3 of the enemy, and brought in 1 wounded prisoner.

April 9: Colonel Myer reported recovery of 2 more shotguns.

April 10: Colonel Myer reported 1 more gun surrendered by deserter. Lieutenant Seemann, Philippine Scouts, with detachment of Company No. 44, Philippine Scouts, returned to San Roque this date, after three days running fight in mountains. Outlaws would not stand and fled into mountains, carrying 15 wounded. One revolver, 20 rounds rifle ammunition, 1 knife, and a constabulary cap recovered.

April 11: Colonel Myer reported recovery 2 shotguns and 30 rounds shotgun ammunition that day. Lieutenant Adams, Philippine constabulary, found 3 shotguns and some ammunition.

April 13: Colonel Myer, at Surigao, addressed about 25 presidentes of the province, impressing upon them the importance of the responsibility to the towns they represented in gathering and imparting to the proper authorities all information possibly obtainable of whereabouts of outlaws, and to arrest on their own responsibility any of the band. The presidentes expressed the utmost desire to aid in every way the efforts of the authorities to secure outlaws and reestablish peace.

April 19: Colonel Myer reported finding by constabulary, in vicinity of Bacuag, in building occupied four hours previously by outlaws, haversacks, canteens, papers, blankets, clothing, loot, a pistol with belt and holster, and small quantity of ammunition. The pieces of two broken shotguns were also found this date by a scouting party under a sergeant of Company K, Eleventh Infantry.

April 27: The department commander, Brig. Gen. Jesse M. Lee, First Lieut. G. V. H. Moseley, First Cavalry, aid-de-camp, and Company No. 45, Philippine Scouts (from Camp Jossman, Guimaras), arrived at Surigao.

April 29: Company E, Twenty-ninth Infantry (from Cebu, Cebu), arrived at Surigao. The department commander, accompanied by Lieutenant Moseley, left Surigao to return to Iloilo, Panay.

April 30: Colonel Myer reported securing 5 more prisoners, 1 revolver, and some bolos.

EXHIBIT 36.

Memorandum of arms captured by outlaws of Surigao and of those recovered.

	Revolvers, caliber .45.	Shot-guns.	Krag rifle.	Spring-field carbines.	Winchester rifle.	Remington rifles.	Total.
Taken by bandits, Surigao.....	59	47	1	9	1	22	139
Recovered at Jobason.....		6		3		5	14
Turned in by Colonel Myer.....	1	6					7
Captured by Lieutenant Seemann.....	1						1
Captured by Lieutenant Schreiner.....		1				1	2
Turned in to constabulary.....	8	9		4			21
Captured by Lieutenant Hibbard.....	1					3	4
Found by Lieutenant Adams.....		3					3
Turned in by Colonel Myer.....	1	1					2
Recovered by Lieutenant Hunt.....	1						1
Recovered by Lieutenant Macklin.....		2					2
Turned in by Colonel Myer.....	1				1		2
Found by provincial supervisor.....		1					1
Found by Lieutenant Delaplane.....	1						1
Total recovered.....	15	29		7	1	9	61
Remaining out.....	44	18	1	2		13	78

SURIGAO, MINDANAO, P. I., May 1, 1903.

EXHIBIT 37.

[Telegram.]

SURIGAO, May 5, 1903—11.40 p. m.

General LEE, Iloilo:

Have just returned from Placer and all the points on the east coast as far as Taganito. Have everybody supplied to include May 20. Could learn nothing new. Have arrested the presidentes of Mainit and Tigamana for alleged complicity Surigao affairs. Evidence against Tigamana quite conclusive. Since last report have got a number of prisoners; some with good information for future use of civil courts. Vicente Attilo, one of the leaders captured, brought in while you were here, gives some very conclusive testimony as to who actually killed Captain Clark. Copy sent to you personally.

MYER, Colonel.

EXHIBIT 38.

[Telegram.]

ILOILO, May 6, 1903.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DIVISION, Manila:

Colonel Myer wires from Surigao he has arrested presidentes of Mainit and Tigamana for complicity in Surigao affair. Evidence against Tigamana quite conclusive. Has number of additional prisoners with good information for use of civil courts. Vicente Attilo, one of the leaders captured, gives some conclusive testimony as to who actually killed Clark, inspector.

LEE, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

EXHIBIT 39.

[Telegram.]

ILOILO, May 9, 1903.

Colonel MYER,

Commanding Surigao Expedition, Surigao, Mindanao:

Before relinquishing command of the department I wish to express to you, and through you to the officers and men of your command in the Surigao expedition,

including the regulars, the scouts, the constabulary, and the loyal civil officials, my heartiest thanks for the zeal, energy, and efficiency which have been manifest in the hard work incident to the campaign. I congratulate you and them upon the splendid success thus far achieved, and upon what I believe will be the early conclusion of active operations and complete restoration of peace and order in the province of Surigao, which you have so ably commanded. If you desire you can publish this in a general order to your command.

LEE, *Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

EXHIBIT 40.

[Map.]

EXHIBIT 41.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION, MANILA, *April 19, 1903.*

LEE, *Iloilo:*

Major-general commanding directs that Forty-third Company, Native Scouts, be sent with thirty days' supply on *Samshui* to Dapitan for station. It is desired commanding general Department Visayas see personally to supplying of Dapitan, Cagayan, and Surigao. Interisland transports on regular routes to be used as far as practicable for this. General Sumner has been notified.

HEISTAND, *Adjutant-General.*

EXHIBIT 42.

[Telegram.]

ILOILO, *April 19, 1903.*

Colonel MYER,

Commanding Surigao Expedition, Surigao, Mindanao:

Forty-third Company of scouts, Lieutenants Frank and Grennan, ordered to Dapitan, change of station. This company will not be within my command, but it will be supplied from my department; also the company at Cagayan which came from Iligan, either from Iloilo or by your boats from Tacloban. Will advise you later as to this. Considered important that you should know as to these stations at Cagayan and Dapitan in event insurrectos in Surigao should break through and make for Misamis and Dapitan and get cooperation from either or both places.

LEE, *Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

EXHIBIT 43.

[Telegram.]

ILOILO, *April 20, 1903.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DIVISION, *Manila:*

Reference to your telegram on 19th directing that I see personally to supplying Dapitan and Cagayan. Does this refer to all supplies, including quartermaster supplies and funds, or only subsistence supplies? Company scouts leaving here for Dapitan will take everything needed, both quartermaster and subsistence supplies and small amount of funds. Understand that scouts at Dapitan and Cagayan will not be within my command for any operations or other military duties. The Forty-third Company can not leave here until to-morrow, owing to delay not now fully understood, occasioned by *Samshui* at Capiz.

LEE, *Brigadier-General, Commanding.*






EXHIBIT 44.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION,
*Manila, April 20, 1903.*General LEE, *Iloilo*:

Reference your message even date re supplies Dapitan, Cagayan. Instructions refer to all supplies.

By command Major-General Davis:

HEISTAND, *Adjutant-General.*

EXHIBIT 45.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *April 20, 1903.*LEE, *Iloilo*:

Reference your telegram this date, Dapitan is not in an organized province under civil government.

HEISTAND, *Adjutant-General.*

EXHIBIT 46.

[Telegram.]

ILOILO, PANAY, P. I., *May 2, 1903.*
ZAMBOANGA, *May 1, 1903, via Malabang, May 2.*General LEE, *Iloilo, Panay*:

I understand from division commander that the Forty-third Company scouts sent to Dapitan were to remain under your command and that the status of Dapitan would be the same as Surigao for the present. Please wire Manila about this. I am going to Iligan to-morrow and may stop at Dapitan en route, as Lieutenant Frank reports some trouble at that point. One of his men attacked and disarmed and one native shot and killed by a sergeant of the scouts. I will wire you from Iligan.

SUMNER, *Brigadier-General.*

EXHIBIT 47.

[Telegram.]

ILOILO, *May 3, 1903.*General SUMNER, *Iligan, Mindanao*:

Replying to your dispatch of 2d, have clearly understood from division commander that the company of scouts at Dapitan were not to be under my command except as to supplies, and same as to company of scouts at Cagayan. I had orders to supply Overton's troop on scout to Cagayan, but was notified by commanding officer Iligan that he had sent forage and supplies to include May 15. Will repeat substance your dispatch to Manila.

LEE, *Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

EXHIBIT 48.

[Telegram.]

ILOILO, *May 3, 1903.*ADJUTANT-GENERAL DIVISION, *Manila*:

General Sumner wires me under date May 2 that he understands from division commander that Forty-third Company scouts, which changed station from here to Dapitan, would remain under my command and status of province would be same as Surigao. My understanding has been that troops at Dapitan and Cagayan

are not under my command for any operation, but that I was merely charged with duty of supplying them, which I am trying to do. Overton's troop of cavalry sent from Iligan to scout to Cagayan and I was ordered to supply their wants on notice. The commanding officer, Iligan, notified me that he had sent them forage and rations to include May 15. Request definite instructions whether troops at Cagayan and Dapitan, including Overton's troop, are under my command for all purposes. If so will give necessary instructions to Colonel Myer to include them in theater of his operations. General Sumner wires me he will be in Iligan to-day.

LEE, *Commanding.*

EXHIBIT 49.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *May 4, 1903.*

General LEE, *Iloilo, Panay:*

Reference your telegram 3d instant, Forty-third Company scouts at Dapitan remain under your command. See copy of letter to General Sumner dated Zamboanga, April 19, furnished you. The company of scouts at Cagayan are under chief of constabulary. Overton's troop sent from Iligan to scout through Misamis for moral effect principally, and ordered to return to Iligan, and hence was not ordered to report to you. Should occasion require, this will be changed later.

HEISTAND, *Adjutant-General.*

EXHIBIT 50.

[Telegram.]

ILIGAN, *May 4.*

General LEE, *Iloilo, Panay:*

I stopped at Dapitan yesterday and directed Lieutenant Frank, Forty-third Scouts, to report to you for orders. You have probably received explanation orders from division headquarters. The Forty-third made an unfortunate entry into Dapitan. First, some trouble arose about a cart and a scout was disarmed by a native; later, and in consequence of this row, a native was shot and killed by a sergeant of scouts without any apparent cause. The revolver was returned and the native is in arrest and the sergeant is in confinement. Charge will be sent to you. The Dapitan people have always been friendly and would, I think, assist in preserving order. They have a feeling against the Forty-third Company owing to this affair, and asked if the Forty-ninth Company can be sent back to Dapitan and the Forty-third sent away. As a matter of policy I thought this move would be wise. The company is well quartered at Dapitan. Lieutenant Frank disarmed the local police on arrival. I advised him to return the arms to the presidente and to work through him in preserving order and securing information.

SUMNER, *Brigadier-General.*

EXHIBIT 51.

DIVISION PHILIPPINES, *May 4.*

General LEE, *Iloilo:*

Following is translation cipher telegram to you dated 3d:

"With reference your telegram 30th ultimo, orders May 2 direct post commissary, Tacloban, receipt to Capt. James A. Logan, jr., for all funds, property, etc., for which he is responsible in connection with *Sacramento*.

"With reference to telegram your office 2d instant, re supplies Cagayan-Dapitan, directs troops these points make requisition direct to supply department Manila. Doctor Hanz arrived Cagayan April 30 with 2 crates onions, 21 crates potatoes, 101 packages commissaries, weighing 11,000 pounds. Hereafter Hanz stops alternate trips Dapitan-Cagayan, next trip Dapitan. Make provisions with your boat that supplies do not become exhausted before this scheme goes into forceful effect."

Telegram from General Baldwin dated November 28, 1902, acknowledges receipt of code book No. 2. This code book was used in sending messages above.

By command Major-General Davis:

HEISTAND, *Adjutant-General.*

EXHIBIT 52.

[Telegram.]

ILOILO, *May 5, 1903.*ADJUTANT-GENERAL DIVISION, *Manila:*

General Sumner wires from Iligan May 4 that he visited Dapitan on 3d instant; that Forty-third Company Native Scouts sent from here had unnecessary trouble, resulting in killing of native by sergeant; that Dapitan people are friendly, but have feeling against this company, and they wish that the Forty-ninth Company, now at Cagayan, be sent back to Dapitan. Sumner recommends this change as wise. I will at once send *Samshui* with discreet officer to Dapitan to investigate, and if so ordered by division commander will change Forty-ninth Company, now under constabulary at Cagayan, to Dapitan, and send Forty-third Company, now at Dapitan, to Cagayan. Request immediate instructions. Copy of letter of instructions to General Sumner referred to in your telegram May 4 has never been received here.

LEE, *Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

EXHIBIT 53.

[Telegram.]

CAGAYAN, *May 5.*ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Iloilo:*

No tentage for men here nor at Iligan.

COOPER, *Quartermaster.*

EXHIBIT 54.

[Telegram.]

CAGAYAN, *May 5, 1903.*ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Iloilo:*

Strength of command, 1 first lieutenant, 1 second lieutenant, 94 enlisted men of Company 49, Philippine Scouts, 1 assistant surgeon, United States Army, 2 privates of Hospital Corps. Rationed to June 20.

WILLETTS, *Commanding.*

EXHIBIT 55.

[Telegram.]

CAGAYAN, *May 5, 1903.*ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Iloilo:*

Scouts rationed to about June 20.

COOPER, *Quartermaster.*

EXHIBIT 56.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *May 6, 1903.*General LEE, *Iloilo:*

Reference to your telegram 5th instant, and with approval civil governor, dated May 6, Forty-ninth Company scouts, now at Cagayan, is relieved from duty with constabulary and the Forty-third Company scouts, now at Dapitan, placed under orders chief constabulary. Forty-third Company will proceed to Cagayan and be reported by telegraph to chief constabulary for duty and relieve Forty-ninth Company, which will then proceed to Dapitan for station and remain under command commanding general, Department Visayas.

By command Major-General Davis:

HEISTAND, *Adjutant-General.*

EXHIBIT 57.

[Telegram.]

ILOILO, May 6, 1903.

The COMMANDING OFFICER, *Cagayan, Mindanao*:

Following telegram repeated for your information and immediate compliance, if practicable:

"MANILA, May 6, 1903.

"General LEE, *Iloilo*:

"Reference to your telegram 5th instant, and with approval civil governor, dated May 6, 1903, Forty-ninth Company scouts, now at Cagayan, is relieved from duty with constabulary and the Forty-third Company scouts, now at Dapitan, placed under orders chief constabulary. Forty-third Company will proceed to Cagayan and be reported by telegraph to chief constabulary for duty and relieve Forty-ninth Company, which will then proceed to Dapitan for station and remain under command of the commanding general, Department of Visayas.

"By command of Major-General Davis:

"HEISTAND, *Adjutant-General*."

As soon as the *Samshui* arrives, the Forty-ninth Company will stand relieved from duty at Cagayan and proceed on *Samshui* to take station at Dapitan, relieving the Forty-third Company scouts, which will proceed to Cagayan pursuant to above quoted order. Ask Captain Overton to leave strong detachment his troop Fifteenth Cavalry at Cagayan until arrival there of company from Dapitan. If this be not practicable, then leave at Cagayan detachment of 10 or 12 men of Forty-ninth Company. Forty-ninth Company will leave all supplies and transportation at Cagayan, taking only one day's rations and all Forty-ninth Company property to Dapitan. Commanding officer, Dapitan, instructed to turn over his supplies to Forty-ninth Company. Show this to Major Dodds and confer with him to expedite movement. Commanding officer, Dapitan, has tentage which he will bring with him to Cagayan. Medical officers and members of Hospital Corps will remain at their present stations unless change deemed necessary. Commanding officer, Dapitan, has rations for about 80 men to include 30th instant.

LEE, *Brigadier-General, Commanding*.

EXHIBIT 58.

[Telegram.]

ILOILO, May 6, 1903.

The COMMANDING OFFICER, *Dapitan*:(Care Maj. Frank L. Dodds, *Samshui, Cagayan, Mindanao*.)

Following telegram repeated for your information and earliest practicable compliance:

"MANILA, May 6.

"General LEE, *Iloilo*:

"Reference to your telegram 5th instant and with approval of the civil governor dated May 6, Forty-ninth Company of scouts, now at Cagayan, is relieved from duty with the constabulary, and the Forty-third Company scouts, now at Dapitan, place under orders chief constabulary. Forty-third Company will proceed to Cagayan and report by telegraph to chief of constabulary for duty and relieve Forty-ninth Company, which will then proceed to Dapitan for station and remain under command of the commanding general Department of Visayas.

"By command Major-General Davis.

"HEISTAND, *Adjutant-General*."

Upon arrival of Forty-ninth Company from Cagayan you and your company will stand relieved from duty at Dapitan and will proceed to Cagayan, reporting to the senior officer present there, if any; otherwise assume command of station, reporting by telegraph to the chief of constabulary, Manila, for duty. You will take with you all your company property and tentage and put your command in camp at Cagayan. You will leave all supplies of subsistence excepting one day's rations to use while on boat. The medical officer and hospital corps men will remain unless necessary to go with you. You will receive all transportation and

other supplies at Cagayan left there by the Forty-ninth Company scouts, having your quartermaster and commissary give proper receipts therefor.

Four horses and 1 escort wagon, 1 spring wagon, and 1 teamster are on *Legaspi* and will be left at Cagayan for your use. It is regretted that the trouble at Dapitan has caused this change, and it is hoped that under your careful management there will be no cause for any further complaint of misconduct of your scouts.

Major Dodds will investigate fully, and I reserve opinion until his report is received. You will not be under my orders for any movements at Cagayan, but you will be supplied by this department. Be as economical as possible consistent with efficient service. Major Dodds will acknowledge receipt. This telegram completes telegraphic orders for which *Samshui* was ordered held.

By command of Brigadier-General Lee.

FINLEY, *Adjutant-General*.

EXHIBIT 59.

[Telegram.]

ILOILO, *May 6, 1903.*

Maj. F. L. DODDS, *Samshui, Cagayan, Mindanao:*

Hold *Samshui* at Cagayan until arrival of my telegraphic instructions for commanding officer Cagayan and Dapitan.

LEE, *Brigadier-General, Commanding*.

EXHIBIT 60.

[Telegram.]

ILOILO, *May 6, 1903.*

The COMMANDING OFFICER, *Cagayan, Mindanao:*

An officer must remain in command of detachment which guards station when Forty-ninth Company leaves.

By command of Brigadier-General Lee:

FINLEY, *Adjutant-General*.

EXHIBIT 61.

[Telegram.]

ILOILO, *May 6, 1903.*

Lieutenant CAMERON,

Fifteenth Cavalry, Cagayan, Mindanao:

What is your status at Cagayan? Are you in command of station to remain there or are you in command of Forty-ninth Company scouts? If the latter, you will go with that company to Dapitan; if the former only, presume you will remain at Cagayan and not under orders of my department except for supplies.

By command of Brigadier-General Lee:

FINLEY, *Adjutant-General*.

EXHIBIT 62.

[Telegram.]

ILOILO, *May 6, 1903.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DIVISION, *Manila:*

Commanding officer scouts under constabulary at Cagayan request authority to hire houses for officers and storehouses. He has no tentage and says none at Iligan. In my opinion this command should be provided with tents and go into camp without expense. Have directed commanding officer to make requisition accordingly. Request orders of division commander on subject.

LEE, *Commanding*.

EXHIBIT 63.

[Telegram.]

ILOILO, *May 6, 1903.*COMMANDING OFFICER, *Cagayan, Mindanao:*

Hire of quarters mentioned in your telegram of May 3 is approved for temporary use only until tentage can be supplied. The rent must be lowest obtainable and privilege of vacation on ten days' notice.

By command of Brigadier-General Lee:

FINLEY, *Adjutant-General.*

EXHIBIT 64.

[Telegram.]

ILOILO, *May 6, 1903.*COMMANDING OFFICER, *Cagayan, Mindanao:*

The transportation sent you by Legaspi is to be retained at Cagayan for use of any troops stationed there.

By command of Brigadier-General Lee:

FINLEY, *Adjutant-General.*

EXHIBIT 65.

[Telegram.]

ILOILO, *May 6, 1903.*COMMANDING OFFICER, *Cagayan, Mindanao:*

As you are to be supplied from this department you are directed to make requisition for necessary tentage for your command by wire, to be followed by requisition by mail.

By command of Brigadier-General Lee:

FINLEY, *Adjutant-General.*

EXHIBIT 66.

[Telegram.]

ILOILO, *May 6, 1903.*Maj. FRANK L. DODDS, *Samshui, Cagayan, Mindanao:*

Take Forty-ninth Company scouts from Cagayan to Dapitan and bring Forty-third Company from Dapitan to Cagayan, and then proceed on *Samshui* to Surigao as soon as paymaster and signal officer get through. Captain Overton wires that he needs no funds. Bring back secret-service money and have quartermaster agent bring back quartermaster funds. Full instructions sent to the commanding officer, Cagayan, also instructions in your care for the Forty-third Company at Dapitan. Acknowledge receipt.

LEE, *Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

EXHIBIT 67.

[Telegram.]

ILOILO, *May 7, 1903.*General SUMNER, *Iligan, Zamboanga, Mindanao:*

Referring to your telegram of 4th instant, regret that no copy of letter or instructions to you of April 19 were received. Orders from division to change Forty-ninth Company scouts with Forty-third Company scouts, the former going to Dapitan and the latter to Cagayan. Also that company at Dapitan will remain under my orders for all purposes. No definite instructions as to whether Overton's troop cavalry is under my orders or not. Hope there will be no more trouble at

Dapitan. Sent *Samshui* to change companies and with discreet officer to investigate Dapitan trouble. From personal experience in Surigao, and Colonel Myer's reports received since I was there, I find much collusion between some native officials and the insurrectos, and we have been repeatedly deceived by double dealing. Hope Dapitan case will prove an exception, and that native officials and people at Dapitan will fully justify your good opinion of them as to their loyal cooperation in preventing any further trouble.

LEE, *Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

EXHIBIT 68.

[Telegram.]

CAGAYAN, *May 6, 1903.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT VISAYAS, *Iloilo:*

My orders again revoked. Please ship rations, quartermaster supplies, and money as order approved. Troops remain for work in this province, Cagayan as base.

OVERTON, *Captain.*

EXHIBIT 69.

[Telegram.]

ILOILO, *May 7, 1903.*

Maj. FRANK L. DODDS, *Samshui, Cagayan, Mindanao:*

Second telegram from Overton states that he needs the funds originally asked for. Turn over the secret-service money as originally ordered, and direct the quartermaster agent to do the same with the quartermaster funds.

By command of Brigadier-General Lee:

FINLEY, *Adjutant-General.*

EXHIBIT 70.

ZAMBOANGA, *April 19,^a 1903.*

Brig. Gen. S. SUMNER, U. S. Army,
Commanding Department, Mindanao.

GENERAL: Referring to his conversation with you, the division commander directs me to inform you that upon the request of the governor of Philippine Islands he has placed the company of scouts at Cagayan, Misamis, for duty under the chief of constabulary, and has directed General Lee to send the Forty-third Company Philippine Scouts to Dapitan, Mindanao, for station which remains under his command. Since the cables are temporarily disarranged in Mindanao, thus cutting off Zamboanga from direct wire communication with Manila, and because of the greater facilities for supplying from Iloilo, the division commander has directed General Lee to take charge of supply of the troops at Dapitan and Cagayan. Should circumstances require in the near future more troops to put down further disorder in northern Mindanao, General Lee will command supply the troops employed, just as is now done at Surigao. This will not, however, apply to those troops at Iligan nor to those on the Lake Lanao road.

I have the honor to remain, General, very respectfully,

G. T. LANGHORNE,
Captain, Eleventh Cavalry, Aid-de-Camp,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

^a Copy not received by General Lee until May 8, 1903.

Report of Col. Albert L. Myer, Eleventh Infantry, of operations of the Surigao expedition, March 24 to July 15, 1903.

HEADQUARTERS SURIGAO EXPEDITION IN THE FIELD,
Surigao, Mindanao, P. I., July 16, 1903.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
Iloilo, Panay, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Surigao expedition in the field, prefaced by a brief account of the events leading up thereto.

PREFACE.

On the night of January 5, 1903, 9 prisoners, to wit, Adriano Concepcion, Eduardo de los Santos, Vicente Atillo, Dalmaceo Orfino, Lucio Suangco, Jacinto Chicote, Isidoro Paquio, Gregorio Limba (alias Pedro Concepcion), and Calixto Baile, most of whom were confined for alleged conspiracy and insurrection, escaped from the provincial jail in Surigao, having been assisted by a woman, Juana Ankao, and a man named Urbano Demano, with an auger and rope furnished by the woman. These prisoners succeeded in boring out and removing the boards in the ceiling of the prison room under the court room and lowering themselves to the ground from that room.

In the early morning of the 6th of January, on the discovery of the escape, the jailer (Mr. Tracy), accompanied by Mr. Frost, notified Capt. L. M. Clark, inspector, Philippine constabulary, and together they succeeded in locating and arresting the man and the woman (who were afterwards sentenced to six months' confinement); 7 of the escaped prisoners made their way to the district of Gamoton by easy stages, Pedro Concepcion and Jacinto Chicote making their way to Bohol, where they were arrested on suspicion and sent to Cebu, awaiting transportation to Surigao, and while in Cebu they broke jail and as yet have not been arrested.

The other escaped prisoners, under the leadership of Adriano Concepcion, after living in that section of the country (Gamoton) apparently undisturbed, succeeded some time in March in organizing a party from that vicinity, the avowed purpose of which, except that of ladronism, has not as yet been discovered.

Some 40 incorporated, and on the 21st or 22d day of March this party started, under the leadership of Concepcion, for Surigao.

They established themselves on the night of March 22 (Sunday) very near the town, obtaining food and information from friends in the town.

On March 23 (Monday), finding the constabulary quarters practically undefended except by a single sentry, they entered at noon, disarmed the sentry, and killed Captain Clark, Philippine constabulary, who encountered them single handed and wounded 2 of them.

They then looted the barracks and storerooms, broke open the safe and destroyed other articles of value, and after practically holding the town and penning up all the American residents in the provincial building until about 6 p. m., they left in the direction of Bugsucan, part of them going to Placer and others to Timamana, where they all joined about Wednesday and went to the vicinity of Gamoton.

As a result of the looting of the constabulary quarters, the following arms, etc., were obtained by the outlaws: One Krag rifle; 1 Winchester rifle, caliber .45; 9 Springfield carbines, caliber .45; 22 Remington rifles, caliber .45; 59 revolvers, caliber .45; 53 Remington shotguns; 5,361 rounds of ammunition, all kinds; \$5,532.79 local currency. Also a quantity of clothing and commissaries.

THE SURIGAO EXPEDITION IN THE FIELD.

On March 24, at daylight, Lient. Col. W. C. Taylor, Philippine constabulary, with Captain Marshall and 25 men, constabulary, arrived at Surigao, and at 10 a. m., same date, Colonel Taylor, with 18 men, went by boat to Placer, where it was reported the outlaws were heading for. On arrival at Placer, as it was reported there that nothing had been heard of the outlaws, nor had the officials of the town heard anything of the occurrences in Surigao on March 23, Colonel Taylor left Placer for Surigao about 3 o'clock p. m., which is to be regretted, as the outlaws arrived at Placer about half past 8 o'clock the same evening, remained there that night, and left early the morning of the 25th for Gamoton, via Timamana and Joboson. At 5 o'clock a. m., March 25, Captain Marshall, with Lieutenant Hunt and 53 men, all constabulary, were sent toward the lake, via Timamana. At 8 o'clock a. m., same date, a detachment of 30 men of the Tenth Infantry, under First Lient. Walter S. Brown, arrived from Iligan with orders to protect the town of Surigao. At noon, same date, Companies G and H, Twenty-ninth Infantry,

arrived with similar orders, and about 7.30 p. m. Brig. Gen. Jesse M. Lee, U. S. Army, commanding the Department of the Visayas, arrived, and on the same date assumed command of all troops and Philippine constabulary, with their transportation in the province.

At 2 o'clock a. m., the 26th, Capt. H. R. Perry, Twenty-ninth Infantry, with his company, H, was sent to Tubay to prevent outlaws from going south. At the same time the detachment of the Tenth Infantry, under Lieutenant Brown, was relieved from duty in the province and sent to its proper station, Iligan, on the *Formosa*.

On the 27th, First Lieut. Paul C. Galleher, Twenty-ninth Infantry, with Detachment G, Twenty-ninth Infantry, and constabulary, were sent to Gigaquit with instructions to work over to Lake Mainit. On the same date Lieut. S. M. Hibbard, Philippine constabulary, with 38 constabulary, arrived from Leyte and were sent to Tubay to cooperate with Captain Perry. On the 28th, Lieut. Col. W. C. Taylor, constabulary, with Lieutenant Goodwyn and 25 men Company G, Twenty-ninth Infantry, went from Placer to Timamana, where Colonel Taylor was informed by letter from Captain Marshall, Philippine constabulary, that the outlaws were reported to be at Magtayaco. Colonel Taylor, with Lieutenant Goodwyn, Captain Marshall, and Lieutenant Hunt, and Lieutenant Hibbard, with their detachments, all arrived at Mainit on the 29th. On the same afternoon Colonel Taylor, constabulary, being the senior officer around Mainit, made the following disposition of the troops:

Captain Marshall, with Lieutenant Hunt and 50 constabulary, were sent to the Magtayaco country, where it was known that the outlaws were. Colonel Taylor, with Lieutenant Hibbard and a constabulary detachment, left same afternoon to go via Joboson and try to get in rear of the outlaws, and Lieutenant Goodwyn, with his detachment of 25 men, G Company, Twenty-ninth Infantry, was left at Mainit with instructions to follow Colonel Taylor the next morning. Captain Marshall's detachment camped at Magtayaco on the night of the 29th, and on the morning of the 30th his detachment was struck by the outlaws, with the following result: One constabulary killed and 2 wounded, and 1 rifle lost. Captain Marshall reports 3 outlaws killed, but no arms recovered. However, natives who were with the outlaws at this fight, and who later were captured or presented themselves, reported that none of the outlaws were killed and but 1 wounded. Captain Marshall withdrew his detachment without following up the outlaws, whom he reported had retreated. Colonel Taylor the same morning recovered at Joboson the following arms: Three Springfield carbines, 5 Remington rifles, and 6 Remington shotguns, in addition to some supplies that were taken from the constabulary building on the 23d. It is to be regretted that the detachment of the Twenty-ninth Infantry under Lieutenant Goodwyn was sidetracked at Mainit while, as it appears, the constabulary who had located the outlaws were sent by Colonel Taylor to win the victory and glory they failed to get. Lieutenant Goodwyn is of the opinion, in which I concur, that he was purposely left out of this engagement so that the constabulary could get the glory of it. Had his detachment been present the result would have been entirely different.

At 7 o'clock a. m., March 30, the undersigned with Companies K (Lieutenant Macklin) and L (Captain Blatchford and Lieutenant Delaplane), arrived at Surigao and reported to General Lee for duty, and on that date General Lee, being recalled by important business to department headquarters, turned over the control of affairs to the undersigned.

At daylight on March 31, Company L, Eleventh Infantry, Captain Blatchford, and Lieutenant Delaplane, 78 men, Contract Surg. Bruce Ffaulkes, and 2 hospital corps men, left for Cantilan, arriving there same date. Captain Blatchford was given instructions to move, if possible, westward and northwestward toward Mainit and the Magtayaco country. On April 1 Lieutenant Macklin with detachment of 40 men, Company K, Eleventh Infantry, left for Jabonga, arriving same date, with instructions to prevent outlaws escaping to the south. On April 2 Captain Battle, adjutant Eleventh Infantry, the Forty-fourth Company scouts (Lieutenants Seemann and Stoneburn), Contract Surgeons Jordan and Hansen, 1 hospital corps, and two signal corps men arrived from Iloilo; and the same date Lieutenant Seemann with 50 men of his company, Contract Surgeon Hansen, and 1 hospital corps man, were sent to Tubay with instructions to report to Captain Perry, Twenty-ninth Infantry, for duty. Lieutenant Stoneburn with 30 men of his company were kept at Surigao to be used for scouting the valley south, and on April 6 this detachment was stationed at Bugsucan.

The detachment Company G, Twenty-ninth Infantry, at Surigao, was sent to Placer for station with Contract Surgeon Jordan, Placer being the base from which troops operating on the north and east side of the lake (Mainit) are supplied. The supplies for troops on the Tubay River are landed at Tubay, and sent

up the river by barrotes. The base for troops at Jabonga and those south and southeast of Lake Mainit is Baguian Bay.

On April 4 the detachment Company G, Twenty-ninth Infantry, at Gigaquit, was moved to Placer.

On same date Lieutenant Seemann, with the Forty-fourth Company of scouts, was sent from Tubay to San Roque.

On April 11 Lieutenant Delaplane, with detachment 25 men Company L, Eleventh Infantry, was transferred from Cantilan to Timamana.

On April 13 Lieutenants Macklin, Eleventh Infantry, and Goodwyn, Twenty-ninth Infantry, with detachments both regiments, were sent to Gamoton.

On April 18 Lieutenant Schreiner, constabulary, with detachment Company G, Twenty-ninth Infantry, and constabulary, was sent to Mopatingbato.

On April 21 Company L, Eleventh Infantry, was transferred from Cantilan to Gigaquit, it having been found impracticable to pass from Cantilan to Lake Mainit without going through Taganito and near Gigaquit.

On April 27 the Forty-fifth Company of scouts, Lieutenants Walker and Small, reported, and on the following morning were assigned as follows: Lieutenant Walker with 43 men to Gigaquit, Lieutenant Small with 25 men to Taganito, which station was abandoned on June 1 and the detachment sent to Gigaquit.

On April 29 Company E, Twenty-ninth Infantry, Captain Woodward, Lieutenant Beebe, reported for duty and was sent on April 30 to Mainit, Mapotingbato, and Gamoton, to relieve Company G, Twenty-ninth Infantry, the latter company being concentrated at Placer. A detachment was kept at Bacuag.

A roster of troops serving in the province at this time is inclosed and marked "A."

The stations of Gigaquit, Bacuag, Mapotingbato, Placer, Surigao, Bugsucan, Timamana, Mainit, Gamoton, San Roque, Jabonga, Baguian Bay, and Tubay were kept until the troops in the expedition were commenced to be withdrawn, and detachments from these places were kept constantly in the field scouting the section in which were the outlaws.

The substations of Tubay, the Ford, and Santiago were abandoned on June 18 on account of malaria.

In addition to the engagement of Captain Marshall, Philippine constabulary, with the outlaws, previously reported, the troops have on nine other occasions encountered the outlaws, the result of these encounters being as follows:

1. April 5, Lieutenant Hibbard, constabulary, with detachment Company G, Twenty-ninth Infantry, and constabulary, struck the outlaws at Gamoton, killing 1, and capturing 3 Remington rifles and 1 revolver. The reason more execution was not done by the troops was that a number of outlaws were dressed in constabulary uniforms, taken in Suriago March 23, and while attempting to find out whether they were outlaws or constabulary, the outlaws, as they turned out to be, discovered the troops and escaped.

2. April 5, Lieutenant Schreiner, with detachment of Company E, Twenty-ninth Infantry, and constabulary, in scouting through the Magtayaco country killed 3 outlaws and recovered 1 Remington rifle and 1 shotgun.

3. April 8, Lieutenant Seeman, with detachment Forty-fourth Company scouts, struck outlaws on the Mamcas River. No casualties reported on either side. Lieutenant Seemann was slightly wounded in this engagement in the shoulder with buckshot, but, to his credit, he has not mentioned it. One revolver captured.

4. May 9, detachment E Company, Twenty-ninth Infantry, exchanged shots with outlaws at Tubog. No casualties.

5. May 17, detachment Forty-fourth Company scouts, under Corporal Christianson, Eleventh Infantry, struck band near Bugsucan, at Hinagnewyen; captured 1 outlaw and 1 Krag rifle.

6. May 22, detachment Company L, Eleventh Infantry, under Lieutenant Delaplane, Eleventh Infantry, struck band of 6 outlaws near Tubog; killed 3 and captured 3, among the captured being Eduardo de los Santos, second in command of outlaws. The following arms captured: One Springfield carbine, 3 Remington rifles, 1 revolver, and 176 rounds ammunition, besides belts, holsters, etc.

7. May 22, detachment of K Company and scouts, under Lieutenant Seemann, struck camp of Concepcion, the outlaw leader; captured 3 Remington rifles, 1 shotgun, 4 revolvers, 100 rounds of ammunition, 1 Krag bayonet and scabbard, 4 belts; no casualties.

8. June 4, Lieutenant Seemann, with Forty-fourth Company scouts, surprised outlaws at Suyo River; captured 6, recovered 1 revolver.

9. June 15, detachment Company E, Twenty-ninth Infantry, under Sergeant Cowlin, struck band of 4 outlaws near Tubog; killed 1, captured 1, and wounded 1 other, who was captured next day; recovered 1 revolver. This is the last that has been seen of any of the outlaws.

The originals of all these reports and also copies have been forwarded to department headquarters.

As stated above, the following arms were taken from the constabulary building on March 28 last: One Krag rifle, 1 Winchester rifle, 9 Springfield carbines, 22 Remington rifles, 58 Remington shotguns, 59 revolvers, caliber .45; 5,861 rounds ammunition, all kinds.

There have been captured in action from the outlaws, found buried, turned in, or recovered by means of secret-service agents: One Krag rifle, 1 Winchester rifle, 9 Springfield carbines, 18 Remington rifles, 42 Remington shotguns, 34 revolvers, caliber .45; 1,726 rounds ammunition.

This leaves the following arms not accounted for, the ammunition not accounted for probably having been expended: Four Remington rifles, 11 Remington shotguns, 25 revolvers; also 1 Springfield carbine lost in action by the constabulary on March 30.

Of the \$5,532.79 currency looted, \$3,630.57 was recovered, leaving not accounted for \$1,902.22.

Appended hereto, marked "B," is a list giving names of the outlaws who sacked the constabulary buildings on March 28 last, also of persons who were, prior to or after that time, associated with them. This list also shows those arrested and still at large, disposition made of those arrested, and, when they were tried, the sentence.

This list shows 226 names. Of the persons shown on this list 183 were killed, captured, or presented themselves, and of these 78 were released by me shortly after the arrest, either from lack of proof or to use for secret service, investigation connecting them but slightly with the outlaws. The remainder, 105, were held in confinement in the provincial jail, bound over for trial by the court of first instance, and of these 2 died while in confinement, 1 was released for lack of proof before completion of trial, 29 were released without trial by order of the court. The remainder, 73, were disposed of as follows: Five sentenced to death; 4 sentenced to life imprisonment; 2 sentenced to twenty-five years; 42 sentenced to twenty years; 9 sentenced to ten years; 7 acquitted; 4 bound over for next term of court. This leaves 43 of the outlaws at large, as shown on the list appended and marked "C."

Seven outlaws whose names are not known are reported killed in the several engagements, and as their names are undoubtedly on the list showing outlaws still at large it is fair to presume that not more than 36 are still at large.

The leader, Adriano Concepcion, has been hunted for constantly, but has been fortunate enough to escape. When last heard of, Concepcion was in the mountains east of Jabonga, footsore and weary, deserted by all of his followers, and with no arms. It is reported he knows nothing of that section of the country; the people living there are not friendly to him, and the officers who were in the field in that section are of the opinion that he must have died from exposure and starvation, and in view of the fact that a number of the natives of that section, Mamamoas, have been engaged as secret-service agents to run him down and have met with no success, such may have been his end.

On June 28, believing that the troops had done everything possible in running down the outlaws, and that those still out could be picked up near their homes later, either by loyal natives or the regular police force, I recommended that the Surigao expedition be discontinued and the troops, with the exception of the Forty-fourth and Forty-fifth Companies scouts, be returned to their proper station. This recommendation was approved by the department commander.

On July 3 Companies E, G, and H, Twenty-ninth Infantry, were relieved from duty in the province and sent on the transports *Butuan* and *Sacramento* to their proper station, Camp Jossman, Guimaras. On the same date the detachment Forty-fourth Company scouts, under Lieutenant Stoneburn, was transferred from Bugsucan to Placer. On July 5 the detachment Company K, Eleventh Infantry, was withdrawn from Gamoton to Baguian Bay, and on the 7th was brought to Surigao. On the 9th the detachment Forty-fourth Company scouts was transferred from San Roque to Mainit. On the 10th Company L, Eleventh Infantry, and Forty-fifth Company scouts were transferred to Surigao, the stations of Gigaquit and Timamana being abandoned. By the changes the following became the stations of troops:

The Forty-fourth Company of scouts at Mainit, with a detachment of 25 men under an officer at Placer; a surgeon and 1 hospital corps man at Mainit, and 1 hospital corps man at Placer.

The Forty-fifth Company scouts at Surigao, with 1 surgeon and 5 hospital corps men; permanent garrison and headquarters Eleventh Infantry and Companies K and L, Eleventh Infantry, awaiting transportation.

Detachments of constabulary at Jabonga, Mainit, Placer, and Surigao.

On July 12 the constabulary in the province was relieved from duty with the Surigao expedition.

Authority has been given for the rent of the following buildings at Surigao and Placer for the use of the Forty-fourth and Forty-fifth companies of scouts. At Mainit the scouts are to go into tents, and, if desirable later, to construct their own quarters:

Surigao: One building for officers' quarters, storerooms, and offices, \$10 per month, United States currency; 1 building, barracks, \$15 per month, United States currency; 1 building, hospital, \$10 per month, United States currency. These are all municipal buildings and have been used by the troops, by permission of the municipality, free of rent. Rent will begin on July 16.

Placer: One building, quarters, storeroom, officers' quarters, etc., \$6 per month, United States currency.

This date the Surigao expedition was officially discontinued, copy of order appended, and headquarters and Companies K and L, Eleventh Infantry, embarked on the *Sacramento* and *Chu Kong* for transfer to their station (Manila) via Iloilo.

A map of that section of the province covering the operations is sent under separate cover. On this is shown the several contacts with the outlaws, also the principal trails. It is impossible to estimate the number of miles covered by the several detachments or to show the actual trails followed, in most cases there being no trails at all.

I invite attention to the reports of the quartermaster, commissary, and the surgeon of the expedition hereto appended.

There has been left at Surigao, with the commanding officer of troops left in the province, a descriptive book, showing the names of all persons connected with the outlaws, their particular culpability, names of witnesses, where available, and disposition made of those arrested.

In closing I desire to state that every one has performed his duty loyally, thoroughly, and cheerfully, even though at times under the most adverse circumstances.

Very respectfully,

ALBERT L. MYER,
Colonel, Eleventh Infantry, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS SURIGAO EXPEDITION IN THE FIELD,
Surigao, Mindanao, P. I., June 22, 1903.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS,
Iloilo, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to state, while all the officers in the field have done their utmost to accomplish the purpose of this expedition, yet I desire to state that First Lieut. Anton Seemann, Philippine Scouts, and Second Lieut. C. E. Delaplane, Eleventh Infantry, deserve special mention for their untiring efforts in running down the outlaws.

Lieutenant Seemann joined the expedition on April 2. He has been since continuously in the field, often living on comotes only, and to his untiring efforts more than anyone else is due the fact that Concepcion's band has entirely deserted him, and that Concepcion is alone somewhere in the mountains near the Suyo River, where he is still being sought for. That Concepcion has not been captured or killed is due to his (Concepcion's) lucky star.

Similarly Lieutenant Delaplane has been untiring in his work, and to him is due the credit for capturing Eduardo de los Santos, second in command of the outlaws, and destroying or capturing the entire party of outlaws with Santos on May 23 last.

Very respectfully,

ALBERT L. MYER,
Colonel, Eleventh Infantry, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS SURIGAO EXPEDITION IN THE FIELD,
Surigao, Mindanao, P. I., July 15, 1903.

The ADJUTANT, SURIGAO EXPEDITION,
Surigao, Mindanao, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the quartermaster's department in connection with the Surigao expedition in the field, from my appointment as quartermaster of the expedition, March 30, 1903, to present date, the end of the expedition.

The work accomplished consisted principally in furnishing promptly the required water transportation to facilitate the movement of troops and supplies and in

transporting the supplies from the base stations on the coast to the troops operating in the interior.

The water transportation available consisted of the U. S. army transport *Sacramento*, the U. S. steam lighter *Kansas City*, and the U. S. launch *Chicago*, for about one and one-half months. With these vessels the water transportation was always ample, but with any less amount the operations of the expedition would have been greatly hampered.

The base of supply for the expedition was at Tacloban, Leyte, and this point was easily accessible in from twelve to fourteen hours with the transportation at hand. Fifty-five trips were made by these vessels during the period from March 30 to July 13, as follows:

To Tacloban and return	10
To Dapitan and return	2
To Iloilo and return	1
To ports in the province with troops and supplies	42

Freight and passengers carried on these trips were as follows:

Officers transported	92
Enlisted men transported	581
Officials insular government	11
Miscellaneous passengers	52
Freight:	
Commissaries	pounds 213, 391
Quartermaster supplies	do 286, 827
Total number of miles covered	6, 524

From the coast stations to the troops operating in the interior all transportation was by carabao and native cargadores. The one exception was the station on the Tubay River, which was supplied by barrotos.

The United States troops operating in the field consisted of 5 companies of infantry and 2 companies of Philippine Scouts, and fully one-half of this command had to be supplied in the manner indicated above, over difficult trails and mountain passes; further, the carrying of supplies and rations from stations in the interior during the operations against outlaws was by native cargadores and carabao.

The average amount paid per capita for the services rendered is as follows: Native cargadores, 1 native ration and 20 cents United States currency per day; native barrotomen or laborers, 1 native ration and 20 cents United States currency per day; carabao, 50 cents per day; carabao, with pack and driver, 80 cents per day.

It was found that upon an open road or country 1 carabao would transport, in weight, about as much as 3 cargadores, and over rough uneven trails and passes 1 carabao would transport as much as 4 cargadores. However, carabao transportation is much slower than that by carrier.

BARRACKS AND QUARTERS.

At those towns where detachments of troops remained any length of time quarters were provided by the municipal authorities without cost to the Government and clear releases given upon the departure of the troops. The one exception to this rule was at Placer, where one building was rented at \$6 United States currency per month.

EXPENDITURES.

The following is a summary of the expenditures made by the quartermaster's department from March 25 to the close of the expedition, July 15, 1903:

March 25 to June 30, 1903, fiscal year 1903:

Regular supplies, wood purchased	\$41. 17
Incidental expenses—	
Interpreters, guides, and spies	\$527. 27
Coffins	10. 40
	537. 67
Barracks and quarters (Philippine Islands), rents	22. 40
Army transportation—	
Crew U. S. army transport <i>Sacramento</i> and pilots	3, 321. 29
Barrotos and barrotomen	152. 40
Cargadores and carabao	1, 331. 40
Miscellaneous	84. 60
	4, 839. 69
Total	5, 440. 98

From July 1 to July 15, 1903:

Incidental expenses, interpreters and guides	70.00	
Barracks and quarters (Philippine Islands), rent	7.00	
Army transportation—		
Carabao and cargadores	98.50	
Barrotos	4.00	
		179.50
		5,620.43

Deducting such expenses as were not incident to the expedition, namely:		
Regular supplies	41.17	
Army transportation—		
Crew of <i>Sacramento</i> , exclusive of pilots	8,285.29	
Miscellaneous accounts not incident to expedition	23.50	
		3,349.96

Leaving balance (for hire of interpreters, guides, spies, carabao, cargadores, laborers, and barrotos; rents incident to expedition, and purchase of 2 coffins, or actual cost of expedition) of. 2,270.47

Very respectfully

WILLIAM WEIGEL,
Captain and Quartermaster, Eleventh Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS SURIGAO EXPEDITION IN THE FIELD,
Surigao, Mindanao, P. I., July 15, 1903.

The ADJUTANT, SURIGAO EXPEDITION,
Surigao, Mindanao, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the commissary department in connection with the Surigao expedition in the field from my appointment as commissary of the expedition, March 30, 1903, to present date, the end of the expedition.

No commissary depot was found at Surigao upon arrival and no funds or commissaries were turned over by my predecessor, Second Lieut. Wilfred Twyman, Twenty-ninth Infantry. All supplies were drawn from Tacloban, Leyte, which was easily accessible by steamer within twenty-four hours, and the supply was always ample.

In addition, the U. S. army transport *Wright* arrived bimonthly and supplied fresh beef. This component of the ration would have been sufficient to supply all troops that could be reached by boat for at least two-thirds of the time if sufficient ice could have been supplied. This was not done after the first two trips of the *Wright*. The beef was kept in large stationary refrigerators on the U. S. army transport *Sacramento* and on the U. S. steam lighter *Kansas City*, and was distributed as these vessels called at coast stations. Occasionally fresh beef was also transported to the troops operating in the interior. From the nature of the storage and the method of distribution it will be seen that more ice was needed than ordinarily required at stations, and particularly so as there was no other source from which it could be drawn. As a rule, troops that could be reached were supplied with fresh beef on an average of ten days per month, and this supply appeared to be sufficient.

The United States troops operating in the expedition consisted of the following:

Organization.	Number of men.	Date of arrival.	Rationed to, upon arrival.
Company K, Eleventh Infantry	72	Mar. 30	Apr. 15
Company L, Eleventh Infantry	76	do	Do.
Company E, Twenty-ninth Infantry	87	Apr. 29	May 20
Company G, Twenty-ninth Infantry	77	Mar. 25	Apr. 7
Company H, Twenty-ninth Infantry	72	do	Do.
Detached Hospital Corps	17		
Forty-fourth Company, Philippine Scouts	84	Apr. 2	Apr. 5
Forty-fifth Company, Philippine Scouts	77	Apr. 27	Apr. 30

Rations supplied during expeditions fiscal years 1903 and 1904.

AMERICAN TROOPS.

	Number of rations.	Cost.	Average cost per ration.
1903.....	29,124	\$8,997.17	\$0.235
1904.....	5,548	1,241.79	.2238

PHILIPPINE SCOUTS.

1903.....	11,011	\$1,221.68	\$0.1195
1904.....	4,417	529.02	.1198

NATIVE CREWS OF TRANSPORTS.

1903.....	1,872	\$285.68	\$0.1018
1904.....			

NATIVE CARGADORES.

1903.....	6,004	\$575.74	\$0.0945
1904.....	330	87.03	.1123

TOTAL NUMBER RATIONS ISSUED.

	Number of ra- tions.	Total cost
1903.....	48,011	\$9,080.25
1904.....	10,295	1,807.84
Total	58,306	10,888.09

Average cost per ration of all rations combined, \$0.1867.

United States Hospital diet.

Number of days	754
Cost	\$271.79
Average cost per day3247

The only expense entirely incident to the expedition was the cost of the cargadore rations, namely, 6,334 rations, costing \$612.77; total money value of stores condemned, \$346.84.

The articles furnishing the greatest percentage of this loss were as follows:

	Per cent.
Beef stew.....	5 ³ / ₁₆
Hard bread.....	4
Desiccated potatoes.....	12 ¹ / ₄
Sauce, cranberry.....	21 ⁷ / ₁₆
Peaches.....	37
Pineapples.....	25
Baking powder.....	4 ¹ / ₂

Statement of receipts and disbursements covering the period of the expedition from March 20 to June 15, 1903, as follows:

FISCAL YEAR 1903.

Receipts.	Amount.	Month.	Disbursements.	Amount.
Cash sales.....	\$548.81	April.....	Hospital supplies	\$9.70
Do	548.51	May.....	Purchase savings	8.02
Do	412.66	June.....	Hospital supplies	7.78
Invoiced to Capt. J. A. Logan, jr., commissary, U. S. Army, by authority of chief commissary, Division of the Philippines, Manila.			Invoiced to chief commissary, Division of the Philippines.	925.00
			Hospital supplies	15.88
			Purchase savings	47.10
Total				491.00
				1,504.48

FISCAL YEAR 1904.

Receipts.	Amount.	Month.	Disbursements.	Amount.
Cash sales.....	\$319.79	July.....	Purchase savings	\$69.15
			Transferred to successor, Second Lieut. E. I. Small, Philippine Scouts.	250.64
Total.....	319.79			319.79

With the exception of slight deficiencies in rice, salt, and soap, the command remaining in the Surigao Province, mainly the Forty-fourth and Forty-fifth Companies Philippine Scouts, will be left, rationed to include sixty days from the discontinuance of the expedition.

The rice is expected by the next trip of the *Ibadan*, and there will be ample time to secure the other articles before needed.

A few articles of the ration are slightly in excess, but not in sufficient quantities to warrant report for shipment to other points.

Very respectfully,

WILLIAM WEIGEL,
Captain, Quartermaster Eleventh Infantry, Expedition Commissary.

HEADQUARTERS SURIGAO EXPEDITION IN THE FIELD,

OFFICE OF THE SURGEON,

Surigao, Mindanao, P. I., July 13, 1903.

The ADJUTANT, SURIGAO EXPEDITION IN THE FIELD,

Surigao, Mindanao, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the medical department in the Surigao expedition in the field:

Contract Surg. W. E. Hall, with a sergeant and 2 first-class privates of the Hospital Corps, accompanying Companies G and H, Twenty-ninth Infantry, arrived in Surigao March 25, 1903, and proceeded at once to Mainit with Company G. Company H proceeded to Tubay, province of Surigao, Mindanao, and Jabonga. Dr. H. E. Winslow, Philippine constabulary, proceeded to Jabonga, where he rendered medical services to the soldiers as well as to the constabulary forces.

March 30, 1903, Colonel Myer, headquarters Eleventh Infantry, and Companies K and L, Eleventh Infantry, accompanied by myself (First Lieut. R. F. Metcalfe, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army), Contract Surg. B. Ffoulkes, 1 first-class sergeant, and 4 first-class privates of the Hospital Corps, with medical supplies sufficient for two companies for one month, and equipment for field hospital, arrived. Doctor Ffoulkes was ordered at once to Cantilan, Mindanao, with Company L.

The field hospital was established at Surigao March 30, 1903, in a building being prepared for a provincial school, but having formerly been used as a military hospital when the town was garrisoned, and was well located and adapted for hospital purposes, being 100 yards from the sea and having a large open space on all sides,

admitting a good sea breeze. Twelve beds were placed in the ward, which in emergency could be increased to 24. One room, capacity 2 beds, being set aside for officers.

A diet kitchen was established in an outbuilding, and oil stoves used for cooking. The corps men were attached to Company K for rations, and therefore patients' diets only were cooked in the hospital. An operating room was prepared with such conveniences as available with the field equipment. A latrine was established a short distance from the hospital, but was soon replaced by dry-earth closets, all refuse being daily emptied into the sea. A first-class sergeant and 8 first-class privates of the Hospital Corps were put on duty at hospital, and later 1 more private added.

The latter part of April Company L, Eleventh Infantry, accompanied by Doctor Ffoulkes and 2 corps men, was transferred to Gigiquit. April 2, Contract Surgs. M. J. Hansen and E. H. Jordan, with 1 private of the Hospital Corps, reported for duty. Doctor Hansen, with 1 private of the Hospital Corps, was ordered to Tubay, Mindanao, and Doctor Jordan went to Placer with 1 private of the Hospital Corps. Dr. H. E. Winslow, Philippine constabulary, who, having volunteered his services for a short time, was relieved the latter part of April and returned to Cebu.

This left 1 first lieutenant and assistant surgeon, 4 contract surgeons, 1 first-class sergeant, 1 sergeant, and 12 privates of the Hospital Corps on duty with the expedition.

Tubay and Placer, being seacoast towns and the outlet of trails to the interior, were used as dressing stations and temporary hospitals, where the less serious ailments were treated and from which places more serious cases could be readily transported to the base field hospital at Surigao.

The troops being broken up into small detachments were each accompanied by 1 private of the Hospital Corps, who, in addition to his corps pouch, was furnished with such medicines as would relieve all ordinary complaints, and when he could not relieve them, they were sent to one of the substations for the observation of a surgeon. Owing to the uncertainty of the length of the expedition, supplies were required for to cover short periods only and were issued in the same manner. All medical supplies were distributed from the Surigao hospital, and transportation facilities being frequent, very little, if any, delay occurred in supplying the detachments.

Special diet articles were procured from the commissary and sent to Gigaquit, Placer, and Tubay, and accounted for on the 40 cents per day allowance.

Considering the hard service and all hardships connected with the campaign in the interior of a tropical country where cholera was prevalent in all the towns, the health of the command was extremely good, the more prevalent diseases being diarrheal and malarial.

It is my opinion that the malaria was brought in here by the troops coming from Camp Jossman, island of Guimaras, as some of the scouts from that place were suffering from malaria upon their arrival, and all cases of malaria occurring here have been among the Camp Jossman forces, there being only two exceptions, one case occurring in a Tacloban soldier and one case in a Cebu soldier, all of whom shared stations equally as liable to infection as were those stations of the Camp Jossman troops.

Owing to the large number of malarial cases occurring at Santiago and the ford on the Tubay River, province of Surigao, Mindanao, and the reports that the places were infested with mosquitoes, I recommended that the places be abandoned, which recommendation Colonel Myer considered favorably, and the detachments were moved to Tubay within forty-eight hours, where Doctor Hanson gave his attention to the proper use of mosquito bars, protecting those already infected from the mosquito, with the result that the number of malarial cases was effectually reduced.

The commanding officers and surgeons of all detachments have given personal attention to the boiling of all drinking water, with the gratifying result that there have been only two cases of cholera, although cholera has been prevalent in all the towns. Of the two cases, both fatal, one was due to the soldier disregarding the instructions of the commanding officer and drinking river water unboiled; death followed in seventy-two hours. The origin of the other case is unknown, but occurred at Mainit June 25. Troops were put in quarantine at once. Three others were reported as suffering from cholera. They were removed to Placer, from which place they were reported as convalescent from cholera, but upon careful examination I found one to have acute dysentery, one gastro enteritis, and one enteritis. They were allowed, together with Companies E and G, Twenty-ninth Infantry, to embark for Iloilo without further quarantine.

The average strength of the command, exclusive of constabulary, for the three and a half months of the expedition has been 22 officers and 571 men.

A number of cases of disability have been due to venereal disease, both gonorrhea and syphilis, which diseases were contracted in Iloilo and Tacloban.

During the continuance of the expedition the following cases have been treated in the field hospital and dressing stations:

A total of 181 cases, as follows:

Abscess:	
Cheek	2
Palmar	1
Adenitis:	
Chancroidal—	
Suppurative	1
Nonsuppurative	1
Gonorrheal, nonsuppurative	1
Tramatic, nonsuppurative	2
Anæmia, secondary, severe	1
Arthritis, tubercular, chronic	1
Beriberi, wet	1
Bronchitis	1
Constipation, acute	2
Coryza, acute	1
Cyst, sebaceous, neck	1
Dengue fever	12
Diarrhea, acute	23
Dysentery, acute	2
Dhobie itch, severe	2
Enteritis, acute	15
Furuncle	2
Fracture:	
Rib, compound	1
Rib, simple	1
Ulnar, compound	2
Radius, compound	1
Humerus, compound	1
Gastro-enteritis, acute	4
Gastritis, acute	4
Gonorrhea, acute	2
Indigestion:	
Gastric	1
Intestinal	1
Malaria:	
Tertian, intermittent	44
Quotidian, intermittent	4
Nephritis, acute	1
Neuralgia, facial	1
Orchitis, gonorrheal	2
Edema, vasomotor dilatation legs	2
Otitis media, acute	2
Ptyalism, mercurial	1
Rheumatism, acute inflammatory	1
Syncope, heat	1
Synovitis, knee, chronic	1
Syphilis, acute, secondary	5
Tonsilitis, acute follicular	3
Typhoid fever	1
Ulcer:	
Phagademic	1
Tropical	1
Wounds:	
Abrasions, foot	5
Contused	1
Gunshot (1 soldier, 2 constabulary, 11 ladrones)	14
Incised	1
Lacerated	5

Of the 181 cases treated, 13 were civilians: 3 deaths were due to disease; 3 deaths were due to wounds received; of the latter, constabulary killed in action and the other an American accidentally shot by an outpost.

The following operations were performed:

Abscess, cheek, incised.....	1
Amputation:	
Shoulder	1
Foot	1
Finger	1
Buba, incised	1
Cyst, sebaceous, excised	1
Excision, rib	1
Hydrocele, excision, sac	1
Infected heel, incised	1

Thirteen of the above-mentioned 181 cases were transferred to other hospitals, it being impracticable to treat them in the field hospital.

July 13, 1903, the field hospital became a post hospital, all funds and medical property being turned over to Contract Surg. M. J. Hansen.

One first-class sergeant and 6 privates of the Hospital Corps were left in the province. The sergeant and 4 privates remained in the town of Surigao (1 to be discharged in about two weeks).

Contract Surg. E. H. Jordan and 1 private remain in the town of Mainit with a detachment of scouts. One private of the Hospital Corps remains in Placer with a detachment of the scouts, both places being substations of Surigao.

In closing this report I wish to express my appreciation of the excellent services performed by First-Class Sergt. Matthew Galvin, Hospital Corps, U. S. Army.

Very respectfully,

RAYMOND F. METCALFE,

First Lieutenant and Assistant Surgeon, U. S. Army, Surgeon.

NOTE.—Since completion of this report it has been reported that 1 private, Forty-fourth Company Philippine Scouts, was accidentally shot and killed at Tigo River, Mindanao. This will make tabulation of deaths given above read, 7 dead, 4 due to wounds received; 2 privates, Philippine constabulary; 1 American; 1 Philippine scout, accidentally killed.

FIELD GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. SURIGAO EXPEDITION IN THE FIELD,
No. 15. } *Surigao, Mindanao, P. I., July 16, 1903.*

In compliance with telegraphic instructions from department headquarters, the Surigao expedition is hereby discontinued, and all orders and instructions in force during that expedition will not be binding on the troops left in the province.

In breaking up the Surigao expedition the colonel commanding desires to express his entire appreciation of the work so loyally and intelligently performed by all concerned in bringing the band of outlaws against whom we have been operating to justice.

In the first fifteen days of this expedition, by hard marching and exposure, you succeeded in breaking up that band into small parties, prevented their escape to the south or to other provinces, and practically hemmed them in to a small territory. Since that time, although beset by the worst of obstacles, rough country, almost impenetrable jungle and swamp, without the aid of resident people, and often when away from your base, compelled to live on native rice and comotes, you have succeeded in running to earth and either killing or capturing almost the entire band, together with all the leaders except the head, who, had he been disposed to contest the ground instead of hiding, would have soon fallen to your efforts. He has, however, been deprived of the majority of his comrades, who have received meet justice, and of practically all the serviceable arms and ammunition he obtained at Surigao, when the lamented Capt. L. M. Clark, Philippine constabulary, was killed in the endeavor to prevent his so doing.

In ten separate affairs, however small they may have seemed, you succeeded in worsting the band of outlaws, with, which is to be regretted, the loss on our side of 1 man killed and 1 who died of wounds received in action, both members of the Philippine constabulary.

To the officers and men of the Twenty-ninth Infantry, Companies E, G, and H, of the Forty-fourth and Forty-fifth Companies of scouts and of the Philippine constabulary, whose lot was thrown with ours, the commanding officer has nothing but the utmost praise to confer, and he thanks them for the good, loyal, and efficient work done under the most trying circumstances.

To the officers and enlisted men of his own regiment he has only to say that he considers himself most fortunate in having the honor to command a force so efficient on all points.

While the troops in the field were doing their work a part of the success is due to the efficient staff of the expedition, who have kept in touch with the troops in the field, endeavoring to anticipate all their wants and necessities. His thanks are especially due to Capt. John S. Battle, adjutant, and to Capt. William Weigel, quartermaster and commissary of the expedition. No less than to the troops in the field are due his thanks to the small detachment left at Surigao for arduous and efficient duty, guarding the mass of desperate prisoners turned over to them for safe-keeping, this detachment practically doing guard duty the entire time, day and night, for several months, conditions often as fully trying as duty in the field.

The base hospital at Surigao, commanded by First Lieut. Raymond F. Metcalfe, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, has been a source of comfort to those sick and wounded sent in from the field. To Doctor Metcalfe especially and to his corps of assistants are due the thanks of the commanding officer for good and efficient service.

The officers and crews of the vessels engaged in this expedition deserve much credit for the cheerful compliance with all orders. The services of Mr. Everard C. Frost especially, and of Pedro Diaz, as interpreters and assistants in collecting evidence, have been invaluable.

The presidente of the town of Surigao has at all times given his full and loyal support.

It is gratifying to state that we have all so performed the duties required of us as to call forth on two occasions the commendation of the general officers under whose direction we have served.

By order of Colonel Myer:

J. S. BATTLE,
Captain, Adjutant Eleventh Infantry, Adjutant.

Report of Lieut. H. Frank, Philippine Scouts, of encounter with insurgents at Catarman, island of Camaguin, May 13, 1903.

COMPANY 43, PHILIPPINE SCOUTS,
Cagayan, Mindanao, P. I., June 10, 1903.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES.

(Through adjutant-general, Department of the Visayas.)

SIR: With reference to my telegram of May 15, 1903, regarding an encounter with insurgents at Catarman, island of Camaguin, P. I., I have the honor to submit the following report:

In compliance with telegraphic instructions from headquarters, Department of the Visayas, Company 43, Philippine Scouts, changed station from Dapitan, Mindanao, to Cagayan, Mindanao, on May 9. Immediately upon my arrival at that date at Cagayan the governor of the province (Misamis), Señor Manuel Corrales, requested me to send a detachment of troops to the island of Camaguin, where, as he stated, a band of insurgents were defying the authority of the government. Having before my departure from Dapitan received instructions to report upon my arrival at Cagayan to the chief of Philippine constabulary at Manila for duty, I did so on May 10 and received an answer from said officer on the 12th, directing me in absence of detailed instructions, which had been mailed to me, to use my own judgment in dealing with the situation at my station. Thereupon I informed the governor that I, with my company, was at his disposition, and he renewed his request regarding the trip to Camaguin.

With a detachment of 45 scouts of my company I left, accompanied by the governor, Cagayan at 1 o'clock a. m., May 13, on the coast-guard cutter *Palawan*, and, arriving at Camaguin Island, stopped first at the southern point, the barrio of Guinsiliban, separated from the island of Mindanao by a strait only about 7 miles wide. As this point is regarded as a favorite stepping-off stone from Camaguin Island for anyone who may be in a hurry, and was at the same time well supplied with all kinds of small boats, I left a detachment of 7 scouts commanded by a sergeant, and also a trustworthy native familiar with Camaguin, at that point with instructions to let no one depart unless he was vouched for by the aforementioned native to have no connection whatsoever with the present trouble on that island. Then continuing the trip around the east and north coasts of the island I

stopped at Manbajao, the largest town of the island, with about 10,000 inhabitants, reaching that place about 9.30 a. m. The governor had informed me in the meantime of the general conditions then existing, the character of the natives, and the approximate location of the band. After securing reliable guides at Manbajao I left First Sergt. Baldomero Alvarez with 9 scouts at that place with instructions to start across the mountains toward Catarman at about 10.30 a. m. and to look out for any members of the band who might be trying to escape in the direction from which he was coming, inasmuch as I intended to strike the band at about 3 p. m., and his route would bring him by that time close to the place, barring accidents. I then continued the trip around the southern coast and landed at Catarman at about 1 p. m.

The town extends along the coast for a distance of about 2 miles, lined on both sides with cocoanut groves, and is located about 7 miles south from an active volcano. All of the inhabitants, with the exception of about three or four natives, had left the town, inasmuch as the band of insurgents in question was encamped about 2 miles from the town, and, further, the leader of the band, Valero Camaro, had visited the town that very same morning with about 250 of his followers. Hearing that troops had disembarked on the island, he left the town for the purpose of preparing everything for the impending fight. The few people who still up to that time had remained at Catarman, now became seriously alarmed, and packing their few belongings together hastily left, part for the mountains and part for the neighboring towns. While discussing the situation with the governor in the Casa Popular, a native entered, bearing a note from the leader, Valero Camaro, in which said Camaro informed everybody that he knew troops had landed at Catarman and that if the troops did really care to meet him and his followers, the "Levantadores," they could easily do so by going to his quartel. One of the above-mentioned few natives who had remained at Catarman served as guide, and starting at 2.30 p. m. we reached the place about 3.15 p. m., after a 2-mile march. The first part of the road had been a steep incline and the latter part a gentle slope until within about 800 yards from the quartel, when it became nearly level, in its formation almost approaching a plateau, covered with grass 4 and 5 feet high.

The fight opened at about 400 yards with a few volleys, upon which the enemy promptly and bravely rushed to the front to meet the attack. They quickly lined up in front of their breastwork in nearly two equal ranks, separated by about 8 yards, altogether 300 hundred strong, the leader and some of his sub-chiefs in front, all uniformed, the officers in gray with a broad red sash across the breast, the others in the old Spanish uniform—blue striped with collar ornaments. They had no firearms whatsoever, but each one had two cutting weapons like bolos, spears, or daggers. I continued the advance up to 100 yards, and by opening rapid fire upon the band drove them back to their shelter. This action was necessary, as there was in the beginning a chance for the enemy to advance through the high grass unobserved, too close. I could now see the cuartel very plainly, which stood in a clearing and was of considerable size, had few bamboo shacks near by, and was surrounded toward the approach, from coast and town, by a 5 foot high fence, constructed of bamboo and bushes in form of an abatis, and followed by a trench. For the next fifteen minutes a desultory fire at will was kept up, but owing to the high grass in which we still found ourselves and which made clear observation rather difficult, and to the inability of the scouts to observe and note the effect of their fire, the enemy being most of the time concealed behind the fence, the men became restless. In order to steady them as well as to prepare for the assault, I caused a few volleys to be fired, advancing at the same time up to within 40 yards, then rushed their position, scaled the fence, and after a few moments of hand-to-hand encounter, in which carbines had to be used as clubs, we broke their line, driving them before us in two ravines near by.

They refused to surrender, even in the face of certain death, and time and time again we had to meet and repulse savage onslaughts of the enemy by parties of 20, more or less, who with a leader would suddenly rush out of some place of concealment, leaving some victims of their rashness behind and carrying the wounded along. I had entered the fight with 25 scouts, and leaving now 10 on the plateau to guard against any surprise scoured the ravines, which caused the band, then already pretty well broken up, to disperse in hasty flight. Singly and in small parties they disappeared into the mountain fastnesses, and after burning their cuartels, with whatever provisions and clothing we found there, returned to the town about 5 p. m., and thence aboard the steamship *Palawan*, where the governor, with a guard which I had at his request placed at his disposition, awaited our return. As I had seen quite a few escaping in the direction of Manbajao, I had reasons to believe that some of them would undoubtedly be encountered by

First Sergeant Alvarez, whom I expected to arrive with his detachment about that time in the vicinity of the fight; but not knowing the exact trail he had taken, I could only wait, keeping in the meantime a sharp lookout in the direction from which he was to be seen or heard. While thus waiting, I related my experience with Camaro's band to the governor, and he told me the following, in order to explain the fanaticism with which they awaited our arrival and met our attack and stood their ground for such a length of time, notwithstanding the heavy losses that were inflicted upon them:

Up to that day there never had been any war or warfare carried on in this island. Some disaffected native, proclaiming himself as the son of Jesus Christ and having come from Paradise, had arrived on Camaguin about two months before and for some purpose collected a band of about 300 followers. He declared a "holy war" against the white race, and by constant preaching and making promises and presents and sale of amulets or "anting-anting" for protection against wounds and death had complete control and sway over this band. One energetic misguided native of some standing and influence, Valero Camaro, became the actual leader and selected, in his turn, assistant chiefs, eight in number. The band was regularly organized and uniformed, but had for arms only spears, bolos, and daggers. They then made up a collection of 800 pesos and sent a commissioner to Manbajao for the purpose of buying whatever firearms he could. This attempt was without result, inasmuch as the president of that town is a staunch friend and loyal supporter of the Government and frustrated this scheme. About this time the census was to be taken on Camaguin Island, but when the enumerator came to Catarman he was ordered away from the town with the advice never to return if he valued his life. Upon this affront a detachment of Philippine constabulary from Cagayan, commanded by the senior inspector of Philippine constabulary of that province, was ordered by the governor to accompany the enumerator to Catarman. Upon arrival at Catarman the inspector of constabulary was informed by some natives, inhabitants of Catarman, that there was no trouble whatsoever at that place and that the recent apparent trouble with the enumerator was caused only by some misunderstanding.

Taking those statements for granted to be true, the inspector thereupon returned to Cagayan with his detachment, reporting upon his return the result of the expedition to the provincial governor. The enumerator, who in the meantime had returned with the aforementioned detachment of constabulary, was sent for the third time to Catarman, accompanied by a detachment of 7 members of the constabulary force stationed at Cagayan. However, when the first detachment of constabulary arrived at Catarman there was the force under Camaro, formerly alluded to, already there in arms waiting only for an opportunity to strike a blow at what they presumed to be their enemies. When luckily the detachment sent first did not make an attempt to attack they were allowed to depart without molestation, although several hundred armed and disaffected natives were hovering like vultures in the neighborhood of the small detachment. When, however, the second detachment arrived at Catarman, Valero Camaro sought and soon found a few hours after its arrival an opportunity for an attack upon this detachment. With few followers he attacked and wounded 2 constabularies and escaped with his adherents under cover of darkness, the shots fired at them by the detachment failing to find a mark. The detachment finding itself too weak in numbers to remain on the island returned to Cagayan immediately, bringing the enumerator back. This was the main reason the governor of the province desired these outlaws to be taught a severe lesson. After this second detachment of constabulary had left Camaguin, Camaro shrewdly collected the empty shells fired by the aforementioned detachment and presenting them with ostentatious show to his followers pointed to his amulet, exhorting his men to remain in arms against their enemy, as nothing could harm them as long as they wore their anting-anting. This naturally had the desired effect upon his ignorant followers to make them fanatic and reckless for any coming fight, and thus explains the rashness, recklessness, and valor displayed by them on May 13.

In the meantime, to resume my report, it was getting dusk and no sign from my detachment, which was to come from the direction of Manbajao, until about 6.30 p. m. Firing was heard in that direction, about 2 miles from shore. I then knew that my detachment had met part of the enemy. With 12 men I went ashore to assist my first sergeant, if that could be done. The firing lasted about forty minutes, and by that time I noticed by the fire and smoke of burned shacks the route the detachment was taking. With the assistance of the captain of the *Palawan*, who blew the steamer's whistle at intervals to indicate the point of embarkation, the detachment reached us about 7.30 p. m. On its way from Manbajao the detachment had encountered an armed native, who, upon being ques-

tioned, stated he had come from the direction of Catarman; that a band of insurgents there had been engaged in a fight with troops that afternoon and dispersed; that he knew of a party between 50 and 100 being concealed about one hour's march from where they then were, and that he was willing to serve as guide. He led the way, and in very few minutes they came in sight of a good-sized house near a bamboo grove, through which latter grove the narrow trail continued. Giving a curious, evidently preconcerted signal, the guide attempted to escape, but was held back, inasmuch as immediately upon hearing the signal about 100 armed and uniformed insurgents made their appearance on both sides of the trail in the aforementioned bamboo grove.

This band, thus lying in ambush, was undoubtedly recruited from small parties of the band which was beaten and dispersed earlier in the afternoon. The first sergeant, with coolness and great presence of mind, threw his 9 men in a skirmish line and ordered the enemy to lay down their arms and surrender. The answer was a shout and rush from the enemy. Owing to the quickly gathering darkness and the close quarters at which both parties found themselves, the fight commenced with a fierce hand-to-hand encounter. The detachment, although only small in numbers, determinedly, resolutely, and persistently drove the band before them, inflicting a loss of 12 dead found on the field, and many wounded, who, however, were carried off by their comrades. On account of the first fierce *mêlée*, during which the enemy, owing to his superior numbers and being armed with knives somehow had temporarily the advantage over the scouts, two members of the detachment were wounded—Corporal Andres Villahermosa, penetrating bolo wound left lung and left shoulder, and Private Celestino Ortizo, bolo cuts left arm and back of left shoulder, both men of Company 43, Philippine Scouts, the wounds of the former serious and of the latter slight. After successfully defeating and dispersing the band and frustrating their ill-meant surprise, the small detachment, carrying its wounded, made its way through the jungles and darkness, with foes still lurking around them, cautiously but nevertheless gallantly, until I met them and brought them back to the steamer.

All possible care was bestowed upon the wounded, who were taken back to Cagayan the next day and placed under proper medical care. The next morning, May 14, I intended to destroy the town of Catarman, on account of most of its inhabitants having taken an active part in this uprising, but abstained from doing so at the request of the provincial governor. I returned on May 14 to the southern point of Camaguin, the barrio of Guinsiliban, where I picked up the detachment of 7 men I had left there the day previous. The sergeant in charge had nothing to report. With this detachment and the 2 wounded scouts I returned to Cagayan, arriving there about 5 p. m. In order to prevent the remnants of this band from reassembling I left 39 men in charge of First Sergeant Alvarez at Catarman with instructions to follow up the victory of the preceding day by attempting to capture any member of the band whose whereabouts they might be able to ascertain. On May 15 I sent Second Lieut. L. E. Grennan, Company 43, Philippine Scouts, with an additional detachment of 13 men to Catarman, thus making the entire force there 1 officer, 52 scouts, and 1 acting hospital steward. My instructions to Lieutenant Grennan were to cross the island several times, to obtain information regarding the whereabouts of any surviving members of the band, to capture or destroy them when found, and thus, in short, thoroughly clear the island of any trace of these evil doers. Lieutenant Grennan was especially adapted to this kind of work on account of his intimate knowledge of the Visayan language and its different dialects. Up to May 25, 18 more outlaws who refused to surrender were killed and 52 captured. (Lieutenant Grennan's report regarding his work is inclosed herewith.) At the end of the month of May the remaining members of the band had surrendered to the detachment, with the exception of one subchief, "Santiago Rama," who, as stated by reliable sources, had made his escape to Bohol.

At the earnest and repeated requests of the provincial governor a detachment of 22 scouts, under a sergeant, with one acting hospital steward, has been kept at Catarman to restore confidence to the inhabitants and to prevent any slumbering embers of the old firebrand from rekindling into a flame of insurrection and rebellion and open defiance of law and order. The detachment of my company yet at Catarman is visited by me as often as I can do so with the present available transportation, and every visit shows more and more improvements in the present peaceful condition on the island, and especially in the once deserted town of Catarman. Law and order reigns now where there once was chaos, and all of the inhabitants, numbering more than 2,000, are engaged in the peaceful pursuits of life and happiness.

The result of the operations of this company on Camaguin Island summed up would be as follows: May 13—number of insurgents killed, 54; number of wounded, unknown; among the dead is to be counted Valero Camaro, the leader; from May 14 to May 25—number of insurgents killed, 18; number captured, 52; number of wounded, unknown; from May 25 to May 31—the surrender of the remainder of the band, with the exception of one subleader, who escaped to Bohol, and a few members who, not caring to surrender, had died in the fastnesses of the mountains.

On May 25 the detachment at Catarman lost one of its members, Private Sixto Villacampa, who died there on that date of Asiatic cholera, in line of duty. In other respects the health of the command has been excellent.

I desire to thank at this place Señor Manuel Corrales, governor of the province of Misamis, for his willing and cheerful assistance and loyal support rendered to the troops under my command at all times.

I desire to invite the attention of the department and division commander to the meritorious conduct of Second Lieut. L. E. Grennan, Company 43, Philippine Scouts, for the untiring energy, good judgment, and perseverance displayed by him in hunting down the scattered members of Valero Camaro's band on Camaguin Island. His work, which has shown a high order of military talent, culminated in the destruction and surrender of the entire band.

In conclusion, I have the honor to recommend First Sergt. Baldomero Alvarez, Company 43, Philippine Scouts, for a certificate of merit for gallant and meritorious conduct in action at Catarman, Camaguin, P. I., May 13, 1903, and for voluntarily nursing, at the risk of his own life, a comrade stricken with Asiatic cholera on May 24 and 25, 1903, at Catarman, Camaguin, P. I. On May 13 he met, with only 9 scouts, a sudden, well-prepared, and savage attack of 100 bolomen; by his gallantry, presence of mind, and coolness saved his small command from utter destruction, inflicted heavy losses upon the enemy, and dispersed the rest of the band. On May 24 and 25, 1903, he nursed Private Sixto Villacampa, of the same company, who was stricken with Asiatic cholera, at the risk of his own life, contracted thereby this dread disease himself on account of his sacrifice, and recovered only after long sickness and suffering.

I have had an opportunity to personally observe First Sergt. Alvarez for two years past, and have found him all the time a sober, industrious, zealous, and painstaking soldier, cool in action, brave and efficient in the performance of every duty devolving upon him.

I intended originally to embody in this report also certain recommendations regarding the change of black powder now in use with the Springfield carbines by the scouts to smokeless powder, or, if practicable, a complete change from Springfield carbines to United States magazine carbines, caliber .30; but as such recommendations must evidently be rather exhaustive and would consume too much space here I will make that matter the subject of a separate report to be forwarded to your office at as early a date as practicable.

Very respectfully,

H. FRANK,
First Lieutenant Company 43, Philippine Scouts,
Commanding Company 43, Philippine Scouts.

APPENDIX III.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF MINDANAO,
Zamboanga, P. I., June 30, 1903.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

(Through Headquarters, Division of the Philippines.)

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the operations in this department from the date of my assignment to command to date of my being relieved.

I reached Zamboanga July 4, 1902, pursuant to Special Orders, No. 142, Division of the Philippines, and on July 10 relieved Gen. G. W. Davis of the command of the Seventh Separate Brigade. Herewith is a statement showing the troops in the department at that date; also the changes and present strength of command:

Troops in Seventh Separate Brigade on July 10, 1902: Entire Fifteenth Cavalry; entire Twenty-seventh Infantry; Tenth Infantry, 10 companies; Company F, engineers; Company G, engineers; Twenty-fifth Battery Field Artillery, and Forty-ninth and Fiftieth Companies Philippine Scouts.

Troops joining since July 10, 1902: Tenth Infantry, Company A, July 19, 1902, and Company B, July 20, 1902; Company E, engineers, May 13, 1903; Seventeenth Battery Field Artillery, March 5, 1903; Eleventh Infantry, Second Battalion, July 27, 1902; entire Twenty-third Infantry, June 1, 1903; Twenty-eighth Infantry, Third Battalion, October 11, 1903; Twenty-eighth Infantry, Companies A, D, F, and G, January 17, 1903; Twenty-eighth Infantry, Companies B, C, E, and H, January 31, 1903; Twenty-ninth Infantry, Companies I and K, October 1, 1902, and Forty-eighth Company Philippine Scouts, October 1, 1902.

Troops leaving since July 10, 1902: Entire Twenty-seventh Infantry, June 7, 1903; Tenth Infantry, Companies C, D, K, L, and M, May 15, 1903; Company F, engineers, November 24, 1902; Company G, engineers, May 15, 1903; Twenty-fifth Battery Field Artillery, April 24, 1903, and Twenty-ninth Infantry, Companies I and K, April 24, 1903.

Troops at present in department: Entire Fifteenth Cavalry; Tenth Infantry headquarters, Companies A, B, E, F, G, H, and I; Company E, engineers; Seventeenth Battery Field Artillery; Eleventh Infantry, Second Battalion; entire Twenty-third Infantry; entire Twenty-eighth Infantry, and Forty-eighth, Forty-ninth, and Fiftieth Companies Philippine Scouts.

Aggregate strength of command on July 10, 1902, was 4,596; aggregate strength of command at present is 4,516.

On October 1 the brigade was discontinued and the Department of Mindanao established, containing the territory heretofore covered by brigade lines and adding the island of Paragua. When I assumed command all the island of Mindanao, excepting the northern provinces of Misamis and Surigao, and all the Jolo Archipelago were under military jurisdiction and have so remained to present date. While there are scattered settlements of Filipinos at several places along the seashore, the main population consists of Moros and pagan tribes. The Filipinos that inhabit the seacoast towns live about as is usual throughout the Philippine Islands. They raise considerable rice and other food stuffs, seek employment in various ways, and are a very peaceful community. Ladronism as it exists in the other islands is not known in military Mindanao. The Moros live in villages scattered

along the seashores and are found in the interior, noticeably in the high open lands surrounding Lake Lanao and the Rio Grande Valley. They have no general form of government, are broken up and divided into numberless tribes and clans, each ruled by a sultan or dato.

These petty chiefs are practically independent of any superior control and are powerful in proportion to their following and their weapons of war. They make peace and alliances with each other; fall out and quarrel whenever any disagreement springs up; wage war on each other; and are generally in a state of perpetual fear and distrust of neighbors. This engenders the almost universal habit of carrying weapons. Firearms are a great advantage, and the average Moro will take almost any risk and commit any crime to secure a gun. They are not well armed as a whole, and most of their guns are of obsolete pattern and ammunition is very scarce and hard to obtain. Every man carries a hand weapon, and it varies in shape and size in different localities; many carry lances, which are perhaps their most effective weapons against Europeans. From early times they have used small cannon, called "lantacas," for defense of their cottas. These guns were evidently made by the Chinese and probably traded to the Moros for such articles as had money value.

While all Moros have many characteristics in common, they vary in some particulars according to locality. The shore Moros are generally fishermen and live largely by toiling in the sea. The lake Moros are farmers in a rude way and raise such crops as the soil and the climate permit. All Moros are weavers of cloth and are expert in making mats, baskets, and various articles from native fibers. They are also expert workers in iron, and produce hand weapons of various designs for war and a working bolo that answers many purposes.

The sea Moros are expert sailors and go about in all weather in their small boats often loaded to the water's edge. The inland Moros have many ponies and were formerly well provided with carabao, but in common with others have lost most of their work cattle by disease. They have no education as a class. The priests or panditas are generally conversant with Arabic characters and some of the chiefs are similarly informed. In communicating with them the Arabic letter is used and generally an answer is returned, probably written by the pandita. This limited education has been kept up by the selection of boys willing to study and who replace their instructors as time goes on. The impossibility to converse directly with the Moros, and having often to use both Moro and Spanish interpreters, who in turn require a Spanish and an English interpreter, has made communication difficult and has probably led to misunderstandings.

The feeling of the Mindanao Moros toward the Americans presents the two opposite phases of friendship and hostility. The Moros inhabiting the Rio Grande Valley have been uniformly friendly. The Moros about Zamboanga and along the coast in both directions have never given trouble. The Lake Moros are divided; some accepted our presence with good will, others stood aloof and are standing aloof to-day, while others were actively hostile and opposed to any advance into their country. This is due no doubt to the personal inclinations of the various chiefs.

The Moro problem as presented in Mindanao and in the Jolo Archipelago is essentially different; in Mindanao we are under no treaty obligations, and the way is open, following military control, to inaugurate such form of government as time and circumstances may prove advisable. In Jolo the problem is much more complicated; while the

Bates treaty clearly establishes sovereign rights, the interior economy and general management of the inhabitants is left in Moro hands and to Moro methods. So far we have managed to avoid any conflict with these people by using the utmost caution and patience. Anarchy prevails in Jolo as elsewhere in the country. The sultan, while nominal head of the people, has very little actual control, and the more powerful chiefs do about as they please without any regard to his wishes or directions. I think it can be stated as a fact that neither the sultan nor the leading chiefs care to try conclusions with the Americans, but these people have never felt the power of our Government in any way. They are well armed (for Moros) and in their ignorance are apt to overestimate their strength. Without going into a discussion of the Bates treaty, I do not believe any development can take place or any advance be made so long as the treaty stands. It was made, as I am informed, to meet and cover an emergency; its use as a temporary measure has passed, and we should now replace it by some wise and just measures that would allow us to get into closer contact and have more direct control and supervision of these people.

The theater of active military operations has been confined to the Lake Lanao country and the road leading from Malabang to Camp Vicars. When I assumed command, the expedition under General Baldwin was already established at Camp Vicars, after a hard march from the sea and a severe fight at Fort Pande Patin. A wagon road was being constructed by the labor of soldiers on route surveyed and laid out by Captain Morrow, of the engineers. This road was commenced about June 1, and was completed to Camp Vicars, 22 miles, by November 15. It is a monument to the energy and skill of the American soldiers and represents months of hard work and daily discomfort, which was borne without complaint. When I first visited Camp Vicars in company with General Davis, about July 7, General Baldwin had received notice of his promotion and was preparing to leave the department. This change placed Capt. J. J. Pershing, Fifteenth Cavalry, in the command of Camp Vicars. During July and August disaffected Moros were continually firing into Camp Vicars at night, assaulting outposts, and raiding along the road to Malabang.

These attacks were reported to division headquarters, and General Chaffee, then commanding the division, directed that some active measures might be taken to put a stop to the outbreaks. Accordingly, on September 10, I proceeded to Camp Vicars, taking seven additional companies of infantry. Expeditions were sent into the Butig country, where it was known that Dato Oali and his people lived and who had acknowledged participation in raids and defied the soldiers. Captain Pershing visited this country first with a considerable command, and later Captain Helmick, Tenth Infantry, with three companies and a platoon of artillery, covered the same ground. The forts and cottas belonging to Oali were destroyed, some of his people killed, and he was driven out of the country. He has never appeared since as a leader and is reported dead. Two expeditions were sent into the Maciu country at the south end of the lake under Captain Pershing. He had several minor engagements, destroyed a number of forts and cottas, and severely punished these Maciu Moros, who refused to return Government property in their possession and who were defiant and actively hostile. As a result of this lesson the road from Vicars to Malabang has been free from any attacks since that date. The camp at Vicars has seldom been fired into.

Another branch of the Moros inhabit a place on the west shore of

the lake and north of Camp Vicars. Their main village is at Bacolod, near which place they were actively engaged in constructing a large fort. It was the original plan to proceed against them on the return from Maciu, but General Chaffee advised giving them time to think over matters and wished to avoid more bloodshed if disaffected Moros could be won over by peaceful means. Several letters were sent to the sultan of Bacolod and every effort made to cultivate friendship, but the letters were returned with more or less evasive and impudent replies, and finally I notified the sultan that he had either to be a friend or be prepared to take the consequences. Meanwhile, those Moros continued strengthening their large fort, and finally considered it secure from capture. The cholera had made its appearance in the lake country and spread rapidly over the entire section. This necessitated strict quarantine at Vicars and a suspension of field operations.

Early in April it was determined to make a thorough exploration of the west shore of the lake as far as Marahui, at the north end. Captain Pershing had received assurances of good will and friendship from the various rancherias along the west shore except Bacolod, and anticipated no opposition except at that point. He left Camp Vicars April 5 with four companies of infantry, two field batteries, and three troops of cavalry. As there were no roads and a difficult trail, everything had to be transported by pack animals. Several friendly datos living near Vicars assisted with native ponies. A letter was sent to the sultan of Bacolod, notifying him of our intentions and advising him to make peace on the arrival of the command in his country; further warning him of the consequences in case he attacked the soldiers or defied our Government. No reply was received, and on reaching the vicinity of Bacolod the outpost was attacked at night and several men wounded. Red flags were flying on the fort, a Moro challenge to war. Captain Pershing immediately invested the place, securing favorable ground for his mortars and mountain guns. The mortars were not so effective as expected, but Captain McNair pushed his Vicars Maxims up to within 300 yards and did very effective work. After two days' shelling and the use of small arms when practicable, the fort was assaulted and captured by infantry and dismounted cavalry. It was a large earthwork covered over by a bamboo shelter and surrounded by a ditch some 30 feet deep and about the same width. Trees were cut down and thrown into the ditch; bamboo ladders were thrown across this fill and the men crossed to the top of the wall.

The effective shelling had demoralized the Moros and many got away and escaped in boats during the two nights' siege; the remaining few were shortly overcome, and, thanks to care and able management, the place was captured with very slight loss, the total being 1 killed and 14 wounded during the entire siege. The fort was set on fire and everything combustible completely destroyed. Two miles farther on the trail another fort was discovered, occupied, probably, by the same tribe. It was shelled and after a slight defense abandoned. From this point to Marahui the march was uninterrupted, and the Moros met the soldiers with expressions of friendship and good will. The return march to Camp Vicars was made without incident. In repassing Bacolod the town was completely deserted, but care was taken not to injure or molest any property. I have enlarged rather freely on this incident, as it shows the character and disposition of these strange people and the best method of attacking their strongholds. Bacolod was probably the strongest fort in the Lake Lanao country and most Moros considered it impregnable. Its easy reduction can hardly fail to have a lasting effect.

In accordance with instructions from the division commander, an expedition under command of Capt. J. J. Pershing, Fifteenth Cavalry, left Camp Vicars on April 2 to explore the south and east shores of Lake Lanao. The command consisted of 4 companies Twenty-seventh Infantry; 3 troops Fifteenth Cavalry; the Seventeenth Field Battery; a pack train of 80 mules, and a native pack train belonging to several friendly datos. The command passed around the south shore and through the Maciu country without opposition, the inhabitants along the route professing friendship. On reaching the vicinity of Taraca, a large village on the east shore, it was found that preparations had been made to oppose a further advance. The population in this section is dense and the many cottas and rancherias along the several streams and lake shore had combined to fight. No fort was found so formidable as at Bacolod, but many smaller earthworks, some of considerable strength. The artillery was used as in former attacks, and in proper time the infantry assaulted. Some ten forts were taken and the Moro loss was heavy; a number of prisoners were taken, and released next day. A large amount of weapons, including cannon of various designs and about 60 small arms, was captured and destroyed.

This capture of arms was a severe loss to the Moros. We lost 2 men killed and several wounded. Our vast superiority in arms and discipline gives us every advantage, and if our troops are properly handled our loss should never be heavy in conflict with these people. The command met with no further opposition and reached Madaya on April 8. The country along the east shore was found low and marshy at many points and was difficult to traverse even at the end of a long dry season. It was determined to cross the command over to Marahui, across the Agus River. This was done without loss, and the command returned to Camp Vicars along the west shore. Some Moros near Bacolod fired on the cavalry flanks and were severely punished, otherwise the march was uninterrupted and without incident. The Moros along the route were friendly and were not interfered with in any way.

This is probably the first body of white men that has ever marched around the lake, and the effect on the Moros must be salutary. Captain Pershing deserves great credit for his able handling of this difficult problem. He and his command had to fight a savage foe in an unknown country, to overcome great natural obstacles, and to face a dreadful epidemic prevailing throughout that country. The lake country no longer remains an unknown land. We now have a correct and complete map of the entire lake shores and of the country between it and the sea to the north and south. The high mountain ranges to the west and east can be explored at a later day if deemed advisable.

Early in October, 1902, it was determined to construct another wagon road to the lake, taking Iligan as the base and Marahui as the objective. The Spaniards had constructed a road between these points and had carried small gunboats to the lake in sections and used them to some extent. This Spanish road was found impracticable in many places for our purpose, and a new line was surveyed, which joins the Spanish road some 12 miles from Iligan. The garrison at Iligan consisted of five companies of the Tenth Infantry and two troops of the Fifteenth Cavalry. The Twenty-eighth Infantry was sent down from Manila, and on November 1 work on the road was commenced. As this additional force brought two regimental headquarters, with 2 colonels at the same post, the senior colonel, Foote, Twenty-

eighth Infantry, was placed in command, and Colonel Noble, with headquarters, Tenth Infantry, was transferred to the important station at Cotabato, in the Rio Grande Valley. At first no native labor could be secured and the soldiers did all the work, but as we got into the country the Moros began to seek employment, and at the present time a large number are regularly employed. For several miles after leaving the sea this road was very difficult to construct, and it was only by the untiring energy of the officers and the willingness of the enlisted men that the natural obstacles were overcome.

The road at this date is fast approaching completion, and when the suspension bridge over the Agus River is in place another highway will be available to the interior of Mindanao. The length of this road is about 21 miles, or nearly the same length as the road from Malabang to Vicars. With these roads into the lake country, the Moro problem in this section, so far as supervision and contact go, should be well in hand.

If it is contemplated to change the customs and habits of these people and bring them to an intelligent understanding and appreciation of our methods of government, it will be necessary to eradicate about all the customs that have heretofore governed their habits of life. They are an essentially different people from us in thought, word, and action, and their religion will be a serious bar to any efforts toward Christian civilization. So long as Mohammedanism prevails, Anglo-Saxon civilization will make slow headway. They have already learned the futility of open warfare against organized troops, but their propensity to kill and steal remains, and so long as any white man inhabits their country or attempts to travel about, they will assault whenever a good opportunity offers. This is not entirely savage instinct; rather a settled conviction that such methods are right and proper.

At the present time there seems to be no system of general control or government among the Moros. Every dato and sultan is a law unto himself and has the power of life and death over his followers. Some seem to have more or less influence outside their rancherias, but it is generally in the shape of counsel. No war lords are paramount, and they come together or stay apart as the numerous petty chiefs decide, and even when banded together for any special purpose there does not seem to be any ruling leader. This absence of combination and concerted action has been of great advantage to us. It would perhaps be as well not to inaugurate any methods toward concentration of power and authority.

For the present at least military control seems about the most practical government for the Moros, and this applies as well to the Jolo Moros as to those inhabiting Mindanao. In consulting with officers who have been closely identified with these people for several years past, it seems to be the general opinion that we should control them through their sultan and datos. We can not assume complete personal supervision, and to remove their natural leaders and leave them without any control would add to, rather than decrease, the already existing anarchy. If the datos are held responsible and their authority recognized they will generally work in favor of order, and if a military chief is at hand they can be easily guided to acknowledge his authority and accept his decision on differences among themselves. This strikes me as the most practicable solution of the problem as it stands to-day, and by careful and just management the way may be gradually opened for some form of civil government at a later day.

Regarding the so-called pagan tribes who inhabit the mountains of Mindanao very little is known, owing to the limited contact with them. I can add no important information to the interesting and valuable paper already submitted by Maj. Gen. G. W. Davis in his annual report of this department for 1902.

The Jolo group of islands has formed a provisional district, and for the past year has been under the supervision of Col. W. M. Wallace, Fifteenth Cavalry. Many complications have arisen with these Jolo Moros, and at one time armed conflict seemed imminent. Additional troops were hurried to Jolo and the navy concentrated a number of gunboats in that vicinity. Fortunately, quiet was restored without resort to arms. Colonel Wallace has had a delicate situation to handle, and by patience and sound judgment has preserved order in his district.

In conclusion, I wish to add a word of praise for the officers and soldiers who have served in the Department of Mindanao during the past year. It has not been the good fortune of all to do equally conspicuous service, but all have had to undergo equal hardship. The danger of assassination has been present at times to all, and every organization in Mindanao has done its share of hard manual labor in constructing roads and making possible the holding and gradual extension of our authority in the lake country. For months they have had to face a dreadful epidemic, both in Jolo and Mindanao, which is perhaps a greater mental strain than actual conflict. It is a great pleasure to say that the command has proved fully equal to the extraordinary and trying duties required of it, and by their humane and kind treatment of the natives have materially assisted the government in its future dealing with the Moros.

Extracts from reports of several staff departments at these headquarters are herewith submitted, and also a Spanish description of the Juramentado, which may prove of interest.

Very respectfully,

SAMUEL S. SUMNER,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

THE JURAMENTADO.

The Moros are accustomed to suffer all the caprices of their despotic authority. The laws of centuries permit the men to be recruited for any purpose whatsoever. The debtor who can not pay becomes, with his family, the slave of the creditor, and the Moros are so indifferent to these conditions that their owners do not encounter any difficulty in making them contract such debts for their own resources. The debtor thus loses all his rights, and his children can be sold throughout the archipelago. He can, however, buy the liberty of his family at the risk of his own life, i. e., for the largest number of Christians whom he can slay. If the debtor accepts this proposition he becomes that moment a Juramentado, knowing perfectly well that if he manages to get into the midst of a Spanish settlement that all hope for escape is dead. Death is therefore certain for all Juramentados, and it is never the case that one repents his imprudence, because there are a number of Juramentados assembled to submit themselves to certain rites performed by expert panditas or priests. Alone in the deserted forest, the moonlight adding its rays to the weird, fantastic scene, they commence their exercises by fasting, reciting, and praying over the graves of the departed Juramentados and speaking of the bliss and happiness that is to be theirs in the heaven of Mohammed.

When they arrive at a sufficient state of exaltation, but never before, they are sent into a Christian community. As this is a ceremony that interests more or

less different families, and a great number of formalities have to be gone through with, it can never be kept absolutely secret, no matter how much it would be to their interest to do so, and thus it is that the governor of Jolo receives notice that an attack by the Juramentados will be made. But they can never inform him of the exact time when the attack will be made because the Juramentados themselves do not know at what time they will reach the exalted state. At nightfall, in the magic splendor of the moon, reverberates in the depth of the forest warlike sounding metal, like the everlasting lamenting echo of ever wandering souls. The priest congregates all fame-thirsting youths; speaks of the strong ones who died a noble death in front of the enemy's steel, of the menacing shadows of creditors, of the glory of the hero, and the infamy and slavery for the coward, and of other inexhaustible lives of pleasure where brilliant eyes look upon infinite treasures; and as imagination crazes them they convulsively grasp their sharp kris (sword) and imagine themselves feeling the cold sweat of death on their foreheads. From the damp vapors of the night surge voices, instilling valor into their hearts. The following day they die at an outpost.

The first Juramentados of whom we have knowledge, through history or tradition, gave themselves to martyrdom through exaltation of belief. Exalted in their practice of prayer, fasting, and making abstractions of all terrestrial pleasures, anxious to gain the paradise offered to all believers of Mohammed, they prepare themselves for the sacrifice, imposing upon themselves material mortification, putting strong binding upon their members and resolve to die on the terminal day. They shave their heads carefully, clothe themselves in clean white clothing (color for mourning among the islanders), and accompanied by their relatives, after arriving at the spot of bloody purification, they take leave from their relatives and present themselves before the largest possible body of armed Christians, calling their attention, provoking them, in search of death and martyrdom. The merit of eternal recompense is to receive cruel blows without a murmur or lament, without a show of agony, or avoidance of suffering, until expiring they lie victims of their own ignorance.

These mystic martyrs followed the warriors and were not satisfied in dying, but anxious to kill, mixing religious fanaticism with political fervor, never retreating, showing themselves to their enemies and trying to cause the death of the largest number before falling. Their open attacks were followed by ambushes and surprises, any means seeming proper to gain their martyrdom. The odium of races, the desire to distinguish themselves before their families, the wish to be revenged, and many other causes to-day make the Juramentado. Abuse, scorn, or any injury will make assassins of Moros and will convert the greatest coward into a ferocious beast. Take a Moro who has been your friend and force him to leave you and he will make you take a kris and kill him, because he will never allow himself to be so dishonored. Tragedies of all kinds among the Moros are credited to the Juramentado. Modern arms have, however, diminished these devils in human form, and only the bravest and most fanatical commit themselves for this purpose. There are few panditas to be found who will prepare candidates for martyrdom, as their respect for authority cools their religious ardor.

The following extracts from annual reports of the several chiefs of department staff officers are submitted with this report for special consideration:

FROM CHIEF QUARTERMASTER.

LAND TRANSPORTATION.

The land transportation has been barely sufficient for the needs of the department. Wagons and other vehicles have been supplied in sufficient quantities, but there has been a frequent demand for more draft and pack animals.

FORAGE.

American animals get thin on native forage when much work is required of them, but except when the animal is taxed to its utmost, native grasses can be used to advantage, except in a few localities where it grows so rank that there is no nutriment in it. The supply of American hay and oats has been sufficient and of good quality.

WATER TRANSPORTATION.

The arrangement made by the chief quartermaster of the division whereby the supplies for posts on the north coast of Mindanao are delivered direct via U. S. chartered transport *Dr. Hans Jurg Kiaer*, and to Jolo, Malabang, and Parang direct via U. S. army transport *Liscum*, has greatly expedited the prompt delivery of supplies required for the comfort and maintenance of troops, as well as affording regular transmission of the mail. The schedule inaugurated for these vessels has been carried out with surprising regularity, especially when the ordinary delays occasioned by rough weather are taken into consideration. Cargoes handled by these vessels have arrived at their destination in better condition than formerly.

CLOTHING AND EQUIPAGE.

Sufficient and generally of good quality. Complaint has been made that nankeen underwear is of inferior quality and easily torn; that buckskin gauntlets are sewed with a poor quality of thread and rip easily. The above notation has been made from two posts only. It is thought that it is due to the stock being old.

SUPPLIES.

Sufficient and of good quality. Losses in transit exceedingly small, with the exception of mineral oil. The complaint is made from several posts that the material used in the shipping cases and cans is of such a poor quality that it does not stand the handling required by transportation. This matter has been reported, and if the cases were of heavier material and a better quality of tin used in the cans the waste would be exceedingly small.

At posts or camps which are permanent to any extent a more improved system should be adopted for the disposal of the excreta than simply removing it by hand and carting it away in open wagons. I would recommend the trough with odorless excavating tank wagon and pump as a solution of this problem.

NOTE.—Special attention invited to this recommendation, which I understand has been tried at various places with marked success.

Statement showing how troops are sheltered in the Department of Mindanao.

Station.	Tents.		Rented buildings.		Government buildings.		Total.	
	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.
Zamboanga head-quarters.....			8	11	12	2	20	13
Zamboanga post.....					132	8	132	8
Tucuran.....					67	4	67	4
Malabang and sub-posts.....	60	3			482	16	492	19
Parang.....					133	5	133	5
Camp Vicars.....	546	22					546	22
Cottabato.....			1	9	240	7	241	16
Davao.....				3	179	6	179	9
Jolo.....		9	1	5	714	18	715	32
Iligan.....	1,058	41	70	20	204		1,332	61
Misamis.....			1	1	63	2	64	3
Puerta Princesa.....					106	2	106	2
Bongao.....					71	3	71	3
Siassi.....					85	4	85	4
Dapitan.....					94	2	94	2
Zamboanga casuals.....					58		58	
Total.....	1,664	75	81	49	2,560	79	4,335	208

Respectfully submitted.

F. VON SCHRADER,
Major and Quartermaster, U. S. Army, Chief Quartermaster.

Statement of allotments made from appropriation barracks and quarters, in the Department of Mindanao, during the fiscal year 1903.

Zamboanga post	\$474.25
Tucuran	1,850.12
Malabang	11,184.70
Parang	781.70
Davao	200.00
Jolo	4,319.96
Siassi	59.50
Iligan	25,023.09
Camp Vicars	7,155.70
Cottabato	225.00
Makar	724.86
Puerta Princesa	1,200.00
Coron	437.02
Alphonso XIII	183.00
Total construction	53,768.90

STATEMENT OF FIELD RANGES.

The Buzzacott and Hunt have been used principally and both have given satisfaction, but especially the Buzzacott. The Linley and Carr ranges have only lately been received, and sufficient time has not elapsed to make report of merits. The durability of the Buzzacott, Hunt, and Linley and Carr are seemingly about equal.

FROM CHIEF COMMISSARY.

The depot at Malabang has supplied the troops at Malabang, Camp Vicars, and all camps between these two stations, while the larger distributing station at Iligan has supplied all troops from Iligan to Lake Lanao. The work of Captain Simonds at Malabang and Captains Barber and Purssell at Iligan has been most efficient and satisfactory.

The supply of frozen beef received every two weeks by the transport *Seward* has been supplemented by the purchase of native cattle and beef cattle bought from the stock yards at Singapore. They were healthy, well-conditioned steers, small herds of which have been kept at Malabang and Camp Vicars, as well as at several other stations. They were offered to every station in the department not receiving a full supply of frozen beef, but a number of posts declined to handle beef cattle. They were the best grade of beef cattle on the market of the East, and so far only 2 head have been lost. Native cattle in these islands are small and almost entirely bulls and cows. They are not purchased save as a last resort to obtain fresh beef.

It is uncontrovertible that troops serving in these islands desire a full supply of frozen or refrigerated beef, and their prejudice against native beef or beef cattle obtained from any other source is so marked that they often prefer the canned meats. My experience during the past year but confirms earlier convictions, that the only practical, economical, and satisfactory method of supplying troops with the fresh meat component of the ration in these islands is by bringing to Manila frozen or refrigerated beef and issuing it from local and central cold-storage plants. I do not know anything more badly needed at stations in this department than cold-storage plants.

FRESH VEGETABLES.

Until my arrival here all stations in the department except those on the north coast were supplied with Java potatoes and onions. I stopped the supply, as they were very small and unsatisfactory in every way, and there was much loss from deterioration. The potatoes and onions shipped from the depot at Manila have been very satisfactory until the last two months, during which time the loss on potatoes has been very heavy. This is due to the age of the potatoes at this season of the year, when it seems to be impossible to prevent rapid deterioration under the best of handling.

LOSSES.

Proceedings of boards of survey and inspection reports show the following losses:

Damaged	\$34,956.04
Shortages	2,952.41
Thefts	406.06
Lost in transit	448.24
Total	88,762.76

The losses on bacon and flour were chiefly in crated bacon and flour in sacks. The loss on fresh meats was due to delays in transportation and breaking down of ice plants. The losses of hard bread, canned meats, canned fruits, and in some cases canned vegetables were due to the continued supply of old stores, many of which were unfit for sale or issue on arrival at stations, or were in such condition from age that they deteriorated rapidly after receipt.

The inability of the subsistence department, from well-known causes, to sell surplus stores a year ago has forced the supply of some stores which had long outlived their keeping power in any climate. Proceedings of boards of survey are replete with grave charges against the climate as almost the universal cause of losses during the past year. A tropical climate is undoubtedly severe on stores, but I am thoroughly convinced from personal observation as well as close inspection of "statements of stores" which accompany boards of survey that over two-thirds of the losses on many articles were directly due to the fact that they were old and were in process of deterioration when received. I am of the decided opinion that fresh stores properly packed and carefully handled in transportation will keep in this climate at least six months and longer without unreasonable loss from deterioration.

CANNED MEATS.

Roast beef, beef and vegetable stew, and corned-beef hash have been used extensively and have given satisfaction. In many instances troops have expressed preference for these articles over native beef. Corned beef, always a reliable article, is showing deterioration from age.

DESICCATED VEGETABLES.

Desiccated potatoes and onions have been issued when fresh vegetables could not be supplied. They are the only articles of the ration which officers and soldiers dislike, and I have yet to find any organization that could by any means make them palatable.

EMERGENCY RATIONS.

Very few of these rations have been used in active operations, which will be the case so long as there is any means of transporting bacon, canned meats, hard bread, sugar, and coffee.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

In my annual report for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1903, I recommended that at least half the flour and bacon be sent to these islands packed in tin. I now strongly urge that all the flour and bacon be packed in tin, no matter what the original cost may be. As a measure of economy the net weight of the flour package might be increased to 75 pounds and the bacon to 27 or 36 pounds. All tinning should be first-class work, seams folded and well soldered, the tops and bottoms put on in first-class manner, and all cans lacquered. Indeed, the tinning should be much better than is used by the average commercial house at home. Many cans, small and large, particularly the square coffee cans, in which both issue and sale coffee are packed, give way in the seams under jars in transportation. The army tin cup is a grade of work which would save much loss on canned stores.

FROM CHIEF SURGEON.

As shown by Table II, 129 deaths have been reported, of which 19 were among civilians attached to commands. Of the 110 deaths among soldiers, 12 were from

wounds and accidents and 98 from disease. Of the latter, cholera caused 32, dysentery 22, typhoid fever 11, beriberi 10, smallpox 1; that is, 26 of the 98 occurred from so-called preventable diseases.

The first case of cholera occurred November 27, 1902, in Zamboanga; in Iligan, December 19; in Lintogoup, January 10, 1903; in Malabang, January 12; in Mataling Falls, January 14; in Camp Vicars, January 19; in Cotabato, April 6. A reference to Table IV shows that the largest losses were in Camp Vicars and Iligan. The cases from the former included those sent in from marching commands and of the latter those sent in from camps engaged in building a road to Lake Lanao. It is very difficult to enforce sanitary precautions with moving commands. The percentage of deaths to population was much greater among the civilians attached to the commands. These men were not subject to so strict discipline.

It is probable that a great reduction can be made in the prevalence of all of these diseases by the study of the problem how to regulate the daily life in large commands so as to exclude human excrement from human mouths. At present the impracticability of this is recognized and a compromise made by insisting that the offensive and disease-producing material shall be cooked before serving. This is performed in drinking water by the Forbes-Waterhouse sterilizer, by distillation or by boiling. Without definite data the general opinion formed by experience is that boiling is the only method that is absolutely reliable. Bacteriologists report the number of colonies that can be cultivated from a cubic centimeter of distilled water, and dysentery is reported from the commands using the Forbes-Waterhouse sterilizer. This indicates defects either in the apparatus or in the administration. It is believed that the latter is more frequently the fault. Human nature is frail, and men required to attend a machine for many hours, and frequently called upon to furnish water in excess of the capacity of the machine, lose interest in the life history of microbes and are liable to meet demands by more direct methods. By boiling the water for thirty minutes; by boiling all utensils used in the preparation and serving of food; by protecting all food from insects and rats; by making men wash their hands before eating and avoid putting their fingers in their mouths, a great reduction can be made in the use of the over-worked expression "climatic influence."

A further reduction will be made when the men can be protected from the sun and rain in barracks with floors 4 or 5 feet above the ground, giving each man a floor space of 100 square feet. This can be accomplished with nipa and bamboo at small expense. Tents are more expensive, more perishable, and more unsanitary. It is very difficult for soldiers to lead clean lives in crowded tents.

Beriberi is the bane of native troops, and anything to throw light on its causation is desirable. Accumulated experience will, it is believed, place this among the preventable diseases. It is very rare among white men, but they are not exempt. As the native troops are clothed and lodged the same as white soldiers, it is natural to turn to the food supply as the source of infection. The scout ration as ordinarily drawn differs from that of the white soldiers in being less in quantity and containing a larger proportion of rice. As the men appear active and well nourished, suspicion is directed to the rice. Common opinion pronounces the fine quality of rice imported from the mainland of Asia more dangerous than the native product. It is possible that the infective material gains access to the sacks in the unventilated holds of old ships, as beriberi is common among sailors in the Tropics.

The writer does not believe that the disease is directly contagious. He has for months watched many cases of the paralytic and dropsical forms in large families and crowded houses without seeing a new case develop, and without further precaution than to expose sleeping mats to the sun.

Many intelligent natives have assured the writer that until last November beriberi was unknown in Zamboanga except when some afflicted sailor was brought ashore. In that month cholera appeared, and measures very effective for stamping out that disease were taken. The natives shut themselves in their houses; boiled the water, and excluded fruit and vegetables from their diet, subsisting exclusively upon rice and fish. By the end of December there were many cases of beriberi scattered about the town. All rice was imported from Saigon, as new rice was not ready for use and the native crop of the preceding year had been long exhausted. The writer believes that the exclusion of fruit and vegetables from the dietary was an important predisposing cause of the disease.

The only case of smallpox was that of an officer who came into the department with the disease. He had evaded vaccination. His young wife who traveled with him had been vaccinated and escaped.

The four dental surgeons in this department have done a great amount of useful work, but lose much time awaiting transportation from post to post. Much

time could be saved by having the teeth of the recruits put in order at the post before being sent from the United States. In the absence of such provision perhaps the new arrivals in the division could be held in a casual camp in Manila until their dental work can be completed.

FROM SIGNAL OFFICER.

On its formation, the department contained within its territorial limits 501 miles of submarine cable, 326 miles land telegraph line, and 64 miles land telephone line operated by the enlisted men of Company F, Signal Corps. During the fiscal year the land mileage was decreased by the abandonment of the Reina Regente-Davao telegraph line (210 miles), pursuant to fourth indorsement, dated Headquarters Division of the Philippines, Manila, P. I., February 4, 1903; by the abandonment of the Tucuran-Lubig telephone line (7 miles), pursuant to telegraphic instructions dated office of the chief signal officer, Manila, P. I., June 6, 1903; and by the transfer to the Philippine constabulary of the Maasin-Surigao cable (47.5 miles) and the Misamis-Langaran telephone line (45 miles).

A telephone line 18 miles in length, between Punta Separacion and Alfonso XIII, Paragua, was completed March 13, 1903, and a line intended ultimately to establish telegraphic communication between Iligan and Marahui (Lake Lanao) was completed as far as Pantar (23 miles) and operated as a telephone line. The Cotabato-Reina Regente line (50 miles) was changed from telegraph to telephone. At the close of the fiscal year the department contained 453.8 miles submarine cable, 66 miles land telegraph line, and 98 miles land telephone line, which connect the following stations:

The telegraph line from Malabang north to Lake Lanao is equipped with "Russel cut-in" telephones, permitting, in addition to the usual telegraph service, a satisfactory telephone service between Malabang, Mataling Falls, and Camp Vicars. This valuable telephone, devised by Capt. Edgar Russel, Signal Corps, has been of great benefit to the line. A similar line, constructed during the year from Iligan along the new military road to Lake Lanao, has at the date of making this report been completed to Pantar, 5 miles south of Marahui, on Lake Lanao, which latter place will be the ultimate end of the land line. This line, though now used as a telephone line, will be immediately changed to a telegraph line and equipped with "Russel cut-in" telephones, with offices at Iligan, Nonucan, Momungan, Pantar, and Marahui. In the construction of this line the Signal Corps is under many obligations to Maj. R. L. Bullard, Twenty-eighth Infantry, who has been in charge of the work of constructing the military road through the jungles and across the mountains from Iligan to Lake Lanao.

The main line of communication between the north and the south coast of Mindanao is over the Tucuran-Lintogup land line, which has been a constant menace to communication ever since its completion. The line passes over a wild rocky region which includes a dense forest of high trees. The region is subject to violent windstorms, which sweep across it from Iligan Bay, and which are constantly blowing trees across the line. To clear a path through this forest wide enough to enable falling trees to clear the line is impracticable. Inasmuch as it is understood that two launches are to be put in commission on Lake Lanao, I therefore recommend that the offices at Marahui and Camp Vicars be connected by cable, thus creating a new and better line of communication across the island, and that the Tucuran-Lintogup line be abandoned. The old line needs constant repairs and necessitates the presence of a company of infantry at Tucuran. The new line can be kept in repair more easily than the Lintogup line, inasmuch as it is built along the new military roads, over which wagon trains are constantly passing. The establishment of a line of communication between Iligan and Malabang would permit the recovery of the Malabang-Tucuran cable and the relaying of the Zamboanga-Tucuran cable from Zamboanga to Malabang, as it is understood that the present garrison at Tucuran is kept at that point for the maintenance of the Tucuran-Lintogup land line. This recovered cable could well be used elsewhere.

There is a very strong current passing Zamboanga between the mainland and the Island of Basilan, which is felt by the largest vessels for 10 miles east and west of Zamboanga and which changes direction with the tides. The water in this channel is only about 40 fathoms deep, and the bottom is of the roughest coral formation. The constant chafing of our deep-sea type of cable over these coral formations rapidly damages the cable. The Zamboanga-Isabela cable (interrupted since September 14, 1902) laid across this channel is in many places unserviceable. I recommend that it be recovered as soon as possible and that communication between Zamboanga and the naval station at Isabela be established by a system

of wireless telegraphy. The Zamboanga-Tucuran cable is also laid in this channel and has suffered accordingly. Communication over this cable was interrupted February 12, 1903, during the absence of the cable ship *Burnside* from the Division of the Philippines. The cable was under-run for some distance and all possible efforts made to repair the fault, but on account of the depth of the water, the strength of the current, and the absence of all proper apparatus, the cable necessarily remained interrupted until the return of the cable ship *Burnside* from China. On the repair of the cable May 30, 1903, the electrician of the repair ship reported three faults within 16 miles of Zamboanga and that the general resistance of the cable was weakened, due to the damaging effects of the current. I recommend that this cable be landed at Bolon, a small village 18 miles north of Zamboanga, and that an iron-pole land line be laid between the two points named. This location of the cable will enable it to avoid the shoal water and the current mentioned above. On March 11, 1903, a fault developed in the Jolo-Zamboanga cable near Jolo. The Jolo end was under-run for 4 miles in an effort to reach the fault, but the depth of the water prevented further efforts with the apparatus available at Jolo. The cable ship *Burnside* commenced the repair of this cable June 1, 1903, and continued the work for three days, but being under orders to proceed to the United States was unable to complete the work on account of lack of time.

The conduct of the enlisted men of the corps in the department has reflected credit on the corps to which they belong.

(NOTE BY THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER.—While the telegraph service has been more or less satisfactory between certain points, the total cut off for months between department headquarters and the important stations of Malabang, Camp Vicars, Jolo, and Iligan has been a very serious inconvenience in carrying on important military operations. In my opinion the Signal Corps should have made some effort to repair the cable to Tucuran and to Jolo, even if the regular cable ship was not available; and even at the present date department headquarters is cut off from telegraphic service with Jolo, and has been since March 11, 1903, something over three months. So far as I am informed no present effort is being made to repair this break. The recommendation of the chief signal officer regarding relaying of Tucuran and Jolo cable so as to avoid the strong current is approved.)

OFFICE OF JUDGE-ADVOCATE.

The records for July, August, and September, 1902, under the headquarters of the Seventh Separate Brigade, Zamboanga, Mindanao, P. I., were transferred to the headquarters Department of the Visayas, Iloilo, Panay, P. I.

No record of trials by general court-martial during June, 1903, have yet been received at this office, and probably not all of the trials for May, 1903. The records of summary court trials for June, 1903, will not be received before the middle of July, 1903, and the same may be said of trials by provost courts. Record to June 26, 1903: Number of general court cases, 177; number of summary cases, 1,870; number of garrison cases, 6; number of provost-court cases, 62; number of regimental cases, none.

OFFICE OF THE ENGINEER OFFICER.

During the fiscal year the following work has been done:

ROADS.

In the vicinity of Zamboanga.—Work of repair on the two roads extending from Zamboanga to Tetuan and from Zamboanga to Masinloc was begun in February under the personal direction of a sergeant of Company G, Second Battalion of Engineers. Two allotments, aggregating \$751.12 Mexican currency, were made for this work. The contemplated work of repair, consisting of installation of several small culverts and surfacing of bad stretches in the road, was completed about the end of May, at a total expenditure of \$707.40 Mexican currency.

Military road, Malabang to Camp Vicars.—This road was begun in May, 1902, and completed in November of the same year, by labor of troops entirely. The necessity for its construction followed from the decision of the division commander to maintain a post (Camp Vicars) in the Lanao region, and from the breaking down of the difficult Ganassi trail, almost impassable after a few days of wet weather and certain to be so after continued rains. An allotment of \$10,000, Mexican currency, was made by the division commander in May, 1902, and after

preliminary explorations work was begun about May 20. The troops engaged on the work at the start were F Company and a portion of G Company, Engineers, 1 troop of the Sixth Cavalry, 2 troops of the Fifteenth Cavalry, 1 company of the Seventeenth Infantry, and 1 company of the Tenth Infantry, shortly joined by a second company of the Tenth Infantry. Maj. Lea Febiger had charge of the work until May 30, when his battalion was relieved from duty in the division and the work was turned over to the engineer officer of the brigade. On June 10 the 2 companies of the Tenth Infantry were relieved, and shortly thereafter the 3 troops of cavalry, 6 companies of the Twenty-seventh Infantry replacing them on the work. Two weeks later one of these companies was relieved, and on July 10 another company detailed on the work in its place. On August 10 the troops of the Twenty-seventh Infantry were relieved, excepting one company working by weekly detail from Malabang, and 1 battalion of the Eleventh Infantry was detailed in its place, remaining on duty until the work was completed, excepting that 2 companies and the 1 company of the Twenty-seventh Infantry were withdrawn during military operations during the entire month of September. About the middle of October these 2 companies, with an additional one of the Tenth Infantry and 1 company of the Twenty-seventh Infantry, were returned to the work, remaining until its completion, about the 1st of November.

The total length of the road is about 21 miles, of which about 15 miles is through heavy timber. The timber has been cleared throughout most of the timbered section to a width of about 100 feet.

The surface is a hard sand, with just sufficient loam mixed to hold the sand firmly together. Throughout nearly the whole length of the road this sand was found overlaid by from 3 to 12 inches of vegetable mold. This latter was entirely removed and the road ditched on both sides (except on hills). The ditching and scraping of the surface was omitted through the cleared land near Camp Vicars, as the underlying clay was quite close to the surface, and it was deemed better to shift the trail through these fields when necessary than to attempt further improvement. The resulting surface has proved to be hard and firm in wet weather, pulverizing considerably in long-continued dry weather, and washing somewhat in unusually heavy rains. The road requires constant maintenance, equivalent to about half a company of troops continuously at work. An allotment of \$2,000 has been made and the money forwarded to Capt. J. L. Hines, Twenty-third Infantry, for pay of native camineros for this purpose.

The construction of this road was under the personal supervision of the engineer officer of the department from the date it was begun in May, 1902, until October 13, and from that date to its completion under the supervision of Lieut. E. J. Dent, Corps of Engineers.

The road was visited at about the time of its completion by the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, and the officers connected with the work were complimented upon its appearance.

The total disbursements on this road, exclusive of those made by Captain Hines, were \$6,116.40, Mexican currency.

Parang-Cotabato road.—Work on this road in progress at the beginning of the fiscal year was completed in May by Lieut. E. D. Peek, Corps of Engineers, assisted by a detail of from 14 to 17 men of G Company, Second Battalion of Engineers. The total disbursements on this road to date have amounted to \$36,449.64 Mexican.

The total length of the road is 13½ miles. Three rivers are crossed—the Parang River, just outside the town of Parang, by a bridge 200 feet long, constructed of pile bents with a 48-foot timber truss over the channel; the Simoay, about 4½ miles from Cottabato, crossed by a ford, and the Rio Grande at Cottabato, where a ferry will be installed, for which a lighter has been constructed, but not yet sheathed.

The road was constructed by Moro labor at 40 and 50 cents Mexican per day. Grades and curves are easy, but the surface is mainly clay, with a covering of sand and gravel over about half the distance. Several hundred feet of corduroy was put in near the Parang River, and about a mile of swampy section near the Simoay River was built in embankment with a surface of fine gravel, the fill being accomplished by means of a portable tramway and cars borrowed from the Tamontaca work.

Cotabato-Tamontaca road.—Work on this road in progress at beginning of the fiscal year was practically completed under direction of Lieut. Wallace McNamara, Twenty-seventh Infantry; Sergeant Wilson, of Company G, Second Battalion of Engineers, being employed as supervisor, the labor being furnished by Moros.

In March an additional allotment of \$1,000, Mexican currency, was made for repairs to the road and to a bridge across an estero on the road. Lieut. W. L.

Reed, Tenth Infantry, has charge of the repair work. About \$600 Mexican of the last allotment has been expended by that officer in repairs to the bridge.

The bed for a large part of the distance is a natural soil of the alluvial bottom, without top dressing, containing, especially near Cottabato, a mixture of red clay, troublesome in wet weather. A short stretch of the road is covered with a good limestone found near the road. This portion contains the only steep grades in the road.

Roads in Davao district.—But little work has been done in this section excepting on trails in the vicinity of Makar. It has been found practically impossible to secure native labor at any reasonable price. In March, 1903, \$10,000 Mexican currency was ordered withdrawn from the allotments for this work, but the order was not received until the balance had been reduced to \$9,968.80, which was turned in for use on the Iligan-Lanao road.

Jolo Archipelago, Paragua and Calamianes.—No road work in these islands has been done during the fiscal year.

North coast of Mindanao.—The only work done on the north coast of Mindanao was the construction of the military road from Iligan to Lake Lanao.

Work on this road was begun in October, 1902, by G Company, Second Battalion Engineers, 1 battalion of the Twenty-eighth Infantry, and 2 companies of the Tenth Infantry. The labor was supplied by the troops. The route extends along the old Spanish railway grade to Tominobo River, a distance from Iligan ford, at the edge of town, of about 2 miles; thence along the foot of the hills to the beach at the mouth of the Nonucan River, about 1 mile farther; thence climbing the hill near the Agus River to the old Spanish road near Momungan, about 7 miles from Nonucan ford; thence generally following the Spanish road to Pantar, about 6 miles from Momungan; thence to Marahui, on Lake Lanao, about 4 miles from Pantar. Total distance from Iligan to Marahui, about 20 miles.

The above working force was augmented at the close of January by one additional battalion of the Twenty-eighth Infantry and early in February by the remaining battalion of this regiment and two additional companies of the Tenth Infantry. In February work was also begun in hiring Moro labor, at first by the day and later by agreement for finished work. The money available for this purpose was about \$32,000 Mexican currency, being the Mexican equivalent of a portion of an allotment of \$20,000 United States currency made from the appropriation for transportation of the Army by the Secretary of War. In addition, allotments of \$26,468.80 Mexican currency were made from funds appropriated by act 1, Philippine Commission.

To date the road has been completed to 3½ miles beyond Pantar and work is under way from that point toward Marahui, which is on the lake and but a mile distant. The bridge across the Nonucan River has been completed and the suspension bridge over the Agus partially completed. It is estimated that the work will be completed by the middle of August.

The roadbed is generally clay. In numerous places boulder outcrop was encountered, and parts of the stone taken out were used in surfacing, but not in many places in sufficient quantity to be regarded as a macadam surface. The road is ditched throughout on both sides (excepting on hillsides) and the timber is cleared to 100 feet on either side to allow the sun and breeze full play in drying out after wet weather. Camineros are being employed to maintain the surface.

WHARF WORK.

Zamboanga.—The wharf at Zamboanga, nearly completed at the beginning of the fiscal year, was completed in October. This wharf is a pile structure, extending from the stem of the old Spanish masonry wharf to a depth of 18 feet at low tide. The stem, 18 feet wide, is 500 feet long, and an L-shaped head 40 by 120 feet completes the structure. All the work was done by small details from G Company, Second Battalion of Engineers.

Funds were appropriated by act 490, United States Philippine Commission, for the purchase of mooring buoys and anchors for this wharf. The supplies have been ordered, but will not be received for some two months, when they will be installed.

Parang.—Construction of an extension to the masonry wharf at Parang was begun by Lieutenant Peek in November, 1902, from funds appropriated under act 430, United States Philippine Commission, to the amount of \$3,500 Mexican currency. A number of piles and a quantity of supplies and lumber had previously been purchased from funds appropriated by act 289. The start in the work was delayed by the slow progress of the Zamboanga wharf, which required the use of the pile driver until October. Difficulty was met in securing piles, about half

those used being purchased at Isabel, Basilan, and shipped from ten to twenty at a time on the U. S. chartered transport *Æolus*. The remainder were cut under the supervision of engineer soldiers on Bongo Island. The work was entirely completed in May, 1903. The work included construction of a stem 18 feet wide and 50 feet long, in prolongation of the masonry stem, and an oblique head 34 by 80 feet to 20 feet in depth. Some repairs were also made to the masonry work of the stem.

This wharf is still in need of suitable mooring buoys and anchorage appliances, as the seas during about five months of the year are such as to make it difficult for a vessel to approach the wharf.

The total expended on this work to date is \$4,684.97 from the two appropriations. The labor was done by natives under the supervision of the engineer troops.

Jolo.—The sum of \$23,000 Mexican currency, for repair to the old masonry wharf at Jolo and its extension by a piled T-head, was appropriated by acts 430 and 483, United States Philippine Commission. An additional pile driver was secured from Manila and shipped to Jolo in December, 1902. Lieutenant Fries, Corps of Engineers, with a small detachment of engineer soldiers from Company G, Second Battalion Engineers, had charge of the work until his departure for Manila in March, when the work was turned over to Capt. F. C. Marshall, Fifteenth Cavalry, until the arrival of Lieutenant Hannum, Corps of Engineers, about May 15. The project consisted of repairs to the masonry work, extensive additions to the riprap protection, and the addition at the end of the wharf of a T-head 122 by 88 feet. A suitable supply of riprap was found on the beach near Jolo, and work on the repairs to masonry work was begun in January. The work met with several delays—from the outbreak of cholera in February, the breakdown of the station transport *Taganac* in March, the impossibility of obtaining piles except from Basilan and Zamboanga, and the lack of transportation for those secured, and finally the departure of Lieutenant Fries and the late arrival of Lieutenant Hannum.

At this date the work is progressing well. All lumber and piles are on hand, the former having been purchased mainly from Sandakan, and the latter hauled from Zamboanga by U. S. chartered lighter *Concord* early in June. A new station boat (the *Gibson*) has been chartered by the quartermaster's department, which will be of great assistance in the riprap work, a large lighter having been constructed for this work.

The total expended on this work to date is about \$15,500 Mexican currency, which includes the purchase of all the piles and lumber that will be needed. The work is done by native labor under the supervision of engineer troops.

Siassi.—A small appropriation, \$960 Mexican currency, was made by act 430, United States Philippine Commission, for construction of a new wharf at Siassi. No work was done during the fiscal year, as all pile drivers available were in use elsewhere. The plant liberated by the completion of the Parang wharf has, however, been shipped to Siassi, and Lieutenant Hannum has been given charge of the work. The appropriation is so small that only a piled landing stage 20 by 38 feet is contemplated.

The work will be done by native labor, under the direction of engineer troops.

Iligan.—Funds for the construction of the wharf at Iligan were appropriated under acts 430 and 490, United States Philippine Commission, to the amount of \$9,500 United States currency, which was converted into Mexican currency in the sum of \$23,750. Start on the work was delayed by inability to secure an engineer officer to supervise the work, until Lieut. C. O. Sherrill, Corps of Engineers, reported at Iligan about March 1, 1903. Preparatory work was then begun in securing piles, lumber, and necessary supplies, a pile driver having been secured from Manila.

In April the division commandant directed that the wharf be constructed at the new post at Camp Overton, about 3 miles south of the town of Iligan, at the mouth of the Nonucan River. These instructions were later confirmed by Governor Taft. The construction was begun accordingly by Lieutenant Sherrill and continued by Lieut. W. A. Mitchell, who relieved the former officer about May 15.

To date about 15 bents of 4 piles each have been placed and capped, and the work is progressing favorably. A piled stem from six to seven hundred feet long will be required, with a T or L head.

The total disbursements to date on this work amount to about \$9,500 Mexican currency.

Survey work.—In addition to the above work the officers and men of the two companies were able to complete survey work as follows: Town of Iligan, reserva-

tion and post of Camp Overton, near Iligan, reservation of Zamboanga, reservation of Malabang, reservation of Parang, reservation of Jolo, besides numerous reconnaissances of the roads and trails between Malabang and Lake Lanao, around Lake Lanao, and from Marahui to Iligan.

FROM THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S REPORT.

INSTRUCTION AND DISCIPLINE.

Instruction of officers as prescribed by general orders, Adjutant-General's Office has been carried on at most posts conscientiously and with excellent results. Field service, road building, and other conditions have in some instances interfered with this work. The officers generally have taken an interest in their work and have benefited thereby.

Cases of intemperance among the officers have been few. Discipline is generally good, considering conditions. Certain exceptions have been noted in my "Report of inspections."

Attention is invited to the fact that at dates of inspection 55 officers were absent from their commands; 26 of the 54 companies and troops inspected were commanded by lieutenants, some of whom were officers of short service and small experience.

TARGET PRACTICE.

Target practice has, so far as conditions would permit, been held as prescribed, but for various causes a number of organizations have had no practice. Since the date of issue of General Orders, No. 855, series 1901, Headquarters Division of the Philippines, conditions in the islands have materially changed.

Many posts have ranges; many more will have them in the near future. The requirements of section 11, paragraph A, ordered noted, are not carried out generally. I recommend that this section be so modified as to meet present conditions.

Target ranges in this department are as follows: Jolo, 1,000 yards; Parang, 300 yards; Reina Regente, 500 yards, no skirmish; Malabang, 300 yards, 1,000 yards possible; Makar, 600 yards; Lintogup, 500 yards; Cotabato, 700 yards, no skirmish; Puerta Princesa, 1,000 yards; Iligan, 1,400 yards; Zamboanga, none; Misamis, 1,000 yards; Davao, 800 yards.

CANTEEN.

The absence of the canteen is seriously felt. The effect is to encourage men to drink the various native drinks, many of which are very injurious, and to encourage the use of opium. At the several posts inspected it was learned that, in spite of all precautions, considerable liquor, usually of bad quality, found its way into garrison.

Prices for whisky smuggled into garrison range from \$5 to \$8 gold per quart, and it finds ready sale even at these exorbitant prices. The "Chino" and native merchants can afford to take very heavy chances with such profits in view. A canteen where the men could procure good pure beer and wine at a reasonable price would be a blessing.

LAND TRANSPORTATION.

Many cases of glanders, farcy, and surra have developed, otherwise the animals have stood the climate fairly well.

The effect of recent orders restricting the use of native grass or forage has, I believe, resulted beneficially. During this fiscal year 256 animals have been destroyed on account of disease.

The most serious transportation problem for this department at present is the supply of troops in the Lake Lanao region. I recommend the construction at an early date of an electric road from Iligan to Marahui. The original cost will be considerable, but it will soon pay for itself in the saving of men, animals, etc., now needed to supply the troops even imperfectly and to keep the roads in good repair.

ROADS.

Good wagon roads have been built mostly by troop labor, as follows: Cotabato to Parang, 14 miles, completed, native labor; Malabang to Camp Vicars, 23 miles,

completed; Iligan to Pantar, 18 miles, serviceable, but not entirely completed; Pantar to Marahui, 5 miles, now under construction.

These roads require constant repair, which, during the rainy season, will involve much hard labor, and will at best be very difficult of passage for heavy trains.

WATER TRANSPORTATION.

The posts of the department are dependent for supplies upon water transportation; several posts of the department have small garrisons and are remote from any base of supplies. At times transportation available has been insufficient to keep them fully supplied. This has caused temporary inconvenience, but in no instance suffering.

The boats now in service, together with those already authorized, should be sufficient to meet the requirements of the department.

The water transportation generally throughout the department has been well cared for. The chartered transports *Borneo* and *Æolus* are clean; linen is abundant and clean; food abundant, of good quality, and satisfactorily served, and service generally satisfactory.

BARRACKS AND QUARTERS.

Consideration of comfort and economy dictate that, so far as possible, troops be housed. Temporary quarters should be constructed, even though it be contemplated to occupy the site for not more than six months or a year. Men under canvas, in this climate, especially during the rainy season, are neither comfortable, contented, nor healthy. Canvas is costly and its life is short—six or eight months.

Closets for use with dry-earth receptacles, as supplied by the quartermaster's department, are defective in that they are not completely inclosed and seats are not provided with covers.

CLOTHING.

It is hoped that the near future may see the troops in the Philippines provided with clothing of better quality, having some semblance of uniformity. The khaki clothing now in use is a mixed lot of various colors and types. Some blouses have standing, some have rolling, collars; some are pleated, some plain; some have shoulder loops, some have none.

With such issues one can not expect much from individuals or organizations. About the only presentable khaki clothing seen is that which has been made, or at least made over, by civilian tailors at the personal expense of the men.

The quality of the campaign hat is a cause of general complaint, and justly so. A hat of better quality should be provided. In my judgment, a tan shoe, stronger and of better quality, could and should be provided. The original cost would be greater, but in the end it would result in economy for the wearer.

Gauntlets are of poor quality. Much of the stitching is rotten, whether from faulty manufacture or from long storage I am unable to state.

The khaki coat, unless protected from the neck, soon becomes soiled at the collar and unsightly. White collars are impracticable and undesirable even at ceremonies. To remedy this defect many devices are resorted to by officers and men.

I recommend that a stock made of khaki cloth be authorized and issued by the quartermaster's department, to be worn by officers and men as prescribed by the commanding officer.

Regarding the new uniforms for officers, the meaning of "falling collar from 1 to 1½ inches in width," prescribed for the "service coat," is either generally misunderstood or the provision is disregarded. One sees collars varying from the low rolling collar fastened by one hook, to the high box collar, 3 inches or more in width.

The coat of arms and insignia of "arm of service" or "corps" are too large for convenience or for appearance; the size should be reduced about one-half. If the present size be retained the coat of arms should be worn on the shoulder loop.

SUPPLIES.

Boxes in which coal-oil cans are packed are too frail, resulting in great inconvenience and in considerable loss. Considerable loss of oil also results from cans being punctured by nails in packing.

Throughout this department generally the climatic conditions are excellent for the Tropics, and wherever troops are properly housed the supply of authorized articles, including fresh beef and vegetables, is ample and water is of good quality and

plentiful. The health of the troops is good. These conditions can not exist without distilled water and ice.

I recommend that distilling plants be supplied all garrisoned posts and camps and that ice plants and refrigerating plants be supplied all posts designated as permanent posts, which are occupied by American troops.

SUBSISTENCE.

The components of the ration are generally excellent; exceptions noted being hard bread, crate bacon, sack flour. Sales stores on the authorized list appear to be suitable to the climate. Many sales stores supplied this department are old and either partially or wholly unfit for consumption. Of others there has been and is a deficiency.

Officers of the Philippine Scouts which I have inspected and several medical officers, who have devoted special attention to the subject, believe that the ration prescribed for scouts is undesirable. It is reported that scouts, while using the soldiers' ration, showed marked physical development and greatly improved health. It is also believed by these officers that the great number of cases of beriberi among the scouts is due to the ration, principally to the excessive amount of rice consumed. Under normal tropical conditions natives subsist principally upon rice, but they do little work and they eat often.

The life of activity and regularity of the scout develops an inordinate appetite, resulting in overloading the stomach with rice. This affects the nervous system, and is believed to cause beriberi eventually. A change in the ration is recommended.

There have been some complaints about the coffee. Not only have these been fully investigated, but careful inquiry has been made of commissary officers, company commanders, and of men on duty in the various messes and kitchens. Coffee put up by Castle Brothers, whenever examined, was found to be unsatisfactory; this may have been due to long storage. Most of the coffee examined was found to be of excellent quality. Coffee roasted and ground will under the most favorable conditions lose some of its aroma.

At many posts it is impossible to find among the troops competent bakers. First-class bread is the exception, not the rule. This can be corrected only by the employment of competent civilian bakers, and I renew the oft-repeated recommendation that the employment of a liberal number be authorized.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

Owing to the large number of troops on duty in the department, to the distance from Manila, and to the lack of suitable facilities for transportation of sick and injured to Manila, a base hospital in the department is urgently needed. From its central and sanitary location, its excellent climate, and from the fact that it is the location of headquarters of the department, Zamboanga is the natural and it is believed to be the best place suited to the location of such a hospital.

The old Spanish buildings now used as barracks for troops, as hospital, and for various other purposes are well suited for the purpose and would provide a hospital of capacity for 150 to 200 patients.

DENTAL SURGEONS.

The dental surgeons in the department take keen interest and pride in their profession, and the excellent work which they have done has contributed vastly to the comfort and health of the troops. Charges made for gold and other material supplied have, so far as I can learn, been satisfactory.

They have been handicapped of late in their work, due to lack of supplies and to the impossibility of getting requisitions filled. I am unable to state the cause of this deficiency.

PAY DEPARTMENT.

Troops serving outside the limits of the United States should, if they so elect, be paid in the currency of the country in which they are serving. The navy serving on this station receive their pay in Mexican currency. Payment exclusively in United States currency is always an inconvenience and at times a great injustice, often resulting in actual hardship. At many stations only Mexican currency can be used. At points remote from Manila it is always with difficulty that one

can purchase Mexican money, even at an exorbitant price, frequently \$1 gold for \$2 Mexican currency being demanded, regardless of the official rate of exchange.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

The Luger automatic pistol as a hunting pistol and for dress occasions is attractive and useful. I have one which I prize highly, but for field service, in the hands of officers and men, it is a failure. It is too complicated, and cartridges often jam, but the main defect is that the bullet will not stop a Moro. The .38 caliber possesses the same defect, but to a less degree. The proper pistol for troops is a .45-caliber double-action revolver. This gun will stop a Moro, as has been repeatedly demonstrated during the past year. I have been led to this conclusion through personal observation and through the statement of many officers and men who have had ample opportunity to use the guns and to observe their execution. I have heard no dissenting opinion. I recommend that all Luger pistols now in the hands of troops be turned in, that troops in the field be supplied with .45-caliber revolvers as soon as possible, and that as soon as practicable all .38-caliber pistols be replaced by those of .45 caliber.

The attachment near the center of the carbine scabbard is not sufficiently strong. Many scabbards become unserviceable, due to breaking of this attachment.

In my "Reports of inspection" I have noted certain defects in small-arms ammunition, in Maxim ammunition, in certain tin cups issued, and in the pack for field mortar; all of which have been investigated in the field by an officer of the ordnance department, and will, I doubt not, be remedied in the near future.

SIGNAL CORPS.

Cable service in the department has been very unsatisfactory. The land line from Lintogup to Tukuran is unserviceable much of the time. Parties are at work on the line almost constantly, but it is found impossible to keep it in working order.

The main line should run from Iligan to Marahui; thence by cable across Lake Lanao to a point near Camp Vicars; thence to Malaban; thence to a point on the east shore of the southern end of Zamboanga peninsula; thence by land to Zamboanga.

From the best information obtainable it is believed that the greater portion of the cable now in use in these waters has outlived its efficiency. If such be the case, it should be replaced at an early date.

FROM ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

Active field operations and frequent change of stations have prevented the holding of lyceums regularly and the establishment of post schools.

Instructions required by General Order 102, adjutant-general's office, 1902, have been carried out as far as it was practicable. Statements of efficiency and reports of officers who have failed to acquire a proper degree of efficiency have not been received from all stations in the department. Those that have been received indicate that the order has been carried out. The number of officers reported deficient is not large.

Target practice has not been regularly held. More attention should be given to this practice, and those posts that have not a suitable range should secure one to include at least 600 yards.

No general recruiting has been attempted and none necessary. As a matter of fact, the department was called upon to reduce the number of enlisted men by discharging over 300. They were recommended to be selected from several classes. Under each class names were submitted, but only those recommended to be discharged for the good of the service were selected.

I renew my recommendation of last year that officers for the native companies be selected from sergeants of the Regular Army by a board of officers to determine their qualifications.

The enlisted strength of the regular regiments in the department has been kept up to maximum by reenlistments and transfer from regiments going home to organizations remaining in the islands. No such process has been possible as to the officers. A scarcity of officers in staff and line is to be regretted. Details to special duty, leave of absence (few are granted), and officers absent sick reduce number present far below the number required for efficiency.

FROM INSPECTOR OF SMALL-ARMS PRACTICE.

RANGES.

Cotabato, Mindanao, P. I.—Best obtainable range within easy reach of the post was used. Total distance available 700 yards; ground swampy and full of holes, making skirmish firing impossible. Difficult to keep grass and weeds down. Ricochets frequently land dangerously near Company A barracks on hill.

In view of the fact that this range is dangerous and will be very difficult and expensive to repair, it is recommended that if practicable another range be built at Cotabato, even if farther from the post than the one now in use.

Dapitan.—A very good range may be had up to 600 yards with very little labor or expense.

Iligan.—The range used this season, to the east of the town, extends over more than 1,000 yards of rough, low ground to a hill about 100 feet high, which was used as a backstop.

Camp Overton.—No range has as yet been constructed. It is thought suitable ground may be found near the post for the construction of a 1,000-yard range.

Jolo.—No report made as required by paragraph 477, Firing Regulations for Small Arms.

Range about 1,000 yards in extent. Not altogether satisfactory for skirmish firing. With reasonable expenditures for repairs can be put in good condition for next season's practice. Six hundred dollars has recently been allotted this post.

Malabang.—The range used this season was only 300 yards in extent. A good target range may be constructed on the north side of the post between the Malabang River and the Mataling River, 1,000 yards in extent, over level ground, with a sandy hill for a background. This range could be constructed with very little expense to the Government, and it is recommended that this be done, as the range used at present is obviously unsuitable. Four hundred dollars has recently been allotted this post.

Parang.—The range is only 300 yards in extent: quite satisfactory to that distance. A more extensive range can not be constructed, safety considered, in the vicinity of the post.

Camp Vicars.—No report has been made as required by paragraph 477, Firing Regulations for Small Arms. Firing has been had up to 600 yards by troops stationed at this post during the past season. It is recommended that a range 1,000 yards in extent be constructed in the vicinity of this post.

Ammunition.—Captains Kinnison and Allen, Twenty-ninth Infantry, report defective ammunition discovered in target practice. This ammunition was made by the United States Cartridge Company, and was at least 20 per cent bad. Lieutenant Willard, range officer at Puerto Princesa, Paragua, reports that the only ammunition that could be depended on during practice conducted by himself was the "Winchester."

APPENDIX IV.

OCCUPATION OF THE LAKE LANA O REGION.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF MINDANAO,
Zamboanga, P. I., June 13, 1903.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to forward report of Capt. J. J. Pershing, Fifteenth Cavalry, covering the operations of his command during the past year.

When I assumed command of the Department of Mindanao I was informed by the division commander that a general war with the Moros was to be avoided if possible, and that a policy of pacification and friendship was desired. This policy has been carried out as near as circumstances would permit, and while we have steadily gained a knowledge and control of the Lake Lanao country and its inhabitants we have fortunately accomplished our object at a minimum loss of life and a very slight destruction of property.

Soon after assuming command I found that certain datos were hostile and were determined to oppose our presence in their country. The Malabang-Vicars road was raided on several occasions; attacks were made on small parties of soldiers; Camp Vicars and the camps along the road were fired into, and one determined attack was made on the outpost at Vicars. The hostile demonstrations were reported to division commander, with recommendation that active measures be taken to suppress these Moros. Authority was granted in telegram dated September 5, copy attached. A command, consisting of a battalion of the Twenty-seventh Infantry, 1 battalion (3 companies) Tenth Infantry, 2 troops Fifteenth Cavalry, and the Twenty-fifth Field Battery, was concentrated at Camp Vicars, all under personal supervision of department commander. Expeditions consisting of all arms were sent out under Captain Pershing, Fifteenth Cavalry, and Captain Helmick, Tenth Infantry. The expeditions were successful in impressing the Moros with our power and our ability to punish them for transgressions. It certainly put a complete stop to attacks along the road and generally to night attacks on our outposts. The camp at Vicars was fired into almost every night previous to these demonstrations.

The Bacolod Moros still remained unfriendly and continued to work on their large fort. I intended proceeding against them at this time, but the division commander advised that they be given time and opportunity to take warning and it was thought they would accept friendship without being forced. In fact, the sultan seemed strongly inclined to be friendly and wrote several letters to that effect; he was probably overruled by more warlike datos and it finally became necessary to reduce his stronghold, the particulars of which will be found in Captain Pershing's report.

The exploration of the west shore of Lake Lanao, and finally the exploration of the entire lake, was accomplished in March and April, 1903, under instructions from the division commander. Detailed account of these expeditions will be found in Captain Pershing's report, who had personal command and conducted the undertaking with skill and judgment.

In making these explorations it was not found necessary to use a larger force than the regular garrison at Camp Vicars and one additional troop of cavalry from Malabang.

At the present time affairs in the lake country are practically peaceful, and it looks as if we would have no further general opposition. The Moros around Camp Vicars are in daily friendly intercourse with the post, and the Moros inhabiting the north end of the lake are apparently friendly with the soldiers in that section. In fact, we are using a large number of Moros in constructing the wagon road from Iligan to Marahui, and they are also engaged in transporting supplies to camps along this route.

I do not, however, anticipate perfect peace and security. Murder and robbery will take place so long as we are in the country, at least for years to come. The Moro is a savage and has no idea of law and order as we understand it. Captain Pershing's recommendation regarding their present control is perhaps the best plan that can be adopted, at least it may lay the foundation for a future system of government. Anarchy practically prevails throughout the region. To take power and control away from the sultans and datos until we can inaugurate and put in force a better government would add to the confusion already existing.

Copies of telegrams and orders regarding military operations in the lake country are herewith attached.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SAMUEL S. SUMNER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION,
Manila, September 5, 1902—4.50 p. m.

General SUMNER,
Zamboanga, Mindanao.

(Cebú take copy for General Wade.)

Owing to the attacks made on the troops in the vicinity of Vicars since May 2, in which we have lost 4 men killed, 1 officer and 11 men wounded, and especially with reference to attacks since August 11, it is evidently necessary an offensive reply be made as our only means of putting a stop to attacks by Moros; with one exception, that of August 12, the parties engaged in the attacks appear to belong in the Maciu section, perhaps the ladrone element, but they certainly act with the knowledge of, and probably with encouragement of, some of the datos. Uli has acknowledged his participation in the attack, August 13, and is reported with the party at Mataling Falls, September 1. There seems to be no doubt regarding his hostility toward the troops, and that he will have to be punished before he will cease his attacks. You are authorized to organize at Vicars at once, weather permitting, a field column of two battalions of infantry, 2 troops of cavalry and the battery; move into the Maciu country, and require the datos, known to be hostile to us, to make promise that they will cease hostilities personally and control their followers to the same end, and deliver up captured arms by those known to have them.

Punishment when necessary to use force will be limited to those parties whom we know have shown hostility to us (see Pershing's dispatch), or who may do so

during your movements. Disarm any cotta you find it necessary to attack. A dato really friendly could not object to your visiting him in his cotta. Destruction of property, houses, rice, stock, etc., outside cottas not to be permitted. Treat prisoners humanely, but be on guard against treachery. I do not approve of proposition to attack Bacolod, Maciu, and other places same day. It is not good practice to disperse your force on day of battle beyond reach of your orders. That you show more force than is necessary to use will be beneficial, rather the reverse on the Moro mind. Please go in person to Vicars, superintend operations, remaining until matters resume a state of tranquillity after the expedition. We are after effect, not revenge for wrongs done; so if Bacolod takes warning from your movements on Maciu your purpose is accomplished. Camp Vicars to have a guard, say two companies, while troops are absent. Burnside en route to repair cables.

CHAFFEE.

MALABANG, P. I., *March 31, 1903.*

PERSHING, *Vicars:*

I am here and ready to arrange for an expedition to Bacolod. Have you any later news from there? What force do you propose to take, and do you need any troops from here to accompany you or to guard Vicars? How long will you probably be absent from Vicars, and when will you be ready to start? The division commander is anxious to have the west coast of the lake explored, and would be much gratified if it can be accomplished without fighting or bloodshed, but if hostile Moro cottas bar the way they must be destroyed. I understand you propose to visit Bacolod and return to Vicars before proceeding to Marahui.

SUMNER, *Brigadier-General.*

ZAMBOANGA, P. I., *April 10, 1903.*

Brig. Gen. S. S. SUMNER,

*Commanding Department of Mindanao,
Zamboanga, Mindanao, P. I.*

GENERAL: The favorable results which have been secured by the recent expedition from Vicars justify the conviction that the near future will be the best time to complete the exploration of the lake. We now have a good knowledge of the topography and inhabitants on the south, west, and north shores of the lake. There remain only twenty miles on the east shore to close the gap. The Moro inhabitants have had abundant proofs of the beneficent purposes of the Government and of the humanity of the Army, but there may still be a few disaffected ones.

In carrying out these objects of an occupation of the Lanao, I desire that there shall be a steady adherence to the policy of pacification and peaceable intercourse. If there should be any conflict it must never be initiated by the troops. All Moros must learn that the troops may not be molested in passing along the roads and trails, and they must also learn that they can not with impunity brandish their weapons and fly war flags in our faces.

The Moros have had abundant displays of our power and of their own impotence, and this has been especially emphasized at Bacolod. I trust there will be no more fighting, and shall be especially glad if this work, herein set out, can be done without further bloodshed. Of course you will use the troops from Pantar should you deem such cooperation available. The sooner this work is done the more likely will be an avoidance of bad weather.

Very respectfully,

GEO. W. DAVIS,
Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding Division Philippines.

MISAMIS, *May 10, 1903.*

Captain PERSHING, *Camp Vicars:*

Please accept for yourself, and express to your command, my appreciation of the soldierly manner in which they behaved during the recent expedition around Lake Lanao. They are the first military force that ever encircled the lake, and have accomplished a feat that has generally been deemed impossible. They have

had to meet a savage foe, to overcome great natural obstacles, and to face a deadly disease. This was done cheerfully and manfully.

The division commander has asked me to add his thanks to my own to the officers and enlisted men who formed the Lake Lanao expedition and participated in this memorable march.

SUMNER,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

CAMP VICARS, MINDANAO, P. I., *May 15, 1903.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF MINDANAO,
Zamboanga, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with telegraphic instructions, I have the honor to submit the following report covering the period from June 30, 1902, to the present date:

The command of Camp Vicars was relinquished by Gen. Frank Baldwin on June 30, 1902, and being the senior officer present I assumed the duties of commanding officer. At that time the command consisted of Troops A and L, Fifteenth Cavalry; the Twenty-fifth Battery of Field Artillery, and Companies F, G, and H of the Twenty-seventh Infantry; in all about 700 men. There have been some changes during the year. Company M relieved Company H on July 4, and Company C reported at Camp Vicars August 21.

Having been on duty at this station for practically a year, these troops have become thoroughly efficient by campaigning among and fighting against the hostile Moros of Lake Lanao. Having learned something of the Moro character, they have by fair and just treatment done much toward impressing upon the Moro mind the sincerity of our friendship. Partly through their influence many Moros have come to believe that American occupation will eventually have a beneficial effect upon the future of Lake Lanao Moros.

The rainy season in this region lasts from May until September, the months of July and August being the months of greatest rainfall.

On account of lack of tentage during the early occupation of this station the command was not properly protected from the heavy rains, and more or less sickness resulted. Up to the middle of October all the supplies were brought from Malabang by quartermaster's pack trains or by pony trains hired from the Moros, and of course supplies of all kinds were necessarily limited. In October the wagon road, for some time completed only to the Mataling River, was finished through to Vicars, and we were enabled to increase the variety of food and the supply of quartermaster stores.

So far as weather and field service would permit, daily instruction has been held by all organizations, and a practice march has been made on an average of at least once a week, except when the rainy season was at its height and during the prevalence of the cholera epidemic in the lake region. Serviceable sheds for cavalry and quartermaster's animals were built during June and July by Moro labor. On the evening of August 21 a severe earthquake was felt about Lake Lanao, resulting in the destruction of the stables and the quartermaster and commissary storehouses. Several Moro houses about the lake were destroyed, and it is estimated that at least 50 Moros lost their lives. None of the old inhabitants remember an earthquake of equal severity. In rebuilding the stables they were placed south of camp on same ridge, thus giving a more concentrated as well as a more defensible position. In December a target range was constructed about a mile to the north, and during the three months following all organizations completed known distance firing.

The water supply at Camp Vicars has been obtained from a small spring which proved ample during the rainy season but insufficient for all purposes during the dry season, making it necessary to use water from a small stream about a mile southwest of camp, toward Tubaran, for bathing, for laundry purposes, and for the animals. Later a well sunk in the ravine below the spring has furnished enough water for bathing purposes. This water question is one that should be carefully investigated before final action is taken on the establishment of a permanent post at or in the vicinity of Camp Vicars, should the construction of a post at any time in the future be considered necessary. An estimate was made of the cost of keeping a command of this size under tentage for a year in this climate, and it was found that temporary buildings could be erected for about half the cost of the tentage. Their construction was authorized, and the work will probably be completed before the rainy season is well under way.

As to the construction of a permanent post, of course, circumstances depending

to a great extent upon our relations with the Moros, must ultimately determine the course to be pursued. It is believed that troops will have to be kept on the south shore of the lake for some time to come, in the event of which there are several considerations which ought to govern in the selection of a permanent site. Other things being equal, that place should be selected which will bring to us and our market the greatest number of Moros. Their principal means of communication being by water, a site accessible to the lake would be most likely to attract them. Such a site would have an additional advantage, as regards supply, of being within reach by water from Marahui or such point on the north shore as may ultimately be selected for a permanent post there. For a site on the south shore it is believed that the second plateau at Bayan fulfills all conditions as well as any other, and its proximity to the lake eliminates the question of water supply.

MORO AFFAIRS.

In order to more clearly understand the conditions as they exist in the lake region to-day, it should be borne in mind that there are three tribes or branches of Malanao Moros, viz, those of Bayabao, inhabiting the northern third of the lake, from Bucayauan, on the west shore, around to Dalama, on the northeast shore, with a center of population near Marahui; the Onayans, inhabiting the southern shore of the lake, from Madumba on the west to Saur on the east, with a center of population at the former capital, Bayan; and the Maciu tribe, consisting of the remaining Moros about the lake except those inhabiting a few rancherias east of Maciu, among the foothills, who belong to the Bayabaos. Maciu Moros claim to be the most ancient, the Bayabaos and Onayans being offshoots, although not any of them are able to trace their ancestry back of the thirteenth century. It is probable that at one time each tribe had a sultan or leading dato whose rule over it was absolute, and while the lines separating these tribes are still more or less distinct, at present the head of each is practically such in name only, or at most, exercises a very limited control over it as a whole. Moros from the different tribes intermarry and have done so to such an extent in the past that it is often difficult for them to trace their ancestry to a particular tribe. The tribes have also disintegrated, so that in some 400 rancherias around the lake there are to-day about 150 sultans, all claiming to be of royal blood.

At the time of our occupation of Lake Lanao we found a considerable number of Moros opposing us either openly or secretly. Perhaps one-half of the Onayan Moros expressed their friendship soon after the battle of Bayan, and previous to this we had received assurances of friendship from most of the people constituting the Bayabao tribe, many of whom I had personally visited while stationed at Iligan.

All others in the Laguna may be considered as being opposed to us at that time. The Bacolod Moros on the west, some of the Macius on the east, and a number of the Onayan Moros, under the leadership of Sultan Uali of Butig, were openly hostile to us. With the small nucleus of friendly Moros to assist us, efforts were at once begun to influence others, at first those of the Onayan and Bayabao tribes, and later those of Maciu. Letters were written and friendly Moros were sent out to assure all of them that we had their best interests at heart, and inviting those who had not done so to visit us and become personally acquainted, in order, if possible, that mutual confidence might be established between us. They were told that our purpose was to avoid further war with them, if possible; that we did not want to kill their people nor destroy their property; that we desired them to bring their produce to our market; that we wished to employ them as laborers on the road and about camp; that we had no intention of disturbing their religion nor of changing their lawful customs, and that in coming among them we had no other idea than to make them our friends.

In response to these letters and invitations many visited us, and others replied by letter, expressing their desire to be on friendly terms with us. To all who came a welcome was given and every effort made to assure them that our motives were the best. A special invitation was sent inviting Moros to come and join us in celebrating the Fourth of July. About 700, from rancherias in the vicinity, accepted the invitation and seemed to enjoy both our sports and their own, for which special prizes were offered.

On June 21, 10 Moros, under the leadership of Dato Tangul, attacked 2 soldiers on the trail to Malabang, near Camp No. 10, wounding both of them and securing both their rifles. An investigation brought out the fact that these Moros were from Binidayan. The sultan had visited the camp after the battle of Bayan, had expressed his friendship, and had received pay for some growing rice destroyed during the Lake Lanao expedition. In conversation he acknowledged that the

Moros who committed this offense were from his rancheria, but pleaded that he was powerless to control them. I told him it would be our policy to hold the sultans and datos responsible for the acts of their people and that he must deliver the leader of these offenders to us. As he failed to comply with this demand I arrested him and brought him to camp a prisoner.

The two stolen rifles were delivered next day, and in a few days several of his Moros brought in the body of one of Tanguil's party, reporting that it was Tanguil himself. This Moro whom they thought dead regained consciousness long enough to confess that he was a member of the party, but said that he was not Tanguil, and that the Binidayan Moros were trying to deceive us. I still insisted that the leader be brought in, and offered to send troops to make the arrest if they would locate him. Before this could be done, however, the sultan went juramentado, struck the sergeant of the guard with a piece of bamboo, grabbed the gun of the sentry immediately over him and began to use it. Of course the guard was compelled to fire and the sultan fell mortally wounded. Every effort was made by the surgeons to save his life without avail. He made the statement that he had run amuck expecting to be killed by the guard and did not hold them to blame. His death in this manner was unfortunate and was to be regretted, but the whole affair served to impress upon the minds of all datos the position we had taken for the enforcement of law and order and caused positive action to be taken by many of them. The Moros of that rancheria assumed more or less of an unfriendly attitude, but they eventually presented themselves at camp under the new sultan, Mambao, and extended an invitation for us to visit their rancheria, which we did in February for the first time.

During the months of June and July there were several acts of violence committed along the trails by unfriendly Moros, usually in attempts to capture arms, and it may be stated in this connection that the one great desire of every Moro is to possess a modern rifle. Telegraph lines were constantly interfered with and the wire often for a distance of a mile was carried away. Camp Vicars itself, however, was not molested until the night of August 11, when one of the outposts was attacked by a band of 15 Moros from Bacolod. A sergeant and 1 man were killed and 2 men wounded. One Moro of the party was found dead afterwards and others were reported wounded. Night attacks were made on camp at intervals during August and September and several Moros were killed or wounded from time to time. These attacks were mainly under the leadership of Sultan Uali, who drew around him a crowd of renegade Moros from Butig and its subordinate rancherias in that section; and Moros from Macui and Bacolod under different leaders also became offensive. To determine the correctness of reports regarding them I demanded explanations from the sultans and datos of those rancherias and in most cases received hostile replies. Our inactivity and failure to punish these offenders was misconstrued as cowardice on our part, and even friendly Moros could not understand why we took no action. I informed them that a time would come when they must pay the penalty and that they would learn sooner or later that Moros could not with impunity attack our soldiers and destroy our property. To put a stop to this marauding, it became necessary to punish the Moros responsible for it, and a campaign against them was ordered. The first campaign, September 18 to 22, was made against Sultan Uali, of Gauan and Butig, and Moros of the rancherias of Bayabao who had been active in their hostility against us.

The second campaign, September 29 to October 3, was made against Macui Moros under Sultans Tauagan and Gandauli. An effort was made even after the campaign had begun to induce them to come in and surrender without fighting, but they refused and made stubborn resistance to our advance into their territory. The result was that their forts were destroyed, and all who opposed us were killed in battle or dislodged from their position in defeat. The immediate effect of this campaign was to put a stop to attacks on camps and on soldiers along trails, and since September, 1902, with one exception, there has been no further interference of this kind. It has been the experience with us, as with the Spaniards, that after the Moros of a particular rancheria have received a sound thrashing the lesson is remembered by them and its effect upon others has been beneficial. Their attacks on our troops and their attempts to stand against us have met with comparatively little success, while they seldom failed to secure arms from the Spaniards when they tried, at one time taking the Spaniards by surprise and securing thirty-seven Remingtons and ammunition. Even after reaching Marahui the Spaniards made little progress in exploring the Lanao region, and there is no record of their having made an expedition against any of the then hostile rancherias except one against Tugaya. Even with launches on the lake they secured no foothold on the eastern side, and were constantly annoyed and often attacked in their forts by large num-

bers of Moros from Pitacus, Taraca, and other rancherias from that side of the lake. Neither did they ever secure a foothold on the south side of the lake, nor did they progress along the western shore south of Tugaya.

After the campaign against Maciu it was decided to postpone further movements against other hostile Moros in the hope that they would profit by the experience of those who had encountered us. Letters were sent to the east lake and to Bacolod Moros, giving them every opportunity to come to friendly terms with us. They were told that even though previously hostile they might visit us without fear, and that we would welcome a change in their hostile attitude. Several Moros on the eastern side of the lake expressed a desire to be friends, including Raja Nurul Caquim, who controls a number of rancherias in that section, and who told his people that they must not interfere with Americans under penalty of severe punishment. Some of the Moros of Butig and Bayabao visited us, declaring that they wished no more war. Nothing of a friendly nature, however, was heard from Bacolod, who still held out against us and continued to send hostile notes.

Under escort of Amai-Manibilang and some of his people from Madaya, I crossed the lake in vintas with 50 men, in November, stopping at several towns along the route; visited Madaya and Marahui, and proceeded thence to Iligan and returned to Camp Vicars by the same route. We were shown every attention at Madaya and also at Marahui, where a large conference was held on market day, at which some 500 Moros from all sections were present. The assurances of friendship we received during this trip convinced me of the sincerity of the promises made one year previous by the Bayabao Moros. Moreover, it was plain that all Moros on the west shore of the lake, except those under the influence of Bacolod, had by this time become reconciled to our presence in the lake country.

In December cholera reached the lake, and has probably extended to all rancherias. Our market was closed for a time, and a strict quarantine against Moros was established. I had letters of instructions prepared in Moro and sent to all the principal rancherias, explaining to them how to avoid the disease and offering to supply medicine in limited quantity to those who wished it. In some places the instructions were followed in the main, and it had the effect of holding the disease in check to a large extent. According to the best obtainable information, it is probable that about 1,500 people died of this disease.

After the battle of Bayan, in May, 1902, a relative of the former sultan, Dato Maguindanao, was unanimously elected sultan of that rancheria, and visited camp several times, expressing the friendship of his people. It soon became known, however, that Bayan harbored feelings of resentment toward us, and that they were strengthening their fort at Maliuanac preparatory to making another stand against us. The actual leader of these Moros was an old pandita by the name of Sajiduciaman. Knowing his friendship for Amai-Manibilang and one or two others, I summoned them to Camp Vicars to aid me in bringing him to see the folly of further resistance. In view of the proximity of Bayan and on account of the pandita's influence with other Moros, it was important that we should win him to our side without resort to force. An interview was finally arranged, at which he and I agreed to be personal friends, but he claimed to be unable to give any assurances as to the future actions of his people.

In January his followers began to interfere with the Moros employed by us, and the sultan was forced by them to return to Oato, his former home, thus confessing that he could not control them, and practically relinquishing his rights. As he is a man of little force of character, for whom the Moros have little respect, I made no effort to induce him to remain at Bayan. Again addressing Sajiduciaman directly, I told him that he must come to camp and explain to me the meaning of the attitude of his people. In the conference that followed he said that he desired to be on friendly terms with us, and that the Bayan Moros had committed no offense, but that they did not desire us to visit their rancherias. I told him that such friendship was of no value to us and that I should therefore not consider him as a friend. As a result a visit was arranged and made, and we were received with every manifestation of friendship. Since then there have been no complaints, and many Bayan Moros are to-day employed about Camp Vicars.

Toward the latter part of January reports indicated that cholera was abating to such an extent that, with caution, practice marches for short distances might be resumed. These marches were originally undertaken to convince the Moros that they need have no fear from the presence of our troops in their territory, and nearly every Onayan rancheria had been visited. With a command consisting of a battery of artillery, 1 troop of cavalry, and 3 companies of infantry a march was made to Gata, under the assurance that we would be received in a friendly spirit. Arriving in the vicinity, we were met by Amai Buncurang, whom I had previously sent with messages, who told us that cholera existed there and that

they did not desire us to visit them. From this and from their general attitude it was evident that there was an unfriendly faction among them and that insistence upon a visit at that time would probably bring a clash. I reluctantly returned to Camp Vicars, passing through Maciu, where, at the crossing of the Malaig River, 5 Moros fired on the column, wounding 1 man. These Moros together with their cotta, were destroyed. In February, with a command of the same size, a visit was made to Madumba, on the west side of the lake, which was farther in that direction than we had yet been. While here I endeavored to communicate with the sultan and the panandungan of Bacolod, but they refused to receive the Moro messengers. Their attitude was extremely hostile, war flags were flying over their fort, and they even went so far as to fire in the vicinity of our camp at night.

During the preceding months every possible effort had been made to convince these people of our friendly purposes and of our desire to avoid further bloodshed. Several datos visited Bacolod of their own accord, entertaining with me the hope that the disastrous results that must certainly come to the Bacolod people in case of a war with us might be averted; but the advice of these friendly datos was scorned. Among the Moros who have been of friendly assistance and who have used their influence with unfriendly Moros a few deserve especial mention in this report for their loyalty. Dato Grande, of Makadar, aided in securing the cavalry horses lost by Lieutenant Forsyth in March, 1902, all of which have been turned in or are accounted for, but one, so far as known, remaining in the hands of the Moros. Amai-Manibilang, of Madaya; the sultan of Ganasi; Dato Adta, of Paiguay; Amai-Buncurung, of Oato, have made every effort to induce hostile Moros to become friends. Many Onayan Moros have furnished us with pack ponies and vintas for various expeditions.

In order to thoroughly explore the lake country and to convince all Moros of our benevolent intentions and to demonstrate to them that there was no truth in the stories they had heard that our purpose was conquest, it had been contemplated for some time to send an expedition completely around the lake. Cholera having abated to some extent and the dry season being nearly at an end, such an expedition was ordered to explore the west shore of the lake from Camp Vicars to Marahui and return. While the experience of the two attempted friendly visits recently undertaken indicated that there would probably be some opposition, the best information obtainable was to the effect that the Moros of Bacolod on the one side and of Taraca on the other side of the lake would be the only ones who would offer opposition of a determined character. The Moros of Bacolod had been strengthening their fort for a year and believed it to be impregnable.

In anticipation of the expedition around the lake a letter was written to all Moros, as follows:

"To all Moros in the Laguna de Lanao:

"The Americans have now been in the Laguna de Lanao nearly one year. During that time we have constructed a good road from Malabang to the lake. We have given employment to many Moros at good wages. We have purchased a great deal of Moro produce. We have established a good market at Bayan. We have not molested any Moros except some who attacked us. We have visited as friends all points on the south side of the lake from Ganassi to Gata. We have gone across the lake and visited many rancherias there. We have kept every promise we have made. We have not interfered with the customs, habits, government, or religion of any Moro. Therefore we have demonstrated to the Moros and to the whole world that we are not here to make war, nor to dispossess the inhabitants of Lanao of their lives, property, or anything that is theirs, but are here for the good of the Moros, as representatives of our great Government, of which all Moros are a part. All fair-minded Moros who know us have become our friends because they believe we are honest and that we can and will help the people in the Laguna. All sensible Moros in the Laguna want peace. Two or three datos refuse our friendship simply because, as they say, they do not like the Americans. To these datos I say they are obstructing the establishment of universal peace in the Laguna, and if they continue their opposition they must some day suffer the consequences of their stubborn ignorance."

The expedition consisting of the Camp Vicars command started on April 5, troops from Malabang having been sent to take their place in camp temporarily, and the following afternoon we arrived at Bacolod. It was evident that anything but fight was entirely out of the question and that they had planned a stubborn resistance. Outlying positions held by them were soon taken and their stronghold invested. After closing the avenues of escape, this fort was pounded by artillery and afterwards taken in a brilliant assault by infantry and dismounted cavalry of the command. One hundred and twenty Moros lost their lives in this

battle, while the Americans sustained a small loss of 11 wounded. At Calahui, 3 miles further on, some resistance was also met, but the fort at that place could not withstand the effect of our batteries, and the hundred defenders said to have been inside deserted their position, 23 of their number being killed or wounded. The expedition continued to Pantar, on the Agus River, and returned, meeting friendly receptions at all places along the entire route except the two above given.

The success of the Bacolod expedition warranted undertaking an expedition around the eastern side of the lake, and, as the season continued favorable, the necessary orders were given by General Sumner and the expedition got away May 2. Notice had been sent to all Moros in that section that we would not molest the persons nor the property of any who desired to be our friends, but that we would overcome any opposition offered in carrying out the purposes of exploration for which the expedition was ordered. Several Moros from the eastern part of the lake accompanied us and used their influence to persuade those who had declared hostility that opposition against us was useless. Among those who assisted us was the leading pandita or high priest of Lake Lanao, Imam Nuzca. He opposed resistance against us on religious grounds, and declared to the people that they would be punished in the hereafter for all such conduct, arguing that it was not supported by the teachings of the Koran and could not be upheld by any argument.

No opposition was encountered until we reached Taraca, where a group of cottas were flying red flags and making other hostile demonstrations. The battle of Taraca River was the result, in which, according to Moro accounts, some 250 Moros lost their lives and 10 cottas were destroyed, including the strong forts at Pitacus and Taraca, which were taken with great gallantry by our troops, and 36 cannon, 60 rifles, and 52 prisoners were captured.

With the exception of a few shots fired at long range soon after leaving Taraca, we were received in a friendly spirit along the route to Madaya. Even though the season was late and there had been no rains on the eastern side of the lake for three or four months, the flat rice country there was well-nigh impassable. It was found necessary to corduroy the trails in many places and to fill them with grass in others, in order to make them passable for our animals without their loads. Our transport trains had to be unpacked several times and the cargoes carried by hand across the marshes. The labor of the troops was indeed very trying, and in order to avoid possibly a worse experience it was determined to return to Camp Vicars by way of the less difficult trail along the west shore of the lake. As a result of the exploration of the trails around Lake Lanao it is suggested that plans be laid for the construction of a road around the lake at such time in the future as necessity for employing Moros may arise on account of any shortage of crops in the lake region.

The favorable results of these expeditions can hardly be estimated at this time, but reasoning from our own experience during the past year and from the experience of the Spaniards at Lake Lanao during several years, and comparing them, it seems probable that there will be no more combined resistance in the future, nor is it believed that the Moros will again undertake to oppose us by the construction or defense of cottas. It is believed that our accomplishment of the entire circuit of the lake, overcoming as we did all hostile opposition with comparatively few casualties to ourselves, treating as friends all other Moros, visiting their rancherias without molesting them, taking no property for which we did not pay, and destroying nothing except unavoidably in battle has had and will have a far-reaching effect in permanently settling the Moro question of Lake Lanao in so far as hostility is concerned, if, indeed, it does not result, under a wise administration, in the establishment of amicable relations that will lead to universal peace in this hitherto warlike region without any further use of force. The achievement has given to us an advantage in their future control which the Moro will be as quick to realize as we are.

In view of the progress that has been made we are now in position to study carefully and work out along the lines of material progress the future of the Lanao Moros. Their government should, of course, for some time remain in charge of the military, either directly or indirectly, thus naturally following the kind of rule to which they have been accustomed for generations. To handle the situation properly, all these Moros, being of one group, with the same dialect, customs, and habits of life, should be under the control of one head in whom they have confidence, who should know something of their language, their character, and their history, and to whom they can go for advice and for the settlement of many questions which heretofore have necessarily been left unsettled. As far as it is consistent with advancement, it is believed the government as we find it, a government by the sultan or dato, as the case may be, should be disturbed as little

as possible; that is, the people should be managed through the *datos* themselves, who, being recognized as such in their authority, should therefore be held responsible for the proper control of the people of their several *rancherias*.

As between different *rancherias*, each of which is practically independent of every other, each having its own sultan or *dato*, who denies the right of every other sultan or *dato* to dictate to him, some sort of judicial tribunal appointed by or brought under the military governor could probably be successfully established. In fact, experience here has proved that in settling disputes between Moros of different *rancherias* and often those of the same *rancherias* a board of arbitration consisting a friendly *datos*, agreeable to both parties, selected by the military authority, could be relied upon to satisfactorily adjust their differences. Due to their lack of confidence in each other it would be difficult to select members to constitute a permanent board of this kind, nor would it be advisable at this time to do so. It is probable that by appealing to their reason slight changes in their laws could be made from time to time through the medium of these courts of equity and that it could be done without exciting their suspicions, although all growth along these lines must be gradual.

The Moro is of a peculiar make-up as to character, though the reason is plain when it is considered, first, that he is a savage; second, that he is a Malay, and, third, that he is a Mohammedan. The almost infinite combination of superstitions, prejudices, and suspicions blended into his character make him a difficult person to handle until fully understood. In order to control him other than by brute force one must first win his implicit confidence, nor is this as difficult as it would seem; but once accomplished one can accordingly by patient and continuous effort largely guide and direct his thoughts and actions. He is jealous of his religion, but he knows very little about its teachings. The observance of a few rites and ceremonies is about all that is required to satisfy him that he is a good Mohammedan. As long as he is undisturbed in the possession of his women and children and his slaves, there need be little fear from him. As a rule he treats his so-called slaves, who are really but serfs or vassals, as members of his family; but any interference with what he thinks his right regarding them had best be made gradually by the natural process of development, which must logically come by contact with and under the wise supervision of a civilized people.

The number of people in the Lake Lanao region according to the recent census is estimated to be about 80,000. They have been unfortunate during the past year in losing a large number, probably 50 per cent, of their carabaos. For this reason it is expected that the acreage of crops this year will be considerably less than in previous years. People of Lake Lanao are practically self-sustaining, raising a great variety of agricultural products and fruit and manufacturing most of their own cloth and other articles of domestic use.

Naturally industrious and inhabiting a country capable of a high state of cultivation, there is no doubt but that the Moro can be induced to cultivate new products and introduce more modern methods in agriculture. His talent for creation is such as to warrant the belief that he is susceptible of training along the lines of industrial pursuits. In my opinion it would be a good investment on the part of the Government to select a few of the leading Moros and take them on a visit to the United States, preferably during the World's Fair at St. Louis, and I would also recommend that the education of at least 10 bright boys of the upper class be undertaken to the extent of teaching them English in connection with work in some industrial school in the States.

JOHN J. PERSHING,
Captain, Fifteenth Cavalry Commanding.

Report of Maj. James B. Jackson, Eleventh Infantry, of an attack on men of the Eleventh Infantry by Moros near Mataling Falls, August 31, 1902.

MATALING FALLS, MINDANAO, P. I., September 1, 1902.

ADJUTANT, Malabang, Mindanao, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report:

Shortly after 1 o'clock p. m., August 31, 1902, it was reported to me that a large body of Moros had attacked a party of soldiers on the road to Malabang. I immediately sent Capt. J. W. Heavey, Eleventh Infantry, with his company to the scene. His report, hereto annexed, gives all the information obtainable. Later in the afternoon I heard firing to the southeast of camp. I ordered Capt. S. G. Chiles, Eleventh Infantry, to proceed in that direction and, if possible, rescue

a hunting party that had gone in that direction. His report is hereto annexed. Of the party that was ambushed on the road about 1 mile from camp, 1, Private Charles M. Branson, Company E, Eleventh Infantry, was killed, and 2, Privates Charles C. Logsdon and Martin Foster, Company E, Eleventh Infantry, were wounded. The Moros secured the rifle and belt of the soldier who was killed. Lient. W. M. Parker, Eleventh Infantry, was also wounded in the right forearm. All the wounds were gunshot wounds. We buried 1 Moro. I respectfully invite attention to the reports of Captains Heavey and Chiles and Lieutenants Game and Parker, hereto annexed. And I respectfully recommend the approval of Captain Heavey's recommendation that certificates of merit be given to Sergeant Nash and Privates William D. Howard, William R. Bryan, and Fred Houck, Company E, Eleventh Infantry.

Very respectfully,

JAS. B. JACKSON,
Major, Eleventh Infantry, Commanding.

OFFICE COMPANY E, ELEVENTH INFANTRY,
Camp at Mataling Falls, Mindanao, P. I., September 1, 1902.

The ADJUTANT, *Mataling Falls.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that a hunting party of 1 sergeant and 7 privates, Company E, Eleventh Infantry, while on the road to Malabang and about 1½ miles from camp, August 31, 1902, were ambuscaded by a force of hostile Moros. Conservative estimate of strength of Moros, 15 rifles and 25 bolos. At first volley Private Charles M. Branson was killed and Privates Logsdon and Foster seriously wounded. The survivors fell back firing. The wounded men lying on the ground called for assistance. Sergeant Nash, Privates William D. Howard, William R. Bryan, and Fred Houck rushed forward and secured the two wounded men and their equipments in the face of the Moro fire, from a distance not exceeding 15 yards. They carried the wounded men toward camp for nearly a mile, keeping the Moro party who had pursued them at bay.

Private Joseph Dubian, after emptying his rifle, rushed to the camp for assistance. Company E being notified by the commanding officer to hasten to attack hostile Moros, that company proceeded with all possible speed to the scene of the attack, but were unable to gain contact with the enemy. The body of Private Branson was found frightfully mutilated, and the ground gave indication of a large party lying in ambush. Sergeant Cline with 30 men was immediately sent down the road to meet the wagon train from Malabang, the size of the party of Moros justifying their attacking the train.

This party withdrew, it is believed, toward the northeast and afterwards encountered the hunting party under Lieutenants Game and Parker, and also Company F, Eleventh Infantry, under Captain Chiles.

Casualties: Private Charles M. Branson, killed, Privates Logsdon and Foster wounded, all of Company E, Eleventh Infantry; rifle No. 36224 and equipments of Private Branson captured by Moros. It is known that at least 4 Moros were hit, but no bodies were secured at scene of ambush.

The action of Sergeant Nash, Privates William D. Howard, William R. Bryan, and Fred Houck, Company E, Eleventh Infantry, in securing their wounded comrades and their arms under the very muzzles of Moros, who outnumbered them at least 10 to 1, and after their party had virtually lost 50 per cent of its strength, was exceedingly courageous and meritorious. It is recommended that they each be given a certificate of merit for their action.

Very respectfully,

JOHN W. HEAVEY,
Captain, Eleventh Infantry, Commanding Company E.

COMPANY F, ELEVENTH INFANTRY,
Mataling Falls, Mindanao, P. I., September 1, 1902.

The ADJUTANT, SECOND BATTALION, ELEVENTH INFANTRY,
Mataling Falls, Mindanao, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with verbal orders from the commanding officer, I have the honor to submit the following report:

At about 2 p. m. yesterday, the 31st ultimo, shortly after a hunting party from Company E, Eleventh Infantry, had been attacked by Moros and 1 man killed and

2 wounded, a number of shots were heard east of camp, the direction taken by a hunting party under First Lieuts. W. M. Parker and Clyfford Game, Eleventh Infantry, I was ordered by the commanding officer to take my company out to their rescue in case they had been attacked. The company fell in immediately and without calling the roll we moved out. I had about 50 men. About 1 mile from camp Lieutenant Game with his party was met, and he reported that they had been attacked and that the Moros were just across the river bed. He also informed me that Lieutenant Parker, with a party (they had divided their original party), was about 100 yards down the river and asked for some men to go down there to his relief. I let him have the men he asked for and then moved on across the river to where we could hear the Moros yelling. The undergrowth was so very thick that it was impossible to see more than 30 or 40 yards at the outside. Lieutenant Game had reported that his party had wounded one of the Moros, and he would yell and the others would answer him. I could tell from their yelling that they were coming back for him, and by the time they reached him we were not more than 50 yards from him. I could hear them, but I could not see them, so continued to advance without firing.

I finally saw one Moro, and I knew that they had gotten their wounded man and were moving off. We had to pick our way through the underbrush, and it was impossible to come up with them, so I decided that we were as close to them then as we would get and I ordered two rounds fired. After the firing we again moved forward for about 200 yards, and nothing more being seen or heard of them we picked up the man that had been wounded and started back to find Lieutenant Parker, in case he had not been found by Lieutenant Game. We had not gone far when we met Capt. Jay J. Morrow, Corps of Engineers, with a detachment, and he informed me that both Lieutenant Parker and Lieutenant Game had gotten back to camp all right, but that Lieutenant Parker had been wounded in the arm. We then came back to camp. The wounded Moro was shot all to pieces when we first reached him, but he was still breathing, so we brought him in. He died on the way in. As for the number of Moros in the party it is impossible to say, as we could not see anything for the underbrush. I actually saw only one Moro, but I heard and saw signs of a number. They returned our fire only by a very few shots. I personally heard two shots that came from them, but some of the men claim they heard a number. I saw traces of two more having been wounded besides the men we brought in. The company got back to camp about 4 o'clock, having been absent about two hours.

Very respectfully,

SEABORN G. CHILES,
Captain, Eleventh Infantry, Commanding Company F.

CAMP AT MATALING FALLS, MINDANAO, P. I., *September 1, 1902.*

The ADJUTANT, SECOND BATTALION, ELEVENTH INFANTRY,
Mataling Falls, Mindanao, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report that a hunting party consisting of Lieut. W. M. Parker, Eleventh Infantry, myself, and 8 enlisted men of Company F, Eleventh Infantry, left camp about 1.15 p. m., August 31, 1902, for the purpose of hunting wild hogs. We proceeded about 1½ miles from camp and took station along the bank of a dry river bed, the party being divided into three parties about 100 yards apart. My party being the farthest from camp, consisted of Corporal Caruthers, Private Everhart, Company F, Eleventh Infantry, and myself. Private Everhart and myself were on a ledge about two-thirds up the right bank of the river, Corporal Caruthers being behind us on top of the bank, all on the lookout for wild hogs, and the corporal being especially instructed to look out for Moros. We had been lying there about an hour when Corporal Caruthers made a warning signal and immediately the corporal and Private Everhart sprang to their feet shouting "Niggers," "Googoos," and began to fire rapidly. I immediately sprang up and saw a Moro not more than 12 yards from us and running away. He was at once shot down by Corporal Caruthers and Private Everhart.

I only saw one Moro, but the corporal saw 9 or 10, armed with rifles, spears, or bolos. The only arms I saw was a bolo in the hands of the wounded Moro, but I saw smoke, caused by the discharge of a rifle, rise among the heavy brush not more than 15 yards in our front. We kept our position for about five minutes, and, seeing no more Moros, we crossed to the left bank of the river, intending to proceed down the river and try to unite with the rest of our party, of whom we had neither seen nor heard anything, but just as we reached the left bank we were joined by 10 or 12 men of Company F, Battalion of Engineers, when we at once

recrossed the river and proceeded in the direction the Moros had taken for about 200 yards, when we came across the wounded Moro, and we were trying to take his bolo from him when he yelled, and he was answered by what was apparently from 40 to 60 Moros. Not knowing the number of Moros opposed to us, we decided it was best not to expose our party unnecessarily, so we recrossed the river at once and proceeded along the north bank, intending to look for Lieutenant Parker and the rest of the original party. We had gone but 150 yards when we met Captain Chiles, with Company F, Eleventh Infantry. I sent back 3 of our party as guides for Captain Chiles, who went back to look for the wounded Moro we had left behind.

Taking 4 or 5 men from Captain Chiles's company, I proceeded down the river bank looking for Lieutenant Parker and the remainder of our original party, but after finding a trail of blood along the river bed, which we followed until it was lost among the underbrush, we proceeded to camp, where we arrived about 3.40 p. m.

Had it not been for Corporal Caruthers's sharp lookout, we would have undoubtedly been murdered, as the Corporal states that he saw the brush swaying to and fro for about five minutes before he saw the first Moro, who when first seen was not more than 8 yards from the Corporal.

Corporal Caruthers and Private Everhart behaved in a cool, determined manner in the face of great danger.

Very respectfully,

CLYFFORD GAME,
First Lieutenant and Battalion Adjutant, Eleventh Infantry.

MATALING FALLS, MINDANAO, P. I., *September 1, 1902.*

The ADJUTANT, SECOND BATTALION, ELEVENTH INFANTRY,

Mataling Falls, Mindanao, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of an attack made by Moros upon a hunting party composed of enlisted men of the Eleventh Infantry, Lieutenant Game and myself, at about 3 o'clock p. m., on the 31st ultimo.

At about 1 o'clock p. m. on the above-mentioned date, the hunting party, consisting of First Lieut. Clyfford Game, Eleventh Infantry, 8 enlisted men of the Eleventh Infantry, and myself, left camp for the purpose of hunting hogs. The party proceeded to a dry river bed about one-quarter of a mile from camp, and after following the river bed up half a mile farther, Corporal Ziel, Company F, Eleventh Infantry, and myself stopped, after I had given instructions that the men should not be separated by a greater distance than would allow them to be in easy support of each other. After about half an hour Corporal Ziel and myself proceeded up the river bed, passing Private Caldwell, Company F, Eleventh Infantry, about 50 yards upstream on the right bank, and Corporal O'Day, Company F, Eleventh Infantry, about the same distance up on the left bank. About this time I heard a shot fired farther up the river, and, proceeding to the point of firing, found the shot had been fired by Musician Saamer, Company F, Eleventh Infantry, at a hog. Musician Saamer then went into the woods on the right of the river, and then returned about fifteen minutes later in company with Sergeant Hennecke, Company F, Eleventh Infantry, who reported that he had seen a body of Moros, consisting of about 15, apparently armed with rifles, and traveling up the right bank of the river about 20 yards back in the timber. I then asked Sergeant Hennecke if he had seen the entire party, in order that I might obtain accurate information as to their number and armament; to which Sergeant Hennecke replied that he had not seen the end of their column, but had returned to make his report after seeing the men armed with rifles.

I then directed Corporal Ziel to go to the rear and bring up all men he could find and join me in order that I might go forward and withdraw the men in front. After Corporal Ziel had proceeded to execute this order, Sergeant Hennecke, Musician Saamer, who was armed with a pistol, and myself were fired upon about 30 yards in our front by a party which I estimated to consist of from 12 to 18 rifles. I was observing the ground in front and saw that it came from a ledge of rock 25 or 30 yards in our front and difficult of ascent. I considered it the only salvation of the party to fall back and pick up the men in rear, and upon first opportunity to gain the left bank of the river and there wait to ascertain anything we might of the other party, and then cut our way through the lines back to camp. At the time when Sergeant Hennecke, Musician Saamer, and myself were fired upon we were in a hollow in plain view of the enemy, and the banks on each side

were too steep to permit of our ascent, thereby gaining a position from which we could effectively fire upon the enemy. After going 10 or 15 yards I was shot in the right forearm, the wound resulting from which bled so profusely that I had to put my rifle under my arms and stop the flow of blood with my left hand. After going about 50 or 75 yards I saw a part of the bank that we could ascend, and ordered the men to get up the bank and take cover in the woods. Here I formed a skirmish line, directing Sergeant Hennecke to take the right and I took the left, and listened to see if I could locate the enemy or hear anything of Lieutenant Game and the two other men. I then directed a man to proceed to camp for reinforcements. After listening five or ten minutes and hearing no sound either of the enemy or the balance of our party, I concluded that the Moros had struck the other party first and then proceeded downstream to us, since the firing appeared to come from a point at or above where the balance of the party should have been. Believing that the Moros had either surrounded us already or would immediately attempt to do so, I saw that the only chance was to return to camp immediately which I proceeded to do and arrived in camp without further difficulty.

Very respectfully,

W. M. PARKER,
First Lieutenant, Eleventh Infantry.

Report of Capt. John J. Pershing, Fifteenth Cavalry, of an expedition to the southeast of Lake Lanao, September 18-22, 1902.

CAMP VICARS, MINDANAO, P. I., October 15, 1902.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF MINDANAO,
Zamboanga, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of an expedition under my command made against hostile Moros to the southeast of Lake Lanao, between September 18 and 22, 1902, pursuant to orders from the brigade commander, Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner, U. S. Army, dated Camp Vicars, September 17, 1902, a copy of which is appended.

The command consisted of First Lieut. C. S. Fries, battalion adjutant, Twenty-seventh Infantry, adjutant; First Lieut. Charles Deems, jr., Artillery Corps, quartermaster and commissary; Capt. C. W. Hack, assistant surgeon, U. S. Volunteers; First Lieut. J. H. Allen, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, with 6 enlisted men of the Hospital Corps; Troop L, Fifteenth Cavalry, Capt. G. W. Kirkpatrick in command, with Second Lieut. I. S. Martin, Fifteenth Cavalry, and 66 enlisted men; 2 Maxim-Nordenfelt guns and 1 3.6-inch field mortar of the Twenty-fifth Battery, Field Artillery, under command of Capt. W. S. McNair, with First Lieut. H. B. Clark and First Lieut. A. H. Sunderland and 90 enlisted men; and the following officers and companies of the Twenty-seventh Infantry: Company C, First Lieut. F. B. Hawkins in command, with Second Lieut. K. L. Pepper and 95 enlisted men; Company F, First Lieut. C. G. Bickham in command, with Second Lieut. A. W. Brown and 88 enlisted men; Company G, Second Lieut. S. C. Loring in command, with 81 enlisted men, and Company M, First Lieut. W. B. Gracie in command, with Second Lieut. H. E. Comstock and 101 enlisted men and a pack train of 60 mules carrying four days' rations for the command. Tomas Torres accompanied the command as interpreter. Maj. James S. Pettit, inspector-general, Seventh Separate Brigade, accompanied the command as a representative of the brigade commander, and First Lieut. A. A. Fries, Engineer Corps, as engineer officer, all as per appended copy of field return. The column left Camp Vicars at 1.30 a. m. the 18th instant, and arrived at Pantauan, about 10 miles to the southeast, at 6 a. m. (See appended map.)

At Pantauan a base camp was established and the operations of the expedition were conducted from there. I was informed here by Amai-Pasandalan that Sultan Uali, of Gauan, and the sultan of Bayabao would not treat with me, but would resist our march toward their rancherias. Accordingly preparations were at once made to move to Gauan, and the pack animals, with rations, baggage, and blanket rolls, were left at Pantauan with Troop L, the mortar detachment of the Twenty-fifth Battery, Field Artillery, under First Lieut. A. H. Sunderland, and 50 men of Company M, under Second Lieut. H. E. Comstock, all under command of Captain Kirkpatrick.

With the remainder of the command I proceeded at once in the direction of Gauan, on Lake Butig. On leaving Pantauan several armed Moros were seen at a distance, but no shots were fired on either side. The trail followed a narrow,

wooded ridge, over which we cautiously proceeded, reaching Gauan, some 3 miles away, at about 8.30 a. m. The end of this ridge projected into a swamp, with Lake Butig on the south and southwest. The stronger of the two forts in sight was situated directly in our front, at the narrowest part of the ridge, completely closing the trail, and some 200 yards from the end of the ridge. This fort was first sighted as we debouched from the woods some 300 yards from it. Directly on our right and across the lake about the same distance was the other of the two Gauan forts that had up to this time been located. Companies C and F were moved into open ground to the front, and Company C was deployed to the left of the first fort, the line extending as far to the left front as possible and resting against a deep, narrow trench, leading from the fort toward the east. Company F was deployed facing the second fort.

The two guns of McNair's battery were unlimbered and posted on the right of Company F. Companies G and M remained in column of files on the trail, hidden from view to the front, but in a position to face the ridge on our left. Several armed Moros were seen to enter the two forts, and it was expected that the firing would come from them. On the contrary, however, the first firing came from a fringe of timber on the near slope of the ridge to our left. This fire was returned by the scouts of Companies G and M, and the battery opened on the fort across the lake, from which several Moros attempted to escape but were killed by the infantry. The battery was then turned on the first fort, which was shortly afterwards entered by Lieutenant Pepper and found to have been hastily abandoned. From the hills on the opposite side of the lake the Moros kept up a desultory fire with Krags and Remingtons. At a distance of some 500 yards to the west of the small fort and across the lake several armed Moros were observed, no doubt thinking they were beyond the range of our rifles; but a few well-directed volleys by Lieutenant Hawkins's scouts either destroyed or dispersed them. It should be added here, by way of explanation, that in each company of infantry 10 selected men were used as scouts. During this time the firing from the ridge on the left had continued at intervals, and my attention was called to a clump of bamboo at the extreme point of the ridge, some 500 yards to the east, and Captain McNair was directed to bring his guns to a more favorable point and to open fire upon it. After a half a dozen rounds from the battery Lieutenant Hawkins with Company C was sent across the swamp, through which the company waded to their waists, to attack and capture the position, thought to be another cotta or fort. He became engaged immediately upon arriving on the ridge, and Lieutenant Bickham with Company F was at once sent to his support.

After some thirty minutes the firing from the cotta ceased and it was entered by our men. Three dead Moros were found within and there were evidences of several having been wounded, the rest escaping by an opening in the wall near the extreme end of the ridge. This cotta was destroyed by fire, as were all others captured. Upon the return of Companies C and F an attempt was made to reach the Butig rancheria, which lay to the southeast beyond Lake Butig and the swamp leading from it to the Malaig River and behind a low intervening ridge, but at this time the swamp was impassable. I then returned with the command to the base camp at Pantauan, arriving about 4 p. m.

At 7 o'clock the next morning, with all of the command (except Company G, which, with the mortar detachment of the battery, was left as a camp guard), I started out to Bayabao, with Captain Kirkpatrick's Troop L in the advance. At about 2 miles from camp, on an open ridge covered with tall grass, the advance guard was attacked by a party of 40 Moros with firearms. Captain Kirkpatrick dismounted his troop and vigorously repelled the attack without any casualties, and moving forward at a double time he continued firing at the retreating Moros, several of whom ran into a wooded ravine on our right, the rest retiring into a cotta about a mile away. Approaching this cotta, from which a few shots were fired, the battery was placed in position at a range of about 400 yards, and Lieutenant Gracie with Company M was sent to the left to cut off any avenue of escape from that direction. Captain Kirkpatrick with Troop L, dismounted, and Lieutenant Bickham with Company F were sent to the right, both wings being directed to cover as far as possible any escape to the rear. In taking position the right wing encountered several Moros attempting to escape, all of whom were either killed or wounded.

The infantry being in position, fire was opened on the cotta with the battery. Lieutenant Gracie soon after entered the cotta and found it abandoned. This cotta was a very strong one, about 150 feet square, with walls of earth 10 feet thick, surrounded by a deep trench, with bamboo stakes protecting all approaches. It contained a large quantity of rice, in a large, substantial building. This building and contents of cotta were destroyed, as was another small cotta some 400

yards to the west. The command then took up the return march to camp at Pantauan, by way of the rancheria of Lumbayanague, whose sultan came out to meet us and stated, after some hesitation, that several of the Moros of his rancheria were implicated in the attack on Matalling Falls on September 1, and that he would be glad to have them punished. He guided the column to the house of Dato Imam, who he said was the guilty dato, but Imam and his people had escaped. We reached camp about 5.30 p. m.

On September 20, with the entire command, I took up the march at 6.30 a. m. for Maciu, arriving at about 11 a. m. at the edge of the lake some 700 feet above Saur, overlooking Talub, Maciu, and other rancherias on the alluvial peninsula at the southeast part of the lake. As directed by General Sumner, I was preparing to send a messenger with a letter to Sultans Ganduali and Tauagan, of Maciu, when the Moros opened fire upon us from the ridge to the east and from the cotta at Saur, and from the adjacent wooded bluff below. From across the arm of the lake lantaca and small-arm firing began, but with no effect.

I had had difficulty in obtaining any accurate information about trails and roads, as well as about the location of cottas, but it was evident that the Moros from Maciu had a fort somewhere near by on the south side of the arm of the lake, as many Moros were seen hurriedly crossing to this side in vintas. I directed Captain McNair to try his guns on them, and, if possible, stop reenforcements coming to this side. After three or four trial shots, a vinta was struck and sunk, and 7 Moros are said to have been killed or drowned. The distance at which the shot was fired was about 1,800 yards, and it made such an impression on the Moros that no further attempts were made by them to cross, and during the entire time thereafter vintas kept their distance.

I sent my adjutant, Lieutenant Fries, with Lieutenant Bickham and Company F, to proceed directly along the ridge toward the east and develop, if possible, any position the enemy might hold. They encountered a force strongly posted in a cotta that covered all approaches along the entire ridge, and, after a brisk engagement of twenty minutes, compelled the Moros to abandon the cotta. We were not again molested from that position that day.

Lieutenant Gracie, with Company M, was ordered at the same time to proceed toward Saur to cover all trails leading in that direction and to overcome whatever opposition might be made to our passage to the cotta at Saur. To support him McNair's battery was posted on the second bench below, overlooking the cotta at Saur. Lieutenant Gracie advanced to Saur, finding the cotta abandoned, with cook fires still burning. There was a large, well-constructed building within, containing rice, coffee, and cocoa, as well as all household furniture. The cotta and its contents were later ordered burned and the command went into camp at Saur.

Upon our arrival at Saur investigation of trails leading around the arm of the lake was immediately begun. It was found that the only trail which it is possible to pass at any time was, owing to its swampy condition, impassable at this time without several days' work, and it was determined to attempt to make the crossing of the arm of the lake by bamboo rafts, and the construction of two of them was at once begun. One of these rafts was practically completed on the same day and another was completed early the next morning.

Firing from the surrounding bluffs and from across the lake continued during the afternoon. The next day, September 21, Captain Kirkpatrick, with Troop L, Company G, under Lieutenant Loring, and one gun from the battery, under Lieutenant Clark, was sent to examine the trails, if any, leading across or down the Malaig River. He found the same fort that Lieutenant Bickham had taken the day before again occupied by Moros, with whom he had a short engagement, driving them from and destroying their cotta. He then proceeded by a Moro trail leading to a village near the Malaig River, but failed to find any regular crossing of that river or any trail leading down it. He returned to camp the same evening.

Upon our arrival at Saur, on the 20th, I sent a messenger to Sultans Ganduali and Tauagan, requesting them to visit camp and confer with me or to meet me at some point to be designated by them. The Moro messenger returned with a verbal message that they declined my invitation, but would meet me when we arrived at Maciu, and directed the messenger not to return with any more messages.

With the rafts an effort was made to cross the arm of the lake, and Lieutenant Pepper, who made the first attempt, succeeded with about 20 men in reaching a point from which, accompanied by several men, he waded with difficulty to a landing on the other side, some 800 yards distant from our side and some 400 yards from the farthest point he was able to reach with the raft, which could be forced no farther owing to the dense growth of water lilies that skirted the swampy

edges of the lake as far as could be seen from our point of view. The raft from there could be gotten neither forward nor backward, until finally, with the aid of a picket rope, Lieutenant Pepper, assisted by Lieutenant Fries, of the engineers, and an additional number of men, succeeded in reaching our side again about noon. In the afternoon another attempt was made by a fresh detachment under these two officers, with results equally futile. During most of the afternoon the party at work with the raft was under fire from Moros on the other side, hidden in the grass, but scouts from our side prevented any close-range firing on the part of the Moros. Both the officers and men on this duty were most of the time in water and mud, oftentimes to their necks. From the day's experience the impracticability of making a crossing in this manner became evident, and the project was reluctantly abandoned. At one time, however, the success of the effort seemed so probable that I dispatched a messenger asking that two days' rations be sent us. My disappointment at the impossibility of making a successful passage at this time was very great and was keenly felt by the entire command.

On September 22 it was determined to return to Camp Vicars. Lieutenant Comstock, with 50 men of Company M, was sent as an escort to Lieutenant Fries, Engineer Corps, to ascertain if there was a trail farther up the Malaig River than any party had yet been. They left camp at 6 a. m. and joined the column about 12 o'clock, reporting no trails, having encountered a rough country approaching the river and swampy bottoms along its course, impassable at that time for animals. As the command moved out of camp at Saur the Maciu Moros began to take courage, and congregated near the cottas of Tauagan and Ganduali, firing rifles and lantacas. As we came to the first bench or plateau above Saur these Maciu forts were plainly visible at a distance of about 3,000 yards. As much for practice as for results against the personnel of our opponents, Captain McNair was directed to try his guns and the mortar on them. The range proved too great for accurate firing, but it had the effect of dispersing all Moro gatherings in that vicinity, and sent them hurrying toward the north end of the peninsula. Several shots, however, apparently landed within one of the cottas. At 10 a. m. the return march was resumed, and Camp Vicars was reached at 7 p. m.

During this expedition, as learned since from friendly Moro sources, 30 Moros were killed and as many or more were wounded. Eight cottas were captured and with their contents destroyed. No other property was destroyed.

Although there were no individual acts that were particularly conspicuous above others, I can not speak too highly of the conduct of the officers and men of my command during this expedition. The discipline was well-nigh perfect. Such an implicit obedience to orders and such an intelligent and fearless execution of them is rarely seen. Wrought up by a defensive attitude for the preceding two months, they would have endured any privation or undergone any hardship to win.

Very respectfully,

JOHN J. PERSHING,
Captain, Fifteenth Cavalry, Commanding.

FIELD ORDERS,)
No. 9.)

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Camp Vicars, P. I., September 17, 1902.

Capt. J. J. PERSHING,

Fifteenth Cavalry, Commanding Camp Vicars:

You will proceed to the neighborhood of Butig with 4 companies of infantry, 1 troop of cavalry, and a platoon of artillery, with a sufficient number of pack animals to carry rations for four days. You will endeavor to communicate with Sultan Uali and the sultan of Butig and such other sultans and datos as you may meet in that country. You will explain to these leaders the desire of the Government to maintain friendly relations with the Moros and invite them to Camp Vicars for the purpose of coming to an amicable understanding. You will also inform Sultan Uali and the sultan of Butig that from their own statements and other reliable information we know they have been participants in attacks recently made on American soldiers. Make a demand on these leaders for any arms or other Government property in their possession. You are authorized, if necessary, to use force for this purpose against these leaders. You are also to use force against any leaders in that section who oppose your march or make any hostile demonstration against you. You are authorized to proceed from Butig to Maciu, carrying out those same general instructions. From Maciu you will return to Camp Vicars. Or you may return from Butig to Camp Vicars if circumstances

make that course the more advisable. Two hundred rounds of ammunition will be carried per man. Strictest orders will be given to control the fire of the men in any engagement that takes place. No property will be taken, damaged, or destroyed outside of cottas captured in the execution of the above instructions.

By command of Brigadier-General Sumner:

L. C. ANDREWS,
Captain and Quartermaster, Fifteenth Cavalry,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

Report of Capt. Eli A. Helmick, Tenth Infantry, of an expedition from Camp Vicars to Lake Butig, September 25-26, 1902.

HEADQUARTERS PROVISIONAL BATTALION
TENTH AND ELEVENTH INFANTRY,
Camp Jossman,^a Mindanao, P. I., September 27, 1902.

The ADJUTANT, PROVISIONAL INFANTRY BATTALIONS.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of an expedition which the provisional battalion under my command made pursuant to Field Orders, No. 16, dated Camp Vicars, September 24, 1902. In compliance with the order just quoted this battalion, consisting of First Lieut. J. S. Young, jr., battalion adjutant, Tenth Infantry, acting battalion adjutant; First Lieut. Earl H. Brown, Corps of Engineers; Capt. W. C. Le Compte, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army; Company A, Tenth Infantry, First Lieut. H. L. Harris, Tenth Infantry, temporarily in command, Second Lieut. F. B. Eastman, and 81 enlisted men; Company H, Eleventh Infantry, Capt. Harry R. Lee, First Lieut. and Battalion Adjt. (Eleventh Infantry) Clyfford Game, and 75 enlisted men; Company E, Eleventh Infantry, Capt. John W. Heavey, First Lieut. James W. Furlow, and 80 enlisted men; fourth section, Twenty-fifth Battery Field Artillery, First Lieut. C. C. Lansing, A. C., and a detachment of 8 mounted men, Troop A, Fifteenth Cavalry, under Sergeant Hughes, left camp at 12 p. m. on the 25th instant and proceeded on the Vicars-Mataling Falls road to the Dato Grande trail, at which point this trail was followed to Dato Grande's rancheria, arriving there at 3.45 a. m. At this point a halt of one hour was caused by failure to locate the dato, who was desired to act as guide. When he was found he informed me that it would be impossible to follow the trail from Macadar eastward to the south side of Lake Butig, but that a good trail for both men and packs could be found leading in this direction at Bacayauan. It was consequently decided to take the entire command to this point, which was reached at 6.30 a. m.

Captain Heavey was here directed to move with his company on the main Butig trail and proceed down the north side of the lake to the east end of the same, and there connect with the main column, which was expected to move down the south side to the same point. Before the main column had proceeded a quarter of a mile of the Bacayauan-Lake Butig trail it was halted by Dato Grande, who was acting as guide, and I was informed by the dato that the trail was impracticable for pack animals; that soldiers might pass, but with a good deal of trouble, and that it would take more than a day to proceed to our destination over this trail. It was therefore determined to proceed to Panatauan on this trail, where Dato Grande stated positively that there was a good trail leading off to the south side of Lake Butig. The column arrived at Panatauan at 7 a. m., where a guide was obtained from the sultan at Panatauan, and Captain Heavey was again directed to proceed on the main trail down the north side of Lake Butig as before, while the main column turned to the right and started on the trail designated by Dato Grande, who, however, by this time had again changed his mind about the trail and informed me that it proceeded to the lake only, and that neither soldiers nor packs could get farther than the lake, and that it would be impossible to get on to the south side of the lake by this trail. Believing that he was not telling the truth, I determined to proceed, and I gave the necessary directions for the main column to turn off to the right just beyond Panatauan. The trail was followed until it ended at the lake, as Dato Grande stated (truthfully, I was sorry to find), and a careful reconnoissance failed to develop a crossing over the streams at the head of the lake. I therefore turned the column about and moved back on to the Panatauan-Butig trail down the north side of the lake. At this time I was very

^a Camp Jossman was a temporary camp on the Vicars-Mataling wagon road, which was subsequently named Camp Butig. It has been broken up.

much surprised to find that one platoon of A Company and Captain Lee's company of the Eleventh Infantry had failed to follow main body and had taken a trail which led later into the trail taken by Captain Heavey. I assume the responsibility for this mistake, which might have been serious, as I neglected to leave a man at the point where the trail turned off directly to the right. I, however, supposed that Lieutenant Eastman, who was at the head of the column, would keep closed up on the artillery section, in rear of which he had been marching during the night. As it turned out, it saved these two organizations an unnecessary march.

Captain Heavey proceeded down the main Panatauan-Butig trail until he reached fort marked "A," where he was fired upon by Moros, using Krag rifles, the shot proceeding from the fort just named, which was captured by Captain Pershing on his expedition. He sent out a skirmish line against this fort and the Moros promptly fled, about 60 being seen beyond the cottas. The advance guard of his company, after passing the fort, fired on hostile Moros on small island, one of whom was reported to be killed. His company then proceeded to the left of the fort marked "B," firing on hostile Moros across rice paddy at "C," where 1 Moro was killed and his bolo captured. It was only at this time that the cotta at "B" was discovered, which was found to be a large, commodious, and strong fort, containing 8 good buildings; all were destroyed. The company then proceeded, as marked on sketch, to the south side of Lake Butig, following around the shore to the cotta on peninsula, being fired upon occasionally by hostile Moros, who fled precipitately upon the approach of the troops. The cotta on the peninsula was also destroyed, the company resting here for one hour for noon meal. One platoon of A Company, under Lieutenant Eastman, and H Company, under Captain Lee, reached the east end of Lake Butig shortly after Captain Heavey's arrival, and crossed rice paddy around the east end up the east side of Lake Butig to the left of Captain Heavey, where they were fired upon by hostile Moros from houses in Uali's rancheria. These houses were destroyed.

All the companies were maneuvering in the position just described when I reached the south end of the lake with the advance guard and the section of artillery. The artillery was parked between fort "B" and the lake on a knoll, it not being deemed necessary to make an attempt to cross the swamps with the packs, the mules already being tired. I reached the east side of the lake at about 11 a. m. A Company and E Company were then assembled and dinner prepared. After the noon rest Captain Heavey with his company made an effort to discover a trail from the south side of Lake Butig to the vicinity of Panatauan or Bacayan. In this he failed after considerable effort and with the assistance of Tomas as guide, and was compelled to return by the east end of the lake. Here, however, he discovered a good crossing with solid bottom just to the south of the fort "B," in the clear water of the lake, the water being only about 3 feet deep. This ford avoids the passage through the miry rice paddies. At 2 o'clock these two companies were formed and ordered to proceed in the direction of the cotta of Sultan Butig. It not being deemed necessary to take both companies, Captain Lee was directed to return to the artillery position on the north side of the lake. A Company proceeded, as marked in the sketch, until it reached the point marked "D," and while skirmishing around in this vicinity a flag was suddenly discovered on the top of the crest. Lieutenant Harris, with a section of the company, was sent forward to investigate and found that it was the cotta of the Sultan Butig, who desired, he stated, to become friendly with the American Government. He was invited to proceed with me to Camp Vicars, and the entire command then proceeded back to Panatauan, where it went into camp for the night, E and H Companies arriving about 6.30, A Company a little later.

The sultan of Panatauan was consulted in the morning, and I was informed that he had communicated with both Sultan Uali and Butig the day previous and that neither of them cared to become friends to the Americans. Great care was taken to distinguish between hostile and friendly Moros, but my experience on this trip led me to doubt the entire good faith of the so-called friendly Moros. A man who accompanied Dato Grande and who had been known as his son was found picking cartridges out of the belt of one of the men, and upon searching him was found to have 6 other cartridges on his person. He was arrested and brought in a prisoner. I also feel satisfied that information of our arrival was forwarded to Uali from Panatauan.

At Panatauan on the morning of the 26th I had a talk with the sultans of Panatauan, Miremis, and Butig, who all promised to send a messenger to Uali and persuade him to declare friendship to the Americans. The result of this effort, if any, was to be promptly forwarded by a messenger to the brigade commander.

While there is no special reason for comparison or commendation in this report, I desire to mention the energy and activity displayed by Captain Heavey, who undoubtedly did more marching and skirmishing than any other organization. Lieutenant Harris, who was with the advance guard, displayed energy in reconnoissance work.

All the companies were well conducted. There was no unnecessary firing and waste of ammunition. The command was constantly marching, with the exception of a short halt about noon, from 12 midnight until 6.30 p. m. of the 25th, a period of eighteen hours. It was only necessary to transport one man in from Panatauan, he having cut his foot on a piece of bamboo.

The hospital report showed this morning as follows: A Company, Tenth Infantry, no sick; H Company, Eleventh Infantry, 2 sick, sore feet and rheumatism; E Company, Eleventh Infantry, 2 sick, foot cut and diarrhea.

Recommendation.—As all efforts failed to discover a trail to the south side of Lake Butig, it is recommended that a company provided with the necessary tools be sent to make a reconnoissance of the supposed trail in this direction from Macadar. This accomplished it would be less difficult to get between Uali's people and the mountains, to which they flee upon the approach of troops.

The expedition was accompanied by Captain Dunton, of the marines, Mr. Severance, a correspondent, and Mr. Collins, of the Young Men's Christian Association, all of whom were with the command during the entire trip.

Respectfully submitted.

ELI A. HELMICK,
Captain, Tenth Infantry, Commanding Battalion.

Report of Capt. John J. Pershing, Fifteenth Cavalry, of an expedition against hostile Moros of Maciu September 28–October 3, 1902.

POST OF CAMP VICARS, MINDANAO, P. I., October 15, 1902.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF MINDANAO.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of an expedition against hostile Moros of Maciu, Lake Lanao, made between September 28 and October 2, inclusive, in compliance with Field Orders, No. 17, September 25, 1902, copy of which is appended hereto.

The command consisted of Maj. L. C. Carr, surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, First Lieut. J. H. Allen, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, with 6 enlisted men of the Hospital Corps; First Lieut. Claude S. Fries, battalion adjutant Twenty-seventh Infantry, adjutant; Chaplain George D. Rice, Twenty-seventh Infantry; Capt. J. J. Morrow, Corps of Engineers, engineer officer; First Lieut. Earle Brown, Engineer Corps, commanding detachment of 20 enlisted men of Company F, Second Battalion Corps of Engineers; Capt. J. W. L. Phillips, Twenty-seventh Infantry, commanding battalion of the Twenty-seventh Infantry, viz, Company C, First Lieut. F. B. Hawkins, Second Lieut. K. L. Pepper, and 76 enlisted men; Company F, First Lieut. C. G. Bickham, Second Lieut. A. W. Brown, and 72 enlisted men; Company M, First Lieut. W. B. Gracie, Second Lieut. H. E. Comstock, and 75 enlisted men; Twenty-fifth Battery Field Artillery, Capt. W. S. McNair, Artillery Corps, First Lieuts. H. B. Clarke, Artillery Corps, and A. H. Sunderland, Artillery Corps, and 85 enlisted men; Troop A, Fifteenth Cavalry, Second Lieut. W. P. Mangum, jr., Fifteenth Cavalry, and 61 enlisted men; as per copy of field return herewith, and a pack train of 75 mules, carrying four days' rations, one day's rations being carried in haversacks.

We left Camp Vicars at 8 a. m. on September 28, and, marching by way of Pantauan, arrived at Saur at 3.30 p. m. (see small map herewith), where the base camp was established. It was discovered that since the campaign some ten days previous the Moros of Maciu had erected at Talub, on the Maciu side of the arm of the lake, a small earthwork, faced with stone, covering the landing that they evidently thought we intended to use, and upon the parapet they had hoisted their red flag of war. Upon arrival I immediately sent Captain Morrow, Engineer Corps, and 15 enlisted men of the engineers, with Company G, Twenty-seventh Infantry, under Lieutenant Loring, as an escort, to make a reconnoissance toward Maciu regarding trails leading in that direction. He returned about dark, reporting an old trail very swampy and obstructed by trees recently felled by the Moros, and that it would take 200 men at least two days to make it passable. Orders were accordingly issued for the work to begin at daylight, and two companies—F and G, Twenty-seventh Infantry—together with the engineers under Captain Morrow,

were sent to work in the forenoon, the infantry companies being relieved at noon by Companies C and M. Lieutenant Brown, with a few men of the engineers, assisted by a detail from the Twenty-fifth Battery, constructed a catamaran of two large vintas that Dato Pedro, of Oato, and the Cabugatan of Oato had furnished. These vintas were of such a size that each would accommodate at least 20 soldiers, and the carrying capacity of the catamaran was about 35 men.

On the morning of the 29th the Moros from the fort opposite fired upon the cavalry as the horses were being watered. The firing was returned immediately by a gun of the battery previously posted for that purpose. After that the Moros kept up a fire from the opposite side during the day but did no damage, a party of sharpshooters being on the lookout for every Moro that exposed himself. Firing from the surrounding hills was also begun by the Moros during the morning, and at 1 o'clock p. m. I sent Captain McNair with 2 guns and Company F, under Lieutenant Bickham, to dislodge them. He encountered strong resistance to the southeast, the Moros being posted on the crest of the hill across the line of his advance, from which position they stood up in line and fired several volleys at him. The infantry soon drove them away and occupied the ridge as well as the cotta near by that had been taken by us on the previous expedition. Several Moros were killed in this skirmish, especially while they were escaping into the undergrowth and down the hillsides.

While I was out on the trail during the afternoon Captain Morrow reported having seen several Moros some distance to the front and that Lieutenant Pepper with 15 men of Company C had gone in that direction. Soon after, firing was heard from our front and with 20 additional men I, with Captain Morrow and Lieutenant Gracie, went hurriedly out along the trail, meeting Lieutenant Pepper and his detachment returning. I then ordered the whole detachment forward, Lieutenant Pepper's party in the advance, and as we debouched from the heavy timber to an open hillside in Maciu we were fired upon. Lieutenant Pepper and the advance returned the fire and the whole detachment closed on the Moros, killing 12 of them and capturing 1 Tower rifle.

I decided to occupy Maciu the following day, September 30, and to complete the trail as far as necessary as we went along. Accordingly an early start was made with the entire command, except the pack animals and a camp guard of 50 men of Company C under Lieutenant Pepper. Captain Morrow, Lieutenant Brown, and the engineer detachment hurried forward to repair the worst places in the trail. Lieutenant Gracie, with Company M, constituted the advance, followed by the battery, Company F, Company G, 26 men of Company C, and Troop A, under their respective company commanders, Troop A acting as rear guard. There was much difficulty in passing over the trail, which became very muddy with use and in places swampy to such an extent that all the battery mules and ammunition mules had to be unpacked, some of them several times, and their loads carried by the men, often as far as 200 yards. It was noon before we reached Maciu ridge, where the skirmish of the day before had occurred. In the meantime Lieutenant Gracie with Company M had encountered resistance, but had forced the Moros to return to their cottas, 2 in number, one being that of the defiant Sultan Ganduali. The command all up, I ordered Captain Phillips to post the leading company of his battalion on the right, facing the west, its right flank extending beyond the cotta that lay to our right front. In a similar manner Company F was sent to the left, covering the cotta to our left front. These two cottas were near the west end of the ridge, which sloped abruptly westward to the alluvial flat on which Maciu proper is located. McNair's four mountain guns were sent into position at 300 yards. The Moros were silenced within twenty minutes, and they deserted both cottas and attempted to escape. The two infantry companies, supported by Company G, advanced hurriedly past the cottas to the edge of the ridge and poured volley after volley into the retreating Moros. The Moro force probably numbered 150 in all, many of whom were known to be killed, and, as learned since, a great number wounded. Two 3-inch muzzle-loading cast-iron cannon were captured and spiked. Both cottas and the houses within and their contents, household effects and rice, were then destroyed.

From here General Sumner's letter to Sultans Ganduali and Tauagan, a copy of which is appended, was sent to them, and, pending their reply, the command was marched to Talub, opposite Saur, and encamped for the night. The Moro messenger returned about dark, saying that they had read the letter, but refused to either keep it or answer it, sending word that 200 of them would be ready for us on the following day at the cotta of the Sultan-cabugatan of Maciu.

On the next morning, October 1, I moved out toward the supposed location of this cotta, Company G in the advance. When just west of Ganduali's cotta the advance guard was fired upon and developed what promised for a time to be the

enemy in force. The battery was posted and the two leading infantry companies were deployed exactly the same as the day before, their flanks extending beyond the two cottas in our front, which were about 150 yards apart. There was no little resistance, however, and the command moved forward cautiously a mile farther, the leading company in skirmish line. Cries of defiance were heard at some distance off and were thought to come from a group of cottas near the lake. Upon reaching the principal one of the group, the battery was ordered into position in front of it, facing the lake, and at a distance of some 350 yards from the cotta. Captain Phillips was directed to place the leading company in position, with its right resting on the lake shore, and about 300 yards from the cotta. I placed Company F in a similar position on the right of the cotta. Company C was posted in front, on the right of and supporting the battery, while Company M and Troop A were held in reserve, with orders to protect the rear. As Company F was being placed in position, they cut off several Moros attempting to escape along the edge of the lake. All the troops being in position, McNair's battery was ordered to open fire. The Moros replied with a vigorous fire from the lantacas and small arms. Our sharpshooters and the battery soon brought their firing down to a minimum, for they found in short order that it was dangerous to expose themselves.

As the number of effective men within the cotta decreased, our lines were advanced from time to time until they were within about 150 yards on the flanks, and the battery and the line in front within about 100 yards of the cotta. The other cottas in this group, consisting of a small one on the left, a very small one in front, and two to the right and near the lake, were inside of our first lines, none of them, however, being occupied. The effective fire of the artillery and the infantry at these close ranges had a demoralizing effect upon the Moros, which they attempted to offset by yells of defiance, by beating tomtoms, and by religious chants. Above all this, our interpreters and friendly Moros could distinguish the prayers of the panditas for their dead and wounded. At about 3 p. m. Lieutenant Loring suggested that he take some of his men of Company G and burn the buildings in the small cotta on the left, and he was directed to do so, as all buildings in other adjacent cottas had been burned. Afterwards Lieutenant Loring volunteered to make an attempt to set fire to the occupied cotta and, if possible, to locate the entrance. With 10 men he succeeded in reaching the walls of the cotta, but the fire set in some dead grass died out. One of his men, Private James Nolan, jr., Company G, Twenty-seventh Infantry, was wounded and had to be assisted to the rear. Lieutenant Loring found the walls to be at least 20 feet high from the bottom of the ditch and perpendicular, making it impracticable without unnecessary loss of life to scale them. During this time, Lieutenant Mangum, with Troop A, had driven some Moros out of, and had destroyed another group of cottas to the left and rear, from which he had been fired upon. At 3 p. m. the troop was sent to Talub, across from Saur, the base camp, for rations, returning just after dark.

The Moros kept up constant firing at Company F's line from the rear that gave more or less annoyance, but as no casualties occurred to us I determined to do nothing more than to hold them off at a safe distance until we had settled with those in front of us.

I ordered the lines drawn closer after dark, so that the distance between the two extremities on the lake shore was only about 100 yards, and the outposts at these points were in sight of each other, and disposed Company M in a line of outposts covering our rear completely. Surrounding the cotta on all sides except the immediate front and immediate right there was a very rank growth of grass (cogon) 10 to 15 feet high, with deep narrow ditches running through it in all directions. I directed that fires be lighted between our lines and the cotta to overcome the darkness, although it was not thought possible for the Moros to escape. Continuous yelling and praying, with occasional firing, were kept up until about 3 a. m., when a party of Moros attempted to escape by rushing through our lines, first trying Company G, commanded in person by Captain Phillips, and then trying Company F, Lieutenant Bickham, but they were repulsed at both places, although one Moro succeeded in passing through G Company's line and was wounded as he ran away. Several Moros were killed in this attempt and others wounded. The next morning at daylight the cotta was discovered to be deserted. The lantacas, a great variety of household effects, were unearthed, and a large supply of rice and provisions were found in various places. There were three houses inside, one, large and substantial, from which the grass roof had been removed, probably as a precaution against fire. The interior of this cotta showed that the owner was of some distinction and evidently wealthy, as Moro wealth goes.

Of the 200 who were said to be determined to make a stand here probably half lost courage toward the last, and some of the remainder by the time we reached

the cotta. Of those remaining there were many killed and wounded besides those we found, as we have since learned, and as was plainly to be seen on the inside of the cotta the next morning, the bamboo building being literally shot to pieces. This cotta had, as we know now, underground passageways and caverns and escapes, and their dead and wounded are said to have been hidden therein, as was the case beyond a doubt. In all their forts they invariably provide a means of escape. There were certainly but three who escaped from this cotta during the night, the tracks of two of them being visible at the edge of the lake; then the one who broke through the line at night. I made a personal examination of every foot of the ground in company with other officers, and believe none others got away. After the cotta was burned a Moro juramentado sprang out of the grass in front of the angle formed by C and F companies' lines and attacked Private R. G. Macbeth, Company F, cutting him severely on the left arm with a campilan. This Moro, who afterwards proved to be the Sultan Cabugatan, of Maciu, was killed, but was shot seven times before he fell. Company C and Troop A were sent through the tall grass in skirmish line, finding another Moro awaiting an opportunity to make a similar attack, but he was dispatched before he was able to do any damage.

Preparations were made to return, and the wounded were sent, under escort of the cavalry, direct to Talub, being taken to Saur on the catamaran. As the command started back, I ordered Captain Phillips with two companies to make a detour to the north and destroy a group of cottas from which the volleys had been fired during the preceding day and night, and Lieutenant Mangum, Troop A, to destroy those in the direction of Talub, from all of which we had been fired upon. I took up the march toward Saur, arriving there about 2 p. m. No Moros outside Maciu were disturbed, but these were certainly given a severe lesson, and the next day the command returned to Camp Vicars.

I can not speak too highly of the conduct of the officers and men of my command during this expedition, and I desire especially to mention the officers and men of the Twenty-fifth Battery under Captain McNair for the manner in which they executed the difficult task of transporting the battery over the swampy country through which we were compelled to pass and for their fearlessness in pushing their guns almost under the walls of the Maciu forts. In their several capacities, the infantry and cavalry are equally deserving creditable mention for their splendid conduct, the infantry under Captain Phillips and Lieutenant Bickham especially, for holding back at night a charging band of desperate Moros.

For his personal daring and coolness in leading ten of his men under the walls of the cotta in an attempt to set fire to it and find an entrance and afterwards assisting to a place of safety one of his men, Private James Nolan, jr., who was wounded, I desire to particularly invite attention to the conduct of Second Lieutenant Loring, Twenty-seventh Infantry.

To the members of my staff, commissioned and noncommissioned, I desire to give especial credit for their efficient performance of duty during this campaign.

We were accompanied by several friendly Moros on this expedition, than whom none were of greater service than Dato Grande, of Makadar, and Dato Amai-Darimbang, of Oato, and their followers.

Very respectfully,

JOHN J. PERSHING,
Captain, Fifteenth Cavalry.

FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 17. }

CAMP VICARS, MINDANAO,
September 25, 1902.

Capt. J. J. PERSHING,

Fifteenth Cavalry, Commanding Camp Vicars, Mindanao:

You will prepare your command for field service. Take 75 men in each company of infantry, one troop of cavalry, and three sections of artillery. Capt. J. J. Morrow, Corps of Engineers, will report to you for service on this expedition with 20 men from Company G, Battalion of Engineers. Take 200 rounds of ammunition per man. Leave this post to-morrow morning at 8 o'clock, with two days' rations carried in haversacks and three days' on pack train. You will proceed to Maciu, and if the sultans and datos in that community continue their hostile attitude and refuse to come to an amicable understanding you will capture their forts and damage them as much as possible. Endeavor to recapture the government stock now held by these people or force these sultans to surrender it. Your field of operations will be confined to the neighborhood of Maciu and be confined, if possible, to those datos and sultans who have expressed determination to resist the Government, and are actively engaged in such hostilities. On completion of this work you will return to this station.

No property will be taken, damaged, or destroyed outside of cottas captured in the execution of the above instructions.

By command of Brigadier-General Sumner:

L. C. ANDREWS,
Captain and Quartermaster, Fifteenth Cavalry,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

Report of Capt. John J. Pershing, Fifteenth Cavalry, of an exploring expedition from Camp Vicars to Marahui, along the west shore of Lake Lanao, April 5 to 16, 1903.

POST OF CAMP VICARS,
Mindanao, P. I., May 15, 1903.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF MINDANAO,
Zamboanga, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of an expedition of exploration along the west shore of Lake Lanao from Camp Vicars to Marahui and return, made by troops under my command in accordance with instructions from department commander dated April 2, 1903, copy of which is appended hereto:

The command consisted of Capt. John J. Pershing, Fifteenth Cavalry, commanding; First Lieut. C. S. Fries, battalion adjutant, Twenty-seventh Infantry, adjutant; Second Lieut. T. W. Brown, battalion quartermaster and commissary, Twenty-seventh Infantry, quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance officer; Lieut. E. D. Peek, Engineer Corps, engineer officer; First Lieut. R. U. Patterson, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army; Contract Surg. H. Greiger, U. S. Army, with 4 enlisted men of the Hospital Corps; Chaplain George D. Rice, Twenty-seventh Infantry; Troop L, Fifteenth Cavalry, Capt. G. W. Kirkpatrick, Fifteenth Cavalry, commanding, Second Lieut. Isaac S. Martin, and 50 enlisted; Troop G, Fifteenth Cavalry, First Lieut. Charles E. McCullough, Fifteenth Cavalry, commanding, with Second Lieut. F. A. Ruggles, Second Lieut. V. S. Foster, and 44 enlisted; 2 Vicker-Maxim mountain guns of the Twenty-fifth Battery, Field Artillery, under command of Capt. W. S. McNair, Artillery Corps, with First Lieut. Clarence Deems, jr., and 62 enlisted; two 3.6-inch field mortars of the Seventeenth Battery, Field Artillery, under command of Capt. G. G. Gatley, Artillery Corps, with Second Lieut. E. H. De Armond and 32 enlisted; Company M, Twenty-seventh Infantry, First Lieut. W. B. Gracie, Twenty-seventh Infantry, commanding, with Second Lieut. B. F. Miller and 75 enlisted; Company F, Twenty-seventh Infantry, First Lieut. A. W. Brown, Twenty-seventh Infantry, commanding, with Second Lieut. E. J. Moran and 71 enlisted; Company C, Twenty-seventh Infantry, First Lieut. G. C. Shaw, Twenty-seventh Infantry, commanding, with Second Lieut. Otis R. Cole and 70 enlisted; Company G, Twenty-seventh Infantry, Second Lieut. S. C. Loring, Twenty-seventh Infantry, commanding, and 63 enlisted; Company K, Twenty-seventh Infantry, 21 enlisted, attached to Companies C, F, and G, to bring their strength up to 75 each; interpreters Leon Fernandez and Tomas Torres; 4 large Moro vintas; 64 native pack ponies; and a quartermaster's pack train of 100 mules, carrying four days' rations. Lieut. Col. John L. Chamberlain, inspector-general, Department of Mindanao, accompanied the command unofficially, and Mr. J. Henry Savage Lander accompanied as a guest by authority of department commander.

The command was provided with ample facilities for boiling water, and each man was furnished an extra canteen. This was done as a precaution against cholera, which was prevalent among the Moros along the west coast of the lake.

Notice had previously been sent to all the principal rancherias on the west coast, and especially to Bacolod, as to the friendly purpose of this expedition, and all were cautioned that they must not molest us or oppose the march. The expedition started at 7 a. m., April 5, 1903, and went into camp at Madumba near a beautiful spring of water, friendly Moros in the vicinity furnishing an ample supply of wood. At about 1 a. m. that night several shots were fired at one of the outposts by Bacolod Moros, who had crept up in the grass to close range, and two enlisted men of Troop A, Fifteenth Cavalry, were wounded.

Resuming the march at early hour the next morning many war flags were seen displayed on the Bacolod stronghold, where opposition was expected, these Moros having been openly hostile and defiant for nearly a year. Some 2 miles west of Bacolod a large party of Moros had assembled on the lake shore and were brandishing their weapons and firing an occasional shot in our direction, but some well-directed volleys and two or three shots from one of the Maxim guns dispersed

them. The country from Madumba to Bacolod is rough and the trails are difficult, so it was nearly 3 o'clock in the afternoon when the head of the column arrived in the vicinity of Bacolod, where the first real resistance was met, although a few shots had been fired from an insignificant fort at Linok, which was returned without delaying the column.

The plan was to attack Bacolod from the north, and to do this it was necessary to rather keep up in the hills, where we had to work our way very slowly. After a skirmish, in which several smaller outlying forts and parties of Moros were either destroyed or dislodged, the ridge on which Bacolod is located was cleared of hostile Moros and occupied. To reach this ridge we had to cross a deep defensive ditch that extended about 800 yards up the hill from the fort, the crossing being made at about 500 yards from the fort. The mortars were left in a commanding position about 2,000 yards from the fort, and opened fire soon after the advance from that point began. On reaching Bacolod hill about 4 o'clock a very heavy rain set in which considerably delayed the advance, especially of the artillery. The leading company was moved down Bacolod ridge toward the fort in skirmish line, and was received with a heavy fire of lantacas and small arms. Advancing to within 300 yards, one company was placed across the ridge and one moved to the right and another to the left, so as to partially envelop the fort. One section of the artillery having arrived, firing began in earnest on both sides. Instructions were given the two flank companies to gradually and carefully extend their flanks toward the lake, with a view of preventing the escape of Moros from the fort, and the remaining companies were ordered into camp on the ridge behind the firing line. The company forming the left wing succeeded in reaching the lake, thus opening up the trail for our water supply, but darkness came on rapidly, and it was impossible on account of the dense undergrowth and tall grass to conclude the reconnaissance on the right sufficiently to warrant the attempt to occupy that part of the line that night.

Desultory firing was kept up on both sides during the night, and at daybreak the morning of the 7th both flanks were extended to the lake. Lieut. A. W. Brown, with 25 men of Company F, was sent into the hills to the northeast to dislodge a party of Moros who had caused some annoyance by firing into camp. He successfully accomplished this mission, killing several and driving others toward Calahui, where he discovered another large fort with war flags flying. At about 9 o'clock a. m. the Moros inside the fort ceased firing and hoisted a white flag, the Panandungan of Bacolod himself requesting terms of surrender. They were informed that nothing but unconditional surrender would be accepted, and that as prisoners their lives would be protected and that they would be well treated. They declined these terms, desiring to keep their arms and to remain in the fort. The effective work of the mountain artillery had already practically destroyed the embrasures and portholes on the north and east faces of the fort, and we soon reached a stage when all that remained to be done was to make the final assault. It was necessary, however, to remain at Bacolod until the following day, awaiting the arrival of supply pack trains sent to Vicars. Moreover, in order to avoid loss of life I was very desirous of forcing the Moros to surrender, and for these reasons concluded to delay the assault until the following day in the hope that they would finally give up. Fresh troops were sent to the firing line, which was strengthened at night, and the utmost precautions taken that none should escape from the fort and no reinforcements enter. Early the morning of the 8th the Panandungan again asked for and was granted a conference, which, however, resulted as before.

Material for filling the ditch was prepared at once, and detailed instructions were given to the officers of the assaulting lines, to be composed of Company C, Twenty-seventh Infantry, under Lieutenant Shaw; Troop L, Fifteenth Cavalry, dismounted, under Captain Kirkpatrick, and 1 Maxim gun, under Captain McNair. All in readiness, the infantry advanced toward the east face of the fort, and the cavalry, with the mountain gun between the two platoons, the north face. Under the protection of the fire of this line the ditch at the point of crossing, opposite the middle of the east face, was filled with fallen trees, and a bamboo bridge was thrown across by Company M, Twenty-seventh Infantry, and Troop A, Fifteenth Cavalry, under Lieutenants Gracie and Lear, respectively, Lieutenant Peek, Engineer Corps, immediately directing the work. Within twenty minutes this was accomplished without casualty, and men of Company C, Company M, and Troop A hurriedly crossed to the berm and sprang upon the parapet, encountering Moros in hand-to-hand combat, who rushed with campilans and krises from the berm galleries and interior of the fort to meet them. Three men were wounded almost instantly, but short work was made of the remaining Moros, who in all parts of the fort continued to fight desperately to the death. The plan of assault

was executed in every detail. It was a brilliant action and one never to be forgotten by those who engaged, and the gallantry displayed by our troops has seldom been equaled.

It is said that there were in the beginning over 200 Moros in the fort, several of whom escaped the first day and night, and just before the assault the number was put at from 50 to 100. Sixty Moros were found dead in the fort and trenches, among those killed being the Panandungan of Bacolod, the leader of opposition to the Americans; Dato Macasasa, Dato Tundia, Dato Antao, and several others of less importance. On account of the danger from cholera, a minute inspection of the interior was not deemed safe, and the fort was at once ordered burned. Many rifle barrels and kris blades were found in the ashes, together with 6 cannons and 7 lantacas, which were destroyed with gunpowder. Our casualties in the Bacolod fight previous to the attack on the fort proper were 5 men wounded, and in the final assault 3 wounded. According to conservative reports of friendly Moros, 60 Bacolod Moros were killed in the fighting in that vicinity in addition to those mentioned above, making 120 in all, besides some renegades from Taraca, Pindalunan, Binidayan, and other places.

The dimensions of Fort Bacolod included within the walls of the parapet were about 80 by 100 feet. The walls were 12 feet high, 15 feet thick at the base, and faced with stone on the outside. A berm 12 feet wide extended entirely around the fort, under which were constructed galleries, and both the fort and berm were covered with bamboo and earth. The fort proper and the galleries were used as a dwelling by the family of the Panandungan and many of his people. The parapet was loopholed for rifle fire, and contained embrasures for cannon and lantacas, and a series of bamboo loopholes extended entirely around the edge of the berm for rifle fire from the galleries.

The fort was surrounded by a ditch with a triangular cross section some 30 feet wide at the top and at least 35 feet deep, and a ditch of the same dimensions, protected by rifle pits, extended north from the northwest corner a distance of some 800 yards along the western slope of the ridge just below the military crest. From the general arrangement of the fort, and especially the position of the cannon and lantacas, they expected to be attacked from the south or southwest, and were undoubtedly surprised and accordingly placed at a disadvantage by our attack from the opposite direction. For plan of fort see appended drawing herewith.

The command remained in camp at Bacolod during the night of the 9th, and preparations were made the next morning for moving toward Calahui, some 8 miles farther to the northeast. The sick and wounded and one of the mortars, under escort of Troop A, Fifteenth Cavalry, were sent back to Camp Vicars, and the command started for Calahui, keeping well up in the hills. At a distance of 2,000 yards the fort came in view with its war flags flying and its Moro krises and campilans flashing in the sunlight. This point was a good mortar position and mortar fire was opened. The rest of the column pushed forward as rapidly as possible toward a position above Calahui that appeared favorable for the Maxims and the infantry. On account of the lack of trails and the roughness of the country it was 4 o'clock in the afternoon when the two leading companies of infantry and the Maxim guns reached the point selected. Here the Moros began firing upon us with great vigor, but the command we had of the position was such that the interior of their fort could be raked with artillery, and it was soon evident that they not only could do but little, but that they could not remain long in the fort without great loss.

The fort was located on a point about 100 feet high that projected into the lake and was surrounded on three sides by water, the shores for some distance on both sides being covered with timber. Placing Company G across the ridge supporting the mountain guns, at a range of 700 yards, Lieutenant Gracie with Company M was ordered toward the fort, to move with his left flank touching the lake. He encountered some resistance in the heavy timber, but soon reached the vicinity of the fort and made a thorough reconnoissance of it. Returning after dark, he reported that many of the Moros had escaped by vinta, as many vintas were seen by him skirting the shore out of sight of our position. Upon his return about dark with the mortar, Captain Gatley reported having seen Moros escaping. As it was impossible to surround this fort, a firing line was held intact during the night, and strong outposts were posted about camp, which was established on the ridge.

Little firing was done during the night, and early next morning several Calahui Moros, under Dato Ampuan, came into camp and surrendered themselves, saying that all Moros had left the fort during the previous afternoon and night. In company with these Moros the fort was entered and afterwards destroyed. The Calahui Moros were required to take the oath of allegiance, which they did according to Moro custom, and were released. They reported that the fort was occupied the

day before by about 250 Moros of Calahui and Taraca, 23 of whom were killed and several wounded. We had no casualties. Five cannon and lantacas were found inside the fort and destroyed.

As before stated, the fort at Calahui was located on a high point projecting into the lake and could be approached only from the land side and then only by crossing a wide triangular ditch some 40 feet deep. The walls were similar to those at Bacolod, although but one face was fortified. Against artillery from the position selected for the Maxim it was absolutely untenable. For details of this fort see appended drawing herewith.

During the day the leading datos of Tugaya and several from Oato came into camp with assurances that there would be no more trouble at any of the remaining rancherias between Calahui and Marahui. In order to give the men a much-needed rest after the four days of constant engagement and to await the return of Troop A from Camp Vicars, the command was held in camp at Calahui during the remainder of that day and night. About 4 o'clock in the afternoon a messenger came in from Lieutenant Lear, stating that the advance guard of Troop A had been attacked by Bacolod Moros in the ravine just west of Bacolod ridge. Medical assistance was at once sent him, and the troop with the wounded reached camp at dark. Lieutenant Lear then reported that 4 Moros, armed with campilans, had sprung from behind some large boulders, each one attacking a member of the point of the advance guard, including Lieutenant Mangum. The 4 Moros were killed, but the 4 members of the advance guard were more or less severely wounded, of whom Corpl. Claude D. Reade died shortly after reaching camp.

The next day, the 11th, the sick and wounded were returned to Camp Vicars in vintas under charge of a guard commanded by Lieut. A. W. Brown. The command resumed the march under escort of many friendly Moros and went into camp for the night at Oato, where we were received with every manifestation of friendship and where every attention was shown us. While here I finally settled an old feud between the rancherias of Oato and Bucayanan that had been the cause of war between them in which several Moros had lost their lives.

On the 12th march was again resumed, and representatives from all the rancherias—including the principal rancherias, Bucayanan, Cauayan, Marantao, Bacolod (north), and Marahui—along the coast came out to meet us. The march was made without further incident to the Agus River, opposite Pantar. Here we remained in camp during the following day and obtained five days' rations and forage for the return trip.

The return march was begun on the morning of the 14th, and camp was made at Marahui. A delegation of Bayabao Moros visited camp, including sultans or their representatives from all the principal rancherias of that tribe, together with Pandita Imam Nuzca, a high priest, the head of the Mohammedan church in Lake Lanao, most of whom I had known and visited during my service at Iligan. On the 15th the command marched to Calahui without incident, and on the 16th, using the trails along the coast through Bacolod, reached Camp Vicars. Passing near Bacolod, Captain Kirkpatrick's troop, which had been thrown out on the right flank of the column as a precautionary measure, had a few shots fired at them from extremely long range.

As a result of this expedition of exploration it was definitely learned that all the Moros along the west shore of Lake Lanao were friendly to us except those of Bacolod and Calahui and a few about Linok. With these exceptions all gave us welcome or came out in large numbers to meet us where the road led us at any distance from their rancherias. Expressions of friendship had previously come from many of them during the trip from Camp Vicars across the lake in November and December. The Moros of Bacolod, however, had openly defied our authority for a year, and were supported by many who, while not openly hostile, were in sympathy with them. The destruction of their fort, thought by most Moros to be impregnable, and their losses in the battle destroyed their prestige forever, and will have a salutary and a lasting effect upon them and upon all the Moros in the Laguna. This effect will be strengthened by the fact that no property of any kind was destroyed except unavoidably, and that all Moros who expressed friendship were treated kindly. An accurate map of the west shore of the lake was made, a copy of which is appended hereto, and it was found that a wagon road could be constructed with little difficulty from Camp Vicars to Marahui, as the main trail follows the shore line only a part of the distance, or from Tugaya to Madumba, and even this could be avoided if found necessary.

The existence of cholera about the lake made the expedition extremely hazardous. The work necessary to carry and boil water increased the labor of the troops twofold, especially as camps could seldom be made near the lake and all springs and streams usually containing water during the rainy season were found dry at

this time. Nine enlisted men contracted the disease during the expedition, 3 of whom recovered, while 4 civilian packers contracted it, 2 of whom recovered.

I can not speak too highly of the conduct of the officers and men composing this expedition. Well disciplined and trained as they have been during the last year in campaigning among and fighting against these semisavages, they were on the alert to take advantage of every opportunity to damage the enemy and at the same time to protect themselves against unnecessary losses. The arduous duty during the expedition was performed most willingly and without exception with good judgment. I desire especially to commend Capt. W. S. McNair and Lieut. Clarence Deems, jr., and the men of the Twenty-fifth Battery of Field Artillery under them for their services during this expedition, and especially during the fight at Bacolod; also Capt. G. W. Kirkpatrick and the officers and men of Troop L, Fifteenth Cavalry, and First Lieut. G. C. Shaw and the officers and men of Company C, Twenty-seventh Infantry, who deserve the greatest credit for their gallant conduct in the final assault on this Moro stronghold. Lieutenant Shaw led his company over the ditch and directed the movements of his men in the hand-to-hand encounter that took place against these fanatical Moros. The splendid services of First Lieut. R. U. Patterson, assistant surgeon, and the members of the medical and hospital corps under him are especially worthy of commendation. Lieutenant Mangum, Fifteenth Cavalry, displayed great personal courage, after his revolver had three times missed fire, in grappling with the individual Moro who was making for him, disarming the Moro and killing him by blows with his revolver. This report would be incomplete without mentioning the excellent services of Lieut. E. D. Peek, Engineer Corps, who directed the construction of the bridge across the ditch on the 8th of April, and of First Lieut. W. B. Gracie and the officers and men of Company M, Twenty-seventh Infantry, and of First Lieut. Ben Lear and the officers and men of Troop A, Fifteenth Cavalry, who performed this difficult work directly under the walls and fire from the fort. Chaplain George D. Rice, Twenty-seventh Infantry, who narrowly escaped losing his life in the assault on the fort at Bacolod, deserves especially to be mentioned for his untiring efforts in aiding the surgeons and caring for and comforting the sick and wounded. I shall forward recommendations in the cases of officers and enlisted men deserving special recognition for services during the expedition.

Very respectfully,

JOHN J. PERSHING,
Captain, Fifteenth Cavalry, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF MINDANAO,
Malabang, Mindanao, P. I., April 2, 1903.

Capt. JOHN J. PERSHING,

Fifteenth Cavalry, Commanding Camp Vicars, Mindanao, P. I.

SIR: You will proceed from Camp Vicars to explore the west shore of Lake Lanao as far as Marahui. From that point you will return to Camp Vicars.

The object of this expedition is to gain information regarding the country, and to visit various Moro tribes inhabiting that section and endeavor to cultivate friendly relations. It is understood that most of the sultans and datos inhabiting the west coast of Lake Lanao are friendly to the United States; great care should be taken to strengthen this friendship.

Strict orders will be given your command not to molest or interfere with these Moros in any unauthorized manner. If they have anything to sell which is needed by the troops purchases will be made and paid for at once. No property will be destroyed unless unavoidable.

Indications point to opposition of your march on the part of Bacolod Moros and that they have constructed a large fort in their territory. If, on reaching the vicinity of Bacolod, you find these Moros unfriendly and determined to oppose your progress, you will take the necessary military measures to bring them into subjection.

Should any other Moros along your route make hostile demonstrations you are authorized to treat them in the same manner.

Have the country along the line of your march mapped as thoroughly as circumstances permit, particularly with regard to trails and the practicability of building a wagon road at some future day.

I inclose you herewith a copy of telegram from the division commander on which these directions are founded.

The troops composing this expedition will consist of 4 companies of infantry, 3 troops of cavalry, the Twenty-fifth Field Battery of artillery, and such men of the

Seventeenth Field Battery as you deem advisable, and you will take 2 medical officers and the requisite complement of hospital corps men. In addition to the pack train at your post, you are authorized to employ such Moro transportation as you may deem advisable.

Owing to the prevalence of cholera in the country through which you will pass, the greatest possible care will be taken to protect the men against danger from this disease.

If the conditions around Bacolod make it necessary for you to return to Vicars from that point you are authorized to do so, but it is advisable to take advantage of the present dry season and continue the expedition as far as Marahui unless circumstances render it impracticable.

The command will be supplied with 200 rounds of ammunition per man and proper supply for field guns.

Very respectfully,

SAMUEL S. SUMNER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, March 30, 1903.

SUMNER, Zamboanga, Mindanao:

(Forward to Malabang.)

I want the west coast of Lake Lanao explored, and wish the commanding officer at Vicars to take this up before the rain sets in. All the datos on that coast are friendly and have invited the troops to visit them, save some of the principal Moros of the Bacolod rancherias, concerning whom reports indicate unfriendliness, but it is hoped that Captain Pershing, with his well-known tact and discretion, will be able to overcome this disposition, if it really exists, and that he will receive a friendly reception; but if the Bacolod Moros attempt to interfere with the survey and examination of the west shore of the lake, any opposition which they may offer must be overcome, as it is the purpose of the Government to visit all the centers of Moro population around the lake and establish the most friendly relations with all the native inhabitants. Requests have been made for medicine by some of the Bacolod Moros. If it is found that any are in need of medical aid it should be extended, if practicable. It will be very gratifying to me if this expedition can be accomplished without fighting or bloodshed. Full value will be paid for all supplies taken. If hostile Moro cottas bar the way they should be destroyed.

DAVIS.

Casualties during the Marahui expedition, April 5 to 16, 1903, inclusive.

*At Madumba, 1 a. m., April 6 (night attack).—*Wounded, Sergt. Harry Waller, Troop A, Fifteenth Cavalry, gunshot, severe, left shoulder, by Remington, .45; Private Louis Luesson, Troop A, Fifteenth Cavalry, gunshot, severe, right arm, by Remington, .45, necessitating amputation.

*At battle of Bacolod, April 6–8.—*Skirmish on hill, April 6: Wounded, Lance Corpl. John F. Murray, Twenty-fifth Battery Field Artillery, gunshot, left thigh, slight; Corpl. William A. Miller, Troop A, Fifteenth Cavalry, gunshot, right arm, severe.

On the ridge in front of fort, April 6: Wounded, Private James Wiley, Twenty-fifth Battery Field Artillery, gunshot, abdomen, slight; Private John J. Curry, Twenty-fifth Battery Field Artillery, gunshot, chest, slight; Q. M. Sergt. Max Coan, Company G, Twenty-seventh Infantry, gunshot, neck, slight.

In assault on fort, April 8: Wounded, First Lieut. G. C. Shaw, Twenty-seventh Infantry, gunshot, hand, slight; First Sergt. Charles J. Marik, Troop A, Fifteenth Cavalry, gunshot, right leg, severe; Private Elmer H. Sossar, Company C, Twenty-seventh Infantry, gunshot, right thigh, severe; Q. M. Sergt. Samuel S. Hafer, Company C, Twenty-seventh Infantry, gunshot, right arm, severe (amputated); campilan, left arm, severe.

In attack on advance guard, Troop A, Fifteenth Cavalry, near Bacolod, April 10: Wounded, Second Lieut. Wiley P. Mangum, jr., Fifteenth Cavalry, campilan, left hand, left thigh, slight; Sergt. Robert Brown, Troop A, Fifteenth Cavalry, campilan, left arm, hand, and back, severe (arm amputated); Private George A. Styles, Troop A, Fifteenth Cavalry, kris, left arm (amputated), severe; kris, back. Killed, Corpl. Claude D. Reade, Troop A, Fifteenth Cavalry, campilan and kris, both arms, shoulder, right thigh, and left leg.

Total casualties: Killed, 1; wounded, 14.

Report of Capt. John J. Pershing, Fifteenth Cavalry, of an exploring expedition around Lake Lanao, May 2 to 10, 1903.

POST OF CAMP VICARS,
Mindanao, P. I., May 15, 1903.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF MINDANAO, Zamboanga, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of an expedition of exploration made under my command around Lake Lanao between May 2 and 10, inclusive, pursuant to orders from department commander, Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner, U. S. Army, dated Zamboanga, Mindanao, P. I., April 28, 1903, a copy of which is appended hereto.

The command consisted of Capt. John J. Pershing, Fifteenth Cavalry, commanding; Second Lieut. Victor S. Foster, Fifteenth Cavalry, acting adjutant; Second Lieut. William C. Gardenhire, Fifteenth Cavalry, acting quartermaster and commissary; Capt. W. F. Lewis, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army; First Lieut. R. U. Patterson, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army, and 7 enlisted men of the Hospital Corps; Troop A, Fifteenth Cavalry, Second Lieut. W. P. Mangum, jr., Fifteenth Cavalry, in command, with 40 enlisted men; Troop E, Fifteenth Cavalry, Capt. F. J. Koester, Fifteenth Cavalry, in command, with First Lieut. R. B. Going and 50 enlisted men; Troop G, Fifteenth Cavalry, First Lieut. Charles E. McCullough, Fifteenth Cavalry, in command, with Second Lieut. Francis A. Ruggles and 43 enlisted men; two Vickers-Maxim mountain guns and one 3.6-inch field mortar, all of the Seventeenth Battery Field Artillery, Capt. G. G. Gately, Artillery Corps, in command, with Second Lieut. D. H. Currie, Second Lieut. E. H. De Armond, and 82 enlisted men; Lieut. Currie, in addition to his other duties, acting as engineer officer; Company C, Twenty-seventh Infantry, First Lieut. G. C. Shaw, Twenty-seventh Infantry, in command, and 58 enlisted men; Company D, Twenty-seventh Infantry, First Lieut. O. S. Eskridge, Twenty-seventh Infantry, in command, and 71 enlisted men; Company G, Twenty-seventh Infantry, Second Lieut. S. C. Loring, Twenty-seventh Infantry, in command, and 62 enlisted men; Company M, Twenty-seventh Infantry, First Lieut. W. B. Gracie, Twenty-seventh Infantry, in command, with Second Lieut. B. F. Miller and 63 enlisted men; Company F, Twenty-seventh Infantry, 38 enlisted men assigned to the infantry organizations; a pioneer detachment consisting of 5 enlisted men from each company of infantry.

Mr. Frank Helm, late ensign, U. S. Navy, joined the expedition after the battle of Taraca River and accompanied it around the lake to Camp Vicars; Contract Dental Surg. F. P. Stone, U. S. Army, on duty at Camp Vicars, was given permission to accompany the expedition as assistant to the surgeons; Lieutenant Williams, Marine Corps, accompanied as a guest; Leon Fernandez and Tomas Torres acted as interpreters, the latter in charge of Moro transportation; five days' rations and forage were carried on the quartermaster's pack train, consisting of 98 mules, and a native pack train, consisting of 115 ponies; several large vintas were employed to accompany the expedition, and were furnished by Dato Pedro of Oato, Dato Gamour of Tugaya, and the Cabugatan of Oato. Every available facility was provided for boiling water, as a precaution against cholera, and each man was issued an extra canteen.

As soon as it became known that this expedition was to be made, notice was sent either by letter or courier to all the leading Moros on the east shore of the lake, and their friendship and assistance solicited. They were assured that we would molest neither the persons nor the property of those who wished to be friends and would pay for all supplies furnished us, but that we would brook no interference or opposition. The expedition started at 7 o'clock a. m., May 2, and marching by the way of Pantauan arrived at Saur at about 12.30 p. m., where camp was established. Two companies of infantry and the pioneer detachment were immediately sent out to repair the trail leading thence through the timber around the arm of the lake to Maciu, as this trail is unusually swampy in places and had been found obstructed on previous expeditions. The greater part of the work was completed during the afternoon, it being necessary to cover several muddy stretches with corduroy. One shot was fired from the Maciu side of the lagoon during the night, but otherwise we were not disturbed.

On the morning of the 3d Dato Pedro, who was in charge of the vintas, arrived in camp as he had agreed. The Cabugatan of Ragayan and other datos of that rancheria and of Tupurug visited camp and offered their services as guides. Two companies of infantry were sent out at an early hour to finish work on the trail, and the command started at 7.30 a. m., marching through Maciu and across the Malaig River, keeping well to the east toward the foothills to avoid swampy rice lands. Reaching the vicinity of Gata, Dato Punilumabao and party met us and turned over one of the remaining Government horses lost by Lieutenant Forsyth

in March, 1902. Moros from Gata and Minbailay reported that we would meet opposition at the fort of Amai-Benanning of Gata, and endeavored to dissuade us from passing through that rancheria. In order to give those Moros time to fully consider the matter I went into camp at Bansayan on the lake shore, in sight of and about 1½ miles distant from their fort. Several delegations of Moros from the vicinity, carrying American or white flags, presented themselves and expressed their friendliness. From Bansayan the vintas were sent to Camp Vicars for rations and forage.

On the morning of the 4th the march was resumed directly toward Gata, but as we approached the fort a delegation came out to meet us and stated that they all desired to be friends. As the rear guard was crossing a small stream, just after leaving camp, two shots were fired by Moros concealed in the grass, and one man of Troop E was slightly wounded. The two Moros who did the firing were killed. From Gata we visited some of the rancherias under Rajah Nurul Caquim, one of the powerful datos of the east side of the lake, after which we crossed the Rogaan River and came out upon an open flat, some 3 miles wide, beyond which could be seen the hostile fort of Dato Ampuan-Agaus of Taraca, literally covered with war flags, situated in the edge of the timber that skirted the Taraca River. The line of march led directly across the flat, but midway we ran into a marsh about 100 yards wide that delayed the column two hours, as all the animals had to be unpacked and their loads carried this distance.

To reach the hostile fort the trail led us near and between two other strong forts that had been reported hostile, but, contrary to reports, several datos came out with white flags and said they wished to be considered friends, and that none of their people would oppose us or interfere with us. After passing these forts Moros were seen running from a strip of timber to our right toward Fort Taraca, and in a few minutes we were fired upon from the fort at about 600 yards. Company C, Twenty-seventh Infantry, was directed to form a skirmish line to the right and move to within 300 yards of the fort, and Company G to take a similar position on the left. The right and left flanks, respectively, of these two companies were ordered advanced so as to partially envelop the fort. The two Maxim guns and the field mortars were placed at a distance of 500 yards and opposite the interval left between these companies for that purpose. The firing became vigorous on both sides, the Moros using both lantacas and small arms. One platoon of Company D was sent toward the timber to the right as a protection to the troops not yet engaged and the animals. As Company G went into position they received the fire of a small cotta on the left, which was at once captured and destroyed.

Almost as soon as it arrived in position the right flank of the line, held by Company C, received a heavy fire from the woods along the Taraca River. Lieutenant Shaw, with that company, was ordered to enter the timber, cross the Taraca River if necessary, and drive out or destroy any opposing Moros and destroy any cottas from which he might be fired on. Troop G dismounted, took the place of Company C on the skirmish line, and the attack on the main fort continued, the artillery, which had been sent to a new and better position, firing with such effect that the defenders could do us little harm. Lieutenant Shaw made his way slowly and developed considerable resistance, so I reenforced him with Company M, under Lieutenant Gracie, and gave orders that in conjunction they should move down the river cautiously and reconnoiter a fort at Pitacus, said to be held by hostile Moros under the Sultan-cabugatan of Pitacus, on the north bank and near Fort Taraca, already engaged.

At the place from which the right flank was fired upon the river flows north, but a short distance farther on it changes direction and flows practically west past Fort Pitacus. Troop E was dismounted and sent to the river to support the infantry if necessary. The timber on both sides of the river was soon cleared of Moros and 7 of their cottas destroyed. Upon approaching Fort Pitacus two war flags were flying, although little resistance was made to the reconnoitering companies. Lieutenant Shaw, who was on the north bank of the river, first examined the fort and vicinity carefully and then ordered his men to scale the eastern wall. A large body of well-armed Moros was found inside, who delivered a heavy fire on the attacking party, but the latter held their ground. Lieutenant Gracie immediately crossed from the south bank and, scaling the south wall with his company, obtained a cross fire upon the Moros that soon demoralized them. Several hand-to-hand encounters occurred on the walls, and after a fight which lasted but a few minutes the Moros displayed a white flag and surrendered. Ninety Moros were found dead within the fort, 13 were wounded, and 23 were taken prisoners. Among the dead were the Sultan-cabugatan of Pitacus, the Sangupan of Lumasa, the Dato-cabugatan, the Cabugatan of Maciu, and the Mama of Maciu, the two former of whom were known on east side of the lake as being very bitter in their opposition to Americans. Fifty-one rifles and 16 lantacas and cannon and several

krises and compilans were captured. In the assault 1 enlisted man was killed and 6 wounded, 1 of whom died the next day, shortly after reaching Camp Vicars.

The fort was a new one, situated in a small opening in the timber and apparently uncompleted. In construction it was like ordinary Moro forts, about 75 feet square, with walls about 12 feet high and about 12 feet thick at the base, and a ditch 10 feet deep. In the interior sheds of rough split lumber 2 or 3 inches thick were constructed against the north and south faces, intended as a protection against shrapnel and shell.

After the fall of Fort Pitacus Captain Koester with Troop E was ordered farther down the left bank of the river in rear of Fort Taraca, and after making a thorough reconnoissance took up a position closing all avenues of escape in that direction. Troop G was ordered to advance to within a short distance of the fort, so that the two troops combined were in a position not to be in danger from each other's fire, and so that they practically surrounded the fort. It was now growing dark, and leaving these two troops in position the remaining organizations were ordered into camp about 300 yards to the east of the fort and the same distance from the Taraca River. There was little firing at or from the fort until about 3 a. m., when it became evident that the Moros were attempting to escape. It was very dark at this hour and afterwards until daybreak, so that probably several Moros sneaked out, passing over the parapet at its lowest point, thence into the grass. A number were seen by the men of the investing cordon just outside the wall at different times, and there were evidences that some of them had been wounded. Friendly Moros afterwards learned that such was the case, and also that several were killed while escaping. At daylight a large white flag was floating over Fort Taraca, and 29 Moros, including Dato Ampuan-Agaus, 6 other datos, and 2 panditas (priests) of some importance called Dianal and the Cali of Maciu, surrendered themselves unconditionally. One dead and 1 wounded Moro were found inside. Prisoners reported that others who were wounded had been taken away. Twenty cannon and lantacas and 9 rifles, together with a number of krises and campilans, were captured. The fort was then destroyed by fire, and a few of the cannon and lantacas were broken up. After the battle friendly Moros reported that over 200 hostile Moros had lost their lives in the fighting that occurred in the forts and vicinity.

The vintas, having returned the night before with rations, were again sent to Vicars with the sick and wounded and such of the captured arms as could be easily carried, all under charge of Lieutenant Williams, Marine Corps, who desired to return. Many delegations of Moros visited camp during the day with assurances of friendship. The prisoners were required to bury the Moros killed at Pitacus, and medical assistance was given the wounded. The prisoners were held over night, for the effect it would have on other Moros, and for that purpose were put in a conical wall tent, with a strong guard around it, my intention being to release them the following morning, previous to our departure. A rain storm came up in the night, and in the extreme darkness four of them escaped and four others were killed in attempting to escape. The rest were released the next morning after taking the oath of allegiance, by cutting a piece of bejuco (a kind of vine).

The march was resumed, the trail leading across the Taraca River near Fort Pitacus, whence we soon debouched upon an extended alluvial flat, reaching some 8 miles from the shore toward the hills, and about 3 miles wide. For over half the distance across following a good trail, fair progress was made, but about the middle it became boggy beyond description and continued so for about three-quarters of a mile. Horses and mules were helpless to move. All hands were turned out, and with such scrubby brush and grass as could be obtained the trail was covered so that by leading the animals along it they managed with difficulty to pass over without their loads. It took five hours to go this distance, as all the animals had to be unloaded and their cargoes carried by the men.

There were a few long-range shots fired at the rear of the column about a mile from Taraca, but thereafter white flags and American flags were liberally displayed at various rancherias along the line of march during the day. Passing Mulundu, a report came in that the Moros of Muut had congregated at a certain cotta to oppose us, but upon our arrival there was no sign of hostility, although a shot or two were fired at the rear guard from long range from a small cotta in the vicinity, which was immediately taken and destroyed by the rear guard. About $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles north of Dalama, whose sultan came out and acted as guide for us for some distance, we came to a wall of earth, which had been constructed by Maciu and Taraca Moros as an obstacle and for defense against troops from the north, extending from the edge of the lake up the hill some 400 yards and across the only trail along the shore at this point, where the foothills are very broken and reach the water's edge. A few minutes with pick and shovel enabled the

command to pass easily. Camp was made at Bintong, on the only available spot near a small stream, but the site was so swampy that it was necessary during the night to remove animals from the established picket lines and lariat them without regard to order. At this camp occurred the only case of cholera that resulted fatally during the expedition.

The next day, the 7th, we came to the extensive flat alluvial country drained by the Remayn River, and made our way among the foothills when possible, crossing the marshy rice lands when necessary, covering trails with corduroy or with grass in many places, until, by dint of extremely hard work on the part of the men and animals from daylight on, we passed over the worst part of the road and reached camp at Ragaan, about 3 miles from Madaya, some time after dark. It was urgent that we should pass through this boggy country before any rain fell, as it was evident that any delay would almost, if not quite, hopelessly swamp us. Fortunately, the spring rains had not yet begun, and it was near the end of a very late dry season.

At Ragaan Capt. James A. Ryan, Fifteenth Cavalry, with Troop C, that regiment, met us and reported that all arrangements had been made for our rations and forage for the return trip. I had concluded to cross the Agus River at Madaya and to return to Camp Vicars by the more favorable west-shore trail. A good ford, though rocky, about 4 feet deep at the deepest place, just below the origin of the river, which was about 200 yards wide at this point, was used for the cavalry, artillery, and pack animals, while our Moro vintas were used on the lake for the infantry, the field guns, and the baggage, and by noon on the 8th the command was in camp again at Marahui.

General Sumner met us at Marahui, and after seeing the command safely over the Agus left in a short time for Pantar. The Sultan of Remayn, who had not previously visited any American camp or post, came in with Amai-Manibilang, of Madaya, accompanied by many datos, including Nuzca, the pandita or imam, who is at the head of the Mohammedan Church in Lake Lanao. The Sultan of Remayn expressed friendship for the Americans and reassured me as to the friendship of all the Moros of Bayabao, over whom he is the chief sultan.

On the 10th the return to Camp Vicars was begun, and nothing of consequence occurred during the day's march. Friendly Moros came out to meet us along the route, and upon arrival at Calahui, where we encamped, Dato Aliudan, with several of his people, visited me to pay their respects. The following day we marched through Calahui, Bacolod, Pindalunan, Corumatan, and Madullum along the shore. Troop G, under Lieutenant McCullough, was sent along the hill trail to act as a flanking party to the column. Between Calahui and Bacolod this troop was fired upon by hostile Moros, 9 in number, said to have been from Pindalunan, 5 of whom were killed and 4 wounded. Second Lieut. F. A. Ruggles and Sergeant Mohn were slightly wounded; otherwise the march was without incident.

The knowledge of the Lake Lanao country obtained on this expedition is invaluable. Heretofore the eastern part of Lake Lanao has been almost absolutely unknown, even Spanish records containing nothing of value relative to it. During the expedition we were able to make a good map (herewith inclosed), examine the character of the country and the inhabitants, and form some idea of their numbers and resources. The tillable land on the east side of the lake between it and the foothills is capable, if properly cultivated, of maintaining at least 100,000 souls, and by using available land in the foothills a greater number could be maintained. To construct a wagon road for permanent use at all seasons of the year causeways would have to be built across the lowlands, the greater part of which are practically flooded during the rainy season, and substantial bridges would have to be thrown across the four larger rivers. Our humane purpose was impressed upon the people by contrasting this purpose with the opposite determination to severely punish all who interfered with us in the proper execution of a duty to the Government and to them, and while there are still a few who will retain feelings of resentment and revenge for a time there can be no doubt but that the effect will be lasting, and when considered in connection with our present knowledge of the country and the inhabitants it will give us an advantage in the future management of them which they, as a whole, will be as quick to recognize as we are.

The duty performed on other expeditions in which this command has participated during the past year has been arduous and the strain great, but on none of them have such discouragements or difficulties been met as on the expedition around the lake. It should be said also that on none of them have men behaved more splendidly while striving to prevent disease and to overcome natural obstacles, nor more gallantly in battle. I desire to make it of record that without the qualities, training, and discipline possessed by this command the successful accomplishment of the expedition and its objects would have been well-nigh impossible.

Among those to be especially commended for their services are First Lieuts. W. B. Gracie and G. C. Shaw, Twenty-seventh Infantry, and the officers and men under them for their action in the assault upon the fort of the Sultan-cabugatan of Pitacus. The attack and capture of the fort in this manner was the only way it could have been done, as previous preparation by artillery fire was impossible. The gallantry and courage with which it was accomplished can but excite the greatest admiration for the participants, and the small list of casualties on our part can only be attributed to the superiority of arms and judgment. Capt. G. G. Gately, Seventeenth Battery Field Artillery, and the officers and men under him are deserving of praise for their patience and perseverance in moving their animals and guns over the difficult country on the east side of the lake, and no less arduous was the work of the cavalry and pack trains. First Lieut. C. E. McCullough, with Troop G, Fifteenth Cavalry, acted with promptness and effectiveness in repelling the attack by hostile Moros between Calahui and Bacolod on the 9th. The intelligent performance of their duties by the members of my staff, often attended by great personal danger, entitle them to high admiration. I shall, at an early date, submit recommendations covering all cases deserving special recognition.

The services of the Moros, with pack ponies, under Dato Grande, of Makadar, Dato Tampogao, of Tuburan, Dato Amai-Pasandalan, of Pantauan, and of the Moros with the vintas were invaluable; without their aid we should have been seriously embarrassed. Interpreters Leon Fernandez and Tomas Torres deserve consideration for the tireless and faithful manner in which they discharged their duties. I have already made suitable recommendation in their cases.

Very respectfully,

JOHN J. PERSHING,
Captain, Fifteenth Cavalry.

True copy of telegram forwarded by Adjutant-General, Department of Mindanao.

MANILA, April 19, 1903.

Brig. Gen. S. S. SUMNER,
Commanding Department of Mindanao, Zamboanga:

GENERAL: The favorable results which have been secured by the recent expedition from Vicars justify the conviction that the near future will be the best time to complete the exploration of the lake. We now have a good knowledge of the topography and inhabitants on the southwest and north shores of the lake. There remain only 20 miles on the east shore to close the gap. The Moro inhabitants have had abundant proofs of the beneficent purposes of the government and of the humanity of the Army, but there may still be a few disaffected ones.

In carrying out these objects of an occupation of the Lanao, I desire that there shall be a steady adherence to the policy of pacification and peaceable intercourse. If there should be any conflict, it must never be initiated by the troops. All Moros must learn that the troops may not be molested in passing along the roads and trails, and they must also learn that they can not with impunity brandish their weapons and fly war flags in our faces.

The Moros have had abundant displays of our power and of their own impotence, and this has been specially emphasized at Bacolod. I trust there will be no more fighting and shall be specially glad if this work herein set out can be done without bloodshed.

Of course you will use the troops at Pantar should you deem such cooperation available.

The sooner this work is done the more likely will be an avoidance of bad weather.

GEO. W. DAVIS,
Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding Division of the Philippines.

[Telegram.]

ZAMBOANGA, April 28, 1903.

Capt. J. J. PERSHING,
Fifteenth Cavalry, Commanding Expedition around Lake Lanao:

You will proceed to carry out instructions contained in my letter of April 21 as soon as circumstances in your vicinity make it advisable, this in regard to the negotiations now going on between the east Lake Moros and the friendly Moros

sent out by you. It is desired that the expedition of the east side of the lake be made without bloodshed if it can be accomplished, and sufficient time should be given the Moros to fully understand and appreciate your presence in their country. Regarding the military proposition, you will take such force as may be deemed advisable, taking care to have strength sufficient to overcome any opposition. I will direct the commanding officer at Malabang to send you two troops of cavalry and one of infantry and to advise with you as to departure from Malabang.

The interruption in the cable seriously prevents my keeping in direct communication with you or with it, and it is therefore impracticable to make any combined movements, as suggested by division commander, but I am going to Iligan in a few days and may send a force along the east shore from that place. If you can send a courier to Major Bullard notifying him of your date of departure, it would be advisable to do so, and you might also send the same notification to the commanding officer, Iligan, via Malabang, by wire.

The service by the latter route is uncertain, but works at times. You will send reply to this as soon as practicable, and the *Baltimore* will remain at Malabang for your reply. Let me know the date of your departure, if decided on. The orders heretofore given regarding the destruction of food or property will be strictly observed. Your own opinion that we should prove our friendship for this ignorant and superstitious people rather than engender a feeling of hatred and revenge accords with my views, and it is also in accord with the wishes of the division commander.

SUMNER, *Brigadier-General*.

The changes above in ink are made in order that this copy may agree with original telegram on file at headquarters, Department Mindanao.

HAMILTON BOWIE,
First Lieutenant, Ninth Cavalry, Aid-de-camp.

Casualties during the expedition around Lake Lanao, May 2 to 10, 1903, inclusive.

In rear guard attack near Gata, May 4, 1903:

Wounded—Sergt. John W. Brown, Troop E, Fifteenth Cavalry, gunshot,
face, slight 1

In battle of Taraca River, May 4, 1903:

Killed—

1. Corpl. Samuel A. Schwartz, F, Twenty-seventh Infantry, gunshot,
chest (through heart) 1

2. Private Burton S. Frank, M, Twenty-seventh Infantry, gunshot,
head 1

Wounded—

1. Private Patrick J. Fogarty, G, Twenty-seventh Infantry, gunshot,
pelvis, severe 1

2. Private Roy H. Hamm, D, Twenty-seventh Infantry, gunshot, face,
severe 1

3. Private John A. Carroll, C, Twenty-seventh Infantry, gunshot, right
thigh, slight 1

4. Private Nat Webb, C, Twenty-seventh Infantry, gunshot, left
thigh and left forearm, severe 1

5. Private William F. Carter, F, Twenty-seventh Infantry, gunshot,
right arm, severe (amputated) 1

In skirmish near Calahui, May 10, 1903:

Wounded—

1. Second Lieut. Francis A. Ruggles, Fifteenth Cavalry, gunshot,
right ankle, slight 1

2. Q. M. Sergt. James F. Mohn, Troop G, Fifteenth Cavalry, gunshot,
both arms, slight 1

At Gata 1

At Taraca River 7

At Calahui 2

Total in the expedition around Lake Lanao 10

APPENDIX V.

CONDITION OF MORO AFFAIRS IN SULU GROUP. (A, ANNUAL REPORT OF COL. WILLIAM M. WALLACE, FIFTEENTH CAV-ALRY, COMMANDING; B, QUARTERLY REPORT FOR THIRD QUARTER, FISCAL YEAR, FURNISHING DETAILS OF EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES.)

A.

JOLO, JOLO, P. I., *June 30, 1903.*

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I.

(Through headquarters department of Mindanao.)

SIR: In compliance with your instructions of 23d instant, I have the honor to submit the following report of Moro affairs in the Jolo Archipelago for the fiscal year 1903:

Little progress has been made in the general development of this group of islands; material conditions remain throughout about the same, and the political conditions were during the last six months far less satisfactory than at the close of the preceding year. The latter remark, however, refers mainly to Jolo Island, the population of which equals that of all the other islands of this archipelago collectively, and is also the most unruly. Cholera, naval survey, and census combined produced a state of unrest and excitement among the Moros on Jolo Island, which often verged upon open hostility. Only the great patience and discretion exercised in dealing with this excitable people have averted open rupture.

As regards internal affairs of the Moros, commanding officers in the Sulu Archipelago are still guided and restricted in their relation and actions toward the natives by the provisions of the Bates agreement; their efforts have been mainly and successfully directed toward the prevention of the formerly so frequent feuds between the different chiefs, which wars, although never bloody, were always the cause of much looting and burning of houses, destruction of crops, etc. In some instances chiefs were induced by pressure brought to bear upon them to return spoil they had taken from some hapless Moro by unjustly imposed fines or outright robbery. Protection has been extended to slaves who applied for same. This action on the part of the American authorities is, however, much resented by the owners.

The principal events recorded during the year were as follows, in order of their succession:

In the beginning of the year a reconciliation took place between the Sultan and the Dato Joakanain and Kalbi. Thefts of horses and cattle were, however, mutually continued by both factions, and were often made a matter of complaint to me by the Sultan as well as the datos. The Sultan's race horse, for instance, which was recovered in Manila, was at the time stolen and sold by a follower of Dato Joakanain.

During the part of July and August the Sultan resided in Siassi, indulging his passion for gambling. His emissaries were sent about to try cases, impose fines, and collect poll tax for the Sultan in the Siassi and Tawi-Tawi groups. His brothers, the Dato Rajah Muda and Dato Attick, went to other parts to do some collecting on their own account. I instructed the commanding officers at Bongao and Siassi not to interfere as long as the people paid willingly, but to allow no forcible tax collection.

An incident which occurred during September in the Tawi-Tawi group is of interest as touching the Sultan's claim of his hereditary right to all produce of the Sulu waters, in exercising which he taxes the pearl fisheries and demands that pearls or other products of the sea above a certain value be brought to him. He pays the finder whatever he, the Sultan, deems an appropriate share of the value. A delegation of natives from Banaran Island visited the then commanding officer at Bongao, Lieut. Warren Dean, Fifteenth Cavalry, and complained that Hadji Taib, in the Sultan's name, had imposed and collected unjust fines. Lieutenant Dean's investigation brought out the following facts: Panglima Jehan, of Banaran, had found floating on the sea a large quantity of "ambal," which is said to be valued by the Chinese at 200 pesos per pound and used by them for medicinal purposes. The panglima had given the Sultan 9 pounds of his find, for which the Sultan paid him 700 pesos; 15 pounds had been secreted and sold by the panglima to outsiders. For this reason Hadji Taib fined him and some others 5,000 pesos in all, but had only been able to collect about 400 pesos, which amount covered the visible worldly possessions of those fined. As the panglima had previously stated to Lieutenant Dean that he had sold his own interest, only 2 pounds, of said ambal, which statement he later admitted to have been false, and as he also acknowledged the Sultan's above-mentioned right, Lieutenant Dean indorsed Hadji Taib's judgment.

Capt. K. W. Walker, Fifteenth Cavalry, made an extended trip through Jolo Island with Troop B, Fifteenth Cavalry, from October 23 to 31. The troops were received in a friendly manner at all places except at Panglima Hassan's in Looc. Hassan was not cordial. November 18 to 22 Troop II, Fifteenth Cavalry, made a similar trip through the district of Parang, and was well received by chiefs and people.

The first news that cholera existed in the Sulu Archipelago reached this post November 27, when the commander of the gunboat *Samar* reported Manunga, a small island northeast of Jolo, infected. The epidemic gradually spread through all of the islands, but it appeared most virulent on Jolo, where some cases occurred as late as May, and the mortality is estimated to have amounted to from 10 to 12 per cent of the whole population. In the Siassi and Tawi-Tawi group the disease assumed a much milder form, and was reported extinct in February. Captain Hickok, commanding Siassi, estimated that 2 per cent of the populace died of cholera in his district. In the Tawi-Tawi group the percentage is probably less. At the posts of Jolo, Siassi, and Bongao the strictly enforced quarantine and rigidly observed sanitary measures effectually protected the garrison, and only a very few cases occurred among the civilians.

Toward the end of November a disturbance arose on Lugus Island, which led to a fight between Hadji Taib and Maharajah Sarapuddin. Capt. Le Roy Eltinge, Fifteenth Cavalry, commanding Siassi, went with a detachment of 15 men to the scene and stopped the fight.

Hadji Taib and Maharajah Sarapuddin he sent to Jolo to report to me for investigation. There later developed the following interesting details as to the cause of the trouble: The Rajah Muda had come to Lugus to collect 200 pesos fine of a man named Dugusan, a follower of Maharajah Sarapuddin, for a crime said to have been committed by Dugusan about ten years ago. Dugusan paid 100 pesos and requested that the balance be remitted; this being refused, he fled to Lamenua. The Rajah Muda then ordered Dugusan's mother-in-law, who is also the mother-in-law of Hadji Taib, to pay the remaining 100 pesos; she refused and was seized by Sarapuddin by order of the Rajah Muda, who took her to Maibun. Later Hadji Taib arrived at Lugus, and when he heard about this affair he demanded from Sarapuddin the value of 20 slaves (commonly computed at 40 pesos per slave) as fine for having seized his (Taib's) mother-in-law. Both the hadji and the maharajah took their case to the commanding officer at Siassi, who advised them to refer the matter to the Sultan for judgment. It seems that Sarapuddin refused to accompany Hadji Taib to Maibun and that this caused the fight. I ordered the parties to lay their complaint before the Sultan, and sent word to the Rajah Muda to at once liberate the woman seized; he obeyed.

A general restlessness and an unfriendly if not threatening attitude toward us commenced to manifest itself among the Moros of Jolo Island during the third quarter of the year. Several reasons for this condition were given by the Sultan, who was evidently exceedingly troubled about the state of affairs, as were his officers and those chiefs who came to see me. The cholera was one of the reasons assigned, which disease undeniably caused much distress and excitement among the people. The Sultan and chiefs further contended that the naval survey of Jolo Island had augmented this feeling. The survey was commenced without notification being sent to me or the Sultan. Later, on different occasions, the latter requested that the survey be postponed until after the cholera had ceased. It was necessary for the boats engaged in this work to send parties on shore to temporarily put up tripods and flags at prominent landmarks. The Moros know nothing about surveying, and it is no easy matter to explain to them. At some places their superstition prompted them to believe that these flags were propagating cholera; at others, suspicion and distrust whispered that they were put up as a sign of the United States taking possession of the Moros' lands.

As the cavalry had taken several trips through the island just previous to the outbreak of the cholera, it was also rumored that they had poisoned the water courses; which latter suggestion, however, found few believers. February 4, at Patotol, on the northeastern coast of Jolo Island, shots were fired from shore at the U. S. S. *Albay*, engaged in surveying. The commander of the ship, Lieutenant Walker, U. S. Navy, went ashore with an armed boat's crew and sent for the chief, who explained that the firing had been done by some bad men without his knowledge. On February 24 a shore party of the U. S. S. *Frolic*, consisting of Lieutenant Jones, U. S. Navy, Midshipman Finney, and 4 enlisted men were ascending a hill about 2 miles northeast of Maibun when they saw a large mob of armed Moros running yelling toward them. Shots were fired by the Moros, and the naval party, who were armed with pistols only, did not await the near approach of the crowd, but, leaving their instruments behind, retreated hastily to the shore and returned thence to the ship. Lieutenant-Commander Dunn, of the *Frolic*, demanded of the Sultan the immedi-

ate restitution of the instruments and the surrender of the leader of the supposed attack. The former demand was complied with, but the Sultan declared that no attack on the Americans had been intended, and that the Moros in question had only been chasing a madman, trying to capture him and prevent his doing any harm to the party. The supposed madman was delivered to Commander Dunn, who took him to Jolo. Charges were filed by Lieutenant Jones before the court of first instance, Jolo, against several Moros in connection with this affair, which were later withdrawn and a trial by provost court ordered. Owing to the absence of Lieutenant Jones on account of sickness, and his declaration that he is unable to identify the supposed leaders of the attack, the trial did not take place.

During the night of February 9 the Chinese quarter at Kaunawai, Parang district, was burned by incendiaries and property valued by the Chinese at 24,000 pesos either destroyed by the fire or looted. The owners swore out warrants before the court of first instance, Jolo, against a number of Moros, including several small chiefs. The warrants were handed to me for execution and I demanded of the Sultan the prompt surrender of the accused, notifying him that his failure to do so would result in immediate action being taken by the troops and Navy to effect the arrest by force. A number of gunboats assembled at Jolo plainly demonstrated to the Moros the seriousness of the affair. Yielding to pressure, and despite the great excitement prevailing in Parang, the Sultan had the accused arrested by his officers and they were surrendered at Jolo February 15. The case was tried before the court of first instance, Jolo. Seven of the accused were convicted and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment; one was acquitted. During the month of March several cases of juramentado occurred at Jolo. On the 9th a Moro entered the cockpit at Tullei, killed one Filipino and wounded one Moro and one Chino before he himself was killed by a vigilante. The following day, at Point Tandoh, a private of the Engineer Corps, member of a party who were blasting rock to be used in repairing the Jolo pier, while resting on shore was killed by a juramentado. The murderer was at once shot dead by the other soldiers. Four days later a party of three juramentados killed three Mohammedans and wounded one Filipino and one Moro woman. They then attacked an approaching detachment of cavalry and were shot before they could do any more damage. The only possible explanation for their killing of Mohammedans is that in their madness they forgot to discriminate. In all these cases it was impossible to identify the murderers or to obtain any positive information of where they had come from.

A new prophet arose among the Moros on Pata Island about January, who declared that he had been selected by Allah to preach to the people and teach them to mend their evil ways. The story went about among the Moros that his mission had been announced to the prophet by a voice issuing from a cocoanut which he had found drifting on the water and split open. It was reported to me that his preaching was mainly directed against the Sultan and chiefs, whose injustice toward the people, he said, was the cause that the country was approaching ruin. He attributed, it was reported, to himself the power of healing any sickness and to make the Americans leave the country. It appears that in the beginning of his career the prophet found many adherents on Pata Island and that many Moros from other places went to see and hear him, but as the novelty was wearing off the prophet seems to have returned to his former obscurity. Nothing more is heard of him.

In view of the turbulent conditions on the island and the constant prospect of serious trouble, I advised an increase of the garrison at Jolo. March 22 the department commander, Brig. Gen. S. S. Sumner, U. S. Army, arrived at Jolo, also one battalion, Eleventh Infantry, which disembarked and took station. On the following day General Sumner met the Sultan and many chiefs in conference. A number of chiefs, though notified that the General wished to see them in Jolo, did not appear. Panglima Hassan, of Looc, one of the latter, arrived near Jolo on March 27 with about 700 armed followers. He came to town next morning with 4 of his subchiefs and 50 armed men, whom I had permitted him to bring in.

Residents of Jolo town and Tullei complained to me that a number of branded horses and cattle had lately been stolen from them, presumably by followers of Maharajah Indanan, of Parang. I therefore sent, April 2, Capt. Le Roy Eltinge with Troops H, I, and M, Fifteenth Cavalry, to the Maharajah's territory to look about for the stolen property. The troops proceeded along the Maibun road and then followed a trail leading to Indanan's cota. Bodies of troops have at different times visited and camped in Parang. Their appearance should therefore create neither surprise nor apprehension among the natives; yet the reception of the cavalry on this occasion was extremely hostile. When Captain Eltinge arrived near Indanan's place, the troops halted and dismounted for a rest, the captain intending to visit Indanan. Immediately gongs were heard sounding at the latter's cota, summoning his people to arms, and in an incredibly short time about 500 armed men gathered at the place, all carrying rifles or spears besides one or two knives each; even women and boys, armed with barong or spear, hurried to the scene. This mob crowded around the soldiers in the most threatening manner. The Maharajah appeared, surrounded by a number of his men, to meet Captain Eltinge. A short conversation took place, in the course of which Indanan professed total ignorance regarding the stolen cattle. His whole behavior was most insolent. When Captain Eltinge inquired why he had called his people together at the approach of the troops, and requested him to at least stop his men from provoking the soldiers, as this might lead to trouble, Indanan replied that if any one of his men was hurt there would be a fight, and if the troops remained at his place until afternoon some 1,500 of his (Indanan's) followers would gather there. When the troops resumed the march, after a stay of two hours and a half, they were followed part of the way by the yelling mob. It was reported to me that Indanan expected the command to return next day, and made preparations for a fight. Some armed bands even advanced that day along the Maibun road, and late in the evening their yelling was heard at the Asturias blockhouse.

I informed the Sultan of this occurrence and enjoined him to take Indanan severely to task, as a repetition of such demonstrations would not be tolerated. A few days later Indanan came to me with profound apologies. However, no faith can be placed in his sincerity; he is an ignorant but cunning, unprincipled savage, and his henchmen are composed of the worst element. Though the cavalry did not see any of the stolen cattle in his territory, yet there exists but little doubt that the thieves are among his people, and that he is perfectly cognizant of the fact.

The Sultan, with quite a numerous suite, left Jolo April 9 for a visit to Singapore via Sandakan, after having appointed his brother, the Dato Rajah Muda, and Hadji Taib his representatives during

his absence. While at Sandakan, the Sultan sent an emissary to Cagayan de Jolo to collect a tax of 5 pesos per capita from the inhabitants, and the collector is said to have succeeded in gathering about 1,700 pesos. In the Sultan's letter to the chiefs of said island, which letter was presented by the emissary, the Sultan stated that "the money thus collected was intended to be used for the improvement of the country and to make his people happy and prosperous." I was informed of this transaction when I officially visited Cagayan de Jolo on May 21, and have left instructions that collections of such taxes will not be permitted unless authorized by the commanding officer, Jolo.

The division commander, Maj. Gen. G. W. Davis, U. S. Army, and Brig. Gen. S. S. Sumner, U. S. Army, commanding this department, arrived at Jolo April 12. Messengers were dispatched to the prominent chiefs, inviting them to meet the general at these headquarters. The following chiefs came: Hadji Taib, Hadji Butu, Dato Tambuyung and Uyung, Sarip Magarip, Maharajahs Indanan and Anad, Nakib Indasan, Orang Kayah Tang, Hatib Awab and Aburan. The Dato Rajah Muda remained absent; I have not seen him or heard from him since. Word was sent to Panglima Hassan of Looc to meet the generals at Lake Seit, 16 miles east of Jolo, on April 14, and the meeting took place as appointed. Hassan was escorted by 500 men armed with spears, barongs, and rifles. General Davis talked to the Moros for two hours.

Two Moros, who attacked the quarantine guard near the Asturias blockhouse in December last and whose surrender I had since repeatedly demanded from the Sultan and chiefs, were delivered to me May 5; their trial will take place before the court of first instance at Jolo.

A typical case of trouble among the Moros, which occurred in May, was reported to me as follows: The son of Hadji Imam Usup, chief of Patian Island, was returning from a voyage when his boat was swamped off Parang. Some Parang people came to his assistance. After his goods had been collected a bundle containing clothing and 40 pesos in coin was missing. Part of this clothing is said to have been found in the possession of a slave of one of the Parang men, Mohamad Apas, a Moro of some standing. The son of Imam Usup charged the slave with the theft of said bundle, and Apas told the complainant to come to him with his companions on a certain day, when the case should be tried. The trial took place accordingly, but Mohamad Apas constituted himself judge and acquitted his slave. The other party objected to the proceeding and judgment for the reason that Apas, being the owner of the slave and as such, according to Moro law, responsible for the slave's actions, was an interested party to the suit and disqualified to judge the case. The plaintiff declared his intention of appealing to Hadji Taib, the Sultan's representative. Thereupon Mohamad Apas drew his barong and struck down Imam Usup's son. A fight followed, resulting in the death of seven of the Patian men, eight being present. The other side had one man killed and two wounded. The Patian chief then prepared to avenge the death of his son and his companions upon the slayers. I received timely news of his intention and at once ordered the Rajah Muda to intervene. It appears that he promptly sent Hadji Butu to settle the matter peaceably.

On Friday, June 26, at 3 a. m., a band of six or more men, followers of Hadji Panglima Tahir, of Parang, stole to a hut at Schuck's plantation, situated only 100 yards from Mr. Schuck's own house, and there shot and killed an old man and kidnaped a girl about 15 years of age. They made their escape before help reached the place. Being

between Moro and Moro, this case was turned over to the Dato Rajah Muda for trial, in strict accordance with the Bates agreement. It was not only a deliberate murder, but there was a contempt for the United States authority evinced. Mr. Schuck, on whose place the outrage was committed, is the official interpreter, and the people attacked were working for him. I have demanded that the girl be returned and that the murderer be punished.

On Jolo Island work in the fields was greatly retarded by the cholera, which appeared most virulent during the months of January, February, and March, the season for plowing and preparing the land for the planting of the staple crops, rice, tapioca, and corn. The tilled acreage is in consequence considerably smaller than last year's, but copious rains have fallen and the growing crop presents a fine appearance, promising a more than average yield, whereas in the preceding year the partly prevailing drought severely impaired the crops. As a result of last year's small harvest the supply of native rice was exhausted some time since. Imported rice is sold by the Chinese dealers at the exorbitant price of 15 to 18 pesos per bag. Those Moros owning hemp are very busy lately working and marketing the same, as they need money to purchase rice. The season for pearl fishing is now at its height, and the numerous Moros engaged in this industry should benefit by the increase of about 50 per cent since last season in the price of mother-of-pearl shell.

The Sultan has engaged a German tobacco planter of experience to start a large tobacco estate for him near Maibun, and has contracted to furnish the necessary considerable capital. The planter, a Mr. Benjamin (German), arrived here June 23. He declares that part of the land he has so far seen around Jolo is superior to the best Delhi tobacco lands, but that to start the plantation, and until the Moros have learned the work required on a rationally conducted tobacco estate, Chinese labor is absolutely necessary.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. M. WALLACE,
Colonel Fifteenth Cavalry.

B.

JOLO, P. I., June 30, 1903.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF MINDANAO,
Zamboanga, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report on Moro affairs for the quarter ending June 30, 1903:

The critical condition existing on Jolo Island as described in my last quarterly report was illustrated by the behavior of the natives on the occasion of a trip of the cavalry, April 2, to Parang. Residents of Jolo town and Tullei had complained to me that a number of branded horses and cattle had lately been stolen from them, presumably by followers of Maharajah Indanan. I therefore sent, on the above date, Capt. LeRoy Eltinge with Troops H, I, and M, Fifteenth Cavalry, to the Maharajah's territory, to look about for the stolen property. The troops proceeded along the Maibun road and then followed a trail leading to Indanan's cota. Bodies of troops have at different times visited and camped in Parang. Their appearance should therefore create neither surprise nor apprehension among the natives, yet the reception of the cavalry on this occasion was extremely hostile. When Captain Eltinge arrived near Indanan's place the troops halted and dismounted for a rest, the captain intending to visit Indanan. Immediately gongs were heard sounding at the latter's cota, summoning his people together, and in

an incredibly short time about 500 armed men gathered at the place, many of whom carried rifles or spears besides one or two knives; even women and boys armed with barong or spear hurried to the scene. This mob crowded around the soldiers in the most threatening manner.

The Maharajah appeared, summoned by a number of his men, to meet Captain Eltinge. A short conversation took place, in the course of which Indanan professed total ignorance regarding the stolen cattle. His whole behavior was most insolent. When Captain Eltinge inquired why he had called his people together at the approach of the troops and requested him to at least stop his men from provoking the soldiers, as this might lead to trouble, Indanan replied that if any one of his men was hurt there would be a fight, and if the troops remained at his place until afternoon some 1,500 of his (Indanan's) followers would gather there. When the troops resumed the march, they were followed part of the way by the yelling mob. It was reported to me that Indanan expected the command to return next day and made preparations for a fight. Some armed bands even advanced that day along the Maibun road, and late in the evening their yelling was heard at the Asturias blockhouse.

I informed the Sultan of the occurrence and enjoined him to take Indanan severely to task, as a repetition of such demonstration would not be tolerated. A few days later Indanan came to me and made profound apologies, stating as the main reason for the ill conduct of his people that they were still very much excited over the arrest and conviction of Sarabi, Selungan, et al., in connection with the burning and looting of the Chinese shops in Parang. However, no faith can be placed in his sincerity. He is an ignorant, but cunning, unprincipled savage, and his henchmen are composed of the worst element. Though the cavalry did not see any of the stolen cattle in Indanan's territory, yet there exists but little doubt that his people are the thieves and that he is perfectly cognizant of the fact.

The Sultan, with quite a numerous suite, left Jolo April 9 for a visit to Singapore via Sandakan, after having appointed his brother, the Dato Rajah Muda, and Hadji Taib his representatives during his absence. While at Sandakan the Sultan sent an emissary to Cagayan de Jolo to collect a tax of 5 pesos per capita from its inhabitants, and the collector is said to have succeeded in gathering about 1,700 pesos. In the Sultan's letter to the chiefs and people of said island, which letter was presented by the emissary, the Sultan stated that the money thus collected was intended to be used in "improving the country and making the people happy and prosperous." I was informed of this transaction when I officially visited Cagayan de Jolo on May 21, and have left instructions that collection of such taxes will not be permitted unless authorized by the commanding officer, Jolo.

April 12 the division commander, Maj. Gen. George W. Davis, U. S. Army, and Brig. Gen. S. S. Sumner, U. S. Army, commanding this department, arrived at Jolo. Messengers were dispatched to the prominent chiefs, inviting them to meet the generals at these headquarters. The following chiefs came: Hadji Taib, Hadji Butu, Dato Tambuyung, and Uyung, Sarip Magarip, Maharajahs Indanan and Amad, Nakib Indasan, Orang Kayah Tang, Hatib Awab, and Aburan. The Dato Rajah Muda was absent. I have not seen him or heard from him since. Word was sent to Panglima Hassan, of Looc, to meet the generals at Lake Seit on April 14, and the meeting took place as arranged. Hassan was escorted by 500 men, armed with spears, barongs, and many rifles.

Dato Joakanain and other prominent Moros returned May 3 from their pilgrimage to Mecca. The dato, now Hadji Dato Joakanain, appears improved in his views; he has expressed his desire to henceforth keep away from trouble and fighting, cultivate the friendship of the Americans, and look after the welfare of his people.

Soon after the Sultan's departure several disturbances occurred at Maibun, and the Chinese traders either left or intended leaving the place for that reason. However, Hadji Taib assured them of their safety and those who left returned.

The two Moros, Dabusan and Kulapo, who attacked the quarantine guard in December last, whose surrender I had repeatedly demanded of the Sultan and the chief, were delivered to me May 5, and are now confined in the guardhouse awaiting trial by civil court. They were brought in by Panglima Ambutong, of Bawisan, Parang. He related to me that some time ago some of Panglima Dammang's men had been seen stealing his (Ambutong's) cocoanuts; that the thieves had escaped, but he had captured some of their arms. Panglima Dammang had then demanded the restitution of these arms, and, this being refused, he and Panglima Hadji Tahil, of Silangkan, Parang, had arranged to fight Ambutong, and Maharajah Indanan had agreed to join them. Ambutong stated that he had incurred Indanan's enmity by refusing to deliver to him the above Dabusan and Kulapo,

whom he (Ambutong) had captured, and Indanan wanted to bring to me so that he (Indanan) might receive the credit for their capture and surrender.

I sent a letter to Panglima Dammang ordering him and his allies to keep the peace, and if they had any complaint against Ambutong, to submit the case to the Dato Rajah Muda. Since then I have heard no more of this matter, but peace has been maintained.

Another typical case of trouble among the Moros was reported to me as follow: The son of Hadji Imam Usup, chief of Patian Island, was returning from a voyage when his boat was swamped off Parang. Some Parang people came to his assistance. After his goods had been collected, a bundle containing clothing and 40 pesos in coin was missing. Part of this clothing is said to have been found in the possession of a slave of one of the Parang men, Mohamad Apas, a Moro of some standing. The son of Imam Usup charged the slave with the theft of said bundle, and Apas then told the complainant to come to him with his companions on a certain day, when the case would be tried.

The trial took place accordingly, but Mohamad Apas constituted himself the judge and acquitted his slave. The other party objected to the proceeding and judgment for the reason that Apas, being the owner of the accused slave, and as such, according to Moro law, responsible for the slave's actions, was an interested party to the suit, and disqualified to judge the case. The plaintiff declared his intentions of appealing to Hadji Taib, the Sultan's representative. Thereupon Mohamad Apas drew his barong and struck down Imam Usup's son; a fight ensued, resulting in the death of seven of the Patian men, eight being present, the other side losing one man killed and two wounded, Apas being one of the latter. The Patian chief then prepared to avenge the death of his son and his companions upon the slayers. I received timely news of his intention, and at once ordered the Rajah Muda to intervene. It appears that he promptly sent Hadji Butu to settle the matter peaceably.

Panglima Hassan, with a small retinue, visited me on June 1. He complained of having trouble with Orang Kayah Haman, a chief living at Cota Makirs, on the northeastern shore of Jolo Island, saying that Haman had seized and was detaining a number of his (Hassan's) people under the pretense that they were slaves belonging to him (Haman). The Panglima declared that those people were no slaves, but free. He said he had tried to induce Haman to let them return to their homes, but Haman had refused to do so.

Hassan further informed me of having lately been told by Dato Maharajah Leila Sali, of Bual, Looc, that the party of three juramentados (see my last quarterly report, p. 6) were given an escort of two men by Orang Kayah Haman to accompany them part of the way to Jolo, and that these two men had returned and were now staying at Haman's cota. Hassan added that, at the time, it had been reported to him that five men were passing through his territory, behaving strangely and singing religious songs; he had sent out men to look for and apprehend them, but his men had failed to find the party. The Panglima proposed that I should send a gunboat to Cota Makirs; he would then attack it from the land side and capture and deliver Haman to me. I replied that as soon as a boat was available for the purpose I would proceed to Bual to investigate personally the matter, and that my further action must depend upon the result of this investigation and the orders I should receive from my superior commander upon report. June 7 rumors reached me of a clash between some of Hassan's and Haman's followers. It was said that one man had been killed on either side. Later I received word from Hassan that he had decided to await the return of the Sultan, when he would submit his case against Haman to him, which means that Hassan and Haman have become good friends once more.

On Friday, June 26, at 3 a. m., a band of six or more men, followers of Hadji Panglima Tahir, of Parang, stole to a hut at Schuck's plantation, situated only 100 yards from Mr. Schuck's own house, and there shot and killed an old man and kidnaped a girl about 15 years of age. They made their escape before help reached the place; however, three of the band were recognized. Being between Moro and Moro, this case was turned over to the Dato Rajah Muda for trial, in strict conformity with the Bates agreement. It was not only a deliberate murder, but there was a contempt for United States authority evinced. Mr. Schuck, on whose place the outrage was committed, is the official interpreter, and the people attacked were working for him. I have demanded that the girl be returned and that the murderer be punished.

With reference to the several cases of juramentado which occurred during last March, I continued inquiries to ascertain, if possible, where the miscreants had come from, their motives, and if any of the chiefs had been cognizant of their murderous intentions. Most of the chiefs professed total ignorance upon the sub-

ject. Aside from Hassan's above report based upon what Dato Maharajah Leila told him, the following is the statement of—

Dato Kalbi:

The man who killed the soldier at Point Tandoh was probably Katibun, a former follower of my brother Joakanain. Katibun had killed one of Joakanain's slaves and then ran away, leaving his family behind. During my brother's absence on this pilgrimage, Katibun returned to Dato Tambuyung, Joakanain's representative, and requested pardon for his former crime. Tambuyung told him he could return to his family if he promised future good behavior; his crime should be adjudged by Dato Joakanain on the latter's return from Mecca. Katibun rejoined his family. Later his only son died of cholera, and the father appeared to be mad with grief. He purchased a muzzle-loading gun and disappeared. He has not been seen or heard from since, and it is believed that he was the man who killed the soldier and was then himself killed. The party of three juramentados consisted of Seiril, Ahamad, and Omang, followers of Nakib Mauddin of Bual, of Looc.

Maharajah Indanan:

The juramentado at the cockpit in Tullei, March 8, was Bayani, a slave who ran away from Panglima Ambutong to Dato Kalbi. The Moro who killed the soldier at Point Tandoh was Pamis, the elder brother of Bayani. The three juramentados of March 13 were the followers of Orang Kayah Bangsauan Hatai of Tandoh, Looc. They told this chief of their intention to juramentado and he advised them to go to Zamboanga, as the Sultan had forbidden it in Jolo. Omang, alleged by others to have been one of the three, did not belong to the party; he was a son of Nakib Mauddin of Bual, and died of cholera.

Dato Maharajah Leila Sali of Bual (his statement to the interpreter, Mr. Schuck, whom he met at Panglima Hassan's house):

The three juramentados of March 13 were Seiril, Ahamad, and Omag, followers of Nakib Mauddin of Bual. Orang Kayah Haman, of Cota Makirs, near Bual, furnished them an escort of two men, Usman and Purroh. These latter returned and are now with Haman.

June 4, 1903, I visited a so-called fort, which is situated 3 miles west from Taglibi. The place was in dispute between Dato Joakanain and a man named Hegaran, formerly a follower of the dato. The place, about 20 yards square, has a stone and earth wall 5 feet high, and 4 feet thick on four sides, and there is no ditch or other form of defense. It is quite an old work, having several large trees growing out of the middle of the wall, their roots coming inside. Dato Kalbi's and Joakanain's cotas were visited en route. The last-named chief was on the point of going to Jolo, but was easily persuaded to accompany us to the old fort. Although we traveled without delay, 50 armed natives accompanied the dato, 20 of them being mounted on ponies. All chiefs have a number of armed followers always at hand, some of them being able to muster 500 armed men in an hour's time. The trail passed over could only be traveled in column of troopers. Several streams of fresh water were crossed, all of them having precipitate banks. Land was cultivated in many places along the trail. Total distance marched was about 18 miles.

Sporadic cases of cholera appeared on Jolo Island as late as in May. Quite a number of deaths from this disease occurred during that month among the people living at the southwest point of Jolo Harbor, and two fatal cases at San Ramondo, the village situated about 150 yards from the main gate of the walled town. At the present time, however, the epidemic seems extinct.

Work in the fields was greatly retarded by the epidemic, which appeared most virulent during the months of January, February, and March, the season for plowing and planting of the staple crops—rice, tapioca, and corn. The tilled acreage is in consequence considerably smaller than last year's; but copious rains have fallen and the growing crop presents a fine appearance, promising a more than average yield, whereas in the preceding year the partly prevailing drought severely damaged the crops. As a result of last year's small harvest the supply of native rice is exhausted. Imported rice is sold by the Chinese dealers at the exorbitant price of 14 to 18 pesos per bag. Those Moros owning hemp are now busy working and marketing the same, and larger shipments of this produce than usual are taking place at Jolo. The season for pearl fishing is at its height, and the numerous Moros engaged in this industry should benefit by the increase of about 50 per cent since last season in the price of mother-of-pearl shell.

The Sultan has engaged in Singapore a German tobacco planter of experience to start a large tobacco estate for him near Maibun, and has contracted to furnish the necessary considerable capital. The planter, a Mr. Benjamin, arrived here June 23. I hear that he has declared part of the land he has so far seen around Jolo superior to the best Delhi tobacco lands.

The commanding officer at Siassi, Capt. H. R. Hickok, Fifteenth Cavalry, reports that many persons are applying to him for protection against slavery or involuntary servitude. The latter term refers to the custom of the Moros to pawn members of their family or relatives, often children, as security for money borrowed. In my experience, in most such cases the money was needed to pay a fine in order to prevent the borrower and his whole family from being—conformably to Moro law—enslaved in default of payment. Objection to being thus pawned is seldom made even by grown persons, but trouble frequently arises later through the creditor's refusing to release the pawn on the claim that either capital or interest is still due him, or he himself may have later borrowed money and transferred the pawn. Captain Hickok reports that the methods of Dato Dakolah, the Sultan's representative at Siassi, are objectionable and a source of irritation, and that his fines smack more of robbery than of justice. The same may well be said of most, if not all, Moro judges. They receive no salary, but depend upon the fines imposed as a source of income, the judges of low rank having to divide the proceeds with the Sultan or some chief bigger than they. The system is corrupt.

Capt. K. W. Walker, Fifteenth Cavalry, commanding at Bongao, reported that a number of slaves applied to him for protection, which was accorded them. In April 7 Moros (Bajaws) from Sibutu Island complained to him of having been robbed of money and goods to the value of 750 pesos and also of being maltreated by Dato Mohamad, a son of Dato Baginda of Sitankai. Captain Walker sent for both datos, and upon their appearance investigated the case. The datos claimed that the Bajaws had not been robbed, but the property was taken from them in payment of a fine imposed upon one of their number for having shown disrespect to a dato. The captain told them that the amount taken from the Bajaws, according to the latter's statement, was far in excess of the maximum limit of punishment for the offense charged. During the severe cross-examination the datos became very much confused, and ultimately admitted having lied. Captain Walker gave Dato Baginda a week's time in which to go and fetch the property, telling him that he would hold Dato Mohamad until his, Baginda's, return. In due time the goods and money were all produced, exactly as claimed by the Bajaws, and returned to them.

Several small reconnoissance parties in charge of noncommissioned officers were sent out by sailboat to neighboring islands and were universally received in a friendly manner by the natives. One party when visiting the island of Sicibong was warned by the inhabitants not to go to the adjacent islands of Lataan and Tandubas, for the reason that the people there would probably fire upon them if they tried to land. The party followed this advice. Tandubas is the island where the census enumerator was not permitted to land.

Very respectfully,

W. M. WALLACE,
Colonel Fifteenth Cavalry, Commanding.

APPENDIX VI.

THE MOROS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

[A monograph prepared in 1901 by the Rev. Pio Pi, Superior of the Jesuit Order in the Philippines, who has supplied this copy by request.]

We have no scruple in affirming, and we do not believe that there is anyone who will be so rash as to deny, that the principal obstacle in the way of the reduction^a and civilization of Mindanao and Jolo is the Moro. We shall devote some space to prove this and to indicate some means for overcoming this obstacle.

I.

In two senses are the Moros opposed to reduction and culture in the archipelago: First, in that they prevent reduction and civilization for themselves and, second, that they impede its reaching the other infidel races. The Moros are interested and anxious that Mindanao shall continue the present status quo indefinitely throughout that territory, seeing that they can not extend their lordship over all.

And to this they are influenced by, first—their character; second, their history or tradition; third, their fanaticism; fourth, their interests. Concerning these four points we will make a few brief remarks:

1. THEIR CHARACTER.

Their character is especially haughty, independent, and dominating.

(a) *Haughty*.—They believe themselves to be the only sons of God. None are more zealous than they in their genealogies. To all the natives not Moros they give the depreciatory title of bisayas, as we should say, pariahs. In carriage, attitude, manners, and dealings they are accustomed to show great asperity and disdain. Although poor, miserable, and needy they show scarcely any gratitude to those who aid them.

(b) *Independent*.—History eloquently records with what tenacity they resist all domination, with what insincerity they submit, how treacherously they rebel. The subjection to the payment of any tribute whatever, or to the recognition of the Spanish Government, even among those Moros living nearest to the Spanish settlements where the action of the Spanish Government could more easily reach, has ever been an arduous undertaking, and has almost always been evaded. It may well be said that they were indifferent even to the most common legislation, nor do they take care to fulfill, for example, the requirements of public hygiene, the forestry regulations, etc., as though they were exempt from all law.

(c) *Dominating*.—They consider themselves the true lords of Mindanao and Jolo. All other native races are looked upon by them as inferiors, and from all of them, as far as is possible, they collect tribute, and exploit, vex, and raid them as though their neighbors had no more right than what they (the Moros) consented to give them. It is as common a thing for them to enter the settlements and villages, both of infidels and Christians, and to rob, kill, take captives, and destroy property, as it was common for them formerly to scour the seas, engaged in expeditions of piracy, for they believed themselves lords of the seas also.

2. THEIR HISTORY OR TRADITION.

Their ancestors were refractory to all reduction and civilization, and they desire to be like their ancestors. And, in fact, such is the history of more than three centuries or, in other words, of the whole time of the Spanish sovereignty in these

^a Reduction equivalent to the English conversion.

islands. The Moros have been the only but constant and tenacious enemies of the civilization brought here by Spain.

Run through the list of the sultans of Jolo and Mindanao and investigate the deeds of the principal *datos* and it will be clearly seen, in spite of the passing of centuries, that what was done by an Ali-Aliudin was done by an Amilol-Quiram; what a Corralat did has been repeated by Uto in what relates to the acceptance of the European domination and civilization. The sole difference is in the degree of resistance offered by the one or the other, more or less rigorous, more or less declared, more or less efficacious, according to the power the said *dato* had to reckon with, or the importance to which he was reduced. The most obdurate opposition of soul and of instinct, the most obstinate passive resistance, the most pertinacious and vigilant intention of really revolting, whether by the aid of strength or craftiness, the very moment the material impossibility of success ceases, or his own personal convenience, which caused him to be temporarily and feignedly submissive, is threatened; this at least is the attitude and constant disposition of the average Moro and of his race against the dominating nation, no matter what be the material power which holds him subject for the moment, or the moral or legal obligation of preserving the most formal treaties and covenants.

3. HIS FANATICISM.

The religious ignorance of the Moro of the Philippine Archipelago is universal and almost absolute, even in relation to affairs concerning Mohammedanism, since all his instruction, and little it is, is reduced to the poor reading of the Koran without understanding what he reads. They have, however, a blind and ever living hatred of all things Christian, whether catholic, schismatical, or protestant; and this one thing they know for certain, that Mahomet commanded a holy war, without truce or termination, upon Christians, who according to their idea are *infidels* (or *capir*); and they believe that it is a meritorious thing to rob, and that to gain heaven it is sufficient to kill the Christians. Hence they must cease to be Moros in order to resign themselves to support a domination so repulsive to their false beliefs.

4. THEIR INTERESTS.

Or, rather, particularizing it somewhat more, the love of their wealth, their territory, their independence.

(a) *The love of wealth, or rather the love of the datos for their wealth.*—They acquire their riches and preserve them principally by means of slavery, for their slaves are their servants both in their houses and on their voyages. They are the laborers in their fields, the workmen in their small industries, the instruments of their rapine, of their exactions, and of their vexations. They are the most esteemed objects of commerce, and the most available means for the making of treaties, settlement of business affairs and of differences, and for the contracting of matrimony—all of which the *dato* must pay attention to for his sustenance and comfort. The *dato* who owns many slaves is rich, and he who has them not has not wherewith to eat; hence the energy exerted to obtain slaves without consideration of the means by which they are obtained, the continual robbery of children, not only from people of another race, but even from the Moros of other settlements, and the killing on most occasions of the parents in order the more easily to carry off the children. It is evident that this chief source of wealth of the Moro *datos* must cease the day the reduction aimed at by the Government reaches them.

(b) *The love of their territory.*—The lands still occupied by the Moros in Mindanao and Jolo are numerous and of vast extent and finely situated. They embrace not a few entire islands, fertile territories, great coast lines, the channels and valleys of many navigable rivers, or a great part of them, and the mouths of others which are not navigable, and the great and beautiful Lake Lanao, with its banks and cascades; all of which is a matter of importance, not only in the matter of the effective domination they exercise over the land, but also in the power they exert over the people who are their neighbors and whom they do not permit to approach the rivers or the seacoasts, so that they may the better shut them in, bury them in the interior, keep them from all communication with the exterior, and so the more advantageously subject and exploit them in the manner above stated. Hence the Moros understand thoroughly that in proportion as their reduction and civilization is advanced in the regions they inhabit they will be less able to preserve their possessions and advantageous positions, at least under the conditions under which they occupy them at present, and much less can they maintain them for

themselves without interference from the white race, which is the way in which they desire to be and live.

(c) *Their love of independence.*—It is none the less certain that the day in which the reduction becomes a fact all their autonomy and their political, military, and religious organization must cease to exist—an organization which insures the race its cohesion and duration in the country, and which up to a certain point they esteem; and if threatened with its loss they would rather resolve without hesitation to abandon the region they occupy, their settlements, their estates and crops, all their means of livelihood. Now, how will their sultans, datos, panditas, and panglimas live except at best as mere ornaments and historical figureheads, mere names without actual significance, and offices without utility, even deprived in a very short time of the servile submission and stupid veneration of their sacopes, and both the one and the other with but the remembrance of their once entire exemption from law? Well they know that this would be the loss of the interior constitution of their people, the end of their nationality still sustained in those islands, and, above all, in their disappearance from the country as a distinct race.

A priori, then, it is well proved that far from the Moros being an element favorable to the reduction, colonization, and civilization of Mindanao and Jolo, they constitute in their present state, as they ever will be while they enjoy their autonomy and organization, a most powerful obstacle in the way of obtaining that desideratum.

* * * * *

But there is a fact, although this be a negative one, which confirms, moreover, this statement a posteriori—namely, the hostile disposition of the Moros to all that the reduction, colonization, and civilization of the country implies. Who, in fact, Spanish, foreigner, or even native, has ever been bold enough to locate any establishment, undertake any exploration, break or cultivate any portion of the soil amidst Moro settlements.

Even in Christian settlements already formed the number of estates is small, and these few exist only in the outlying districts of the settlement and under the shelter of some military detachment. One of these few is the estate of Rosales & Co., adjoining the military camp of Parang-Parang; and of how many depredations has it not been the object! How many victims, Spaniards and soldiers, has it not cost! How many times was it not necessary for the troops to deal out punishment for the violences perpetrated there by their Moro neighbors! The same might be said of any other estate established in Cotabato, in Isabela de Basilan, or near the town and fortifications of Jolo. And if in this latter place the German, Herr Schuck, succeeded in establishing himself, even before the Spanish occupation in 1876, acquiring and cultivating some tracts of land which his sons still possess, we shall find, without doubt, for this singular fact very peculiar reasons, at least in the most admirable political arrangements made with the Sultan by that old-time merchant, when as such he made voyages from Singapore to Maibung and from Maibung to Singapore again.

Can we, then, deny great significance to this general want of all kinds of enterprises in Moro territory, on the part of even those who lived as neighbors in the same regions and in continual relations with the Moros? It will be necessary to recognize the fact that such proximity and relationship did not engender intimacy or confidence.

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And as we foresee that against what we are sustaining some particular fact may undoubtedly be put forward, we will explain these facts briefly in order that it may be seen that as a matter of fact they prove nothing against what we say.

It can not be denied, in fact, that there have been a few Moro datos who have always or for a greater or lesser length of time shown themselves sincerely friendly to the Spanish Government, and who, moreover, recognized the American Government as soon as it took possession of that territory. Why, then, it may be said, can we not hope to find the other caciques of the same race the same, and expect that all will lend a hand in the reduction and reconciliation of the Moros to the new, common, and civilizing régime which America will establish, especially if that Government adopts a good policy of conciliation? Will not the Moros thus submitted and disposed of be an example and instrument toward the submission of the other infidel tribes of Mindanao, who will hasten to imitate them, thus facilitating and advancing the reduction and civilization of all that island?

We shall reply by coming down to particulars. One of the Moro datos alluded to is doubtless Mandi, the Zamboangueno, of the barrio of Magay. We begin by recognizing his genuine adhesion to Spain till the end of her domination, since, apart from other good services even during the war with the United States in the Philippines, Mandi and his people bore arms on behalf of Spain against the native

malcontents of the Visayas. But it must be remembered that Mandi, Moro and all, is a Spanish mestizo, brought up from childhood in Zamboanga, the most Spanish settlement in the archipelago, always treated considerately, fondled, and recompensed by the government of Mindanao, and associated with the patriotic deeds of Zamboanga patriots. Mandi is a Spanish dato. It must be remembered, also, that the population of the settlements of Mandi is to a great extent the result of the dispersion of Balanginingui, made more subject precisely by the lesson given in 1848 by the governor-general, Señor Claveria, a lesson which was, in all truth, not of that class badly named the "policy of attraction." Another reason for the fidelity of Dato Mandi to Spain at the outbreak of hostilities between the Spanish troops of Zamboanga and the revolutionists under Vicente Alvarez, as also for his favorable conduct toward the triumphant Americans, was the evidence of the insane attitude of the revolutionists and of the well-known fact of the ancient personal enmity existing between the two caciques.

Another dato to whom reference may be made in connection with the matter we are dealing with is Pedro Cuevas, of Basilan. We must note in his case the special circumstances which gave a reason for his conduct. He is not a Moro, but a Tagalo. He was condemned to garrison prison for highway robbery; fled with his reckless companions from the colony of San Ramon (Zamboanga) to the island of Basilan, where, without danger of ever being captured, he entered into negotiations with the Spanish Government with the intention of replacing himself in the good books of that authority and making himself worthy of pardon; struggled with the Moro rebels at the disposition of the governor of that district, and conquered and killed in single combat the Dato Calung, being then proclaimed dato by Calung's people and by those he had himself drawn around him. He was at length pardoned, and afterwards being made dato by Alindi, the claimant to the sultanhip of Jolo, the Spanish Government confirmed his dignity in the hope that in future he would defend the interests of the Spaniards in the island. This he did. But it must be confessed that in this he has also defended, and perhaps bettered, his own interests—that is to say, the excellent position he held and his prestige and influence—by making habitual use of deception. He became in reality very Moorish without ceasing to show himself Spanish in appearance, and by compromising in things of small importance because circumstances did not permit him to do otherwise. He took no hand with the revolutionists, who, a little before the occupation of Zamboanga by the United States, took up arms against the Spaniards and desired to resist the Americans, since, apart from his antecedents, which were favorable to Spain, he was crafty like Mandi and more so than Alvarez, and knew how foolish such a course was and what a sorry end the latter's enterprise promised.

We wish also to say a few words concerning the Dato Piang, since he is another of those whom some might avail themselves of in argument against the proposition we are defending. It must be understood that Piang is a Chinese mestizo. In the time of the celebrated Dato Uto he was advanced by him to the station of dato, and kept faith until he found Uto overcome and humiliated by the Spaniards, and himself, owing to his greater leniency when commanding, master of the sympathizers whom Uto had alienated by reason of his harshness in treating with his subjects. He then drew away the greater part of the sacopes from their master. Taught by another's experience, he considered it politic, and it proved also profitable to him, to maintain good relations with the Cotabato government, which was also interested in fomenting discord between the two datos, and to favor Piang. The dato was a great help in the construction of the beautiful fortress of Reina Regente in supplying men and materials, and offering other services for which he was recompensed. When the Spanish Government retired forever from Cotabato, in order to assure the peace made under agreement with Piang, it handed over the capital to the Indian Roman Vilo, then named presidente; but the good understanding between the two did not last long, and Vilo and some of the other honorable and intelligent Indians of the district became victims, sacrificed to the rapacity and gross excesses of the Chinese residents there, who were protected and probably stirred up by the half-caste dato, who thus dishonored the power which he possessed.

Hence, bearing in mind the small number of such datos, who they are, under what circumstances and with what motives they work, and that they conduct themselves in a manner which is unusual among the Moros, what can be deduced from these particular cases when compared with the constant, general, and never-failing tendencies of the Moros of this country and of all the world? Nothing, absolutely nothing. It is necessary, then, to do away with the obstacle which the Moros constitute, because otherwise the reduction will never be brought about, and much less will the civilization of the islands occupied by the Moros be accomplished.

II.

What, then, should be the plan of procedure? We have already been taught by abundant experience, and we shall briefly expound a plan based on that experience.

Above all be it understood that we are not going to defend the extermination of the Mohammedan race; on the contrary, we reject it as unjust, inhuman, impolitic, most difficult, and very costly. (On this point read the memorandum written by P. Pablo Pastells, ex-superior of the mission of the society, published as the appendix to Vol. IX of the *Cartas of the Missionaries*.)

The system we are about to propose for the reduction to civil life of the infidel tribes of Mindanao and Jolo under the government of the archipelago is different. It must be remembered that some Moros have submitted, although not voluntarily, whilst others have not, and that among the infidels or mountain tribes some are under the thumb of the Moro, whilst others are not. The system of political action of the government must comprehend the four following enterprises or operations intimately connected with the one or the other, procedure being made gradually in each one of them, although at the same time in all jointly: First, the assimilation of the submissive Moros to whom the action of the government reaches with the remaining population of the islands; second, the liberation or emancipation from Moro slavery of the infidels who are under the dominion of this race; third, the extension of the effective domination of the government over the Moros not yet really submitted, or still beyond the action of the said government, and, fourth, the decided protection of Catholic evangelization of all the region. We will amplify this thought point by point.

1. *The assimilation of the submissive Moros.*—The four reasons explained above why the Moros are a great obstacle to the reduction and civilization of Mindanao and Jolo will cease to exist as soon as the assimilation of the race under a common régime is effected. It must be noted, however, that those four qualities we have described in the Moro do not exist among the whole people in general, but among what we might call the aristocracy, or rather caciques, who, as is well known, are such generally by right of blood, and that in so far as the popular mass participates in the said qualities, in that same degree do they derive it from their chiefs who foment it. The Moro population of the Philippines is what it is by reason of its sultans, *datos*, *panditas*, and *panglimas*. This organization being suppressed, not in what relates to matters purely religious (which it will be necessary to tolerate to the same degree as other false religions are tolerated), but in matters political and military, the Moro population of the Philippines will be in a very few generations no more or less than the remaining population. What we have said relative to the character of the Moros, haughty, independent, and dominating, is to be said principally of their *datos* and *panditas*. These are, moreover, the only zealous guardians of their traditions, superstitions, and fanatical hatred of Christianity, and they and not the people are the ones really interested in the maintenance of their social and political status quo.

It is necessary, in order to understand thoroughly what we say, to know and even better to realize by experience what these *datos* are among the Moros. The *dato* is, as a general rule and with very rare exceptions, a semisavage when he is not entirely a savage; he is as haughty as he is ignorant, embruted by the blackest passions, polygamy, and other vices. He is held by his *sacopes* and represented by his *panditas* or priests to be an extraordinary being, a demigod, against whom he who dares to raise a hand or to despise shall be held in disgrace before man and cursed by God. Thus it may be explained that, in spite of their continued and horrible cruelties, not a single case is recorded in which any one of the *sacopes* have attempted to do the least harm to the person of the *dato*, and thus also is it explained how they scarcely ever dare to try and escape their tyrannical power, because they believe (and the *panditas* take care to assure them of it) that if they flee doubtless a greater misfortune than the slavery or the maltreatment they suffer will overtake them. Hence the *dato* is a veritable lord of the lives and property of his subjects, and these he is able to turn to his own account without reserve, without the rightful owners being able to complain, much less to have recourse to another authority when they are despoiled, exploited, or chastised with inhumanity and arbitrariness beyond imagination, and, finally, the *dato* is the only one interested in the maintenance of slavery, as we stated above. What estimate of the civilization offered to him will a man have who finds himself satisfied with his pride and brutal passions. a man who does not realize the existence of things better than those he possesses? How will he accept willingly a social state ordered and ruled according to the demand of the greater good of the public, he who is the law and who rules according to the dictates of his own passions?

If, then, the datos of Mindanao and Jolo are such in their dealings with one another, and such they usually are, and in perfect accord concerning the subjects of their common and chief interests, consider how great ought to be the opposition to Filipino Moroism, extensive as it already is, so widely influenced and governed by such an aristocracy. It is therefore evident that the action of a good government ought to be directed toward the undoing of such an organism as Moroism constitutes, which is a nationality or state within another sovereignty, systematically and obstinately opposed to the ruler's civilizing aims. Why, then, should not the submissive Moros, or those who are so called or wish to pass for such, be subjected to the popular organization adopted generally in Mindanao for the reduction of these heathens? Not many years ago this was tried, and not without good results, among the Moros of the fourth district (Davao), who commenced to live under *gobernadorcillos* (petty governors), lieutenants, and judges elected by the people themselves, and subject to certain services and personal labor contributions. This arrangement should be followed and continued without interruption till, gradually and in due time, as we have previously indicated, complete political, administrative, and judicial uniformity shall have been attained.

"Let us make a beginning," said P. Pablo Pastells,^a as early as 1892, "by taking a list of those subject to the payment of taxes, a general muster or census of the population, made by definite groups, levying upon them, as guaranty of security in their travels, a small tribute of half a real, for instance, as a personal *cedula* which should be in due time a new indication of the recognition of sovereignty, and which later on should be gradually transformed into general tribute, which should be increased in proportion to the progressive development of culture in the several branches of civilized life. When this is attained there might be planted among them a system of embryonic rule similar to that in other parts of the archipelago, leaving them to themselves, naming in each settlement *gobernadorcillos*, lieutenants, judges, constables, and sheriffs (*cuadrillos*), holding an election every two years. Afterwards, gently and by means of their own justices, will follow the grouping of their settlements, distinct *pueblos* being raised among them, the obligation being placed upon the Moros themselves of planning the streets and squares, with their corresponding public buildings, tribunal, schools, convent, and a small church. In this manner, a new form of government and of justice, our legislation and codes would continue to be observed, and at the same time the elements of material, intellectual, and moral culture are fomented and established, and impulse given to the advancement of agriculture, industry, commerce, primary instruction, and solid maxims of the gospel."

This advice falls all without exception within the bounds of religious liberty as outlined by the Constitution of the United States.

2. *Emancipation of the infidels subjected to the Moros.*—We have already spoken of the sad oppression and miserable state in which the Moros of Mindanao hold the neighboring infidels, who compose the tribes in the south and a considerable part of those in the north. From these tribes they provide themselves with slaves; they collect taxes in the form of provisions and enforced labor; they rob, or at least they purchase from them for whatever trifle they have a mind to give them, their scanty harvests and manufactures. They prevent them from engaging in all commerce which is not carried on under the immediate supervision of the Moros themselves; they aim whenever possible to conceal them or keep them at a distance from the missionary; they exercise against them all kind of arbitrary measures, and when they feel so inclined make war upon them and invade their settlements, bringing fire and death; and how will these people who treat their subjects as harshly as we have seen above, treat a foreign people?

The enterprise, therefore, of the emancipation of these poor natives, an emancipation which would be an act of great humanity for any individual, is one of rigorous justice for the government of the nation which is the sovereign of the territory.

On the other hand it is an enterprise which ought to be undertaken because there is a question of populating an island still sparsely populated, and this is the principal element with which we have to reckon. What is certain is, that while writers of the archipelago have for many years been disputing to no purpose about the problem of the colonization of the island by means of this or that scheme of emigration, promoted by the government of the Philippines, the missionaries have been busy gathering together into *pueblos* many thousands of infidels who were previously completely useless for the purpose of colonization, since they destroyed

^a Appendix to Volume IX of the letters of the Fathers of the Society of Jesus in the Philippine Missions.

one another in continual petty conflicts, completing the havoc made among them by famine and pestilence and thus causing the death of those spared by disasters.^a The system still was a slow work, but it is surer than any other; it does not offer the grave inconveniences of all the others which have been attempted, and to this very day is the only efficacious one, if we leave out of account the not inconsiderable spontaneous immigration which has gone on from the other neighboring islands of the archipelago.

Whoever wishes to gather more information concerning what we have said should study the statistical reports annually published by the mission of the Society of Jesus and read the above-cited memorandum of P. Pastell and the statement of P. Juan Ricart, another ex-superior of the mission. The latter is to be found in Volume X of the letters of the missionaries. The increase of Christian and civil population of Mindanao in the last twelve years of Spanish domination is owing to two causes, namely, evangelization and native immigration, one-half to each.

The government of the Philippines should be encouraged in this enterprise by the consideration that the infidels are still in great numbers in Mindanao; that they are not less intelligent than the Moros and certainly more docile and accessible, and many of them susceptible of culture as the best races of the archipelago; that the labor undertaken in their reduction and Christianizing, under equal circumstances, gives much better results than those employed in civilizing the Moros, and that the thinly populated district of South Mindanao would have been very different now and the production of hemp, sugar, coffee, cocoa, copra, etc., incomparably more extended and beneficial in those most fertile regions had the Subanos, Tirurayes, and other infidels been free from the harassing tyranny of the Moros and had these districts been free from their effective domination, which has always proved sterile and sterilizing wherever it has existed.

To help on in all possible ways this emancipation it will be necessary, first, that the Government should declare publicly and formally that it will receive and shelter under its banner, power, and protection, with entire equality, all its subjects of Mindanao who recognize it, whatever may be the race to which they pertain; and that, consequently, the authorities of the island and the officials will administer justice with the same equality among individuals as among communities of distinct races; second, that it should be absolutely prohibited for any individual or caciques of any race whatever to capture or enslave other individuals of another race; third, that every slave or captive, whether of a foreign or the same race or settlement, who in any way should effect his escape and put himself under the protection of the Government should be held free from all subjection to his former master, and that the master should have no right whatever or title to indemnification; fourth, that the Moros, or those of any other race whatever, established on the coasts, along the course, or at the outlets of the rivers be obliged to permit free passage over all water and land ways and free access to the shores and anchorages to all those other races who live in the interior, and not to impede anyone in passing from one place to another; fifth, that there be a general prohibition to collect tribute of any kind whatever from the natives of other races without the express approbation of the Government; sixth, that provision be made that any assault or arbitrary action committed by the caciques of any race whatever upon the persons or property of the individuals of another, whatever be the condition of the person committing it, be rigorously chastised; seventh, that provision be made that some Government vessels patrol the coasts occupied by the Moros and be anchored opposite their settlements, and even that gunboats of light draft should ascend the navigable rivers where the said Moros live, in order that some agent of the Government may visit the settlements, correct abuses, give audiences, and dispense protection to anyone who considers himself aggrieved; eighth, that it procure that all these dispositions and others leading to the same end be perfectly fulfilled, so that after a few severe chastisements many disturbances may be avoided and what is aimed at be attained.

3. *Extension of the dominion to the Moros who are still independent.*—It is our opinion, and more especially in view of what we have just discussed, that it will be of great interest to the country, and something to which the Government ought to direct its political labors with decision, to proceed to the reduction of Moroism as it exists in the Philippines to a perfect assimilation with the remaining population under a common law, and this under the penalty of driving it out from the territory by means of war, unless, perhaps, the Government should prefer to concentrate it in some specified spot (a particular island or group of islands, for

^aThe number of those reduced to civilized life and baptized by the Jesuit missionaries alone amounts to more than 70,000, representing the labor of 40 years, although at the beginning of that time they had under their care but few missions or centers of action.

example), where the Moros might live with more or less autonomy and protection or with total independence. Otherwise the Mohammedan-Malay race will be ever in the Philippines, not merely in Mindanao or Jolo, a powerful element of disturbance.

To adopt the third suggestion—that is, to concentrate the race in some point of the archipelago—does not appear to be a sufficiently radical remedy nor a solution very worthy of the civilizing aims of a cultured nation in dealing as it must with a race so abject, deceitful, and likely to break out in treacherous rebellion.

Our whole aim was to accomplish the perfect assimilation of the Moros into the other races. For apart from other considerations, Moroism constitutes a nucleus of population by no means to be despised even supposing that the alleged number of 350,000 exists in Mindanao alone (this to some appears to be somewhat exaggerated), and it would avail much to our purpose to bear in mind, to a greater or lesser degree, what we have already said, as well as what we have not up to the present mentioned.

But if in the end Moroism exists, and determines at all costs to preserve its present autonomy and its organization, and if, on the other hand, its concentration in a limited strip of territory—a reservation—be not adopted by the Government and accepted by the Moros, there remains no other course than to appeal to arms to obtain without hesitation the assimilation of those who submit and the driving out of those who prefer such a course to submission.

From all points of view, whatever may be the designs of the Government, we can not suppose that it would consent to the unfurling of any banner but its own in all the Filipino territory, or that another distinct sovereignty be exercised over the territory, large or small, which it occupies.

And in order not to remain silent concerning the measures which to all appearances it is well to adopt immediately, in order to extend the effectiveness of the dominion to all the territory of the Moros not submitted, we will do no more than indicate in general terms only these three:

1. The recovery by the Army and Navy of all the ports, bays, and anchorages, forts and strategical points and outposts occupied in the last days of the Spanish sovereignty by the Spanish army and navy, so that later on new positions may be gradually taken.

2. To patrol as frequently as possible with gunboats or war launches the coasts and navigable rivers inhabited by the unconquered Moros. This alone will suffice to secure either their submission by their entering into a treaty with the dominating race or their emigration to where they will not be molested with such visits which they do not care for.

3. To treat of establishing among them in the meanwhile a worthy, just, and rigorous police, which, whilst being neither irritating nor hard, might not give any evidence of cowardice or fear nor reveal any weakness; that no countenance be given to abuses against them (the Moros) even by the white race, but that those who injure in any way the dato or sultan be chastised without hesitation; that the people of that race or of any other tribe may be protected against all injustice committed by caciques; that the Government permit all lawful commerce to the Moro; that it utilize and justly recompense even for public works, their labors and services. Perhaps some would give the name of "policy of attraction" to such a policy as we advocate. In that case we find no exception to the "policy of attraction;" but in no manner can we approve a more flattering and less decorous policy in dealing with the Moros, call it what you will.^a

^aI understand and believe it to be the common opinion that the conduct of Spain in dealing with the Moros of Mindanao and Jolo in the latter days of her sovereignty, under a pretext of a "policy of attraction," was characterized by excessive toleration or condescension. I do not know whether this state of affairs was due to the individual character and temperament of good-natured governors, who were not over scrupulous in upholding the dignity and honor of their country, or whether it was owing to inordinate fear on their part of the complications that might arise from an energetic course of action; and who knows whether at times it may not have been owing to the loose moral tone of their private life, or to the political corruption of officials, both high and low, intent only on filling their pockets. This policy was shown in the open violation of the common laws with impunity, in odious exemptions, in a marked preference and favor shown to the Moro race, and in undue obsequiousness shown and undeserved honors and attentions paid to their utterly repugnant magnates. I myself was for some years a witness of the contempt, of the shame, and confusion felt by the honorable Spanish element, especially the military who lived in the southern islands, under such a pusillanimous government, for the result was always the opposite of that desired, making both the subdued and unsubdued Moros haughty and ungovernable.

4. *Protection to Catholic evangelization.*—In speaking of the protection of Catholic evangelization of Mindanao and Jolo we do not propose that the new Government should discard its principles of religious liberty in the sense of dispensing protection to any one communion in preference to another. We aim at much less, as it is unlawful, anti-Christian, and subversive of the end intended that the Government should use physical force to oblige any infidel to become Christian. Even though the Government were Catholic, as was that of Spain, it could not infringe in the least on the liberty of its subjects by forcing them to embrace or not to embrace the Christian faith. Our idea is that the Government should recognize and protect the Catholic missionaries of Mindanao and Jolo in their entire liberty to follow up their work in the evangelization of these infidels, and in every possible way to assist them, even with material resources which may enable them to labor in favor of the peoples not only in evangelical work, but as propagators of civilization in the name of the Government and with its approbation.

We found our pretension upon the following reasons:

1. That instruction and persuasion such as are employed by the Catholic missionaries of Mindanao and Jolo in their apostolic labors do not deprive any subject of liberty to labor, but rather assist him to do so.

2. That up to the present Catholic missionaries alone have evangelized those regions, and all the native Christian inhabitants are Catholics.

3. That Catholic evangelization has been of immense value in Mindanao, not only to religion, but also to the State, inasmuch as the interests of the one are well identified with those of the other, so much so that in proportion as the missionaries made Christians out of the Moros in the same proportion did they acquire faithful subjects for Spain. In this way the evangelization and the reduction to civilization have been practically one and the same thing; and this the said converted infidels have well understood up till now, namely, that in becoming Christians they were becoming Spaniards, and that upon ceasing to be Subanos, Manobos, or Mandayas, they become at one and the same time sons of the Catholic Church and vassals of the King of Spain, whose place and rights have fallen to the Republic of the United States of America.

4. The fact that the conduct of the missionaries of Mindanao and Jolo was never opposed to the action of the Spanish Government, never gave rise to conflicts, but, on the contrary, were always of assistance in building up the prestige and popularity of that Government in everything that concerned patriotism, culture, and civilization, is a sufficient guaranty that those who never abused the effective protection afforded by the Spanish authorities would still less abuse the simple and effective liberty of action which the Government of the United States may accord them.

5. That the defending of the persons of the missionaries and repression of any violence offered to them when, in the exercise of their ministry among the infidels, they run any risk of danger is not imposing upon the Government, nor is it forcing the will of the subjects in matters of religion; nor, granted the constitutional state of liberty of religion, is the Government exceeding its rights in this matter or contradicting its principles; but it is simply sanctioning the liberty of action it recognizes in the ministers of the Catholic religion as well as those of any other.

6. That everything the Government may do to guarantee the free exercise of the evangelic ministry to the Catholic missionaries; also to facilitate the reduction to civil life of the natives, not only the pagans, but also and more especially among the Moros themselves. For it is evident that the principal difficulty all the infidels, and particularly the Moros, experience in becoming reduced to civil life and law is their abominable customs, especially polygamy and slavery, which are so deeply rooted among these last-mentioned people. These customs the Catholic missionaries censure, condemn, and endeavor to extirpate, for they can not be permitted in those who receive or ask the waters of baptism.

7. That there exists no inconvenience but rather many motives for adopting this plan, under the title of the propagation not of Christianity but of civilizing the savages. The Government should grant resources for the erection of schools and the maintenance of masters and supply the material and expense of education, as also the expense of their other material and moral needs. There are none better able than the missionaries, as agents of the Government, to carry on the above works in the reductions, which may be formed little by little, and where neither the administrative nor even the personal inspection of the authorities is available, or if it is done by them can only be accomplished under the greatest difficulties.

We have spoken. Anyone who wishes to gather still further information as to what the Moros are in the Philippines, and what may be expected of them, as

also to collect valuable data for the purpose of adopting a good system of reduction and civilization in the islands of the south of the Archipelago, should read the histories which have been written of the said districts, and especially those of Mindanao and Jolo, written by P. Combes, S. J.; also the collection of cartas of the padres of the said mission; the annual estado or statistical summaries which are published; the already cited memoria of P. Pastells and the informe of P. Ricart, S. J., ex-superior of the said mission; not omitting the memoirs which have been written or published by several governors of Mindanao and of the provinces occupied by the Moros. We cite chiefly the publications of Jesuit missionaries, because everyone recognizes their ability to judge in this matter, and the disinterestedness of those who for so long and with such earnest labor and zeal have consecrated their lives to the material and moral welfare of those islands, and who have received the unanimous praise of all unprejudiced critics for the results which they have accomplished.

This statement, written at the instance of the most reverend apostolic delegate of His Holiness, Mgr. Placidus Louis Chapelle, who expressed his lively desire to acquaint himself with the question of which we treat, we finished on the 8th of February, 1900. Later on, yielding to the opinions of others, we thought that if it were translated into English and published it might be of some utility in enlightening American opinion on the subject; hence we consented to give it to translation and the press. We add the following points recently communicated to us by one of our missionaries who has resided among the Moros of Mindanao these twenty years. They form a collection of recent data very much to the point and concern particular facts which form a good substantiation of what we have said above.

A FEW MORO VICES.

In dealing with this race, refractory to all that is good, much may be said, and unfortunately all that can be said is bad. When we say that it is refractory to all good or to all civilization we must be understood as speaking of its present organization, with its sultans, datos, and panditas, because if on a chosen day all these "birds" of the archipelago should disappear the other Moros would obey the constituted authority and become as meek as lambs.

I will point out here a few facts that will serve to make known a few of their principal vices:

1. GAMBLING.

Perhaps there will not be wanting some who will wonder that we speak of gambling as a vice of the Moros, seeing that it is so general throughout the country; but though this be true the results of gambling among the Moros are especially worthy of attention.

The Moro datos, as a rule, spend their lives in gambling; and when they lack money for keeping up that occupation they sell the first thing that falls to hand, namely, the property of their vassals, of whose lives and property they are the absolute lords. Often have I heard complaints from Moros on this point, who had been robbed of their only carabao, and who were considered as having no right to reclaim or recover it, the actual possessor having purchased it from the dato; and it is looked upon as luck if they sold only the carabaos of their sacopes, for at times they would sell some individual of the family, as it happened in the case of Emilio Calumpit, lost at play by his dato in gambling, and who after several vicissitudes went to Tamontaca and became a Christian. The lately deceased Dato Galan, the most famous gambler and greatest mountebank of all the river, gambled away the daughter of his slave; and neither tears nor prayers were of any avail to cause him to desist from tearing her away from the arms of her mother and handing her out to the winner of the game.

What will civilization say to this?

2. CRUELTY.

The Moro datos are notorious for their cruelty.

Uto, the once famous Uto, perhaps one of the most cruel men of these later days, gave at times his slaves and sacopes, even for insignificant shortcomings, unheard-of punishments, and other datos used to do the same thing, although less frequently. Those who escaped from him he punished by cutting the tendons below the knees, so that they would be unable to run and walk only with difficulty. Others he ordered to be bound in a place swarming with red ants, which are very vicious and whose bites are poisonous and insupportable. Others he caused to be

bound naked to the trunks of trees and exposed by day to the burning rays of the sun and by night to the agonizing torments of the mosquitoes, which infest and molest that part of the world. That an idea may be formed of this torment I will merely state that a calf was once purchased in Tumbas for the purpose of slaughter on the following day. The calf was left that night bound to the trunk of a tree, and on the following morning was found dead. Every one attributed its death to the cloud of mosquitoes that passed that way. For my own part, I can say that one night in Tumbas I was seated in a canvas chair and was compelled to rise because the mosquitoes penetrated with their "lancelas" not only the canvas but even the habit and trousers. The men of the garrison of Reina Regente always put newspapers over the seats of their chairs, this being the only way to prevent the bites of the mosquitoes. It happened once that Uto put some one in stocks, where he died slowly of hunger and misery, as the only food given him was some ears of corn, which were thrown to him every afternoon in the same manner as they would be thrown to swine, serving rather to prolong his martyrdom than to nourish his body. Once a commander of a gunboat visited the house of Uto in Chapacan and came across a Moro there dead in the stocks. There he had ended his days, and they had not even removed the corpse.

Another of the punishments meted out by the *datos* is that of throwing those they wish to chastise into the river with their bodies encumbered with an immense stone, but in such a manner that when the tide rises to its maximum height the sufferer thus imprisoned has to stretch himself as much as he is able in order to prevent the water from entering his nostrils and mouth. Thus they leave the victims at times for weeks in the water, always exposed to death from drowning.

From the cruel Dato Andung, who ordered the death of Piang, there once escaped a slave who hastened to take refuge in Tamontaca; but unfortunately the *dato* heard of his flight shortly after his having set out in a *banquita*. Andung followed in pursuit and immediately upon coming up with him put him to death with a kris.

About the year 1885 a schooner under command of a Dutchman visited Cotabato. It appears that among other articles of commerce he carried arms. Believing doubtless he would be able to do business there he made his way to the dwelling of the Sultan. The result of his visit was that he was robbed of all he had in his vessel, which was scuttled and sunk; the crew were made captives, and the Dutchman was tied naked to a tree, while the surrounding Moros tested the edges of their kris upon his body, thus putting him to death by a slow, cruel process.

Guillermo Galmes (or Uring) at the time of the evacuation of Cotabato remained in Tamontaca, and one day having seen a *banquita* floating down the tide, he captured it. This fact became known to the Dato Diambungan, to whom the boat belonged, and he accused Galmes of theft and for this supposed robbery imposed upon him a fine of 60 pesos. As the accused was unable to pay, he was carried into captivity, together with his wife and four children. Later on P. Beunasar, S. J., went there and, aided by the governor, reclaimed the said family. The woman and children were given up, but the man had been killed in an attempt to escape.

One of the gentlemen who came with the American civil commission recorded that in Jolo he had seen a Moro who had always carried a large bandage to hide from public view his repugnant mouth, which was unsightly not from any natural defect, but because, having one day spoken disrespectfully to a *dato*, the chief ordered his mouth to be slit; and it was done with a kris, transversely, deepening it up to the articulation of the jawbone, the mouth in consequence remaining extraordinarily enlarged. The *dato* remained unmolested. According to his laws or customs he could do as he wished.

But are these customs compatible with civilization?

3. HAUGHTINESS.

I do not think it would be an easy task to find a haughtier people than the Moro *datos*. As a rule they are a miserable set of people, but believe themselves Russian czars. Their pride is revealed in all their acts. In passing from one point to another they must always go under a palio—or, in other words, an umbrella—gaudily decorated, and surrounded by guards of honor armed with kris or *campilan*; and if they travel in their *vintas* the law commands that the drums and *agungs* must accompany them in their boats.

They are considered impeccable, and however great their faults may be they are

not considered responsible for them. Dato Aco advanced this argument in the dispute which arose in the detachment of Tamontaca, in order to escape from being killed or bound. They did not know that although the dato is supposed to be irresponsible and invulnerable among the Moros he is not so among the Christians.

Once some Moros traveling in a banca with their dato asked for some cocoanuts from the deceased H. Vinolas; and, when the petition was refused, gave the reply, "He who asks is the dato." Vinolas still continued to refuse, and once again the Moros reminded him that it was the dato who wanted the cocoanuts. The Moros were dumfounded to see, contrary to their customs, that he denied the dato what he asked.

Uto was accustomed to mount his horse by putting his foot upon the shoulders of one of his servants, who bent down purposely to accommodate the magnate. The writer once saw the act performed in Bacat.

The Dato Mamon ordered the immediate death of one of his vassals who had made some irreverent gesture.

We have frequently seen presents made to some datos, and, although the said presents were of some value and things appreciated by them, they always received them with apparent indifference and as though they were of no importance. All this is a result of their haughtiness.

The wives of the datos likewise always travel under a palio and accompanied by their maids in waiting, who surround them chanting songs of a dirgelike nature, but which to them appear very agreeable music. At times also they mount their horse after the manner of the datos, using the shoulders of one of their slaves as a stepping block.

As the Moros are very fanatical and superstitious they look upon their datos as almost supernatural beings, a belief to which the panditas contribute greatly with their trickery, and thus it may be explained that in spite of the cruelty with which they ordinarily treat their vassals there can scarcely be found a case where one of them has been found insubordinate or rebellious against his dato. The most they do is to attempt to escape, if an occasion offers, to some distant point.

Thus, haughty as they are, it is not strange that they should refuse to subject themselves to the rule of a civilized government. They do not desire to be governed by anyone, nor do they wish to have any communication with civilized beings. It is sufficient to put a group of houses of Christian Indians close to a Moro settlement to see the latter little by little disappear. All the Moros who at the commencement of the occupation of Tamontaca lived around the neighborhood gradually disappeared. General Salcedo proposed the formation of a Moro village in Tucuran, but a few weeks after the occupation of that point by Spanish troops there was not a single Moro habitation remaining of those formerly existing there.

That the Moros do not desire to be governed by anyone is evidenced by the wars of Jolo, by that of Uto in 1889, and by those of Lanao in 1897 and 1898, not counting the many previous wars which Spain was constantly obliged to wage against the Moros. All the several races of the Philippines, one after the other, subjected themselves to the yoke of Spain and entered into the ways of civilization. And the Moros? As far as concerns later times, the only thing that has been accomplished with this race is what was done at Tamontaca, and well we know how it was obtained, by what means, and at what cost. And there not a single dato was baptized, not because they can not be converted, but because their organization and autonomy makes their evangelization exceedingly difficult.

4. ROBBERY.

Among the Moros there scarcely exists one who is not a ladrone. This is not strange to anyone who knows a little of the race, for the dato being the one who robs in the most barefaced manner, can it be expected that his vassals will not rob also? And let not the reader suppose that this vice is confined to datos only; it is the same with all. They do not commit the robbery themselves, but they have at their orders those who are expert and accustomed to the work. Once a Tiruraye, who knew perfectly well this tinglado, was explaining it to me and said: "Dato A has so many, etc." One of their maxims is that to rob another settlement, above all if there be any enmity between the inhabitants of the two, is no fault. Such actions are so general that they are the common practice of all. At the southern mouth of the Rio Grande there lived and still lives the Dato Ara, who, without any doubt, is the most reasonable and decent of all the people of the river, and in spite of this we are aware that among his carabaos there are some branded with a cross, mark of the mission of Tamontaca.

5. TREACHERY.

Of the history of the Moros it may be added that it is nothing more or less than a series of treacheries both in Spain and in our possessions, in Morocco and the Philippines, for when have the Moros been found faithful? They submit to reduction for convenience or because they are powerless to resist. Or, in other words, are faithful in keeping treaties as long as it suits them, or whilst they have not sufficient strength to free themselves therefrom.

It is within a year and a half ago that one Mariano Doz, who several times has been skipper of the vinta of P. Beunasar, in his voyages to Lebac found a good rice field in that part known as Linas, close by the River Tran. As he had good rice that was to yield a heavy crop, friends were not wanting to warn him not to trust the Moros, but he took no notice of these warnings. One day some Moros sent by Matabalan, dato of the River Tran, visited him and entered into a very interesting conversation with him on the seashore. According to the custom of the country they chewed the buyo together, but suddenly drawing their krises the Moros killed him. Immediately there appeared two more vintas which were near by, and whilst one took up a position at the point as a watchman the remaining Moros busied themselves in cutting the rice and carrying it to the dato.

About the year 1884 two Moros who had escaped from the clutches of Uto reached Tamontaca. Both received Christian instruction in preparation for baptism. One day in the market place of the same settlement an emissary of Uto entered into a friendly conversation with one of the two. Whilst chewing the buyo together the emissary of the magnate—sent, as was afterwards known, with that object in view—suddenly drew his kris and cut off the Christian's head. Without the possibility of his being captured, he escaped among the people, who were struck with amazement at the boldness of the deed.

A short time previous to the evacuation of Zamboanga by the Spanish troops several families of Tamontaca who had followed the fathers to that capital wished to return once again to the former settlement. For this purpose two or three large vintas were hired. P. Beunasar gave them letters of recommendation to the Datos Benito and Mamogueten, the former having always been high in praise of the Spaniards and the latter always a great friend of P. Juanmarti, from whom he had received so many favors. The former ordered the death of several of these people and the captivity of others with several women, although he afterwards freed them at the instance of Mandi. With the same end in view some others were also detained for a day and a night; and if he did not finally carry out his idea it was because of the threat of one of the prisoners that P. Beunasar would return to Cotabato in a gunboat.

Another case that may be cited in this connection to prove the treachery of the Moros is that of the treachery of Balabag.

6. PIRACY.

The Moros are unexcelled pirates, and slavery constitutes perhaps their greatest wealth. It is well known that within the last quarter of a century formidable fleets of vintas sailed continually from Jolo and the Rio Grande, and after sacking some pueblos of the Visayas returned to their strongholds loaded down with booty and with captive Christians. Their hatred inspired them at times even to approach the walls of Manila. The then bishop of Cebu, Señor Gimeno, did not desist from petitioning the Spanish Government to occupy southern Mindanao in order to put a stop to such piracy. He sent every year a record of the people of his diocese who had been captured by the Moros, and at times the number reached 2,000. At times whole pueblos were captured and the churches robbed of every object of any value they contained. At last the Rio Grande was occupied, and later on Jolo. Several faluas (small rowboats) were sent down, but they were so heavy that when they were rowed they scarcely moved, while the Moros in the vintas, which were generally very light and of but little draft, had the laugh on them.

Hence the faluas were useless to prevent piracy, but later on when the gunboats came the scene changed. The vintas met with on the high sea were overhauled and, if suspected, were searched; and if contraband was found aboard it was confiscated and the crew made prisoners. A great many were sunk, and in this manner in less than a year piracy was stamped out in the south. From that time on the Moros could no longer conduct their piratical expeditions to the Visayas or to other ports. But then they began stealing children among themselves. The Moros can not exist without their slaves, and when they can not have Christian ones they procure them from among their own race. Malabang and Baras have

been for a long time the chief markets of human flesh, and to the said points were carried those captured in Lanao, to be sold to the Chinos of Cotabato or to the Moros of the Rio Grande. And there also were sold those captured in this last-named place, to be sold in turn to the Moros of Lanao. In this manner to a great extent escape from their masters was almost impossible, as they were far from their own settlement and in an unknown region. The immense majority of the children who entered the refuges established at Tamontaca were Malanaos, and it was an interesting thing to hear them recount the manner in which they had been captured.

From the time that the gunboats commenced to cross the seas of the south to a degree did piracy cease at sea. For the seventeen years I was on the Rio Grande I received notification of only 3 or 4 Christians being captured. But the practice was renewed after the evacuation by the Spanish, when a Filipino government was left in Cotabato. This was succeeded by the American Government after the cataclysm of crime and violence with which we are well acquainted. But the American Government has done nothing up to the present to put down piracy, which has commenced once more to assume extraordinary proportions, its principal victims being the Tirurayes, the third part of whom have been carried away captive to Jolo and other points in two years. In this respect we have retrograded to the times of Corcuera (1639).

In concluding this subject, I will mention the following: Some time since, speaking with the American colonel at Zamboanga and with the commanding general of Cotabato, I told them that it appeared to me that the Moros went to Rio Grande and neighboring shores in Joloan pancos loaded with arms, which they sold at these places, and returned loaded down with Tirurayes. Although the said officers did not deny this, they doubted it, or believed at least that the tale was exaggerated. The following occurrence dispelled their doubts:

On the 29th of April the launch of Cotabato, which had come to Zamboanga three days before, returned, having as passengers myself and two American officers. A good distance before reaching Punta Flechas we discovered a white object on the larboard. We soon knew it to be a vinta. The captain of the launch remarked, "Surely that is a Joloan panco, and if it is going out that way they are certainly carrying arms, and if it comes thence it carries Tirurayes." In Spanish times this boat would have been examined. "Shall we examine it?" said the captain, as though defending his honor. No sooner said than done. It was in fact a Joloan panco, the crew of which seeing us bearing down upon it let down its sail and hoisted the American flag. However, the flag proved of no value to them. The captain boarded her with four marines and commenced his examination. In half a minute they discovered in the hold large quantities of cartridges, carbines of various classes, rifles, Remingtons, and a large case of cartridges and pistols. The panco was taken in tow and, together with its crew, carried to Cotabato, where the captain and crew were thrown into prison.

Our task is done. It will be a happy day when the Government of the United States becomes convinced of the existence of the obstacle to civilization we have here denounced and of the possibility and necessity of removing it for the common welfare of the country.

Pio Pi, S. J.

MANILA, P. I., *July 25, 1901.*

APPENDIX VII.

A BRIEF SUMMARY OF HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS RESPECTING THE SPANISH MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOROS, FROM THE YEAR 1578 TO 1898, COMPILED FOR MAJ. GEN. GEORGE W. DAVIS, COMMANDING THE DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES, BY FIRST LIEUT. WILLIAM E. W. McKINLEY, NINTH U. S. CAVALRY, ASSISTANT TO OFFICER IN CHARGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION DIVISION, HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA, P. I., JULY 1, 1903.

About the same time that the last Moorish kingdom in Spain was conquered the Mohammedan faith became the religion of the natives of southwestern Mindanao, as well as those of Jolo and other adjacent islands; and by the time of the arrival of Legaspi at the mouth of the Pasig, in 1571, two Mohammedan chiefs had established themselves at Tondo and Manila. This Pasig River colony was soon converted to Christianity by the Spaniards, but the relations of the latter with the Mohammedans of Mindanao and Jolo have been more frequently hostile than amicable.

The Spaniards gave to these Malayan Mohammedans the name of Moros, and with the name brought much of their hereditary hatred for the Barbary Moors or Moros, who for seven hundred years had held the most fertile spots of Spain.

For nearly three centuries intermittent attempts were made by the Spaniards to destroy the power of the Moro pirates, who, almost without intermission, raided the Spanish colonies throughout the islands south of Luzon, and even occasionally on that island. Many reverses were met by the Spanish expeditions against the Jolo and Mindanao Moros, and some successes. The important events of the three centuries will be sketched briefly below:

It was in 1578, during the administration of De Sande, the third captain-general of the Philippines, that the first conflict between the Mohammedans and the Spaniards took place. In this year Sirela or Malaela, the Sultan of Borneo, came to Manila, offering his kingdom as a tributary of Spain for help to recover his throne from his brother. The captain-general personally headed the expedition of 400 Spaniards, 1,500 natives, and 300 Borneans. This expedition was successful and Sirela was replaced in power.

In the same year the Jolo Moros seized and enslaved the crew, partly Spanish, of a vessel en route from Manila to Cebu. An expedition against Mindanao and Jolo was successful, but achieved no permanent success, as the force was not sufficient to leave garrisons.

In 1581 a second expedition was sent against Borneo for the same purpose as the former one, Sirela having been again deposed by his brother, and in 1582, under orders from Philip II of Spain, an expedition was sent to conquer the Moluccas. This conquest was defeated by an epidemic among the troops.

In 1596 Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa was given the title to Mindanao for conquest at his own expense. In the same year the conquest was entered into by an expedition of 214 Spaniards from Panay. The expedition reached the Rio Grande, was well received by the natives, who were hostile to the Buhayen Moros, under the leadership of the datos, Silonga, Malaria, and Bulusan, who had fortified themselves 24 miles up the river. The outcome, however, was disastrous, the commander losing his life. The survivors intrenched themselves near the mouth of the river, founding the town of Murcia. Advices were sent to Manila and an expedition of 400 men, under Ronquilla, was dispatched to the relief of the colony. Meanwhile a fleet from the Moluccas, organized by Bulusan, with 600 men, was surprised by two Spanish galleys while in Illana Bay en route to the Rio Grande and was practically annihilated.

This disaster caused the Buhayen Moros to seek peace, and the Spaniards were enabled to traverse their territory unmolested. Ronquilla, however, reported the

place indefensible and asked leave to return to Manila, which request was so far approved as to authorize him to retire to Caldera, near Zamboanga. The governor changed his mind after the completion of this move and of the fort at Caldera, and ordered a return to the Rio Grande. Ronquilla left a garrison at Caldera under Pacheco and returned to Manila, where he was court-martialed but acquitted. The Rio Grande station was not reoccupied. Pacheco, in 1598, made an unsuccessful attack on Jolo (the first Spanish attack on Jolo on record), and in this attack he was killed and his forces defeated. The Caldera fort was then abandoned.

In July, 1599, Dato Silonga, with 3,000 Buhayen Moros, raided the coast settlements of Cebu, Negros, and Panay, committing all kinds of outrages. In 1600 a repetition was attempted by a large force, but was repulsed in southern Panay.

In February, 1602, a second expedition against Jolo under Gallinato failed on account of lack of supplies. In the same year a raid of Mindanao Moros under the personal command of the dato of Buhayen penetrated to Batangas Province, but were repulsed at Balayan. The Moros, however, captured a Spanish vessel en route from Cebu to Manila, destroyed the principal towns of Mindoro, only 60 miles from Manila, and very nearly captured the governor-general, who was returning to Manila. While dividing their spoils at Marapon the Moros were attacked by an expedition under Travelo and were routed, with a loss of 200 killed and 50 prisoners.

In 1603 the governor-general began the construction of forts in Panay. In 1605 Silonga asked for peace, which was made and Moro captives were liberated.

The peace continued until 1616, when a Moro expedition was organized at Jolo. This fleet was surprised off Point Potol and again between Cebu and Negros, and the remnant was finally destroyed off Cavite. The expedition was successful, however, in destroying Pantao, in the Camarines, and the shipyards at Cavite and exacting a large sum for ransom of Spanish prisoners. In 1625 a Moro raid from one of the islands near Borneo descended on Catbalogan, Samar, and sacked the town. A Spanish expedition from Iloilo retaliated on the pirate town near Borneo, reducing it to ashes. In 1627 and 1628 two expeditions were directed against Jolo. The first from Cebu was successful, considerable Moro property being destroyed. This attack was then directed against Basilan, the Moros inhabiting that island being allied with the Joloans. The second expedition failed, the leader being wounded. In 1628 a treaty was made between Spain and the Mindanao Moros. In 1629 the Jolo Moros committed outrages in Samar, Leyte, and other islands, and in 1630 a punitive expedition from Dapitan destroyed 7 large and 33 small boats at Jolo.

In 1635 the Moros raided and sacked Tayabas and numerous towns in Bohol and Leyte. In 1635 de Chaves, with 300 Spaniards and 100 natives, began work on a fort at Zamboanga. In the same year Dato Tagal, with a force of Buhayen Moros, sacked Cuyo, Culion, and several towns of Mindoro and enslaved 650 natives. He was surprised, while returning, near Punta Flechas, and his fleet destroyed with great loss, 130 of his prisoners being released and much booty retaken.

The Spanish Government concluded that this situation was intolerable, as no less than 20,000 prisoners had been carried off captives during the thirty years. The new governor-general, Corcuera, decided on a conquest of Mindanao and Jolo, and in February, 1637, his first successful campaign was inaugurated. Starting with 4 companies of infantry, 3 of marines, and a large number of Visayans and Pampangans, his force was augmented at Zamboanga by 3 additional companies, bringing his strength in Europeans to 760. He proceeded to the Rio Grande (called Corrolat, after the reigning sultan). He pushed to success an attack against the town of Lamitan, burning it and several others, and executed 72 captured Moros. The defeated sultan attempted another stand at the hill commanding the present town of Cotabato, but was driven also from there here, escaping wounded. The datos of Buhayen and Basilan then submitted, and Corcuera returned to Zamboanga and later to Manila. In October of the same year Corcuera returned to Zamboanga and organized an expedition of 600 Spaniards and 1,000 natives against Jolo. In January, 1638, the expedition was started. Landings were made on both sides of the island, and after several fights Caceres and Jolo were captured, but the Sultan escaped. Corcuera repaired the fort on the hill now called Alphonso XIII, and, appointing a governor, left him with a garrison of 200 Spaniards and 200 natives. This is the record of the first mastery of the islands by Spaniards.

In 1638 the Buhayen dato, Moncay, resented the construction of a fort near his own seat and besieged the Spanish garrison, which was reenforced by the Manobos with 2,000 men. Supplies and reenforcements from Zamboanga raised the siege. Almonte built a fort at Sabonilla (now Malabang), and an expedition from there

in 1639 against the Buhayens defeated Moncay, but did not prevent his escape to the mountains. Meanwhile, in 1639, the Lanao Moros, though acknowledging the sovereignty of Corralat, committed depredations on the north coast of Mindanao. The warlike Recolleto friar, Agustin de San Pedro, retaliated, leading a party of his people to the lake and burning a Moro settlement. Again, in April, 1639, a party of 50 soldiers and 500 volunteers from Caraga, under Atienza, accompanied by the same priest, reached the lake without opposition, carrying up 6 boats from Iligan, and 2,000 families are said to have submitted. (At this period the leading datos were Pagayayabon, on the Didungan; Dagalo and Monacor, of Taraca; Mabololo, of Bayang, and Macaluyo, of Banayan.) Atienza retired against the wishes of the priest, without fortifying in the lake region. Shortly afterwards another expedition from Sabonilla reached the lake and constructed a fort, which was later destroyed, the garrison returning to Iligan, as the Moros were becoming hostile.

In 1638 an attack at Jolo caused a loss of 42 men to the garrison. General Almonte attempted the capture of the Sultan, but the latter escaped to Tawi-Tawi, though with severe loss. Almonte returned to Manila, leaving Morales as governor of Jolo.

The Moro submission was of short duration. Morales forcibly abducted a daughter of a leading Moro dato, which exasperated the Jolo Moros into hostilities. Morales was relieved for this act, but was later restored to his command, losing his life in an imprudent pursuit near Parang. This disaster was soon avenged by the successor of Morales, and expeditions were sent against Pangutaran and Tapul.

A piratical expedition about this time ravaged the Calamianes.

In 1641 and 1642, Corralat, Sultan of Mindanao, captured two Spanish vessels, and, with Moncay, attacked the Buhayen fort, mortally wounding the commanding officer and completely defeating the relief expedition from Zamboanga, only seven Spaniards escaping. General Almonte made peace with Corralat and the Buhayen garrison returned to Sabonilla. General Corcuera, then at Zamboanga, beheaded the leader of the ill-fated relief expedition, caused the Sabonilla fort to be destroyed, and sent its garrison to punish Corralat. The expedition failed and Corralat, in his turn, attacked a town near Zamboanga and some minor settlements in Basilan.

In 1644 de Fajardo, the captain-general, made peace with Corralat, and in 1645, at a convention at Simuay, the governor of Zamboanga, de Atienza, representing Spain, signed a treaty to that effect. A Moro attack on Jolo was repulsed, but in 1646 the station was abandoned, and a treaty was made whereby the Jolo and Tawi-Tawi Islands remained under the Sultan, the islands of Tapul, Balanguitan, Siassi, and Pangutaran remaining Spanish. The Sultan acknowledged Spanish sovereignty and promised to prevent piratical depredations. Very shortly afterwards, however, trouble arose between Corralat and Moncay, into which Monforte, at Zamboanga, was drawn as an ally by Corralat.

Despite the Jolo treaty, the Jolo dato, Salicala, and a dato from Borneo ravaged the Visayan coast. The force of the latter was defeated by Monforte near Masbate, and Salicala returned to Jolo. Monforte destroyed several towns and 300 boats in Borneo. In 1655 trouble again broke out between Corralat and the Spanish forces, the Moros sacking numerous towns in the Calamianes and one town near Zamboanga. In 1656 a fleet dispatched by De Sara, the new captain-general, burned Corralat's town and some Moro towns in Sibuguey Bay, destroying also a Dutch fleet allied with the Moros. The Moros at the same time were ravaging the coasts of Mindoro and Marinduque, and succeeded also in repulsing the attack on the fort at Corralat, forcing the Spaniards to return to Sabonilla and Zamboanga. In 1657 Salicala scoured the Philippine seas, capturing over 1,000 native prisoners, entering the Bay of Manila during the raid. In 1660 Moros from Jolo and Tawi-Tawi, taking advantage of an insurrection in Luzon, raided the coasts of Bohol, Leyte, and Mindoro.

In 1662 a Chinese rebellion embarrassed the Spaniards, and at this time several datos from the Jolo and Tawi-Tawi islands sacked and burned a great many towns in the Visayas. Following these inroads, Bobadilla, governor of Zamboanga, was ordered to evacuate that station, which was done in January, 1663.

For the next half century Moro raids on the Mindanao and Visayan settlements marked each year, and many fights were chronicled between the fleets of praus and the Spanish fleet known as the "Armada de los Pintados."

The Jesuits had endeavored in 1666 and 1672 to have the fort of Zamboanga rebuilt, but it was not until 1712 that the Spanish King ordered its reestablishment, and even then the project was not realized until 1718, in which year the present fort, with four bastions, was built and the city walls protected. The place was defended by 61 pieces of artillery. The reestablishment of the Zamboanga station

caused great discontent among the Moros. It was besieged for two months in 1720 and 1721 by 5,000 Moros under the dato of Butig. The resistance, directed by the governor, Amorrea, was successful, and the siege abandoned, the Moros turning their efforts to raids on Mindoro and the Calamianes, where great damage was done.

In 1724 the Jolo sultan made a treaty of peace with the Spaniards, ceding the island of Basilan. But this same year Manaol, in Mindoro, and Cateel, in Mindanao, were attacked. In 1730 Tay-Tay was sacked and burned by Tawi-Tawi Moros, and the fort at that place unsuccessfully attacked. In 1731 a punitive expedition was sent to Jolo and a number of Moro towns destroyed. In 1734 the Tawi-Tawi Moros attacked and nearly succeeded in capturing Zamboanga. In the same year, and again in 1735, Tay-Tay was again attacked, but the Moros were severely punished in these engagements. In the same year another surprise was attempted at Zamboanga. These actions were supplemented by numerous minor engagements, and were temporarily terminated by a new peace treaty in 1737 with the new sultan of Jolo.

In 1746 letters from King Philip V, addressed to the sultans of Jolo and Tamontaca (Mindanao), requesting that the Christian religion be allowed to be preached in their domains, were received, and upon sending embassies to the sultans the project was apparently well received. In 1748 two Jesuit priests took their station at Jolo, but on account of a family quarrel Bantilan, brother of the Sultan, proclaimed himself as ruler of Jolo during the absence of the sultan at Zamboanga. The deposed Sultan came to Manila in 1749, and in 1750 professed a desire to become a Christian. The archbishop of Manila did not believe in his sincerity, but he was baptized at Paniqui, in another diocese. In 1751 the sultan returned to Jolo, escorted by a Spanish force under Antonio de Abad, with the intention of overthrowing Bantilan. The expedition was unsuccessful and returned to Zamboanga. In the meantime a letter was intercepted from the Sultan of Sulu to the Sultan of Mindanao, and its contents established the infidelity and disloyalty of the Sultan Ali Mudin. He, his family, and his followers, numbering over 200, were imprisoned in Manila and Cavite, and a second expedition was sent against Jolo without result.

During the succeeding two years the Jolo Moros were unmerciful in their raids, which were most extensive. Paragua, Leyte, the north coast of Mindanao, Romblon, Tayabas, Ticao, Mindoro, Culion, and the Calamianes suffered severely. Two towns in Zambales Province were reached by the Moros. In 1754 the raids were repeated in Mindoro, Leyte, and Mindanao, and extended to Cebu, Negros, and Panay; this year Albay and Batangas provinces also were reached. The Spaniards were not without success in these years. In 1753 a fleet of 150 praus was destroyed, with about 2,000 Moros, and 500 captives liberated. In 1754 the fort at Misamis was built. In 1756 it is reported that 2,500 Moros were killed in an attack on a Spanish galley off Batangas. In 1757 the Moros burned the town of Mariveles, in Manila Bay, as well as several towns in the southern islands and the Calamianes, but lost a fleet from Tuboc in an encounter with Spanish galleys.

During these five years the Moro attacks were so persistent and successful that in many of the Visayan towns 50 per cent of the inhabitants were killed or enslaved.

In 1762 the British captured Manila, and, due to this and the rising of the natives of the northern provinces, the Moros renewed their attacks on the southern islands. Continuing for several years, they sacked and burned towns in Sorsogon, Tablas, Sibuyan, Mindoro, Bataan, and Leyte, and in Surigao and Misamis provinces in Mindanao. Even Manila suffered from the raids during this period, 20 captives being secured in Malate. Malabon and Parañaque were also attacked.

In 1771 de Anda, the new captain-general, reorganized the Armada de los Pintados, but the incursions continued. In this year a Spanish friar was captured by a Moro fleet at Aparri, Cagayan. About this time Israel, the son of Ali Mudin, was established in the sultanate of Jolo by the British.

In 1773 Anda, desiring to promote better relations between the Spaniards and the new sultan of Jolo, proposed free trade and Spanish help to expel the British from the Moro territory without interference with the internal government of the sultan, but the Spanish officer failed to observe his instructions and nothing beneficial resulted, save further irritation of the Moros. About 4,000 Chinese expelled from Manila in 1758 joined the Jolo Moros; also a number of Englishmen, the leader of whom, named Brun, was put in charge of the defense. In 1775 the Moros destroyed the British colony on Balambangan, led by the dato, Teteng, who later in the year made an attempt against Zamboanga and, upon its being frustrated, committed great ravages upon the coast of Cebu, and continued this for two years. From 1776 to 1778, during the rule of Governor Pedro Sarrio, the Moros harassed the coast as never before. At this time the Sultan Israel, of Jolo was poisoned by

Ali Mudin, his cousin. In 1778 the "Light Fleet" dislodged the Moros from their fort at Mamburao, Mindoro, and traffic between Luzon and the southern islands, which had been practically paralyzed for ten years, began to revive. The Sultan of Jolo asked for peace in 1781. In 1781, also, the Mindanao Moros invaded the Visayan Islands, but were defeated.

In 1785 the Moros burned several towns in the Visayas and captured a prau in Bulacan Province, near Manila.

In 1789 the captain-general, Mariquina, informed the King that constant war with the Moros "was an evil without remedy." The governor of Iloilo reported more than 400 persons made captives in two towns. In 1792 Boljoon in Cebu and another town in Leyte were burned and 120 of the inhabitants made prisoners. In 1794 expeditions visited Mindoro, and the Jolo Moros became more peaceful, but the Ilanaos, living on the bay of Tubug, in Mindanao, and the natives of Tampassooc, on the west coast of Borneo, made constant raids, not only in the Philippines, but also upon the Dutch islands of Banca and Malacca. In 1794 Siroma, in the Camarines, was attacked and many natives of Daet, in the same province, were carried off.

In 1796 the shipyard of San Blas, Mexico, was transferred to Cavite for building the vessels required in the Moro campaigns. From this resulted the naval arsenal at Cavite.

In 1796 the naval lieutenant, Arcillos, was captured and put to death at Sibuguey, and the next year Caraga was attacked by the Moros.

In 1798 Zamboanga was attacked by the British fleet; and in the same year 500 Moros, with 25 praus, fell upon Baler, Casiguran, and Palanan, east coast of Luzon, capturing 450 people. The headquarters of the pirates for years was on Burias Island, from whence they descended upon the neighboring towns. The Spanish ship *San José* was also captured at Tawi-Tawi by the brother of the Sultan of Jolo, and part of its crew sacrificed.

In 1803 the Moros had so ravaged Mindoro that the greater part of the people abandoned the towns for the mountains.

In 1793 to 1794 no headway was made against the pirates, while some of their boats made a landing on the coast of Zambales, north of Manila Bay, and escaped without loss.

At a meeting of the authorities in Manila and persons of the southern islands, it was shown that each year the Moros captured and enslaved about 500 persons.

The expenses from 1778 to the end of 1793 amounted to 1,519,209 pesos fuertes. Six divisions were formed, each of six gunboats and one "panco" or prau, and the forts of the Visayas, Mindoro, Tayabas, Batangas, and Zamboanga were repaired. Privateering against the Moros was also made permanent.

In 1805 a treaty was made between the Sultan of Jolo and the Spanish Government whereby it was agreed that no foreign resident would be permitted in Sulu without the consent of the Spanish Government, and that in case of war between Spain and any foreign country the Sultan's ports would be closed against Spain's enemies. From 1806 to 1815 detailed accounts of piratical raids are infrequent.

In 1813 a royal order incorporated the privateer fleet of the Philippines with the royal fleet. In 1815 the raiders took 1,000 natives prisoners and captured several Spanish, British, and Dutch vessels. In 1818 twenty-three Moro praus were captured or destroyed in a naval action off the coast of Albay, but later attacks were made by pirates upon Catanduanes Island and some towns of Albay and Camarines.

In 1824, at Pilas, 21 miles west of Basilan, a Moro fort was taken and severe losses inflicted upon its defenders, among the dead being the Dato Ipoypo, called "the lash of the Visayas," who each year had carried off more than 500 persons. The expedition also destroyed piratical boats at Jolo, Ilana Bay, Polloc, and other parts of Mindanao.

From 1827 to 1835 the records respecting Moro conflicts are meager. In 1836, under Salazar, a treaty (mainly commercial) was made with the Sultan of Jolo. In this same year hostile Moros were dislodged from Masbate.

In 1842 a fort was erected in Basilan. In April, 1843, a convention between the Sultan and the French emissary was made. It stipulated for equal rights of trade between the French and Joloan ports, and a later treaty, dated February 20, 1845, ceded the island of Basilan to France for the sum of 100,000 pesos. In 1844 the French war ship *Sabine* arrived at Zamboanga, and the commander notified the Spanish governor, Figueroa, that he had come to investigate the capture of some of his crew by the Maluso Moros; and later three other French vessels, under Vice-Admiral Cecille, arrived and blockaded the island of Basilan, the offender being the Dato Usak. A Spanish force under Bocalan went immediately to Zamboanga, and soon the French raised the blockade. A Spanish fort was built at Pagsanjan,

Basilan. Later the Davao country was ceded to the Spaniards by the Sultan of Mindanao. The Davao settlement was made by José Oyanguren, who, in 1849, took the fort of Hijo.

In 1845 a Spanish frigate left Manila for Zamboanga, and from there proceeded to the island of Balanguingui, of the Samales group, where an anchorage was made at the principal port. Colonel Peñaranda, secretary to the civil governor of the Philippines, tried to communicate with the dato of the island, but in place of this was ordered to leave at once, and the Moro fort fired upon the Spanish frigate. A landing was made, but the party was obliged to retire with the loss of some men and Commander Rodriguez. At this time this island was the center of piracy in the archipelago, and the visit of the Spanish vessel was to ascertain its means of defense.

In 1848 the English-built steam gunboats *El Cano*, *Magallanes*, and *Reina de Castilla*, with three barkentines, carrying three companies of troops, went to Balanguingui, which was still a center of piracy. The expedition, headed by Claveria in person, anchored off Balanguingui, and an attack was made. After a cannonade from the vessels, three companies and 150 Zamboanga volunteers assaulted the walls and carried the fort after a desperate resistance, the Moros losing 100 killed. The Spanish lost 7 killed and 50 wounded. The next day another fort was captured in the same manner, 340 Moros being killed and 150, mostly women and children, being taken prisoners. The Spaniards lost 1 officer and 15 men killed, 224 wounded, and 22 contused. Seventy-nine pieces of artillery were captured in the two forts and 30 captives rescued. Two smaller forts were also taken, and the towns of Buasugan, Suitan, Pahat, and Padanan destroyed.

In 1848 two Dutch corvettes, being denied the return of some captives by the Sultan of Jolo, cannonaded the forts there for twenty-four hours.

In 1849 the British war ship *Meander*, Captain Kepple, with Sir James Brooke, the founder of Sarawak, on board, made a treaty with the Sultan of Jolo in which the Sultan promised not to recognize any other power as his suzerain without the consent of Great Britain. Later in 1849, 3,000 Moros from Jolo attacked the fort of Isabela de Basilan, but were repulsed. The prisoners taken were conducted to Zamboanga and a notice was sent to the Sultan of Jolo concerning the capture and punishment of his subjects.

A Moro fleet from Tonquil, together with some praus, in 1850, raided the islands of Samar and Camiguin, carrying off 75 natives. The old and the children were thrown overboard as useless. A Spanish fleet then went to Jolo. The place was defended by five cotas or forts. It was also fortified by a wall and was well supplied with cannon. The population numbered some 7,000 people, of whom 500 were Chinese. Two officers sent to arrange an interview were fired upon by Moros after embarking. The place was deemed to be too strong for attack by the force present and the Spanish commander decided to return and await reinforcements; but the forts, without notice, opened a general fire upon the fleet at anchor, killing 7 and wounding 4 sailors. The fleet replied, but soon returned to Zamboanga.

The *El Cano* was sent to Manila with the news. Reinforcements arrived and the expedition returned to Jolo, capturing the place after a spirited action. The Spanish lost 3 killed and 92 wounded, while the Moros had 300 killed and lost over 100 cannon.

The fall of Jolo was not without effect. Numerous small expeditions to various Mindanao datos and sultans were well received. In April, 1850, the governor of Zamboanga went to Jolo, and on the 19th the Spanish flag was raised. The same day, in a treaty, the Sultan acknowledged the sovereignty of Spain, and agreed not to make treaties, conventions, and alliances with European powers, companies, persons, corporations, nor with any sultan or chief, and all treaties previously made with other powers were declared null and void. The Sultan also agreed to use no flag but that of Spain, and the Spanish governor guaranteed to respect the religion of the Moros. Piracy was also declared to be prohibited. A salary of 1,500 pesos was allowed to the Sultan, 600 pesos to 3 datos, and 360 pesos to the "sheriff" for his services to the Spanish Government. This treaty was dated and signed April 19, 1851.

Notwithstanding the promises of the Sultan, pirate vessels continued to scour the remote parts of the archipelago. Five small Spanish vessels encountered a Moro fleet of 4 praus on the southwest coast of Paragua. One of the Spanish vessels was blown up, but the pirates were defeated with a loss of 100 dead. The Spaniards lost 14 killed and 12 wounded, but rescued 20 captives from the Moros.

In 1852 a general rebellion broke out in Sugut near Polloc. The Spanish attacked the fort and killed 50 of the Moros.

In January, 1854, a company of the Principe Regiment was ambuscaded in Basilan and nearly all killed. In this same year a town on Capul, near Jolo, was burned by the Spaniards from Basilan; but in 1855 the Moros from Sulu made a dash upon Zamboanga and burned the best part of the town.

In 1856 a Spanish expedition burned a town of Jolo for piracy, also one in the islands of Simisa and one on Basilan.

In 1857 the gunboat *Reina de Castilla*, 150 soldiers, and 50 Zamboanga volunteers destroyed 2 villages near Zamboanga. In 1858 General Norzagaray offered premiums to whomsoever should kill any pirate wherever found, but this was of no important result.

In this year the "light fleet" of *Isabela de Basilan* sailed for Simisa, where it surprised the Moros and after a hard fight put them to flight. Seventy-six captives were rescued and 116 prisoners taken, among them the families of two powerful datos. In view of the state of the island and the captivity of their people the two chiefs presented themselves at Basilan with 60 captives, one a priest and another a European woman, and in view of their submission the governor made an exchange of prisoners. In 1860 the Moros established themselves on the islands of Catanduanes and Biti and others belonging to the province of Albay, the governor of the province being unable to dislodge them. They also infested the straits of San Bernardino between Luzon and Samar, their number being between 400 and 500, where they killed some 16 persons, captured 10, and carried off a vessel. The same year two piratical datos of Dong-Dong in Tawi-Tawi were killed by the dato Alip and their heads carried to Zamboanga. In 1860 the Moros attempted to seize a vessel lying at anchor at Tuluyan, and in the attempt 3 of them were killed. The Spanish officer wrote an arrogant letter to the Sultan demanding the return of 2 Spaniards and 200 natives within six days, and the Sultan acceding sent 12 vessels to Tawi-Tawi to repress some of the pirate datos.

In 1861, 18 steam gunboats were purchased in England, and it was due to these boats that the almost continued piracy which had existed up to that time was soon reduced to insignificance.

In 1862 Samales Moros made raids on the Zamboanga coast, but the raids ceased when a small gunboat sank a large prau with all of its crew. At the same time a small fleet forced the Sultan of Mindanao to hoist a Spanish flag at Polloc. The Moros met reverses in loss of fleets near Guimaras and Tugubanan islands and in the destruction of the four towns Ponugan, Bugamputi, Patan, and Caneanga.

In September of 1864 an expedition was sent from Polloc against the Rio Grande Moros, who had built defenses on that river from Cotabato to Tumbao. The fort at Pagalungan was captured, with a severe loss to the Moros. In the report of this assault honorable mention was made of Ensigns Cervera and Montijo, afterwards Spanish admirals. In this year the Talayan Moros were proceeded against, the Spanish being aided by a force under Dato Uto, son of the Sultan of Buhayan, but during the attack Uto joined the Talayan Moros, and the expedition failed. A second expedition also failed, and the outlying fort at Bongao was abandoned.

In 1866 the Moros of Supangan and Simunay rose in rebellion, and the governor of Mindanao, with a force and four gunboats, proceeded against the fortified towns of Supangan, Dulugan, and Sanditan. The expedition was entirely successful, with but slight loss. In 1870 a raid was made by Tawi-Tawi Moros on the east coast of Paragua. The town of Santa Monica, or Batacalan, was destroyed and all of its inhabitants carried away. Two years later a garrison of native troops was placed at Puerto Princesa.

In this year a naval blockade of Jolo was established, and in 1873 two German vessels were seized while carrying contraband of war to the Jolo Moros. In 1874 this fleet did considerable damage to the Moros of the islands from Jolo to Tawi-Tawi. Toward the close of the same year a large party of Moros attacked the garrison at Balabac, but were repulsed. In October, 1875, two gunboats in search of Moro pirates located their headquarters in the Bay of Areray and sank one large prau.

These operations practically terminated the long term of piracy under which the colonies had suffered for three centuries. The mobility of the steam gunboats and the subsequent blockade against introduction of arms and ammunition had in a dozen years practically removed the menace, though occasionally raids appeared in the years to follow. Most of the trouble in the succeeding years, however, took the form of more or less extensive campaigns against the three large groups of Moros (Sulu, Rio Grande, and Lanao) in the control of the fanatical running amuck, called by the Spaniards "juramentado."

CAMPAIGN OF 1876.

In 1873 Spain had largely reorganized her Philippine forces, and in 1876 the forces included seven native regiments of infantry and one of artillery, two regiments of the civil guard, and some force of carbineers and marines. There were also troops at Balabac, Isabela de Basilan, and Cavite.

The relations between the Government and Di Amirul, the Sultan of Jolo, had been becoming more and more tense, and an extensive expedition was planned against the Sultan by the captain-general in 1876, in spite of Spain's political troubles at home and the depleted condition of the treasury. The projected expedition was received with great enthusiasm in the city of Manila and throughout Luzon, especially by the great religious orders. The fleet of 10 steamers leaving Manila early in February was reenforced at Zamboanga and proceeded with 11 additional transports and miscellaneous vessels under the escort of 12 gunboats to Bacungan, where anchorage was made on February 20. The captain-general was in command and was accompanied by the admiral in command of naval forces. On the 22d a landing was made at Paticolo, about a league northeast of Jolo, the fleet silencing the ineffectual Moro resistance. Malcampo, the captain-general, ordered a half brigade to remain at Paticolo with the engineer section and a mountain battery, with directions to march upon Jolo the following day in order to unite with the force which the captain-general would lead into the interior to flank the Moro stronghold. The plan proved nearly fatal to the turning column. It was lost in the thick woods and was unable, on a very hot day, to find water. The following afternoon, harassed by the Moros and nearly perishing from thirst, the column reached the shore at Tandu, where it united with that left at the beach, which had not been molested in the least.

The captain-general, loth to abandon his plan of attacking Jolo from the interior, finally decided to attack by the shore. The army advanced at daylight on the 29th, the fleet opening upon the forts at the same time. At 9 a heavy rain came on and lasted an hour, at the end of which time a brigade advanced against the forts of the *datos* Daniel and Ubico. The vanguard was led by the First Regiment, and the brigade commander was the first to set foot upon the enemy's works. After a sharp fight the forts were captured by the Spaniards, and the entire force advanced. The Moros in the forts of the Sultan and the Dato Tanquan made a fierce resistance, and two colonels fell wounded; but the last works were carried by an assault of the Spanish artillery battalion, Jolo remaining in undisputed possession of the Spaniards.

On the following day a half brigade, with 4 naval guns, took the fort of Panglima Arab, situated in a wood about 1 kilometer from the shore.

The town of Liang was also burned, and a small expedition destroyed 80 boats and burned 90 houses on Tapul Island, besides killing some Moros; and an expedition under General Sanchez destroyed the town of Lacul-Palac, 3 kilometers in the interior from Jolo. The "cota" at Parang was taken, and later Maibun was taken by a landing party from the fleet under Lieutenant Ordonez. A fort called Alphonso XII was erected on the site of the "cota" of the Dato Daniel, and a redoubt named "Princesa de Asturias" upon that of the "cota" of Panglima Arab. Between the two a camp was formed called "Our Lady of Victories." The fort of Alphonso XII was soon completed and 2 infantry regiments, one company Spanish artillery, another of engineers, the 2 disciplinary companies of Balabac and Puerta Princesa, and the "prisoners' brigade" were designated as the garrison of Jolo. Capt. Pascual Cervera was made politico-military governor of the island.

General Malcampo was given the title of "Count of Jolo" and "Viscount of Mindanao," many decorations were given, and a medal was struck for each participant in the campaign.

The Moros made frequent attacks in a small way and resented the occupation of the capital. These attacks were repeated in greater force in April and May, but were repulsed in both cases. Fevers decimated the garrison, and even in September the sick numbered 340.

In 1876 there began a series of diplomatic negotiations between Spain, on the one side, and Great Britain and the German Empire, on the other, respecting Spanish sovereignty in Jolo and on the north coast of Borneo, which was not concluded until the protocol of Madrid on March 7, 1885, by which the sovereignty of Spain relinquished any claim to the territories occupied by the British North Borneo Company. It is, however, of interest to note that the British North Borneo Company is the outgrowth of an American company founded in August, 1865, under the name of "The American Trading Company of Borneo," under a concession from the Sultan of Brunei.

Among the most important documents of this period may be cited the Madrid protocol of March 11, 1877, between Great Britain, Germany, and Spain, giving free trade and equal rights with Spaniards at Jolo to British and German subjects; the treaty of the Sultan of Jolo and his datos submitting to Spain, signed at Licup (Jolo) July 22, 1878; the letter of incorporation of the British North Borneo Company, dated London, November 7, 1881; and the Anglo-German-Spanish protocol of 1885.

In September, 1877, a determined assault was made on the Jolo garrison by about 2,000 Moros. After three days of fighting, in which they destroyed some property, they were driven off.

The treaty above mentioned, establishing Spanish sovereignty in the Sulu Archipelago, was signed by the Sultan and Colonel Martinez, the governor, at Licup, Jolo, in 1878.

In this same year the Dato Uata Mama and his followers assassinated several Spaniards at Tamontaca, Mindanao, among them the judge of the first instance, an army surgeon, a lieutenant, and several soldiers. The act was treacherously carried out while the Spaniards were holding a conference with the Moros. This crime was never punished, the dato dying of cholera in 1882.

In 1878 was also recorded the first case of "juramentado." The fanatic attacked and wounded 6 men in the marine barracks at Jolo before he was dispatched. This was the first of a long list of similar attacks at this station, which are detailed briefly below to show the extent to which these outrages grew:

In 1878, 1 man in public square of Jolo killed 7 and wounded 6 natives, and then escaped.

Six men made an attack injuring 1 Chinaman and 2 Moros; 4 were killed, 2 escaped.

February 9, 1 Moro wounded 5 men, and was killed.

March 8, 1 Moro wounded 3 men, and was killed.

September 16, 1 Moro wounded 2 sentinels, and was killed.

September 29, 4 Moros wounded 2 missionaries, and 2 were killed.

November 25, 13 Moros entered Jolo with arms concealed in bamboo water tubes: 11 were killed by the troops, but not until 13 persons had been wounded.

In 1880, March 30, 40 Moros from Looc attacked a Spanish party, killing 2 soldiers and wounding 8. Twelve of the Moros were killed. This attack was punished by the Sultan, who was awarded the "Cross of Isabel" by the Spanish Government for the service.

In 1881, February 16, 2 Moros were killed in the Jolo trenches after killing a native soldier.

February 19, 4 Moros attacked the Jolo lines, wounding a Spanish ensign, and all were killed.

March 26-28, similar attacks were driven off without loss to the troops.

August 29, 3 Moros lost their lives at an outpost, killing 1 soldier and wounding 4.

September 19, 8 Moros killed 1 soldier and wounded several near Jolo, themselves escaping.

In 1882, September 12, 3 juramentados in the Jolo market wounded 11 soldiers and a native, being killed by the troops.

September 14, 3 Moros wounded a soldier and a native before being dispatched.

September 20, a small band lost 7 killed in an attack upon an outpost.

To suppress these outrages the settlements in which most of them originated, Looc and Boal, were destroyed in October and November, 1882, by expeditions from Jolo, and severe losses were inflicted on the Moros by the troops.

Nevertheless in July, 1883, three juramentados in the square of Jolo killed 2 officers and a soldier and wounded an officer and 2 soldiers; 2 of them succeeded in escaping. Later 12 Moros attacked 8 soldiers who were cutting wood near Jolo, and all but two escaped.

In addition to these assassinations a well-organized attack on the garrison at Jolo was made in April, 1881, but it was successfully repulsed. On the death of the Sultan a few days later the attack was repeated with the same result.

The "juramentado" fanaticism was not confined to Jolo. The following cases are recorded among the Rio Grande Moros:

November, 1881, one Moro wounded 1 of the mothers of the Moro Orphan Asylum at Tamontaca; he was later beheaded by the Moro Raja Muda.

June 8, 1882, during a religious parade at Cotabato a juramentado beheaded a soldier and wounded another and 2 women before being dispatched by the troops. Soon after another killed 2 soldiers near the Taviran fort.

In 1882 Spanish detachments occupied the stations of Bongao, Siassi, and Tataan.

In 1884 a tour of the Southern Islands was made by the governor-general, de Jovellar, and he reported as follows to the colonial minister:

"The enterprise of occupation is completely paralyzed, and either on account of insufficient means or a badly followed system twenty years have been lost. There is nothing, in effect, further from signifying a proposition of permanence and improvements than the state of all our establishments. There hardly exist the ruins of the buildings formerly erected. At Polloc the old fort and barracks have both completely disappeared. The fort at Cotabato has also completely disappeared, not one stone remaining upon another, and the smaller forts of Libungan, Tumbao, Taviran, and Tamontaca, upon one side or the other of the two arms of the river, could not be more temporary. The troops are badly quartered at all places—in buildings either honeycombed by the white ants or threatening to fall in ruins. In Cotabato the ammunition has become useless on account of the lack of a magazine, and the ordnance supplies and commissaries of the military administration for the garrison are stored in a rented house. Nothing exists in that part of Mindanao to indicate a fixed occupation or thought of permanency except the continued renewal of the troops; each day under worse conditions."

On January 26 General Jovellar returned to Manila, and as a consequence of his representations 100,000 pesos were authorized in the budget of 1885-86 for the construction of a fort for one company, a storehouse, a hospital, and a magazine at Cotabato.

On February 22, 1884, Badurudin, the Sultan of Jolo, died at Maibun without issue. The council at once divided on the succession, the factions favoring Raja Muda Amilol, a youth of 14, and Dato Aliubdin, respectively legitimate son and brother of Diamarol, the preceding sultan. Each faction proclaimed its candidate sultan, at the same time notifying General Parrado, governor of Jolo. The latter preserved a neutral attitude, informing the captain-general of the condition. The proposition from the captain-general that Amilol should be sultan, but under the regency of Aliubdin until his majority, was refused by both factions, and two sultans reigned in Jolo, the boy Amilol, under his mother at Maibun, and his uncle, Aliubdin, at Paticolo. In April of the same year a similar condition of affairs followed the death of the Sultan of Mindanao. Dato Uto having proclaimed his protege, Mamuku, the new sultan, the other datos protested, favoring Mamucpun, of Sibuguey, brother of the late sultan's widow. Following the protest, the Spanish influence favored Mamucpun. In June of this year a royal order conferred on the sultans of Jolo and of Mindanao the honors of a lieutenant-general, without command, and the title of "Very Excellent," and salutes were decreed them upon visiting warships.

CAMPAIGNS OF 1886 AND 1887 AGAINST RIO GRANDE MOROS.

In Mindanao the Dato Uto had gradually become the most powerful chief upon the Rio Grande. The datos of the lower Rio Grande were harassed continually, and Uto even appeared defiantly before Cotabato with 80 war canoes, an insult to which the garrison was obliged to submit in silence in compliance with a decree forbidding aggressions upon Moros except in self-defense. Later some slaves of Uto escaped to Cotabato, and as they were not returned to him by the Spanish authorities he sent one of his followers into the town to kill one of the fugitives, the order being carried out. The district judge endeavored to secure Uto for trial, but the governor was unable to bring the dato before the court, and upon referring the matter to Manila the captain-general desired the audiencia to quash the case. When the judge refused he declared martial law and had the judge ordered to Manila, and later abolished the judicial district of Cotabato. Uto became more inimical to and defiant of the Spanish power, and a small expedition was sent against him composed of disciplinarios and troops, the former by land and the latter by gunboats, but the result was unfavorable to the Spanish. Then the Moros burned the Jesuit mission house at Tamontaca, the town of Amadeo, the infantry barracks, the coal sheds of the navy, and other buildings of the garrison of Cotabato, also other buildings on the Rio Grande. Notwithstanding these troubles, General Julian Serina, governor of Mindanao, had an interview with Uto and made an effort to arrange matters peaceably with him, but without satisfactory result, although some escaped slaves were returned to him and he was also paid for alleged losses sustained. Serina then decided to use force, and cited Uto for an interview at Bacat, but receiving no answer troops were ordered to Bacat and the place occupied.

The strategic position of Bacat, situated at the junction of the Bacat and Rio Grande rivers, was such that its permanent occupation would control the entire delta. A force was then formed to occupy the forest of Buhayen; small garrisons were left at Polloc and Tamontaca and 300 men at Cotabato. Two columns of about 300 men each were formed for the advance, moving up the river by steam ves-

sels, no resistance being encountered except at ineffective long range. A landing was made near the wood of Kinodal, where several "juramentado" attacks were made on the troops. A sharp fire being opened from the woods, the Spanish replied, and in the resulting engagement lost one killed and seven wounded, the Moros losing fifty killed and wounded. The expedition returned to Bacat, where the Moros attacked from the right bank of the river. A force crossed and dispersed them, leaving a detachment to protect the crossing. Moro houses in the vicinity of Bacat were destroyed, and, leaving a garrison of 500 to hold Bacat, the remaining troops were withdrawn to Cotabato.

On March 30 a small column left Cotabato and defeated the Moros at Tamontaca with a loss of 15 killed, and a few days later sank four Moro armed vessels in the backwater of Sapacan, 10 others escaping, but leaving 20 dead, among them the Dato Ladialam.

The approach of the rainy season made it impossible to carry out further operations, and General Serina reported what had been accomplished to the captain-general. The latter, upon receiving the report, resolved upon an immediate campaign in person, and so advised Serina, at the same time hiring several vessels, whose arrival at Zamboanga in the rainy season with troops, supplies, commissaries, and forage filled the garrison with astonishment. General Serina, seeing that the greater part of the supplies would be lost by the wet weather, and that a campaign during the rainy season would only result in heavy losses for the Spanish forces, left Zamboanga late in September, 1886, for Manila, where he persuaded General Terrero to wait until the end of January or the beginning of February before making an advance.

Upon his return to Zamboanga, Serina transferred his headquarters to Cotabato, where he arrived November 14. On the 15th he sailed in the *Bacolod* for a trip up the Rio Grande, preceded by a gunboat, 130 soldiers, and some 20 officers as guard. The steamers, joined by 2 gunboats, continued the voyage to Bacat. They were fired upon several times during the trip up and once while returning. On the 20th it was learned that the Dato Sanhuan, an ally of the Spaniards, had been assassinated by partisans of Uto, and that the latter was preparing forts and defenses against the threatened campaign. On December 6, 300 men reinforced Bacat. On the same day the followers of Dato Ayunan revenged themselves at Talayan for the killing of his brother Sanhuan, killing 7 of Uto's followers, 2 of whom were datos. On December 10, 500 men reinforced Cotabato.

On January 1, 1887, Tumbao was occupied by Lieutenant-Colonel Matos with about 300 men from Cotabato and a company of engineers from Libungan. A few days later Lieutenant-Colonel Holguin followed with troops from Zamboanga and Cotabato, and two forts were constructed at a bend in the Rio Grande, 10 miles from Tumbao and 3 from Bacat.

Meanwhile General Terrero had prepared his expedition, and early in January sailed from Manila with a force composed of 5 infantry regiments, 3 companies of artillery, 2 squadrons of cavalry, 300 disciplinarios, and 8 field and 2 siege guns. After a short stop at Zamboanga the expedition sailed for Polloc, where several gunboats had assembled. On the 14th three transports were sent with troops to Forts Bacat, Liong, and Piramide without a single Moro being seen. On the 19th the cavalry, marines, and some artillery were also taken to Bacat. To compose the expedition ships and troops had been drawn from throughout the archipelago, less than 1,000 men remaining to guard Manila, and not a gunboat or a soldier, except of the civil guard, being left in the Visayas. In Jolo, where hostilities were commencing, Colonel Arolas had but 320 men. Considerable discontent was apparent in Manila from this situation.

The field forces were organized into two columns, the first under General Serina and the second under Colonel San Felin. Serina's force numbered 1,182 men, with 6 field pieces and 4 siege guns; the column of San Felin was 1,129 strong, with 4 field pieces; 1,100 men were retained to garrison the ten forts or stations of Cotabato, Polloc, Libungan, Tumbao, Taviran, Tamontaca, Liong, Piramide, Bacat, and Kudaranga, a total of 3,411 men in the Rio Grande region. On the 26th two columns advanced along the "estero" of Bacat, one numbering 320 men and the other 330. The launch of the *Aragon*, towing two boats filled with soldiers, steamed along the stream, and many obstacles were removed from the channel. Like work was also done on the 27th and the 28th. On the afternoon of the 28th General Terrero directed a force of 460 men, with 3 guns, to bombard the forts of Saliling from the estero of Buhayen. The Moros replied with cannon, "lantacas," and rifles, but without effect. On the 29th two columns opened a road for 7 Whitworth guns, which opened fire on the forts on the 30th, the bombardment continuing on the 31st. On February 2 a general advance was made by three columns under General Terrero and Colonels San Felin and

Matos, that under the captain-general being composed almost entirely of Spaniards, the others being composed largely of native troops. These forces arrived within sight of the forts of Saliling almost without resistance from the enemy, but about 4 p. m. a torrential rain turned the camp into a swamp.

As the torrents of rain continued, the troops were obliged to take refuge at the camp of Reina Regente, the supplies being considerably damaged. A sand battery was built, guarded by 2 guns, and remained garrisoned by 1 company and 2 disciplinarios. Although up to this time the losses had been but 1 artilleryman killed and 2 wounded by the explosion of a gun charge, the hospitals were filled with sick owing to the exposure. On the 9th, the storm having ceased, the captain-general advanced and made his headquarters at the wood of Kinodal, the front being covered by the column of Matos and the left by that of San Felin. Eleven cotas (forts) at Lintunkan impeded the march and on the 11th were bombarded by 5 Krupp and 4 Plasencia guns, a general advance being made by daylight on the 12th.

The vanguard was formed of 2 companies and 120 disciplinarios, under Major Villabrille; the left by General Serina, a column of 3 regiments and the sailors from the *Aragon*; the right by Colonel San Felin's column of portions of 2 regiments and sailors from the gunboats, General Terrero's headquarters being escorted by a section of engineers and a squadron of cavalry. The condition of the ground greatly retarded the column by delaying the cavalry.

Upon arriving at the backwater or "estero" of Lintunkan 16 forts or "cotas" were discovered, but as the greater number were without defenders they were occupied after a very slight resistance from a few forts. The Spanish loss was 1 killed, 1 drowned, and several native soldiers wounded in the feet by bamboo stakes.

On the 13th the sacred grove was occupied, the troops wading to the waist in water the greater part of the time and driving the Moros before them at the grove. The Spanish loss was 6 killed and 17 wounded. The forces returned to Camp Reina Regente. A white flag was hoisted on the first fort of the Dato Kabalo, and after more than two weeks of negotiations the Dato Silungan, paternal uncle of Uto, presented himself to Terrero in the name of Uto, and on the 10th of March returned with the conditions of peace signed by Uto, his wife Radja Putri, the Sultan of Bacat, and others.

General Terrero then returned to Manila, arriving on March 21, where he was received with great honors and congratulated by the Madrid Government. The expedition is said to have cost over 1,000,000 pesos, part of the funds being taken from the fund of 3,000,000 pesos set aside for the harbor works of Manila, which were greatly crippled thereby. The number of sick was very great, some 680 having been sent to Zamboanga or Manila.

CAMPAIGNS OF 1886-87 AT JOLO.

The situation in regard to the Jolo sultanate, previously described, was further complicated in January, 1885, by the application at Manila of the Dato Harun, of Paragua, uncle of Amilol and cousin of Aliubdin, and the only living Moro signatory of the 1878 treaty, for support in his candidacy for the sultanate. He was informed by the governor-general that his full and spontaneous election by the council of Jolo datos would be recognized, whereupon he returned to Paragua, promising that it should be so. The early part of 1886 passed quietly at Jolo, Colonel Arolas having become governor of that station. In September General Terrero resolved to intervene actively in the disputed sultanate question, and announced Dato Harun as the Sultan of Jolo at a reception at the Malacañan palace in Manila, the reasons given for this action being that Amilol, aided by his mother, was gaining the ascendancy and that his accession had been rendered possible by his mother's crime of poisoning both her husband and the late Sultan Badarudin. In October Harun sailed for Jolo, where he was received by Colonel Arolas. Not being supported by the Jolo datos, it was necessary, under General Terrero's order, for the Spanish troops to give him active support. Accordingly, an expedition of 200 men, with a gunboat, escorted Harun to Parang, where he was received as sultan, but he soon retired to Jolo. Later it was learned that the Moros of the rancheria of Maibun were attacking those of Parang, and Arolas, in company with Harun, made another expedition to Parang on November 2, where several more datos swore allegiance to him; but on December 18 it became necessary to send a gunboat, with 150 men, against the rancheria of Bausang, which was taken by the troops, the Moro leader, Ambut, being killed in the fight. Tajil, a partisan of Harun, was relieved and the fort of Bausang destroyed.

Early in January, 1887, an expedition was sent with a launch and 40 soldiers

against Maibun, where two Moros were killed, and against the settlements of Tamparan and Tuyat, which were destroyed. In this same month an expedition destroyed the settlement of Tumahan and Taudic Bunha. Both of these expeditions were accompanied by the new sultan.

At Siassi the governor, Rossi, attacked and destroyed Dato Gran's fort, about 3 miles from Siassi, on January 22; 14 Moros were killed in this fight.

By the 1st of February the Jolo situation was critical. More than half the garrison had been withdrawn for the Rio Grande expedition, leaving less than 300 men to garrison the town and Fort Alphonso XII.

The most important datos had joined Amilol Quiram, and about 3,000 hostile Moros infested the neighborhood of Jolo, making it almost impossible for the garrison to rest day or night. During the first week in February five nights were spent by the Spaniards in momentary expectation of an attack, and the situation became most critical. The Moros of Tawi-Tawi, Tatang, Bongao, and Tapul were also in arms, as well as those of Siassi. In the latter island the fort was attacked on the 10th and 12th, but the assailants were driven off with a loss in both cases. At Torre Resina, on the Island of Lapac, opposite Siassi, a small garrison of 9 men was attacked by a large force of Moros on the 13th, 1 being killed and another wounded in the first attack, and later sustaining a siege of three days from 300 Moros, until relieved by a force of 56 men from Siassi, under Capt. Fernandez. In the siege the Moros lost 30 killed; the garrison 1 wounded.

The Mindanao campaign was terminated in March, and the Jolo garrison returned, and on March 12 the strength was about 400. A further reenforcement arrived from Zamboanga in April. It was ordered that the troops should embark at midnight for an expedition. The artillery started with the expedition, but a deep ravine made its return to Jolo necessary. At daybreak the Moros commenced to fire upon the troops, and in turn the Spaniards burned the houses along the trail, both in order to signal their advance to the fleet and to repress the activity of the Moros. At noon the expedition arrived in sight of Maibun, beyond which lay the Spanish fleet at anchor. The principal fort formed a quadrangle about 80 meters square. The north face, which was the one to be assailed, being of coral rock and 2½ meters in height. The south face fronted the sea and had been strengthened with a double parapet of tree trunks over 4 meters in height and five embrasures for cannon, each well protected. The east and west sides were protected fully by timber, swamp, and river and were weaker in construction, but an attack there was impracticable. In the interior of the fort was the sultan's palace, a ten-sided building upon high, wooden pillars, and two smaller buildings.

The Spanish advance formed in line at the river, some 300 meters from the fort; 2 companies of the Second Regiment, the rifle section, and second company of disciplinarios formed the head of the column, under Lieutenant-Colonel Novella, and forded the river. The firing then became general. The Moro fort had an American machine gun, which inflicted some losses upon the assailants, but after a fierce resistance to the Spanish charge, led by Colonel Arolas and Lieutenant-Colonel Novella, the fort was captured. The Moro loss was about 130 killed (of which about one-third were killed during the march); the Spanish lost 14 killed and 77 wounded. The Spanish casualties included Lieutenant-Colonel Novella, wounded, while in the list of Moro killed were Naquid Pula, governor of Maibun, the Panglima Timbul, and four datos.

At the close of the fight the fleet landed the Sultan Harun with 50 men, the town and the Chinese quarter were burned, and the fort destroyed. On the 17th the expedition returned to Jolo.

On May 9 Arolas embarked 800 men on the fleet, disembarked at Parang, and marched upon the fort of Panglima Alimanaran, about 4 kilometers in the interior. Upon the approach of the troops the chief hoisted the Spanish flag and submitted to the Sultan Harun, who had accompanied the expedition.

The Panglima Sayari, chief leader of Tapul Island, still remained hostile to Harun, and on May 23 Arolas and the Sultan, with about 800 men, sailed for Tapul. At 7 in the morning the expeditionary forces disembarked, together with 100 men from the fleet; the gunboats then opened fire on the fort and also shelled the surrounding hills. A captain was sent with two companies of the disciplinarios to occupy the settlement of the friendly Dato Buluan, but either by the ignorance or the treachery of the Moro guide he encountered a force of some 300 Moros in a well-defended position, who were commanded by the Panglima Sayari in person. Arolas hurried to the scene, and realizing the danger of defeat sent back for two more companies and four Plasencia guns. A heavy fire was opened upon the Moros, and their leader Sayari, with great coolness, appeared from time to time upon the parapet encouraging his men to resist to the utmost. The fight lasted for four hours and a half and was only terminated by a desperate attack

from the entire Spanish force led by Arolas in person, the Moro defense being taken in hand-to-hand fighting, the Panglima Sayari falling dead in the midst of the struggle, together with several of his chiefs. The total Moro dead numbered over 90, the Spanish loss being 18 killed and 115 wounded. The expedition returned to Jolo the following day.

As a result of these fights many datos submitted to Harun, among them being Anislusin of Siassi and Janjari of Lati. Amilol Quiram and his mother had taken refuge at Talipao, while Aliubdin requested a conference. But the Panglima Sakilan, who governed the northwestern part of the island of Pata, situated south of Jolo, remained in a state of open hostility, and after an examination of the coasts of Pata in June, Arolas decided to lead an expedition to that island. For this purpose considerable reinforcements, especially the artillery and engineers, were sent to Jolo early in September, where the expedition was formed. It numbered some 1,500 men; the forces also had a battery of four Plasencia guns. The troops embarked on the gunboats on September 19, arriving off the "cota" of Sakilan on the morning of the 20th. The forces were disembarked and advanced against the fort, which was bombarded by the fleet and finally taken by assault between 2 and 3 o'clock in the afternoon. On the following day another encounter took place, resulting in the flight of the Moros. The Spanish losses were 21 wounded. Colonel Arolas was made a brigadier-general, but continued in command at Jolo.

On December 2, the Sultan Harun was obliged to return to Jolo from the island of Boal on account of the opposition of the inhabitants, and General Arolas found himself obliged to head a force of 700 of the Second Regiment and disciplinarios, which embarked at once with 5 gunboats. Arriving off Boal the troops disembarked and carried the Moro forts after a short action in which 5 men were wounded. The Moro loss was 45 killed, 32 of whom were at the fort and 13 "juramentados" who had attacked the first landing party. On the 4th the troops returned to Jolo.

The beginning of 1888 witnessed several expeditions and combats, the first being against the Moros of Sariol. At dawn on February 19 two half brigades marched out of Jolo, the first under Lieutenant-Colonel Novella, the second under Capt. Victor Diaz, of the artillery. The headquarters and Sultan Harun also accompanied the forces. No opposition was encountered until the district of the Dato Yulcone was entered, but at that time a general fire was opened against the entire column. After some sharp fighting the Moros were driven off and the troops advanced. After a short interval the attack was renewed, an hour being consumed in gaining the plateau of Tambayang. After a short rest General Arolas decided to fall back to Jolo, and the column retired, harassed by the Moros until the territory of the friendly Dato Yau-Yali was reached. Jolo was reentered at 5 in the afternoon, the troops having suffered a loss of 2 killed and 18 wounded, 13 of the latter being disciplinarios. The Moro loss as reported was 7 killed and 16 wounded.

Another expedition to Paticolo on February 24 resulted in the death of some 11 Moros and the wounding of 60. The Spanish forces lost 1 officer and 19 men wounded, 15 from the disciplinarios.

On the 27th 4 companies of artillery, a mountain section with 2 guns, a company of engineers, and 250 of the Fourth Regiment arrived at Jolo. On March 8 at daylight an expedition nearly 2,000 strong left Jolo, under the command of General Arolas, for a march through the little-known district of Lati. On the afternoon of the same day the settlement of the Panglima Arosa was taken and destroyed, the Spanish having 7 wounded, the losses of the enemy being considerably greater.

On the 11th another expedition, numbering 1,500 men, left Jolo on 7 war vessels in the harbor and disembarked at the point of Pandanan, in the eastern part of the island. A vigorous campaign was then begun, the Moros being defeated at Paticolo, Porrión, Piquidapo, and Piquidajo on the 15th, 16th, 19th, 22d, 26th, and 27th of March, the dead Moros amounting to the number of 56. The Spanish losses were 7 killed and 84 wounded in the several fights.

Notwithstanding the apparent supremacy of Sultan Harun, the Moros of Jolo persisted in their allegiance to Amilol Quiram, and the Spanish Government gave up the attempt to force Harun upon the people. Amilol Quiram was then recognized as the Sultan of Jolo.

CAMPAIGNS AGAINST MINDANAO MOROS.

On January 5, 1888, Lieutenant-General Weyler became captain-general in succession to General Terrero. Upon his arrival the military forces of the Philippines numbered 12,800 men, of whom 1,400 were Spaniards (of the artillery regi-

ment) and the balance natives. The years 1888 and 1889 were without important military operations, and in the latter year the infantry regiments were renumbered. The new names and numbers, dating from October 31, 1889, were as follows: Sixty-eighth, Sixty-ninth, Seventieth, Seventy-first, Seventy-second, Seventy-third, and Seventy-fourth. The disciplinary battalion was also retained.

The fortified isthmus from Lintogup to Tucuran, begun by Terrero, was finished in 1890, the fort of Infanta Isabel being midway at Lubig. Posts were established at Parang-Parang, Tinancu, and Macar, the latter on the Bay of Sarangani. Relations with the Mindanao Moros, especially those of Lake Lanao, a region which had not been visited by Spanish forces since the days of Corcuera, two and a half centuries before, began to be strained through the establishment of those posts, and Weyler decided that operations were necessary against further aggressions. However, the outbreak in the Caroline Islands in June, 1890, made an expedition to that distant part of the colony necessary and delayed operations in Mindanao until April, 1891. On October 15, 1890, a band of Moros surprised the settlement of Monticao, near Iligan, killing 20 natives and carrying off 24. Other attacks of a minor nature also took place. On April 16, 1891, General Weyler sailed for Mindanao, and on the 20th arrived at Parang-Parang, where 4 companies of the Spanish artillery regiment, 3 companies of the Sixty-eighth, 3 companies of the Seventy-second regiment, a section of cavalry, and 2 mountain guns were assembled.

Two expeditionary columns were organized under Lieutenant-Colonels Marina and Hernandez and took the field on the 23d and 24th of April, respectively. That of Marina, composed of the Spanish company and the three companies of the Sixty-eighth, marched from Parang upon the rancheria of Lipauan on the 23d, arriving at the place on the morning of the 24th, and discovered a fort garrisoned by 30 or 40 Moros. The place was attacked and captured, 1 Spaniard being severely wounded, and at 11 that night the return march for Parang was taken up, the latter place being reached in a sixteen-hour march of great difficulty.

The column under Lieutenant-Colonel Hernandez, composed of one Spanish company and three companies of the Seventy-second Regiment, left Parang on the 24th against the rancheria of Buldung. The first day six rivers had to be crossed, the column bivouacking, the march being resumed the next morning. The camp that night was beside the Rio Sumased, the advance being resumed at dawn on the 26th. At half past 8 the column arrived before the cota of Buldung, which was defended by about 200 Moros. The column immediately attacked and took the fort with a loss of 2 killed, 3 severely wounded, and 5 slightly wounded, one of the latter being Lieutenant-Colonel Hernandez. Six dead Moros were seen and many were wounded. The following day the column returned to its base.

On the 28th a force consisting of 6 companies left Parang for Baras, where a fort was constructed with a capacity of 200 men. Expeditions were also sent out through the country between Parang and Tucuran and to the lake called Lanao Chico by the Spaniards (now Dapao). The Lanao Moros, however, attacked the forces at Baras several times, in one of which attacks the Sultan of Bayat was wounded.

On April 30 a column composed of 8 companies, commanded by Colonel Hore, of the artillery, left Baras for Maladi, where a body of Malanao Moros were reported to be fortified, and after a few hours' march the vanguard, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hernandez, discovered the Moros in a fort strongly protected. Upon seeing the Spanish force, many Moros attacked the column, but Hernandez advanced and took the fort after a hard fight. No less than 85 dead Moros, including the Sultan Benidel and 11 *datos*, were found within the fort, and 21 prisoners were taken. The Spanish loss was but 2 killed and 3 severely wounded. This fight is deemed to have been one of the most brilliant between the Spanish and Moros.

But just at this time all operations were stopped by an epidemic of "la grippe," which so affected the troops that on June 24 but 250 men were fit for duty, not one of whom was a Spaniard. At Parang 450 were sick; at Cotabato, 150; at Zamboanga, 600, and 190 at Isabela de Basilan.

General Weyler occupied Malabang in July, 1891, with eight companies and commenced the erection of Fort Corcuera, which occupied nearly the site of Corcuera's Sabanilla. A column under Captain Pintos was also sent toward Ganassi and took two *cotas*. The Moros attacked Malabang but were repulsed, and Weyler left for the Rio Grande, where the construction of three forts was ordered. Communication was also opened with Cagayan de Misamis, the mail being sent by the Pulangi (Rio Grande) River to Catituan and then via land through Linabo to Cagayan. The politico-military government of Cotabato was also divided, that part of the river Nituan to Punta de Firchas being erected in the "Comandancia de la Bahia Ilana."

General Weyler then decided to attack the Lanao Moros from the north. To

divert the attention of those living on the southern part of the lake, he ordered the commanding officer on Ilana Bay to make a demonstration toward Ganassi about August 17, penetrating as far as possible into the enemy's territory. The troops for the main attack were organized into a "flying column" of 360 men, under Captain Pintos; the "first column" of 300 men, under Colonel Castilla, of the artillery; the "second column" of 522 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cortijo. The "first" and "flying" columns were landed at Linamon August 15, 1891, and marched up the left bank of the Agus River toward the lake, while the "second" column marched out of Iligan on the 16th, following the right bank of the Agus to the lake. Another force was landed at Galan to prevent the Moros of the rancheria of Manay from aiding those of Marantao, while a body of 160 men occupied Balud. The various columns returned on the 23d to their respective starting places, having severely punished the above-mentioned rancherias, killed their datos and the leader Amay Pac-Pac, together with many other Moros, and displayed the Spanish flag where it had not been seen for two hundred and fifty-one years. A fort was also erected near Momungan en route to Lake Lanao from Iligan, and another post was established on the river Liangan, near the point of Binuni, which was named Almonte, after the Spanish general of that name who fought the Moros more than a hundred years before. The Ilana Bay column, which left on August 17, under Lieut. Col. Antonio Moras, for Ganassi, defeated the Moros at Catalaluan, near the lake, killing 7, and then returning to Malabang with a loss of 1 wounded. As a consequence of this march many chiefs and datos, including the Sultan of Ganassi, presented themselves at Malabang and recognized the suzerainty of Spain.

General Weyler was relieved as captain-general of the Philippines on November 17, 1891, being succeeded by Despujol, who, on a visit to Momungan, narrowly escaped assassination at the hands of a Moro dato, who killed several soldiers when he discovered his inability to find the captain-general. On May 4, 1891, Lieut. Gen. Ramon Blanco became captain-general. He conducted the last considerable Moro campaign in Mindanao.

Iligan was determined upon as the base of supplies, and Blanco arrived there in March, 1894, by which time 3,000 troops had been assembled there. The troops worked upon the road from Iligan to Momungan, and 250 convicts sent from Bilibid prison, Manila, were added to the road force.

On April 11 a band of about 100 Moros made an attack upon the cattle guard at Malabang, consisting of 35 men, but were repulsed with a loss of 7 killed and several wounded. Upon hearing the firing other troops came out, accompanied by Capt. Manuel Prieto, the politico-military governor of the district, who was attacked by some of the wounded Moros whom he had ordered to be cared for, and wounded so badly that his left hand had to be amputated.

General Blanco left Iligan for Momungan April 22. On the 23d the Moros attacked a detachment of woodcutters at Cabasaran, wounding 23, including Lieutenant Salgado of the Seventy-fourth. The Moros, however, were driven off, leaving 9 dead on the ground and many wounded. In May reinforcements of 350 arrived at Iligan.

In May the Spanish advance lines were at Pantar, where General Parrado and Colonel Novella also had their headquarters, and Cabasaran was occupied. The greatest difficulty was experienced in the transportation of supplies, the carabao becoming useless through fatigue, and the trail being too rough for the supplies to be taken in baskets on poles. On May 8 a company of disciplinarios was attacked at Pagua, about 2 kilometers from Ulama, by some 60 Moros, who wounded 2 men, 1 mortally. The Moros were repulsed with a loss of 8 killed and some 25 wounded.

On May 15 General Blanco published a general order by which the field forces were organized into a brigade, under command of Brig. Gen. Julian Gonzales Parrado, the politico-military governor of Mindanao, divided into two demibrigades, as follows: First demibrigade, 11 companies, Col. Federico Novella, commanding; second demibrigade, 10 companies, Col. Enrique Hore, commanding; troops attached to general headquarters, about 750 men.

On May 22 Moros near Momungan attacked a convoy guarded by 250 men and killed 4 and wounded 7 soldiers. They were driven off with a loss of 4 killed, one of whom was the Dato Sampiano, who had tried to kill Despujol on his visit to Iligan and Momungan about two years before. On June 2, while a convoy was being escorted to Camp Ulama from Momungan, 15 Moros attacked the convoy, killing 4 soldiers and wounding 2, but were driven off with loss of 8 or 10 killed.

On the 3d Colonel Novella, with his demibrigade, made a reconnoissance. After much hard work in the jungle and crossing ravines, the height of Tomarmol was climbed about 10 a. m., the Moros offering slight resistance. In the afternoon

Pimba and Panco were taken without difficulty, and the column returned to camp. The Spanish loss was 1 killed and 3 wounded, that of the Moros being estimated at 16 killed and many wounded. On June 5 Colonel Novella captured the cota of Dato Noral Kakin at Mut Pu, with a loss of 2 wounded, the Moros retreating without much resistance. The column returned to camp.

In June Blanco left Parrado in command of the operations in Mindanao, returning to Manila on the 19th.

On June 9 a band of 500 Moros attacked the troops working on the road near Pantar; 41 Moros were killed and about 50 wounded. June 26 the sick in hospital at Iligan numbered 147, of whom 46 were Spaniards and 101 natives; malarial fever and dysentery prevailing among the former and ulcers and intestinal catarrh prevailing among the latter. On July 9, 400 Moros from various rancherias, commanded by Juarna Mamasa Balabagan, of Maguindanao, attacked a road-working force under Captain Salazar, who was killed, as were also several of his men. After a hard fight the Moros were repulsed with a loss of 26 killed, 14 mortally and 46 others were wounded, among the latter being 5 datos and a pandita (priest).

On July 24 the advance arrived near the lake of Calaganan, where more than 1,000 Moros under the Dato Amani Pac Pac and the sultans of Maciu, Ramain, and Tugaya had assembled. Here the Spaniards were attacked by more than 500 Moros, ambushed on each side of the road, and driven back in some confusion. A reenforcement of 200 arrived at this moment; an advance was ordered and the Moros were driven back, the Spanish loss being 2 killed and 9 wounded, while that of the Moros was reported as about 250 killed and 300 arms left on the field.

In September the Sultan Rumani, the reputed ruler of 18 towns on the lake, visited the Spanish commander at Ulama, to indicate his desire for peace with Spain. In October the work of building the suspension bridge across the Agus was begun.

About November 10 General Blanco returned to the scene of operations for a short time only. The Agus River bridge was finished and opened on February 27, 1895. The bridge consisted of a suspension span 40 meters long, with approaches of 21 meters and 12 meters, respectively, and was intended to bear the weight of railway trains.

In February General Blanco again visited Iligan, and on March 10, at noon, the cota of Amani Pac Pac at Marahui was attacked by Spaniards. After a fight of four hours the fort was taken and the army gained the desired position on Lake Lanao; Generals Blanco, Parrado, and Aguirre were present and a cantonment was at once established.

On May 9 some 40 Moros attacked Las Piedras, killing 2 and wounding 3 soldiers, but themselves losing 9 killed. On July 12 some 40 Moros from the rancherias of Tugaya and Putud, bearing a Spanish flag, approached a working party and attacked the soldiers, escaping with several rifles, after killing 2 soldiers and wounding 38.

On August 18 the launch *Lanao* was launched at Marahui, the others being nearly finished.

Many Moro dignitaries gave in their adhesion to Spain about this time, among them being the Rajah Muda of Ganassi, the Dato Pranga-Rungan of Tugayas, and the Dato Uregan of Maciu, said to have been the councilor-general of the Lake of Lanao.

In October, 1895, the Spanish forces were again reorganized, a division of two brigades being constituted. The division was commanded by Gen. Gonzales Parrado, the Northern Brigade by General de los Rios, and the Southern Brigade by General Luis Huertas.

Divisional troops: Three companies engineers, mortar battery, cavalry squadron, and troops of the military administration.

First (Northern) Brigade: About 10 companies of infantry, 2 companies disciplinarios, and 1 mountain battery.

Second (Southern) Brigade: About 10 companies of infantry, 2 companies disciplinarios, 2 companies of engineers, 1 company of foot artillery, 1 mountain battery.

The garrisons were as follows: Two companies of infantry and 1 company of engineers at Iligan; 1 company of infantry at Las Piedras; 2 companies of infantry at Camp Maria Cristina; 2 companies of infantry at Momungan; one-half company of infantry at Fort Tiradores; 3½ companies of infantry at Camp Victoria. At Fort Briones, one-half company infantry; Fort Salazar, 1 company engineers, 1 company infantry; Fort Lumbayanegui, one-third company of infantry; Fort Nuevo, one-half company of Infantry; camp at Marahui, 10 companies of infantry, 1 mountain battery, 1 company engineers, mortar battery, naval battery, and cavalry squadron.

For escort purposes each branch of the service was to furnish an eighth of its force, except the cavalry, which was to furnish only a noncommissioned officer and 4 soldiers. Garrisons of forts mentioned above were exempted from furnishing escorts. Troops from Iligan were to convoy trains through to Marahui. Troops of the Seventy-third and Seventy-fourth to return to Sungut and Victoria the following morning and while resting were only to be employed in instruction and rifle practice.

"The "cargadores" (bearers) were not to be employed in any other labor whatever.

From the report of General Blanco, dated Marahui, October 19, 1895, to the Spanish minister of war, the following is gleaned:

Both horses and carabao are unsuitable for work on the road, the former on account of lack of strength and the latter on account of slowness and inability to work without very frequent water or mud baths. In consequence half of the army was compelled to work at keeping the road in repair.

Material for 35 kilometers of the railway was at Iligan, which was enough to complete the same to the suspension bridge of Alphonso XIII over the Agus.

The railway route would have to deviate from the road slightly to the west in the first 10 or 12 kilometers from Iligan in order to ascend the passes of Tominubo and Nonucan, Fort Maria Cristina being 450 meters above the sea at the head of the Nonucan. From Maria Cristina to the bridge the railway could follow the wagon road. From Iligan to Fort de las Piedras was 11 kilometers; from the latter fort to the river Nonucan was 2 kilometers. The bridge over this river is commanded by Fort Maria Cristina, which also covers several trails leading to important Moro rancherias. From the river Nonucan to the fort at Momungan on Agus River, which is of considerable width at this point, was 4 kilometers. From Momungan to Fort Tiradores at Banar 3 kilometers. This fort commanded the approaches to some rancherias, and also the ascent to the cota of Bulut on the same hill, while 4 kilometers distant was the lake of Calaganan, near which were Fort Victoria and Fort Salgado, the latter near the wood of Balete. To this succeeds the plateau of Ulama, dominated by Fort Briones, which is in sight of Fort Salazar, 2 kilometers distant. This latter fort, situated 40 meters above the bridge of Alphonso XIII across the Agus, together with the Fort of Sungut, on the opposite bank, commanded the crossing and also guarded Linanan. For 5 kilometers beyond Sungut the country was rolling, open, and cultivated, and protected by the small fort of Lumbayanaqui, which also guarded the near-by wood of Vito. Here the road ascended a precipitous hill to the extensive and elevated plateau in which Lake Lanao is situated at a level of about 800 meters above the sea. At the summit of the hill was Fort Nuevo, 2 kilometers from Marahui, the station on the lake. Marahui was also flanked by the redoubts of Aranda and Allanegui, which defended the landing place.

On February 17, 1896, about a thousand reinforcements arrived at Iligan from Manila. General Blanco and General Aguirre also visited Iligan on March 6. The road was found in bad condition on account of eight days' rain. On March 12 the captain-general arrived at Marahui. The water supply from Lake Lanao was found to be as satisfactory as that from a spring at Fort Nuevo.

Two Moros seized the rifles of 2 native soldiers, and on the night of the 12th Fort Nuevo, garrisoned by 50 men, was attacked by the Moros, who were repulsed with a loss of several killed.

The maximum temperature of Marahui is stated to have been 27° C., and minimum 12° C. (April and May).

On February 25 Fort Reina Regente, on the hills of Tinuncup, in the Rio Grande Valley, 18 meters about the sea, was garrisoned. The commanding officer, Col. Ricarto Perez, is said to have been asked by Dato Uto if 10,000 men could take the fort, to which the Spanish officer replied that all the Moros in Mindanao could not take it. At this time the most advanced post of the Spaniards was Fort Picit, 34 miles above Reina Regente, but another at Catituan, 8 leagues beyond Picit, was contemplated.

On March 20 a company of disciplinarios under Capt. Felipe Garde was attacked by a number of Moros while clearing ground near the new fort of Corcuera at Malabang, losing 5 rifles and having 7 men wounded. Later these Moros were surprised at Baqui, near old Fort Corcuera, 18 being killed and 12 wounded. On March 30 a detachment of Spanish troops, together with 180 Moro allies, left Corcuera for the source of the river Mataling in search of a hostile force from the rancherias of Pualas, Bacolod, Gadungan, Boras, and Dinaposas, but without result.

In the latter part of March the gunboat *Panay* shelled some Moros at the mouth of the river Macklin.

On April 1 General Blanco left Marahui for Iligan, where he embarked for Zamboanga and the Rio Grande region. At this time the military organizations in Mindanao were as follows: The division of Mindanao, with headquarters at Zamboanga; First Brigade, Gen. F. Castilla, comprising second, third, and seventh districts, headquarters Iligan or Marahui; Second Brigade, headquarters Parang-Parang, Col. C. Lasala, comprising first, fourth, fifth, and sixth districts. Colonel Hereidla, count of Terra Alta, was politico-military governor of Lanao, the actual command, however, being under Colonel del Real. Gen. Luis Huerta was politico-military governor of Jolo and Gen. Diego de los Rios was politico-military governor of Iloilo.

On April 12 General Blanco arrived in Illana Bay and inspected the new fort of Malabang on the 13th. During his visit some Moros attacked the place, but were repulsed, leaving 22 dead on the field. On the following day a Spanish force on a scout was attacked, General Aguirre and Lieutenant-Colonel Soro being wounded. General Aguirre returned to Manila on May 10, and General Blanco also returned after visiting the forts of Polloc and Cotabato.

In April, 1896, some piratical vessels robbed a boat on the coast of Occidental Negros, but pursuit of them was not effective.

On April 29 the garrison of Marahui consisted of 1,700 men, with 40 sick.

Near Baras, 6 miles west of Malabang, 40 men, under a captain, away from the fort, were attacked by Moros, but after a sharp fight the latter were repulsed with a loss of 5 datos and 11 others killed. The Spaniards had 1 soldier mortally and 3 severely wounded.

On July 1, 1896, the city of Manila presented a sword of honor to General Blanco as a memorial of his campaign in Mindanao.

On July 9 a "juramentado" killed a soldier at Cotabato and was himself killed by soldiers of the garrison.

On August 7 the Sultan of Tugaya presented himself at Marahui with a request for peace.

On August 9 a Moro attacked and wounded a lieutenant in the Lanao country, but was killed by the latter.

The outbreak of the Tagalog insurrection in August, 1896, evidently influenced the disciplinarios, of whom some 800 belonging to the Third and Fourth companies deserted late in September from the Lanao country, making for Misamis Province. They were pursued and defeated near Opol and Agusan in Misamis. A sergeant killed Lient. Bueno Espanosa at Lintogup on September 16. He was afterwards shot at Iligan.

On November 12, 80 Moros from a rancheria near Taraca attacked a convoy escorted by some marine infantry near Aparicolo, killing 1 soldier and wounding 3. The Moros were driven off with a loss of 3 killed and 23 wounded.

On November 19 the lake gunboats *General Blanco*, *Corcuera*, and *Almonte*, near Bayan, were fired upon by the Moros. After returning the fire the vessels returned to Marahui, where two companies and some marines embarked for Bayan, which was bombarded and a loss of 100 killed inflicted upon the Moros. Later the cota of Bacolod was bombarded and destroyed, and 3 deserters from the disciplinarios were shot at Marahui.

In December a so-called insurgent governor was captured and shot at Misamis. On December 24 a force of deserters was defeated near Cagayan Misamis, and the leader, a former Corporal Bravo, was killed. On the same day Major San Martin, with 60 soldiers, attacked and defeated another band of deserters who were in possession of the Church at Milagros Viejo (Butuan Valley), killing 4 and wounding many, while 2 soldiers (natives—Tagalogs) were executed at Iligan on the 29th for complicity in the uprising; and during January 2 corporals and 5 soldiers were shot at Tucuran and Cotabato for the same crime.

On April 11, 1897, a plot was discovered at Jolo implicating many of the deported Tagalog insurgents and some of the men of the Sixty-eighth Regiment, the plan being to overthrow the Spanish rule at Jolo. As a result of the plot 13 former insurgents were sentenced to death, together with 3 corporals of the Sixty-eighth Regiment.

General Polavieja was relieved on April 23, 1897, by General Primo de Rivera as captain-general of the Philippines.

On May 15, 8 juramentados from the rancheria of Boal, Jolo, went to Bus-Bus, a suburb of Jolo, and attacked some soldiers of the Sixty-eighth Regiment, who were landing in a small boat. The soldiers fired on them, killing 6 of the number in the water and 2 on shore.

During the spring of 1897 expeditions were made by the lake gunboats from Marahui against the cotas of Bayan, Binadayan, and Bacolod. Later operations were carried on against the rancherias of Sugut, Molundum, and Lipo. On May

15 two companies and the lake launches attacked the settlements of Uato and Malaig, near Marahui. In July, 1897, Fort Corcuera, built by the military engineer, Galvez, was garrisoned by one company of infantry, and Fort Baras by one company. There was also one company guarding the isthmus, with posts at Tucuran, Lubig, and Lintogup; headquarters at Parang. The posts on Illana Bay were visited about every ten days by the gunboats *Panay* and *Mariveles*, which had their headquarters at Polloc.

In July other deserters from the disciplinarios were being pursued by troops from Iligan.

On August 7, 1897, the third squadron of Thirty-first Cavalry left Manila for Iligan to relieve the cavalry serving in that district.

In July, 1897, the forts on the Rio Grande de Mindanao were Cotabato, Reina Regente, Picit, Kudarangan, Taviran, Tamontaca, and Labungan. The gunboats *Gardoqui* and *Urdaneta* were also in the vicinity.

In October, 1897, Moros attacked the Spanish fort near Las Piedras, wounding 2 soldiers. One Moro was killed, and later the rancheria of the assailants was destroyed and 3 Moros killed.

On November 13 nearly all the buildings at Marahui were destroyed by fire, which the prevalence of a strong wind facilitated. Almost at the same time Iligan was inundated by the rivers at that place and much damage done.

On December 15 a small force from Iligan, in pursuit of some escaped deported natives of Luzon, was attacked by Moros. Four Moros and 4 of the deported natives were killed in the fight, the Spaniards also losing 1 man killed.

On February 4, 1898, General Buil directed 4 columns under Lieutenant-Colonels Brandeis, Iturriaga, Torres-Ascarza, and Ruiz Toledo from Marahui, which, together with the 3 gunboats on Lake Lanao, destroyed the rancherias of Bonto, Buayan, Ragayan, Minbalay, and Maciu. The Moro losses were 32 killed, 80 wounded, and 25 prisoners; Spanish losses not given.

General Primo de Rivera was succeeded in April by General Agustin; and the destruction of the fleet, on May 1, cut off the Southern Islands from Manila until the middle of August, at which time General Jaudenes represented the Spanish power at Manila and General de los Rios at Iloilo. In December General de los Rios evacuated Iloilo, the Spanish troops being concentrated at Zamboanga from all parts of Mindanao under the command of General Montero. The last Spanish politico-military governor of Iligan was probably Capt. Ricardo Carnicero Sanchez, who was appointed to that position on November 1, 1898.

NOTE BY TRANSLATOR.—The four Spanish gunboats were scuttled in the deeper part of Lake Lanao. The post of Marahui was abandoned, and the Moros assert that the bridge over the Agus River was destroyed by the Spanish troops.

The dates of the occupation of the country by the American forces was as follows:

Sulu Archipelago	May —, 1899	Cagayan	Mar. 31, 1900
Zamboanga	Dec. 7, 1899	Iligan	Apr. 1, 1900
Cotabato	Dec. 12, 1899	Misamis Dapitan	Apr. 1, 1900
Davao	Dec. 20, 1899	Oroquieta	July 11, 1900
Polloc	Dec. 21, 1899	Camp Vicars	May 2, 1902
Matti	Dec. 22, 1899	Nonucan	Nov. —, 1902
Parang	Jan. 5, 1900	Pantar	Mar. —, 1903
Surigao	Mar. 29, 1900		

APPENDIX VIII.

THE PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION, 1896-1898: AN ACCOUNT, FROM SPANISH SOURCES PRINCIPALLY, PREPARED BY DIRECTION OF MAJ. GEN. GEORGE W. DAVIS, U. S. ARMY, COMMANDING THE DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES, BY MAJ. JOHN S. MALLORY, FIRST U. S. INFANTRY.

The following account of the insurrection of natives of the Philippine Islands against the authority of Spain in 1896-97, and of its revival in 1898, including the operations of the insurgents against the Spaniards in the islands outside the city of Manila during the Spanish-American armistice arranged by the protocol of August 12, 1898, follows in the main Spanish versions, particularly that portion descriptive of the Cavite campaign of 1897.

Below is a list of the publications, reports, etc., consulted in the preparation of this narrative.

JOHN S. MALLORY,
Major, First U. S. Infantry.

MANILA, P. I., *July 1, 1903.*

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS, ETC., CONSULTED.

La Insurrección en Filipinas y Guerra Hispano-Americana, Manuel Sastron.
Campana de Filipinas—La División Lachambre, Frederico de Monteverde, teniente coronel de infanteria.
The Inhabitants of the Philippines, Frederick H. Sawyer.
The Philippine Islands, John Foreman.
Pamphlet, Isabelo de los Reyes.
Official reports and documents, headquarters Division of the Philippines.

ORIGIN OF THE INSURRECTION.

All authorities agree in attributing the organization and prosecution of the insurrection to the great Katipunan league or conspiracy, an association which some of the Spanish writers on the subject declare to have derived its inspiration from and to have had its origin in Freemasonry, while other authorities deny that the two had anything in common, except that the Katipunan copied, with variations, certain Masonic emblems and details of organization, while adopting a creed and authorizing methods utterly at variance with the principles and practices of Masonry.

The "Liga Filipina" (Philippine league), of which Dr. José Rizal was the principal founder and its first president, was a different organization, and appears to have had for its object the accomplishment of certain reforms by political agitation rather than by force of arms. It was based upon opposition to the friars, and demanded their expulsion and the practical confiscation of their estates, together with participation by the Filipinos in the government of the island equally with the Spaniards and greater economy in public expenditures. It was composed largely of the educated and wealthy classes among the mestizos and full-blooded natives, who, however, were unwilling to risk their lives and fortunes by an appeal to arms. The league was dissolved in 1894.

On the other hand, the Katipunan was composed of the common people, with only a sprinkling of the well-to-do, middle class. They believed in action, and in action of the most drastic character, having a contempt for mere political agitation not backed up by the rifle and the bolo, their platform being summed up by them as follows: "To redeem the Philippines from its tyrants, the friars, and to

found a communistic republic." Andrés Bonifacio, an employee of a Manila mercantile firm, was the president of the society. He was assisted by a treasurer, a fiscal, and a council; the supreme authority, however, being placed eventually in the hands of Emilio Aguinaldo, who was appointed generalissimo.

When the movement had become popular and seemed to stand a reasonable prospect of success, many men of wealth and education who had hitherto held aloof from the society desired to identify themselves with it, but it was made a condition of admission that they must start at the bottom—in the ranks—and prove by acts rather than by mere professions their fitness to become leaders.

OUTBREAK OF THE INSURRECTION.

The insurrection broke out in the latter part of August, 1896, being preceded by wholesale arrests of natives who were implicated, or suspected of being implicated, in a plot to rise and massacre the Spaniards indiscriminately on the night of August 20.

Although their plans were somewhat disconcerted by the discovery of the plot, the leaders of the Katipunan conspiracy, or league, soon threw off the mask and openly raised the standard of revolt in the suburbs of Manila. On August 26 a horde of insurgents, only a few of whom were equipped with firearms, made an attack upon the town of Caloocan, a few miles from the capital, but were driven off by a small force of the civil guard.

Following this affair, insurgents began to assemble in considerable force and to make demonstrations to attack the city via the Sampaloc and Tondo districts, their principal object being the liberation of the large number of prisoners confined in the Bilibid Jail.

The garrison of Manila at this time consisted of about 300 peninsular artillery and about 400 other European troops, principally marine infantry and detachments of sailors from the squadron, and about 2,000 native troops of all kinds.

Measures were taken to strengthen the small garrison, and as a first step outlying detachments of the native civil guard were drawn in and posted within the city limits. The defense of the capital was committed to the *segundo cabo*, the veteran Gen. Bernardo Echaluze, who established without delay a defensive line extending from the captain of the port's to Sampaloc.

On the 29th of August the captain-general, Ramon Blanco, who had previously advised the home Government of the discovery of an extensive native conspiracy, but who later had been disposed not to admit the gravity of the situation, finally telegraphed to the Madrid Government for reinforcements of 1,000 men. The Government responded by ordering 2,000 men immediately to the scene of insurrection, consisting of a battalion of marine infantry and another of *cazadores*, armed with Mausers and well equipped, and, in addition, 6,000 Remington rifles, model of 1889. Also the cruiser *Isla de Cuba* was ordered to sail for Manila immediately and the *Isla de Luzon* as soon as she could be made ready. The Government further approved of the organization of a battalion of volunteers from the citizens of Spanish birth resident in Manila, and encouraged the formation of similar organizations in the islands.

On August 30, at San Juan del Monte, in the suburbs of Manila, occurred the first action of any importance between the Spaniards and insurgents. The latter first attempted to capture the powder magazine, situated on the left of the high road leading from Manila to San Juan del Monte, but being repulsed by the small Spanish force holding it, retreated, and later concentrated in force at the "Casa Alegre," San Juan del Monte, where they were attacked by a small force of about 100 Spaniards, led by the *segundo cabo* in person, and routed completely, leaving about 90 dead on the field, their leader, Sancho Valenzuela, and several other chiefs being captured and later publicly executed on the Paseo de la Luneta, Manila.

On the same day (August 30), because of the rapid spread of the revolt, the captain-general issued a proclamation declaring a state of war to exist in the provinces of Manila, Bulacan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, La Laguna, Cavite, and Batangas.

The total number of European troops scattered over the islands at the beginning of the insurrection was about 1,500, and there were in addition about 6,000 native troops.

It was necessary to leave 500 of the white troops in the Visayas, but the remaining 300 and such native troops as could be spared were withdrawn and hurried north to the scene of insurrection. These reinforcements enabled General Blanco to take steps to extinguish the foci of rebellion in the central provinces of Luzon.

General Jaramillo, with the contingent from Mindanao, proceeded to the district south of Cavite Province with a view of preventing the insurgents from occupying that section. A battalion was placed in the cuartel of Santo Domingo, to the east of Cavite Province, near the Laguna de Bay, with a view of preventing communication from that direction with the insurgent stronghold at Silang, while the gunboat *Leyte* patrolled the Manila Bay along the coast of Cavite with a view of preventing access to Bulacan and Manila.

THE INSURRECTION IN CAVITE PROVINCE.

Although the first manifestations of the insurrection occurred in the province of Manila (now Rizal), the movement appears to have had its origin in the province of Cavite, the home of the principal agitators and organizers of the Katipunan League, and this province soon became the center of disaffection and revolution and the chosen theater of operations of the insurgents.

On the 31st of August Emilio Aguinaldo issued an appeal to arms simultaneously in his native town of Cautit (Cavite Viejo), Noveleta, and San Francisco de Malabon, which was followed by uprisings of the populace throughout the province. The insurgents speedily possessed themselves of the entire province excepting the fortified town and arsenal of Cavite, the adjoining barrios of San Roque and Caridad, the isthmus connecting Cavite with the mainland, and an adjoining strip of the latter, where the Spaniards later established the intrenched camp of Dalahican. At Noveleta, Naic, and Imus many atrocities were committed by the insurgents upon the prisoners who fell into their hands, particularly in the case of the friars at Imus, whose estate house, being surrounded by massive high walls, was practically a fortress, and was only captured by the insurgents on September 1 after being besieged by an overwhelming force.

The insurgents established their headquarters at Silang, threw up intrenchments everywhere to strengthen their positions, and sent out foraging parties in all directions to gather supplies, and compelled the entire population to commit themselves to the cause of the insurrection.

In the meantime the governor-general had remained passive, not thinking himself strong enough in troops to move against the rebels in Cavite Province in spite of its proximity to Manila.

To obtain reinforcements for Manila, pending the arrival of troops from Spain, the governor-general had, as soon as he realized the dangerous character of the revolt, ordered troops to be concentrated in the capital from Zamboanga and other southern stations, with the result that by the middle of September the garrison of Manila was swelled to 6,000 men. The small garrison at Cavite was reinforced and some heavy artillery was sent over from Manila. General Diego de los Rios was appointed military governor of the province and of the city of Cavite, and was placed in command of the troops in the province. The Spaniards still delaying to take the offensive, the insurgents became daily more aggressive and threw up a mile and a half of intrenchments between their position at Noveleta and the peninsula of Cavite, and thence made attacks upon the barrios of Cavite itself, which, however, were repulsed.

The Spaniards found it necessary, in order to better guard against such sorties, to establish an intrenched camp at Dalahican, at the southern extremity of the peninsula, paralleling the insurgent works.

PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN OCTOBER, 1896.

On October 1 there arrived in Manila Bay the transport *Cataluña*, bringing the first reinforcements from Spain, consisting of a battalion of marine infantry, 22 officers and 895 men, commanded by Col. Juan Herrera.

England notified the Spanish Government that instructions had been given to the governors of her possessions in India and on the China coast to dispense with the services of Filipino laborers, and in various ways showed a disposition to maintain the most friendly relations with Spain. The governor of the Straits Settlements by two decrees prohibited the organization, etc., within the colony, of any expedition to assist the insurgent Filipinos, and the exportation, for a period of three months from September 12, of any war material.

The Spanish detachment guarding the powder magazine near Binacayan, Cavite Province, repelled an insurgent attack with a loss to the latter of about 150 killed and wounded.

On the 6th of October the second expedition arrived from Spain on the *Monserrat*, consisting of 38 officers and 1,040 men of marine infantry and cazadores.

The Katipunan League made every exertion to extend the insurrection and even sent emissaries to Zamboanga, Paragua, and other remote islands to incite the inhabitants and native troops to revolt.

On October 14 the third expedition from Spain arrived on the *Antonio Lopez*, consisting of 27 officers and 785 men of the marine infantry, and on the 17th the fourth expedition, on the *Isla de Luzon*, consisting of 66 officers and 1,995 men, cazadores.

On October 14, 151 natives were deported to Fernando Po, via Cartagena, on the steamer *Manila*.

On the 18th General Jaramillo, at the head of a column composed of civil guard, native infantry of the Seventieth and Seventy-third regiments, and of the First Battalion of cazadores, and aided by the gunboats *Leyte* and *Bulusan*, attacked and dislodged from the town of Nasugbu, Batangas, a large force of insurgents who had fortified themselves there, killing about 124 and wounding a large number, the Spaniards losing 2 killed and 28 wounded.

General Aguirre, commanding the Bañadero-Tanaúan line, by great effort and vigilance, prevented various parties of insurgents from getting through to Talisay and Silang, where they were trying to rendezvous.

There were various minor combats and petty skirmishes in nearly all the provinces of Luzon, but none of sufficient importance to be noted.

In Mindanao the native soldiers composing the Third Disciplinary Company (convicts), which garrisoned Fort Victoria (Iligan-Lanao road) revolted and attacked their officers, who miraculously escaped with their lives, although covered with wounds.

The rebels then fled by way of Piedras to the Dengayen Mountains, but were pursued and dispersed near Cagayan, suffering considerable loss. The rest of the disciplinary force was disarmed.

A sergeant and a corporal belonging to the Tagalog Katipunan, a short time after joining the Sixty-eighth Native Regiment, garrisoning the archipelago of Jolo, succeeded in making proselytes to their cause in Jolo, a conspiracy being formed to kill the white officers. The governor of Jolo, General Huertes, however, discovered the plot in time. A summary court was convened, and 2 sergeants, 5 corporals, a bugler, and a private were shot and other conspirators sentenced to imprisonment for life.

During the latter part of October General Echaluze, the *segundo cabo*, on account of failing health, returned to Spain and was succeeded as *segundo cabo* by Lieut. Gen. Camilo Polavieja y Castillo, who was at the time in Spain and who soon embarked for the Philippines, accompanied by Major-Generals Zappino and Lachambre and Brigadier-Generals Galbis and Cornel.

As a brief summary of the situation, at the end of October it can be said that the insurgents, with a large force, were in possession of the whole of the province of Cavite, except the peninsula and town of Cavite, and the insurrection had spread to all the central provinces of Luzon, the rebel forces, except in Cavite, being widely scattered and very deficient in organization and equipment, only a small portion having firearms of any description.

While the Spaniards had been materially strengthened by the arrival of troops from Spain, General Blanco did not yet feel justified in undertaking operations on a scale demanded by a plan of campaign having for its object the conquest of Cavite and the suppression of the insurrection in the other provinces. He therefore continued to pursue an offensive-defensive policy.

PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN NOVEMBER, 1896.

In the month of November the insurgents were particularly active in the provinces of Bulacan and Pampanga, immediately north of Manila.

They maintained two strongholds, one at Angat, in Bulacan, and the other in the mountains of San Mateo, Manila Province. By means of a system of preconcerted signals, consisting of fires lighted at fixed points equally distant, or by captive balloons similarly displayed, they were able to concentrate their followers at appointed rendezvous to the number of 5,000, and thence made raids upon the railroad, upon convoys en route from Malinta to Novaliches via Quingua, and attacked various pueblos in Bataan Province, Caloocan, near Manila, and other points, plundering, murdering, and burning. They were under the leadership of a half-caste named Llanera, who was assisted by other chiefs, notably Giraldez and Pedro Francisco. They styled themselves the "avengers of their brothers."

To oppose them the Spaniards organized a flying column of 500 men, commanded by Major Arteaga. Repeated encounters took place between this column

and the insurgents, and although the latter were usually driven off and dispersed, they reassembled in their strongholds at Angat and San Mateo, from which the Spaniards were unable to dislodge them, and whence they soon renewed their marauding expeditions.

On November 3 the fifth expedition arrived from Spain on the *Colon*, consisting of a battalion of cazadores, a squadron of cavalry, and a battery of artillery—55 officers and 1,328 men.

General Blanco now decided to take the offensive in Cavite Province, and on November 8 simultaneous attacks were made upon the intrenched positions of the insurgents at Binacayan and Noveleta.

The column to which was assigned the task of taking the insurgent works at Binacayan was composed of 1,612 men of the marine infantry, 2 companies of the Seventy-third Native Regiment, 1 company of artillery, and 60 men of the Sixth Company of Engineers, and was commanded by Col. José Marina (afterwards general).

Previous to the land attacks the Spanish squadron, comprising the *Castilla*, *Reina Cristina*, the gunboats *Bulusan*, *Leyte*, *Villalobos*, and *Cebu*, took position in line of battle in the bay and, together with the guns of the forts at Cavite, opened fire on the rebel trenches at Bacoar, Binacayan, Cavite Viejo, and Noveleta. A flotilla of armed launches and boats also took position close to shore opposite the Binacayan intrenchments, and by their fire contributed to preparing the way for the assaulting column. The latter, which had been assembled at the Spanish powder magazines near Binacayan, advanced along the beach to the attack as soon as the squadron ceased firing. The insurgent works at Binacayan and vicinity consisted of a long line of formidable intrenchments which could not be flanked and, at a considerable distance in front of this line, an earthwork or cotta, flanked by a trench and fortified houses. This latter position the Spaniards attacked vigorously and carried by assault after an hour and a half's severe fighting. In this affair the Spaniards lost over 70 killed and wounded, including several officers. The insurgents' loss could not be ascertained.

Instead of advancing to attack the main position of the insurgents, the Spanish commander withdrew the greater part of his command at nightfall to his base at the powder magazines after reversing the front of the cotta and leaving there two companies to hold it, the latter being harassed throughout the night by the fire of the enemy.

The next morning the column returned to the cotta and thence advanced to attack the enemy's line of intrenchments. No opposition was developed until the advance arrived at the angle formed by the roads leading to Cavite Viejo and Imus, when it was almost overwhelmed by a rain of projectiles from a long line of intrenchments at short range. The main body deployed and attempted to take the works at the point of the bayonet, but were met by a withering fire from *lantacas*, *Mausers*, *Remingtons*, shotguns, and even parlor rifles, which killed or wounded a third of the command and every officer, from Colonel Marina down to the youngest second lieutenant. Unable to face this hail of bullets and demoralized by the loss of their officers, the Spaniards broke and retreated precipitately to the cotta taken the day before, under cover of which they were rallied and their retreat arrested by the energetic efforts of Colonel Marina, who had been wounded three times. Thus terminated the attack upon the Binacayan intrenchments.

The troops designated for the attack upon the Noveleta intrenchments were formed in the intrenched camp on the borders of the small lake of Dalahican, near the town of Cavite. They consisted also of marine infantry, peninsular artillery, the Seventy-third Native Regiment, and a section of engineers, the whole commanded by General Rios. The force was divided into two parts, one being left in the trenches at Dalahican to guard the base and the other, commanded by Col. Diaz Matoni, of the marine infantry, forming the column of attack.

The insurgent intrenchment at Noveleta extended almost to the beach on their left and across a deep estero on their right.

If an attempt were made to flank the position by the beach, the flanking force would be compelled to advance in column, and as the estero was impassable between the Spaniards and the insurgents, the latter having destroyed the bridge, it was impracticable to turn the insurgent right without rebuilding the bridge, and as the lines were so close that the working parties would have been exposed to a continual fire at short range, the Spaniards did not attempt this.

Nothing but a frontal attack was left, and this the Spaniards attempted. The road from Dalahican to Noveleta is a raised causeway, running through a mangrove swamp, with deep mud on each side. Along this road the attacking column marched, its advance being covered by the fire of the gunboats in the bay. The

Spaniards were unmolested in their advance until the head of the column had traversed the swamp and reached ground upon which it could deploy.

Barely had the two sections of the Seventy-third in advance deployed as skirmishers when the insurgents, from concealed positions in front and from behind mangrove trees on the flanks, opened a terrific fire upon them and the head and flanks of the column at short range. The two deployed sections were reenforced by a section of engineers and by the only section of the Seventy-third remaining in the advance guard. The main body of the Spaniards, being in column on the causeway, were unable to take any active part in the fight, and the troops deployed were withdrawn, after suffering a loss of 100 men, and were replaced by peninsular (white) troops exclusively, 2 companies of marine infantry and 2 of artillery, aided by 2 pieces of mountain artillery, but these met with no better success. The battle began at 10 o'clock in the morning (November 9) and at 4 p. m. the order to retreat was given and the column returned to the trenches at Dalahican, suffering heavy losses during the retreat.

A Spanish authority places their loss in the two engagements at Binacayan and Noveleta at 500, but other authorities largely exceed this number in their estimates. The casualties were principally in the Seventy-third Regiment (native), which suffered severely in both engagements. A large quantity of arms and ammunition fell into the hands of the insurgents, who were greatly elated by these victories.

In the meantime General Aguirre had left his headquarters at Calamba, on Laguna de Bay, with a view of conducting operations along the Sungay line, between Cavite and Batangas provinces, and, while holding the insurgents in their positions at Amadeo and Mendez Nuñez, he succeeded, on the 12th, in capturing the insurgent town of Talisay, on the border of the Lake of Taal.

During this month there were numerous attacks by the insurgents upon towns in the provinces of Manila, Bulacan, La Laguna, Bataan, and Zambales, most of which were repelled by their small garrisons, while the forces commanded by General Aguirre and the flying column of Arteaga repeatedly encountered the insurgents and gained minor successes. Arteaga was promoted to be lieutenant-colonel for a successful action fought at San Rafael, in Bulacan, when, according to Spanish accounts, 800 insurgents were killed.

On the 14th the sixth expedition arrived from Spain in the *Covadonga*, consisting of 69 officers and 1,930 men, cazadores.

On November 19 an insurgent force under Llanera wrecked a train on the Manila-Dagupan line about 20 miles from Manila, inflicting damage estimated at \$40,000. This was done as an act of retaliation, because the English officials of the road paid no attention to the insurgent demand that they desist from transporting Spanish forces.

PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN DECEMBER, 1896.

No military operations of any magnitude were undertaken in the month of December. The insurgents continued to strengthen their defenses in the province of Cavite and to receive daily accessions to their forces in this stronghold from adjoining provinces. The leaders of the Katipunan labored incessantly and with considerable success to establish new centers of insurrection and to raise the people throughout Luzon. On December 21, General Blanco issued a proclamation declaring the provinces of Bataan and Zambales to be in a state of war.

General Rios, having been appointed commanding general of the center of Luzon, established his headquarters in Pampanga and addressed himself to the task of suppressing the insurrection in the important zone intrusted to him, directing his efforts particularly to the province of Bulacan, where the insurgent cause had made great progress. Numerous minor combats were had with the guerrilla forces of Llanera, the Spaniards usually being successful, particularly in the affair at Meycauayan, on the 16th.

The insurgents, however, nothing daunted, continued their raids, not only in General Rios's zone, but in the vicinity of Manila itself and along the borders of the Laguna de Bay, and began to make head to the north in Nueva Ecija.

On December 3, the seventh expedition arrived from Spain on the *Alphonso XII*, consisting of 9 officers and 255 men of the marine infantry and 26 officers and 651 men of the cazadores, besides Lieutenant-General Polavieja, Major-General Zapino and Lachambre, and Brigadier-Generals Cornel and Galbis.

General Polavieja on his arrival entered upon his duties as segundo cabo and military governor of Manila, relieving General of Engineers Rizo, and a few days later was appointed captain-general, general in chief of the army of the operations in the Philippines, and governor-general of the archipelago. He assumed the

supreme command December 13, relieving General Blanco, who embarked for Spain on the *Leon XIII*, December 20.

General Zappino was appointed by the Madrid Government *segundo cabo* of the islands.

General Polavieja announced the following assignments:

Commanding general of the division of Laguna, Batangas, and Tayabas, Major-General Lachambre.

Commanding general of the first (Laguna) brigade of the division, Gen. Pedro Cornel.

Commanding general of the second (Batangas) brigade of the division, Gen. Nicolas Jaramillo.

Commanding general of the brigade of Morong, Pasig, and northern Manila, Gen. Francisco Galbis.

Commanding general of the brigade of the center of Luzon, Gen. Diego de los Rios.

Chief of the general staff of the capitania-general, Gen. Ernesto de Aguirre.

On December 6 the prisoners of the Cavite Jail rose, killed their jailer, and attempted to escape. Of the 150 concerned, 60 were killed in the streets of the town and in the suburbs, and 21 who were captured were afterwards shot.

On December 30 Dr. José Rizal, a learned Filipino, who by his writings had incurred the hostility of the friars and who had been convicted by a court-martial of entertaining treasonable designs and of being an instigator of the rebellion, was publicly executed, being shot to death on the Paseo de la Luneta.

Beginning with the discovery of the Katipunan conspiracy, hundreds of Filipinos, among them some of the wealthiest and most prominent natives in the islands, were from time to time arrested, conveyed to Manila, and imprisoned. Of these a large number were shot and about 1,000 deported to various penal settlements, yet on the departure of General Blanco several thousand still remained in prison awaiting trial, a permanent court-martial having been organized for their trial.

The volunteers organized in Manila at the beginning of the insurrection rendered good service in and about the defenses of Manila, supplementing the regular troops and also assisting in patrolling the lake (Laguna de Bay) in armed launches from Manila, keeping the lake district free from insurgents. They also took part in sorties and raids; but it is charged (not on Spanish authority, however) that they committed many excesses and outrages, particularly when making domiciliary visits in Manila.

Volunteers were also organized in other provinces from time to time, frequently largely composed of natives. The parish priests were very active in promoting the formation of volunteer organizations in their respective parishes, the clergy themselves at times joining the ranks to repel insurgent raids. The parish priest of San Rafael, Bulacan, on one occasion raised a company of volunteers and took command in person when his town was threatened with an attack by the enemy. On the other hand, there were some desertions from the native regiments of regulars.

On December 10 the eighth expedition arrived from Spain on the *Leon XIII*, consisting of 36 officers and 1,733 men, cazadores; and in the last of December arrived the ninth expedition on the *San Fernando*, consisting of 29 officers and 1,903 men, marine infantry: 24 officers and 928 men, cazadores.

December being the month in which municipal elections should occur, the governor-general suspended these elections in the provinces which had been placed under martial law, to wit, Manila, Bulacan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, La Laguna, Tarlac, Cavite, Bataan, and Zambales.

PRINCIPAL EVENTS FROM JANUARY 1, 1897, TO THE END OF GENERAL POLAVIEJA'S RÉGIME.

By the end of December reenforcements to the number of 11,000 had been received from Spain since the outbreak of the insurrection, and these, together with the 1,500 European and 6,000 native troops that constituted the original Spanish force in the islands, gave General Polavieja, after allowing for desertions that had occurred from the native regiments and for losses in battle during preceding months, and subtracting the garrisons of the Visayas and southern islands, an available force of over 12,000 to suppress the insurrection in Luzon. The dry season having set in, he therefore determined upon active operations, his plan being first to pacify the zones separated from the province of Cavite, and then to make an offensive campaign against that province, which, with the exception of the town and peninsula of Cavite, was in the possession of the insurgents.

Accordingly, the month of January was a period of great activity, and innumerable engagements and combats were fought in the center of Luzon, the insurgents being vigorously and usually successfully attacked wherever they could be found. The most important success occurred at the place called Cacaron de Sile, in the center of Bulacan Province, a position having strong natural defenses and which had been greatly strengthened by insurgent works. The insurgents occupied this stronghold with over 3,000 men.

Five columns, averaging about 200 men each, attacked this position almost simultaneously from different directions and completely defeated the insurgents with a loss to them, according to Spanish accounts, of over 200 killed and 1,000 wounded.

The result of this engagement was very discouraging to the insurgents in Bulacan, and a number took advantage of an amnesty that was proclaimed about this time to present themselves—i. e., to surrender. General Rios, commanding the zone, planned this attack, and it was skilfully carried out by the chiefs of the columns, Maj. Olaguer Feliu, Lieutenant-Colonel Villalón, Major Sarthou, Lieutenant-Colonel Arteaga, and Captain Cundaro.

The insurgent leader in this zone—Llanera—threatened with death all who availed themselves of amnesty, but presentations continuing, Llanera transferred his activities temporarily to Nueva Ecija.

The Macabebe troops (native) distinguished themselves in several engagements about this time.

In General Cornel's district (Laguna), in General Jaramillo's (Batangas), and in General Galbis's (Morong, Pasig, and North Manila), particularly in the latter three, were also numerous combats and minor engagements. These were so generally in favor of the Spaniards and so decisive that on January 22 General Jaramillo reported that no insurgent force could be found in all Batangas, and the same was reported from Bataan and Zambales.

CAVITE CAMPAIGN, 1897.

In the month of January, 1897, over 12,400 fresh troops arrived from Spain, making the total of 587 officers and 24,875 men received from the mother country since the outbreak of the insurrection.

General Polavieja, the captain-general, determined to commence early in February his offensive campaign against Cavite Province. Preparatory to commencing operations, the Army of Luzon was reorganized as follows:

Organization, Army of Luzon.

DIVISION OF LAGUNA, BATANGAS, AND TAYABAS.

Commanding general, Don José Lachambre y Dominguez; chief of general staff, Lieut. Col. Don Jenaro Ruiz Jimenez.

First brigade.—Commander, Brig. Gen. Don Pedro Cornel.

Forces: First Battalion Cazadores, complete; Second Battalion Cazadores, complete; Seventy-fourth Regiment of the line, 2 battalions; two mounted detachments.

Second brigade.—Commander, Brig. Gen. Don José Marina Vega.

Forces: Fourth Battalion Cazadores, 4 companies; Sixth Battalion Cazadores, complete; Eleventh Battalion Cazadores, 4 companies; Fifteenth Battalion Cazadores, complete; Seventy-third Regiment of line, 1 battalion; fortress artillery, 1 battalion.

Third Brigade.—Commander, Brig. Gen. Don Nicolas Jaramillo.

Forces: Eighth Battalion Cazadores, 2 companies; Thirteenth Battalion Cazadores, complete; Seventieth Regiment of Line, 1 company; Seventy-third Regiment of Line, 3 companies; 1 mounted detachment; 1 section mountain artillery; 1 section of 50 men, engineers; 1 movable park, engineers.

ATTACHED TO DIVISION HEADQUARTERS.

Cavalry.—Philippine regiment, 1 squadron; mobilized volunteers of Ilocos Norte, 1 squadron; mounted guerrillas of Ilocos Sur, 25 horses.

Artillery.—Two 15-centimeter B. C. howitzers; 6 pieces 9-centimeter B. C. of the mountain battery; 7 pieces of the regiment of mountain artillery; 4 pieces Whitworth.

Engineers.—One company of 150 men (for First and Second brigades); 1 movable park.

Infantry.—Abra Volunteers, 200 men; Ilocos Sur Volunteers, 300 men; Albay Volunteers, 500 men.

Field hospital.—At Taal, with 100 beds; at Calamba, with 100 beds; at Biñan, with 100 beds.

Bases of supplies of all kinds.—Taal, Calamba, Cuartel de Santo Domingo, and Biñan.

Means of transport.—Half brigade and 600 Chinese, with as many as can be collected from the territory occupied.

Independent Brigade.—Commander, Brig. Gen. Don Francisco Galbis Abella.

Forces: Third Battalion Cazadores, complete; Fifth Battalion Cazadores, 4 companies; Seventh Battalion Cazadores, complete; Eleventh Battalion Cazadores, 4 companies; Fourteenth Battalion Cazadores, complete; 3 mounted detachments.

Cavalry.—One Peninsular Squadron.

Artillery.—Two mortars; 2 pieces B. C., 12 centimeters; 2 pieces B. C., 8 centimeters; 4 pieces mountain; 2 pieces nonregulation; 2 pieces Krupp A., 8 centimeters.

Transport—Half brigade.

COMANDANCIA GENERAL OF THE CENTER OF LUZON.

Commander, Brig. Gen. Don Diego de los Rios.

Forces: Fourth Battalion Cazadores, 4 companies; Fifth Battalion Cazadores, 4 companies; Eighth Battalion Cazadores, 6 companies; Ninth Battalion Cazadores, 4 companies; Sixty-eighth Regiment of Line, 1 company; Seventieth Regiment of Line, 2 companies; Seventy-third Regiment of Line, 1 company; Second Regiment Marine Infantry, 2 companies; 1 mounted detachment; 1 section of 40 men, engineers.

Volunteer.—From Masbate, 100 men.

Those from other places:

MANILA GARRISON.

Commander general of division, Don Enrique Zappino.

Forces: Ninth Battalion Cazadores, 4 companies; Tenth Battalion Cazadores, complete; Second Battalion Second Regiment Marine Infantry, 3 companies; Seventieth Regiment of Line, 3 companies.

Artillery.—Regiment of fortress artillery, 2 companies.

Cavalry.—Thirty-first Philippine Regiment, 1 squadron.

Volunteers.—Battalion of Manila infantry; squadron of Manila cavalry.

In addition to the veteran civil guard, the civil guard of the two provinces and the artillery had the resources of the Maestranza to draw on.

General Lachambre's division was organized for the purpose of conducting the operations in Cavite and to its commander, General Polavieja, addressed the following letter of instructions:

To His Excellency the Commanding General of La Laguna, Batangas, and Tayabas:

Appended to this letter will be found the new organization of the division you so worthily command. I have found it necessary to increase the number of your battalions, to add three pieces of field artillery, to equip it with artillery of position, an engineer park, means of transportation, and, above all, to reorganize the division in a manner best adapted to the campaign you are about to begin against the province of Cavite.

The infantry I place under your orders is divided into three brigades, one with fewer battalions than the other two, because in the earlier period of the operations it will have a more limited sphere of action.

The artillery, except the mountain section, which General Jaramillo retains, is attached, as well as the cavalry, to the headquarters of the division, in order that you may distribute and employ each according to circumstances; that is, according to the necessities of the advance and engagement, the attack of positions, advance guard, and flanking service, and the necessities of rear-guard service and the position of the line of communications and supply.

Also the native infantry volunteers of the various provinces of Luzon, amounting to 1,000 men, are attached to division headquarters in order that they may be instructed and employed on detachment duty and rear-guard service, in combination with the cazadores contingent, and in order that they may become familiar with the tactics of the insurgents, thus preparing them for the offensive movements they will later undertake against the latter.

Colonel of engineers, Don Francisco de Castro, is placed under your orders in order that the movable park of engineers may perform such service pertaining to their corps as he may recommend.

Your excellency will have at your disposition the half transport brigade for supplying the troops with ammunition and 600 Chinese for transporting rations.

In order to provide rations and all other necessities for the soldiers, you will utilize the resources of the territory under your command and of that you are about to occupy.

Your excellency will find already established a field hospital with 100 beds in Calamba, another in Biñan, and another in Taal, as well as a depository of 200,000 rations and 1,220,000 rifle cartridges and 800 cannon cartridges in Calamba; of 100,000 rations, 1,220,000 cartridges, and 700 artillery charges in Biñan, and in Taal one of 100,000 rations, 1,000,000 cartridges, and 200 mountain artillery charges. Your excellency will please establish another depository of such rations and ammunition as may be deemed suitable in the cuartel of Santo Domingo for the operations against Silang.

For these operations your excellency will please concentrate the Cornel and Marina brigades, with all the artillery and movable park of engineers, and the cavalry, the volunteers, and the transportation you may judge suitable, at the cuartel of Santo Domingo, from which point your excellency will make a frontal march upon Silang, turning by the left flank the precipitous slopes and the intrenchments the rebels have upon them, in order, after having swept away such obstacles as may be encountered in your progress, to commence the attack upon Silang by Balete to the left of the Imus River, and to the right of the latter to the north of Iba, uniting both forces by a bridge over the said river.

After having taken Silang and leaving there a suitable garrison, your excellency will please take up the march in two columns toward Imus, the stronger by the road to Perez-Dasmariñas, and the other, or weaker, by that leading to the position of Paliparang.

Both columns will reconnoiter and beat the woods of the Fandaguera, and then, united or separately, the one from Perez-Dasmariñas and the other from the Paliparang position will march upon the estate house of Saltiran, which, on account of its strong construction, may have to be battered down by the 15-centimeter howitzers.

The hacienda of Saltiran being occupied, your excellency will have it garrisoned and will resume your march upon Imus, in whose suburbs I will take command of all the forces which are to attack that point, Bacoor, Cavite Viejo, and Noveleta.

In order that the rebels may not be able to concentrate all their forces upon those under your command at Silang, as well as when upon your advance upon Imus, I have ordered General Jaramillo to open fire upon the rebel intrenchments of Bayuyungan the evening before your excellency moves out from the cuartel de Santo Domingo toward Silang, and next by pressing them to feign an attempt to ascend Sungay by its northern slope, not ceasing his demonstrations until your excellency is master of Silang, and then to continue by operating upon Talisay by the lake to Taal with armored launches always covering the Pansipit and the interior of the zone he now occupies, in order to keep on distracting the rebel forces.

He will be opportunely reenforced in order that he may occupy Alfonso and other places of the northern watershed of the Sungay Mountains.

Also, with the object of harassing the rebel forces and covering this place at the same time upon the same day your excellency begins the movement upon Silang, General Galbis with his brigade will encamp upon the right bank of the Zapote River, threatening Bacoor and Imus by the lower river, while by the upper river his forces will threaten a turning movement and march upon Paliparang.

These forces, if circumstances permit, will communicate with those of your excellency first in Paliparang and then at the estate house of Saltiran, where your excellency will receive further instructions for the attack upon Imus.

I have placed under the orders of his excellency the commanding general of marine the forces of marine infantry which are in Binacayan and Dalahican, together with two barges belonging to the Park Works, which I have placed subject to his orders and which are being armed at the arsenal with two 12-centimeter Hontoria cannon; also two lighters armed by the Compañia Transatlantica with two 9-centimeter Hontoria pieces and rapid-fire guns; another also armed by the same with two 7½-centimeter Krupp pieces; also two others for disembarking, each accommodating a hundred men; another for an operating hospital, all three belonging to the same company, and with the squadron under his orders his excellency, the general aforesaid, will support the operations of your excellency against Silang and your advance upon Imus, by bombarding the rebel trenches on the coast from the mouth of the Zapote up to their position at Lictong and by simulating also a disembarkation between Santa Cruz and Naic.

In order that your excellency may not lack supplies in your march from Silang

to Saltiran, the depository of rations and ammunition at Biñan has been established, as well as a field hospital, in which your excellency may leave such as are wounded on the march.

Permit me to inform your excellency that if the circumstances should require it, your excellency is authorized to act according to your judgment after taking Silang, reporting the same to me, as well as the reasons which induce your excellency to decide upon your resolutions, in order that the other land and sea forces may continue to act according to an harmonious plan.

The marine infantry of Dalahican will demonstrate toward Noveleta and that of Binacayan will keep up a fire on the rebel trenches while your excellency carries out the operations indicated.

With my headquarters I will establish myself in Parañaque or Las Piñas, to which point your excellency, while in front of Silang, will please direct telegrams and communications to me. From Paliparang your excellency can forward them via Carmona and Biñan.

I recommend that in conducting operations it be taken into account that the enemy may cut the dikes of the rivers as a means of defense. It is proper to warn your excellency in order that this obstacle may be overcome.

Your excellency will please inform me of the disposition made of the forces and of the rear-guard service of the columns in the provinces of La Laguna and Batangas, following the rule of employing companies of all the battalions in garrison detachments and details in order that no single organization may be charged with all this second-line service.

I know that no exhortation or appeal to the skill and valor of your excellency and to the skill and valor of the generals, commanders, and officers under the orders of your excellency and to your brave troops is necessary, and that all will discharge their duty to the uttermost, responding with every kind of sacrifice to whatever the King and country may expect of us.

I well know that the generals, commanders, and officers will take care that the soldiers be well fed and cared for, and that the infantry, cavalry, and artillery will know how to give such an account of themselves, each arm in its own sphere of action, as to produce the maximum results, and that the same can be expected from the skill of the engineers. Unless precipitate, we will be able to inflict much damage while receiving but little.

Your excellency will please acknowledge receipt of this communication, which only the generals under your orders should see, to whom I beg you to transmit it, with a copy of the general organization of this army.

May God preserve you many years.

Manila, February 7, 1897.

CAMILO G. DE POLAVIEJA.

General Lachambre acknowledged receipt of the foregoing, as follows:

COMANDANCIA GENERAL OF LA LAGUNA, BATANGAS, AND TAYABAS.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: In acknowledging receipt, as your excellency directed, of your esteemed communication dated the 7th instant I have the honor to express the profound gratitude with which this division receives the flattering expressions which you address to each and all who compose it and the firm conviction I entertain that the excellent spirit which animates all and makes them desire a post of honor and of danger and to consider as a disgrace an assignment to duty in the second line is a sure guarantee that they will expend all their energies in bringing to a happy termination this campaign, fulfilling the sacred duty of sacrificing their lives for the high interests of king and country, to whom they offer through me the protestation of their most loyal devotion.

God grant, etc.

Calamba, February 9, 1897.

JOSÉ LACHAMBRE.

To His Excellency the MARQUIS OF POLAVIEJA,

General in Chief of the Army of the Philippines.

The headquarters of the First Brigade (Cornel's) was at Calamba and of the Second (Marina's) at Biñan.

These brigades constituted the forces for the advance upon Silang, together with the troops attached to the division. Detachments from them were left at Santa Cruz, Calamba, Santo Domingo, Tayabas, on the Tanauan-Bañadero line, and at Biñan, amounting to 1,563 men, leaving a total of combatants in the two brigades and divisional troops for the advance upon Silang of 9,277.

The Third Brigade (Jaramillo's) had its headquarters at Taal, Batangas Prov-

ince. To it was assigned the duty of cooperating in the attack upon Silang by acting as a containing force to prevent the insurgents in the south of Cavite from advancing to the relief of those in Silang, and at the same time its commander was directed to make an offensive movement with a view of occupying Talisay and other positions on the southern slope of Mount Sungay. It had detachments at Batangas, Lobooc, Calaca, Liang, Balayan, Point Santiago, and on the line of the Pansipit River amounting to 1,563, leaving 1,645 for offensive operations.

The total of troops available for the offensive was therefore 9,277 and the total detached 2,658, making a total in the division of 13,580.

The details of the composition and disposition of the troops in the division is shown in the annexed table:

TABLE.

Detachments.

FIRST AND SECOND BRIGADES.

	Men.
Santa Cruz	339
Calamba	147
Cuartel de Santo Domingo	122
Tayabas	189
Tanaúan-Bañadero Line	614
Total	1,311

THIRD BRIGADE.

Batangas, Lobooc, Calaca, Liang, Balayan, Point Santiago	450
Pansipit Line	645
Total	1,095

COMBATANT FORCES.

First Brigade	4,001
Second Brigade	3,913
Attached to division, 16 guns	1,363
Total forces in advance on Silang	9,277
Third Brigade	1,645
Total combatant forces	10,922

RÉSUMÉ.

Detachments:	
First and Second Brigades	1,563
Third Brigade	1,095
Combatant forces:	
On Silang—	
First Brigade	4,001
Second Brigade	3,913
Attached to the division	1,363
On the southern slope of Sungay—	
Third Brigade	1,645
Total forces in the division	13,580

In addition, a fourth brigade, commanded by General Galbis and operating under the direction of the governor-general, was extended along the northern bank of the Zapote River. The lakes of Bay and Bombon (Taal) were guarded by armed launches and other small craft, while the gunboats of the squadron patrolled the seacoast. The insurgent province was therefore invested on all sides.

Before proceeding to an account of the military operations in Cavite some brief description of the theater of operations, the military organizations, and defensive works of the insurgents in the province is necessary to a proper understanding of the campaign.

The province of Cavite is situated between 14° 7' 30" and 14° 30' north latitude and bounded on the north by the bay and province of Manila (Rizal); on the south

by the province of Batangas, and separated from the latter by the lofty range of the Tagaytay; on the east by the same province and by that of La Laguna, and on the west by the Bay of Manila.

It contains a superficial area of about 1,800 square kilometers, being 50 kilometers in its greatest length from north to south and 44 from east to west.

Its population is about 141,250, distributed in 22 towns and 103 barrios, the principal being Cavite—a word derived from the Tagalo “cauit,” which means a fishhook, called by the natives Tanguay, otherwise “land which projects into the sea”—which is the capital of the province and is situated, together with the towns of Caridad and San Roque, in the northwestern part upon a sand spit projecting easterly into the sea, and forms with the Bay of Bacoar the safe and sheltered anchorage of Cavite.

According to the census made by the archbishop of Manila the population of the three towns mentioned amounts to 12,614 inhabitants. Near the sea and upon the same shore are situated the adjoining coast towns of Bacoar, Cavite Viejo, Noveleta, Rosario, Santa Cruz de Malabon, Naic, and Ternate, their population aggregating 48,859 inhabitants.

In the vicinity of the Bay of Manila are found Imus and San Francisco de Malabon, with populations of 14,338 and 8,337, respectively; to the southeast of both and bordering upon the province of La Laguna, Carmona, with 3,548 inhabitants.

In the southern, or, rather, southwestern part of the province, near the Batangas border, are found Bailen, with 4,425, Magallanes, with 2,577, and Alfonso, with 6,977, inhabitants. In the interior of the province, in almost the same latitude as the former, are found Perez-Dasmariñas, toward the east, containing 4,309, and, to the west, Maragondon, with 7,234 inhabitants.

Finally, Amadeo, with 3,293, Mendez Nuñez, with 4,506, Indang, with 13,602, and Silang, with 7,081, inhabitants, occupy the most elevated points in the district, on the northern watershed of the Tagaytay Mountains.

The natural features of the province of Cavite render it a very difficult country for any but native troops to operate in. It abounds in rivers, the largest of which run from south to north, parallel to each other at short distances, and empty into Manila Bay, their beds being the bottoms of deep ravines, which present excellent positions for defense. The same is true of the smaller streams, which flow to the northeast and empty into the Lake of Bay (Laguna de Bay).

Among the rivers emptying into Manila Bay the principal are the Imus, or Tibagan; the San Cristobal; the Bambang, or Bacoar; the Zapote, which forms the boundary between Cavite and Manila (Rizal) provinces and which receives the names of Salippit and Limbong in different parts of its course; the San Augustin, or Hasaan, called Ilang-Ilang in its lower course and Casundit in its middle course; the Canas, and the Tartaro.

Among those emptying into the Lake of Bay are the Alagao, or Bitucang-Manoc (Tripa de Gallina), which forms on the southeast the boundary between Cavite and La Laguna; the Tibay; the Lumbia; the Calabozo; the Munting-Ilog (Rio Pequeño), and the Malaquing-Ilog (Rio Grande).

These rivers all have their sources in the Tagaytay Cordillera, or range, which extends from the southeastern coast of Batangas along the northern shore of the Lake of Bombon (Taal) between Cavite and Batangas provinces, rising into the inaccessible Mount Sungay, north of Talisay, and having numerous other peaks.

Across the narrow neck of land in Batangas, between the Lake of Bombon and the Gulf of Balayan, runs the Pansipit River, from the lake to the gulf. The line of this river was held by detachments from the Third (Jaramillo's) Brigade.

With the exception of the single badly paved highway from Las Piñas to Cavite, 20 kilometers in length, the province of Cavite has no paved roads. There are 13 roads practicable for carts, and the other means of communication are simply horse trails and footpaths. All are crossed at frequent intervals by streams and bordered by dense growths, which render military operations very difficult.

There were a number of well-constructed bridges in the province, but on the approach of the Spaniards these were cut down and partially or wholly destroyed by the insurgents and had to be repaired or reconstructed by the engineers.

MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE INSURGENTS.

The territory was divided into five parts, called zones of war, each having a capital.

Each of these zones was defended by an army, which was divided into active and volunteer forces, the former comprising all the fighting men and the latter all those engaged outside of the ranks in works of a mechanical character.

The active army was organized into regiments, companies, and batteries, and performed duty in the trenches, towns, and on the roads, and also patrolled the territory to check desertions and defections.

In turn the companies were subdivided into soldiers with firearms and those without, the duty of the latter being, in proportion of five of them to each rifleman, to keep themselves close to the rear of the fighting line and to secure the guns of men who became disabled, it being required that such reserves should be provided with a spear or bolo (short machete) to attack with the riflemen, with cold steel, when the order was given to charge the Spaniards.

To the batteries were committed duties pertaining to the care and use of native cannon (lantacas), the firing of rude fougasses and mines, and the preservation of the gunpowder.

The function of the volunteer army was the gathering and storing of food supplies and iron and copper instruments wherever they could be found, to which end sugar mills were destroyed, bathing establishments, and whatever contained a pipe or spindle, even to the extent of breaking up carts to get their tires and axles. Moreover, it was the duty of the volunteers to search the surface of the fields, etc., for projectiles which, fired by the navy at towns and trenches on the coast, had failed to explode, to carry food to the troops on guard or on duty in the defenses, and with those of the active army and the women and children, since where works of this kind were concerned neither age, sex, nor condition was exempt, to strengthen daily the defenses and to throw up others on suitable sites.

For the command of their forces they established the hierarchies of generalissimo, lieutenant-general, marshal, brigadier, colonel, and major, creating in addition the following officials:

A minister of marine, whose portfolio was taken by Marcelo de los Santos, superintendent of the Nautical School of San Francisco de Malabon; a military chaplain superior, who was the coadjutor named Eladio Almeyda; an intendant-general of revenue, who was Silvestre Aguinaldo (chief also of the administrative council), to whose office pertained the collection of contributions from each head of the barangay, the payment of the soldiers, who were allowed each 10 centavos and a chupa of rice per day; a general of artillery, who was Crispulo Aguinaldo, a cousin of Emilio; an inspector of cannon and arms, projectiles and powder, factories for which were located in Silang, Imus, and San Francisco; a general of engineers, the office being filled by the Spanish mestizo Edilberto Evangelista (of whom it was said that he had followed the career of a civil engineer in Belgium); director of defensive works; and finally an auditor-general for war, who was Santos Nocon, a Manila notary's clerk. All of these exalted personages were lieutenant-generals.

Emilio Aguinaldo, ex-municipal capitan of Cavite Viejo, exercised supreme authority over the civil and military hierarchies, and was also principal chief of the insurrection, with the title of generalissimo.

The armies of the various zones were commanded as follows: That of the first, or Silang zone, by Victor Belarmino; that of the second, or Imus zone, by Andrés Bonifacio, who also exercised the functions of inspector over all; that of the third, or Bacoar zone, by Felix Cuenca; that of the fourth, or San Francisco de Malabon zone, by Ramon Panagasi; that of the fifth, or Alfonso zone, by Lazaro Quiamon.

Each town had its marshal, charged with the defense of the same and of the people in the vicinity, and acting also as the second of the general of the zone. These were Martin Medina, of Silang; Juan Analdo, of San Francisco de Malabon; Ariston Villanueva, alias Campuput, of Noveleta; Nicolas Estrella, of Perez-Dasmariñas; Pascual Alvarez, alias Bagumbuhay, of Imus; Santiago Alvarez, alias Apuy, of Cavite Viejo; Arcadio Arayata, of Bacoar; Juan Pio, of Naic; Julian Saigco, of Santa Cruz; Julian Parausa, of Indang; Miguel Barba, of Maragondon; Pedro Pacheco, of Ternate; Francisco Engracio, of Rosario; Artemio Ricarte, alias Vibora, of Mendez Nuñez; Diego Bautista, of Amadeo; Juan Graput, of Bailen; Fausto Viera, of Magallanes, and Julian Cando, of Alfonso.

INSURGENT DEFENSES.

The combination of defensive works of the province of Cavite is worthy of consideration and study as giving evidence of some technical skill, which is explained by the fact that they were constructed under the direction of the mestizo Evangelista.

The territory occupied militarily by the insurgents formed a great intrenched camp, the towns, rivers, defiles, and a multitude of positions and mountains in the interior, moreover, being fortified by works more or less united, according to

the strategic location of each point, an infinity of parapets and of every kind of obstacle being thrown up on the frontiers, by means of which the roads of communication were rendered useless.

Two lines of trenches, one with intervals and one continuous, occupied the frontiers. The line with intervals began at the mountains of Tagaytay, extending southeasterly and northerly to the head of the Zapote River; the continuous line began at the mouth of the Bacoar, skirted the beach, the esteros of Noveleta and Dalahican, as far as the town of Santa Cruz, and continued thence, with intervals, to the towns of Naic and Ternate.

The line with intervals, in addition to shelter trenches, was constructed with parapets usually 8 feet high, made of earth, logs, and stones, strengthened on the exterior with cylinders, heavy beams, sheets of galvanized iron, and even dried skins of carabaos, covered over and concealed by vegetation and thorny entanglements. Usually there was one tier of embrasures for lantacas and two tiers of loopholes.

As obstacles there were placed in the front and on the flanks chevaux de frises, crowsfeet, etc., and some had ditches with water utilized from a neighboring stream.

Such intrenchments were constructed on the banks of streams and at places where roads and defiles leading to the interior could be enfiladed, and usually there were several parallel lines of intrenchments, those in rear commanding those in their front.

Within these exterior lines the towns were also defended by intrenchments constructed at points commanding the roads leading to the towns, tenailles and even lunettes with very open gorges being placed at the principal entrances, around about which were placed pitfalls, etc., and occasionally bombs, as at Perez-Dasmariñas and Imus. At the same time the defensive possibilities of churches, convents, estate houses, and strongly built dwellings were availed of and strengthened, and finally barricades were erected in the streets. In addition to the laborious works described, frequently interior roads, rivers, and dikes were placed in a posture of defense, parapets being constructed across roads, rivers or mountains being flanked by traverses resting on precipices and bridges being fortified by bridgeheads more or less strong.

Finally, sluices in the dams across rivers were so contrived as to produce inundations when desired, like those at Perez-Dasmariñas and San Francisco de Malabon.

The continuous line of intrenchments which extended along the entire length of the seashore was constructed of sand, with a height of 6 feet 6 inches and a thickness of about 20 feet, with revetments of bamboo fastened together with rattan.

A banquette ran the whole length of the parapet, and at intervals were casemates where the defenders, sentinels, and even the fishermen along the beach could take refuge when Spanish war ships fired on the trenches.

The insurgents obtained such arms as they had, according to Spanish writers, from the small detachments of troops and posts of the guardia civil, which were surprised and overwhelmed at the beginning of the outbreak, from deserters from native Spanish regiments, and by individual purchase. Moreover, a number of arms and equipments had been captured from the Spaniards at the battles of Noveleta and Binacayan. However they were obtained, it is estimated by Spanish writers that at the beginning of 1897 the insurgents had about 15,000 firearms of all descriptions, consisting of Mauser, old-style Remington, Freire-Bull, Winchester, Colt, Peabody, Minie, Berdan, breech-loading and muzzle-loading shot-guns, and even parlor rifles and air-guns, besides a great variety of revolvers.

They displayed considerable ingenuity in making cannon out of every kind of material available, using boiler tubes, water pipes, etc., and casting some bronze cannon from church bells. They also utilized the iron cannon sunk into the beach as anchors for the cables of vessels, and those planted at the corners of plazas.

Two Chinese, one of them named Paua, directed the work of casting guns at the Imus foundry as well as the repair and refitting of arms.

They were assisted by 16 operatives of the Manila artillery Maestranza and Cavite arsenal, who had gone over to the insurgents, taking with them in their flight a number of cannon tubes, which when completed as cannons were designated as heavy guns.

At San Francisco de Malabon, where there was a considerable deposit of saltpeter, the insurgents established powder works, a cartridge factory, plants for reloading and for casting bullets. A large number of Chinese and natives were employed in labor of this kind and in the manufacture of lances, bolos, and other kinds of cutting weapons, the insurgents having at the beginning of 1897, according to a very liberal Spanish estimate, about 90,000 men armed with weapons of

this kind, in addition to 15,000 equipped with firearms, in the province of Cavite alone.

As the normal population of the province was estimated to be about 140,000, the estimate of 105,000 men under arms is explained by Spanish writers by the statement that many thousand natives from other provinces had managed to elude the vigilance of the Spaniards and had added themselves to the insurgent defenders of Cavite, and, further, every boy capable of wielding a bolo had been pressed into the ranks or had voluntarily enlisted. Cavite was therefore a huge intrenched camp, the whole population and a considerable portion of that of other provinces being committed to its defense.

After the receipt of General Polavieja's plan of campaign, General Lachambre made his dispositions in accordance therewith and issued detailed instructions to his subordinates.

General Lachambre having reported himself ready, he received on the 13th of February the following dispatch from General Polavieja at Manila:

[The general in chief to General Lachambre, Calamba.]

I have ordered General Jaramillo to demonstrate against the rebel trenches at Bayuyungan to-morrow, the 14th, and your excellency will please march on the 15th with your forces on Silang, in accordance with the instructions already communicated. General Galbis, with his command, is to-day on the Piñas, Almansa, Muntinlupa line, and on the 15th will be on the right bank of the Zapote River.

POLAVIEJA.

General Polavieja on the 14th established his headquarters at Parañaque, and on the morning of the 15th General Lachambre began the advance on Silang, the two brigades taking the different routes indicated and converging on Silang.

The march was attended with many difficulties, and the heavier pieces of artillery were carried along only by the exercise of great effort and perseverance. The enemy disputed most vigorously the advance of each column, and their positions at Munting-Ilog and Malaquing-Ilog were only carried after a most stubborn defense, costing the Spaniards considerable loss in officers and men.

The two columns having fought their way to the outskirts of Silang, that formidable position was taken by a joint assault on the 19th of February, after a preparatory bombardment in which the artillery fired 105 rounds of shell, the infantry expending 25,000 cartridges.

The insurgents lost about 500 killed and 1,500 wounded, the Spaniards losing 12 killed and 70 wounded, the action lasting four and a half hours. The celebrated Tagal bishop was found lying dead across the parapet with a bullet through his heart. Nevertheless, the insurgents on the 22d made a desperate attempt to retake the town, but were repulsed with a loss of 400 killed and many wounded.

General Lachambre burned the greater part of the town as a punishment, but reserved the church, convent, and the best houses in their vicinity, utilizing them for a hospital, barracks, and storehouses. Having established a post here, he garrisoned, fortified, and connected it with the telegraph line.

Lachambre advanced from Silang February 14, his main body taking the direct route to Perez-Dasmariñas parallel to the Casundit River, while a flanking force of three companies covered his left and a battalion and a half under Colonel Villalon, which had started an hour earlier on the road to Palimparan, with the Rio Grande on its right, protected his right flank. Villalon encountered but slight opposition in his rapid advance and occupied Palimparan with trifling loss. At this place he bivouacked, being joined at sunset by a half brigade under Colonel Arizon, which General Galbis had detached from his force on the Zapote River.

In the meantime the main body arrived at the hamlet of Sampaloc, 3 miles from Perez-Dasmariñas, and bivouacked there. The next day, after a short bombardment by the mountain batteries, Perez-Dasmariñas was attacked from the south and west, and after several hours of hard fighting was carried by assault, many of the insurgents remaining in the trenches to die in a hand-to-hand fight. The rice fields to the east of the town had been flooded and were impassable, but Arizon's column, approaching the northern end of the town from the eastward, took the insurgents, who fled, in flank.

Four hundred insurgents were killed within the defenses of the city and a large number outside, the Spanish losing 21 killed and 121 wounded.

Aguinaldo directed the earlier part of the defense, but before the decisive attack was made he fled, turning over the command to Estralla, an ex-sergeant of the civil guard.

The insurgents, undismayed by their defeat, soon rallied, and on the 27th attacked a column which had been sent out to reconnoiter toward Palimparan, but were defeated with a loss of about 300, the Spanish losing 2 killed and 10 wounded, and their mountain guns firing 22 rounds, which were very effective, while the infantry expended 63,000 cartridges.

The church, convent, and stone houses of the Plaza of Perez-Dasmariñas were put in a defensive condition and garrisoned by two companies of infantry.

The division, however, did not resume its advance until the 7th of March, owing to the difficulty of bringing up supplies.

On the latter date the division took up the march for Imus, following the eastern road, while Arizon's half brigade marched on the right flank on a parallel road which intersected the route of the division at Salitran, a large stone estate house belonging to the Recoletos Order, which the insurgents had strongly intrenched and occupied. Arizon's command arrived first, but the insurgents, although prepared to expect a Spanish advance from his direction, seeing also a large force approaching on their right flank abandoned their position, which Arizon immediately occupied. The division, however, being unaware of this, opened on the estate house with their guns and fired five rounds before they discovered the Spanish flag flying over it.

Soon the scouts reported the insurgents to be in force in an intrenchment a mile and a half long and only a mile north of the town.

This intrenchment covered both roads to Imus, and each flank rested on a deep ravine, there being a redoubt at the eastern end and a flanking epaulement at the western. This formidable intrenchment was called by the Spaniards Anabo II.

It being considered impracticable to make a flank attack, General Zabala made a front attack with a half brigade, advancing over the perfectly open ground with no other cover than that afforded by the pilapiles of the rice fields. When the line had advanced to within 100 yards of the enemy, General Zabala waved his sword and gave the order for the assault, but fell mortally wounded immediately after, a shot from a *lantaca* having pierced his breast. Two captains also fell near him, but the troops pressed on, leaped across the ditch and, climbing the high parapet, took the position with the bayonet. Two hundred insurgents lay dead on the field, while the Spaniards lost 11 killed and 33 wounded.

Nevertheless the insurgents on March 8 made two desperate attempts to retake the position, in both attacks coming to close quarters. The Spaniards, firing deliberate volleys and hurling case shot into the insurgent masses, repulsed them with a loss estimated at 300, themselves losing 5 killed and 25 wounded.

On the 10th of March the division took up the march for the Zapote River, and after traversing a most difficult country reached the river and effected contact with the Fourth Brigade, now commanded by Barraquer and formerly by Galbis. When Press-Molino was reached three companies of infantry were detached and left there as a garrison.

From the Zapote River General Lachambre rode over and reported in person to General Polavieja at the latter's headquarters at Parañaque.

The troops encamped at San Nicolas, one brigade on each side of the river, and remained there for a number days, reorganizing and constructing roads and defensive works.

Although the camp sites on the Zapote River were presumably healthful, there was much sickness and suffering in the command, due to climatic causes, the effects of overexertion, sleeping on the ground, and the lack of nourishing food. Their vitality was sapped by malarial fevers, dysentery, rheumatism, etc., while nostalgia depressed the spirits of many of the young soldiers. The division had lost since February 15, 185 officers killed, wounded, and invalided, and a greater proportion of enlisted men.

There still remained, however, much to do. After the Fourth Brigade was incorporated in the division, and two battalions added, one from the Third Brigade and the other from the Independent Brigade, the total number of combatants in the division was brought up to about 12,000.

A practicable road had in the meantime been built to Salitran by way of Almansa, defended by redoubts. This work had been performed most skillfully by the native engineers and the native Seventy-fourth Regiment, and, in passing, it is remarked that the services of engineers and native troops are almost indispensable in the construction of works of this kind in the Philippines.

Imus was General Lachambre's next objective, but he intended to make the attack from Salitran. General Polavieja's state of health did not permit of carrying out his previously announced intention of personally taking command of the operations against Imus, and the roads being finished and the convoys of provisions having been sent forward with such transport as the country afforded,

General Lachambre, on March 22, started out with his division to Salitran, arriving there the next day after encountering slight opposition en route.

The division set out for Imus early on the 24th, but it was necessary a second time to take the formidable intrenchments at Anabo, which, restored, strengthened, and with the ground in front now flooded, barred the way. Again General Lachambre was forced to make a frontal attack, but he detached bodies of troops to advance simultaneously on the flanks overlapping the ends of the intrenchment. The infantry deployed, and the firing line advanced within 300 yards of the parapet before halting.

Then the mountain guns were brought up and breached the parapet. The troops rushed forward to within 150 yards of the parapet, and General Marina, seeing the opportune moment had arrived, ordered the assault. As in the former attack, the troops charged with the utmost impetuosity and courage, but the Tagals again stood firm, and opposing bolo to bayonet, fought with desperate fury. In the end the Spaniards prevailed and the insurgents abandoned the works, leaving over 300 dead in and near the trenches, among them being Crispulo Aguinaldo, a brother of Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo. The engagement lasted two and a half hours without cessation, the Spanish loss being 9 killed and 108 wounded. This engagement is known as the battle of Anabo II.

The division, after a short rest, resumed the march upon Imus, bivouacking after marching only 2 miles. On the 25th the division resumed the march in deployed formation and very soon came within sight of an intrenchment over 2 miles long, 6 feet thick, protected by cane fences, one of them being placed about 100 yards in front of the parapet. The center made a direct attack, the wings executing flanking movements. The insurgents retained their fire until the Spaniards arrived within 200 yards and then opened with *lantacas* and small arms.

The Spaniards, however, took the works, the insurgents losing some 600 men. The advance upon Imus was resumed, but as the Spanish lines came within sight of the town their appearance caused a panic among the mass of people assembled there for the defense of the town, and they took to flight in spite of the exhortation and remonstrances of Aguinaldo and Andrés Bonifacio. The former, to cover his retreat, ordered the magazine blown up and the town burned. While the device delayed the Spanish center the wings continued their advance, and pouring in flanking fires on the panic-stricken mob of insurgents, killed over 800 of them.

When Lachambre entered the ruins of the town he caused the colors of the Seventy-fourth Regiment of Native Infantry to be raised upon the church tower in recognition of their splendid services, the troops presenting arms and cheering.

Thus fell the citadel of the Katipunan with a cost to the Spaniards of only 25 killed and 119 wounded.

General Polavieja, considering the time most opportune for extending amnesty, on the 26th of March issued a proclamation offering pardon to all who had been in arms against the royal authority or who had assisted the insurrection, on condition that they presented themselves before Palm Sunday, April 11; leaders to present themselves with their forces and arms.

On March 26 the division advanced towards Bacoor, intending to take the defenses of that place in reverse, a garrison being left in Imus.

The insurgents, however, were so disheartened by the fall of Imus and by the overwhelming force in which the Spaniards advanced that they abandoned Bacoor precipitately, and the division occupied it without meeting any resistance. It was far different, however, with Binacayan, for on March 28 Marina's Brigade, while attempting a reconnoissance in force, met with such a warm reception that Lachambre found it advisable to return to Bacoor without pressing an attack, as his troops would have to advance over narrow causeways through swamps, and the resultant sacrifice of life would be great.

At Bacoor provisions and ammunition were received from Manila by sea, after which General Lachambre marched his division back to Imus.

On March 31 the division left Imus at daylight, marching across country in a southerly direction and fording in their advance numerous streams which run at the bottom of deep ravines, and many irrigating canals and ditches in addition. The advance had not proceeded far when the insurgents opened fire on the right flank of the column, the fire increasing in volume as the division advanced. It being necessary to improve the approaches to the fords of the Julian and Batong Dalig rivers, the engineers did the work under fire. The leading brigade took several intrenchments with slight opposition, but the rear brigade had to fight a rear-guard action, repelling at the same time attacks on both flanks. The division having arrived at Bacao, from which it could threaten the insurgent towns of San Francisco, Santa Cruz, Rosario, and Noveleta, all within a short distance, bivouacked there, having lost during the day 6 killed and 37 wounded, while 400

insurgent dead were counted in the open, many others doubtless having fallen in the thick brush. At night the insurgents, undismayed, engaged the outposts and surrounding the bivouac, fired repeated volleys.

The next day, April 1, the division crossed the Ladron River, taking up a position in the center of a large tract of rice fields, Noveleta being on the north, San Francisco on the south, Rosario and Santa Cruz on the west, and San Antonio on the east.

After breaching the parapet of San Antonio with mountain guns, this place was taken by assault, the defenders who were not killed taking refuge in Noveleta.

The situation was now as follows: Arizon's brigade threatened Noveleta, Marina's brigade threatened Rosario, and Sarralde's brigade attacked Santa Cruz, the baggage being in the center and out of fire.

At this moment a dense mass of the enemy issuing from San Francisco made a desperate attack upon the Spaniards nearest to them.

The whole of the division with its 12 guns was now in action and surrounded by the enemy, Lachambre in the center keenly watching the fight. When he judged the right moment had arrived, he ordered Arizon's brigade to storm Noveleta.

The brigade greeted this order with thundering shouts of "Viva España!" and with the pluck that has always distinguished the Spanish soldier when well led carried the intrenchments at a run, and fought a hand-to-hand combat with the defenders, who were either killed or driven out, notwithstanding that these were the very best of the insurgent troops, among them being many of Aguinaldo's guards, wearing a special uniform, some of them having served in the native regiments. Here, again, the Seventy-fourth Native Infantry distinguished themselves by their remarkable bravery, and once more their colors were displayed from the church tower as a recognition of their valuable and loyal service.

The capture of Noveleta placed the division in communication with the marines occupying the intrenchments of Dalahican.

In this action the division lost 11 killed and 58 wounded, but many hundreds of the insurgents were killed.

As a result of the fall of Noveleta the insurgents abandoned Cavite Viejo, and Binacayan, which were occupied the following day without resistance.

Nevertheless the insurgents, on the 4th and again on the 5th, attacked the troops in Noveleta and sustained the combat for some time, killing 10 and wounding 33 Spaniards, but leaving 50 of their own dead on the ground.

On the 6th the division marched from Noveleta, in which a garrison of marines was left, and took the direction of San Francisco, the advance guard in extended order across the same open ground upon which the engagement of April 1 was fought. The insurgent positions on the right flank were marked by lines of skirmishers with their supports and reserves. The Tagals had, however, inundated the part of this plain immediately in front of the town, and the advance was made with great difficulty, the guns and ammunition boxes having to be carried by the gunners with the assistance of the infantry. With undaunted bravery the troops struggled on under a heavy fire, but Lachambre, realizing the difficulty and the danger incurred, changed the direction of the advance. The right wing, under Arizon, inclined to the right, and the left, under Marina, bore away to the left. Half a brigade crossed the River Ladron, notwithstanding the opposition of the insurgents, and attacked the town from the east. Firmer ground was soon reached, the guns that had been taken up with so much difficulty were mounted, and a rain of shell soon fell among the insurgents. The infantry poured in steady volleys, advancing in the intervals of firing.

The whole combined attack being within a proper distance for the final rush, Lachambre gave the word, and, like greyhounds released, the Spanish and native infantry leaped to the assault. The parapet was high and the ditch deep, for the defenders had not spared their labor on it, and as the Spanish line reached the edge the rebels boldly mounted the parapet and discharged their arms at close quarters. In this critical moment the moral superiority of the white man once more was manifest. The Spanish troops reached the parapet and a hand-to-hand combat took place, the bayonet against the spear or bolo. The less determined of the enemy fled, and in a few minutes 120 Tagals lay dead against the parapet, and 5 guns and 80 rifles remained as trophies to the victors. The companies re-formed for the pursuit, but the enemy fired the thatched huts to interpose a curtain of flame between them and their pursuers, a measure which was only partially successful, for some of the troops, nimbly darting through the lances, shot down or bayoneted many of the fugitives, killing 400 in the pursuit besides those who died in the intrenchments. The Spanish loss was 25 killed and 125 wounded, including several officers. The fighting had lasted four hours over very difficult

ground and the troops were exhausted. Lachambre therefore camped in the town, which had many fine edifices and a spacious church and convent. The insurgents were under the command of Andrés Bonifacio, the president of the formidable Katipunan. This terrible blow to the insurrection was followed by the occupation of the towns of Santa Cruz and Rosario without firing a shot.

Many of the natives had joined the insurrection under compulsion and had long desired to submit themselves. Now they came in by hundreds every day to claim the amnesty offered by General Polavieja.

The campaign had lasted fifty-two days, 57 combats had taken place, and the total loss of the division was 1 general, 14 officers, and 168 men killed, and 56 officers and 910 men wounded. Probably a far larger number died or were invalided from disease, induced by the fatigue, exposure, and privations inseparable from such a campaign, especially as most of the men were mere youths.

General Lachambre more than maintained his high reputation as a skilful and enterprising general in this campaign, receiving loyal and able support from his brigade commanders.

The officers and men maintained throughout a high standard of morale and discipline in spite of discouraging circumstances of climate and country. General Polavieja's plan of campaign appears to have been well considered and skilfully directed by him, and the result added more luster to the Spanish arms than all the operations of his predecessor and of his successor, previous blunders and reverses in the province of Cavite being more than compensated by his uniform successes in this territory chosen by the insurgents as the theater of their greatest operations of war.

OPERATIONS ON OTHER LINES.

While the operations in Cavite were being conducted, General Jaramillo's brigade (Third) fought several successful actions of a minor character in and about Bayuyungan, driving the insurgents from their intrenched positions everywhere in Batangas.

Also at Paso de Blas, near the boundary between Manila and Bulacan provinces, the column of Olaguer Feliu completely defeated an insurgent force.

Presentations about this time were numerous in Bulacan and elsewhere, in Manila over 3,000 families taking advantage of the amnesty, and Llanera's secretary presenting himself at the head of over 500 insurgents in Bulacan.

Numerous parties of insurgents were destroyed in Nueva Ecija and adjoining provinces.

In the province of Capiz, in Panay, a fanatic named Castillo led an uprising of the people, the town of Calvo being the center of the movement, but this attempt at insurrection was quickly suppressed.

By a general order, dated the 12th of April, 1897, a new distribution and reorganization of the army was directed by General Polavieja, and new commands formed, with districts as follows:

Taal Brigade.—Commander, General Jaramillo.

Tanauan, Bañadero line.—Commander, lieutenant-colonel of the Eleventh Battalion of Cazadores.

Silang Brigade.—Commander, General Sarralde.

San Francisco de Malabon Brigade.—Commander, General Suero.

Imus Brigade.—Commander, General Pastor.

Military Comandancia of the district of Manila.—Commander, Gen. Nuñez Lucio.

(Includes all the southern part of the province of Manila, which has for its northern boundary the arm of the river which empties at Parañaque.)

Comandancia-general of Manila and Morong.—Commander, General Zappino.

Comandancia-general of the provinces of the center of Luzon.—Commander, General Rios.

General Polavieja having applied to be relieved on account of sickness, the Madrid Government designated as his successor General Primo de Rivera, Marques de Estella, the victorious General Lachambre being designated to exercise the functions of governor-general, etc., in the interval between the departure of General Polavieja and the arrival of General Rivera.

General Polavieja embarked for Spain April 15, and General Rivera arrived at Manila April 25.

On the departure of General Polavieja the situation may be briefly summed up as follows:

In the provinces north of Manila the insurrection had almost been extinguished, as, with the exception of a few hundred insurgents who had retreated to their mountain fastnesses, all armed resistance had disappeared.

To the south, in Batangas and Cavite, the eastern part had been pacified, but in the mountainous western part, from the line of the Pansipit River to Ternate, on Manila Bay, the insurgents still preserved an organization, and so terrified by their threats the inhabitants of the mountain towns that they were afraid to take advantage of the amnesty, although elsewhere in Cavite, on the 13th of April alone, more than 24,000 had presented themselves.

Among the more important towns that still remained in the possession of the insurgents in Cavite were Ternate, Naic, Maragondon, Magallanes, Bailen, Alfonso, Mendez-Núñez, Amadeo, and Indang.

Shortly after his arrival Gen. Primo de Rivera issued a proclamation of amnesty, which was to run till May 17, the King's birthday, and then, with his headquarters, proceeded to Cavite to take the field.

The details of his plan of campaign were not given out, and no official copy is available.

As has been said, the brigades which were to operate against the insurgent positions in Cavite were four in number, the Fourth Brigade, under Jaramillo, operating in Batangas and being charged with preventing the insurgents, when attacked in Cavite, from crossing the precipitous slopes of the Sungay and Tagaytay Mountains, and also their passing the Bañadero and Pansipit lines.

On the 1st of May operations were begun in concert by the three Cavite brigades. The general in chief, with his headquarters and the troops to the number of 1,000 attached to the same and accompanied by General Castilla, took up the march from Cavite to Silang, having as one of his guides the mestizo Cailles, who at the beginning of the insurrection was a general in the insurgent army, but who accepted amnesty after the taking of San Francisco de Malabon. In the second period of the insurrection, and after the return of Aguinaldo from Hongkong, Cailles went over again to the insurgents, but could attain only the rank of lieutenant-colonel. Pastor's brigade from Imus accompanied the commander in chief.

Suero's brigade, marching from San Francisco de Malabon on the 3d, proceeded to invest Naic, and after a brilliant attack, lasting three hours, captured that stronghold the same afternoon, with a loss of 8 officers and 91 men wounded, the enemy losing 400 killed, a large number wounded, and 200 prisoners, besides a quantity of arms and ammunition. The defense of Naic was directed by Aguinaldo in person, who after the action fled toward Maragondon.

In the meantime General Ruiz Sarralde occupied Amadeo and General Pastor the barrios of Buena Vista and Alalang, all of which places the enemy abandoned after making a slight resistance.

From Alalang the column of General Primo de Rivera marched to the attack of Indang, fighting four minor engagements en route, and on the 11th captured this place, General Castilla conducting the attack while Gen. Ruiz Sarralde's brigade flanked the position on the south.

In this engagement and the preliminary one of the 10th the insurgents lost 300 killed. Twelve thousand natives took advantage of the amnesty in Indang.

Gen. Ruiz Sarralde next occupied Mendez Núñez with slight resistance, and Alfonso was similarly occupied.

For the operations against Maragondon three columns of attack were formed, one commanded by General Castilla, one by General Suero, and the third by General Cardenas. The latter column embarked in ships and proceeded to Ternate, where it landed and moved against Maragondon in order to take it in the rear, but finding the only bridge down over a river it had to cross it was delayed so long that it did not arrive in time to assist in the capture of the town nor to cut off the insurgents in their flight, which was the principal duty assigned to it. Maragondon was taken May 11 by the forces of General Castilla, those of General Suero cooperating, and General Primo de Rivera being present and directing the attack.

The Spanish loss was 23 killed and 115 wounded; that of the insurgents was very heavy, more than 200 being killed.

Aguinaldo, assisted by some of the most notable chiefs of the insurrection, among them being Gen. Emiliano Riego de Dios and his son, Mariano, conducted the defense.

After the fall of Maragondon, General Primo de Rivera returned to Manila.

Ternate, Bailen, and Magallanes were occupied later with but slight resistance, and, the last intrenched position of the insurgents being thus taken, all active opposition ceased and the province was declared to be conquered and pacified.

Jaramillo's brigade, having performed the duty assigned to it very effectively on the Pansipit-Bañadero line, extended toward Calamba with a view of preventing the insurgents escaping by way of the mountains toward Santo Domingo.

Cavite being thus reclaimed, General Primo de Rivera drew up a plan by which

troops were to be so stationed and such other measures taken as would prevent a recrudescence of the insurrection.

The plan was well conceived, but was never put into effective operation, and the troops, without having remained long enough in their stations to accomplish anything permanent in the way of tranquillizing their various districts, were withdrawn to Manila on the 18th of May, leaving a single battalion under the orders of the politico-military governor.

The governor-general wished to construct military roads from the coast towns to the towns of the interior, and insisted upon employing native troops of the Seventy-third and Seventy-fourth Regiments for this work, and a number of these soldiers, dissatisfied with the hard labor imposed upon them, deserted.

After the withdrawal of the troops the province was left in a demoralized condition, and the Katipunans, seeing the time opportune, renewed their activities and formed plans to revive the insurrection.

Many of the surrenders or presentations of prominent leaders had been made with the approval of Aguinaldo, so Spanish writers claim. Andrés Bonifacio, the president of the Katipunan, had long regarded Aguinaldo as his rival and had constantly striven to weaken his influence and to foment discord among his followers. Aguinaldo made him a prisoner and tried him by court-martial for various offenses, chief among which, according to Spanish writers, was the assassination of certain Augustinian and Recoletos friars, especially the parochial priest of Talisay, Padre Cadenas, to whom Aguinaldo professed to be strongly attached. Bonifacio was sentenced to be shot and was executed accordingly.

Aguinaldo was thus left without a rival of any importance, and his authority was everywhere recognized by the insurgents.

THE INSURRECTION IN OTHER PROVINCES.

Aguinaldo, conquered in Cavite, took refuge in the almost inaccessible mountains immediately to the south and gathered about him many of the insurgents who refused to avail themselves of the liberal amnesty proclaimed by the governor-general.

In the districts bordering on Cavite and Manila provinces the insurrection, instead of dying out, began to raise its head again. In Bulacan particularly many insurgents appeared in arms, and frequent encounters occurred between them and the Spanish columns, which had kept moving incessantly.

There were also parties of insurgents in Zambales and La Laguna, in Batangas, Bataan, and other provinces.

Many insurgents from Batangas, Cavite, and from the towns of Taguig and Pateros, Manila Province, all under the leadership of Malvar, took possession of the ruins of Talisay on the northern border of the Lake of Taal, fortifying themselves as well as they could.

The place was attacked and taken by several columns which converged on it, the armed launches on the lake cooperating, on the 30th of May. The insurgents suffered a heavy loss. Other intrenched positions in the vicinity were previously taken by the Spaniards and thousands of insurgents fled to the mountains and toward Silang and Amadeo, Aguinaldo fleeing by way of Bayuyungan to the mountains of Sungay.

FROM THE CONQUEST OF CAVITE TO THE END OF THE INSURRECTION IN 1897.

In the month of June, 1897, thousands of insurgents who, after being vanquished in Cavite and Batangas, had fled to the mountains and the adjoining provinces of La Laguna and Tayabas, including, according to Spanish accounts, many who had accepted amnesty, abandoned the provinces named and after effecting a concentration in the mountains of San Mateo invaded Bulacan and strongly re-enforced the guerrilla parties in that province.

On the 10th of June Aguinaldo passed over to Bulacan. He went by Paliparan, and, passing between Almansa and Muntinlupa accompanied by 500 men, crossed the Pasig River at Malapadnabato, a place between Guadalupe and the river, at the same time that a larger force marched by La Laguna to the mountains of San Mateo.

Aguinaldo crossed San Juan del Monte district within sight and hearing of Manila, and proceeding via Montalban and Puray, went directly to Biac-na-bató. Neither he nor Llanera was at Puray during the engagement which occurred soon after.

On June 14 the Spaniards had a bloody engagement with a host of insurgents of Puray, where the latter were strongly intrenched. The Spaniards failed in their

attempt to drive the insurgents from their position, and retired to Montalban and San Mateo with heavy loss, owing to the failure of Lieutenant-Colonel Dujols to delay the attack until the arrival of the cooperating column commanded by Maj. Primo de Rivera.

The Spanish casualties were largely increased by an act of deceit practiced by the insurgents, a party of whom dressed in Spanish uniforms and calling out that they were Cazadores were mistaken by Dujols's force to belong to Rivera's column. The Spaniards, while thrown off their guard, were suddenly attacked and suffered a heavy loss in killed and wounded.

While there were numerous minor engagements, attacks, and raids by insurgents on the towns and barrios in various provinces, no important action except that at Puray was fought in the month of June.

From the mountain fastness in which he was ensconced in Bulacan Emilio Aguinaldo, now installed as president of the revolutionary government, with the additional title of generalissimo of the army of liberation, proceeded to perform various acts of supreme authority.

He deposed from their offices Mariano Alvarez, Ariston Villanueva, and Diego Mojica. He appointed as vice-president his ex-secretary of grace and justice, Mariano Trias, who remained in Batangas and Cavite at the head of a small insurgent force, and appointed to the latter office the Chinese mestizo, Severino Alas. About the same time the priest Dandan was elected president of the Katipunan.

In the month of July no actions of importance were fought, with the exception of one between the insurgents in Batangas and General Jaramillo's force at the barrio San Augustin, although there were numerous combats in Bulacan and Nueva Ecija between the Spanish flying columns and raiding columns of insurgents.

Miguel Malvar, the chieftain of Talisay and ex-capitan municipal of Santo Tomas, Batangas, exercised command over the Batangas insurgents, while Llanera was the principal guerrilla chief in the center of Luzon.

In the month of August parties of insurgents sprang up in Cavite Province, evidencing that the fires of insurrection in that province had only been temporarily smothered and not extinguished. They were beaten and dispersed by the troops under the command of Gen. Ruiz Sarralde.

In this month the insurgent hosts of Aguinaldo and Llanera made repeated attacks upon the town of San Rafael, Bulacan, but were repulsed, while in Batangas the forces of General Jaramillo dislodged the enemy from their intrenched position near Calaca, between Taal and Balayan. In La Laguna the Spaniards had several successful minor engagements with the insurgents, particularly on the 29th, between Alaminos and Calanang. In this province numerous parties of insurgents recruited in Biñan and neighboring towns, well provided with Remington and Mauser rifles, went about attacking barrios and haciendas, but were frequently overtaken and dispersed.

In the month of September a new military organization was put into effect for the provinces of Central Luzon, Maj. Gen. Francisco Castilla being appointed to the command and establishing his headquarters in Nueva Ecija. Eight thousand troops were assigned to the comandancia general of Luzon. They were divided into two brigades, designated as the northern and southern, respectively, and subdivisions of these brigades were assigned to specified zones of operation.

The distinguished Lieut. Col. Olaguer Feliu, of the general staff, was appointed chief of the general staff of the division.

The insurgents, being desirous of possessing themselves of the extensive granaries of Nueva Ecija, concentrated for an attack on Aliaga, held by a small garrison which occupied a fort called Nozaleda, constructed by the commanding officer, Major Caballos. The insurgents to the number of 4,000 or 5,000 gained possession of the town and besieged the fort, which was heroically defended. Three separate columns, under the command of General Nuñez, Colonel Monet, and General Castilla, hastened to the succor of the garrison from different points in Nueva Ecija. General Nuñez, arriving first, attacked vigorously the numerous intrenchments which the insurgents had thrown up about the fort, but was repulsed, and being severely wounded turned over the command to Major Navarro. At this juncture the column of Colonel Monet arrived, and the latter assuming command of the combined forces drove the insurgents from the barrio of Bacot and early the next morning (September 4) attacked and drove them from their position at Aliaga, the enemy making slight resistance, as their ammunition was exhausted. As Monet's forces entered the town the advance guard of General Castilla's column entered from a different direction. In this affair the Spanish loss was 1 officer and 44 men wounded.

In Pampanga, Tayabas, La Laguna, and Batangas there were minor engagements in the month of September in which the insurgents were usually defeated.

In September Colonel of Infantry Niceto Mayoral was installed as civil governor of Manila with a view of suppressing the operations of a band of kidnapers who were terrorizing the inhabitants and of breaking up the nests of conspirators who were plotting an uprising in the capital. In a few days he had discovered the haunt of the kidnapers, captured them and destroyed the barrio in which they made their headquarters. A few days later he captured a band of about 80 armed conspirators in a house on Camba street, in the barrio of Binondo, and on the 15th captured the entire personnel of a heliograph corps, counted on by the insurgents to establish communication with the insurgents in Biacnabató.

In the month of October there were numerous minor engagements in Pangasinan, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija. Also, at San Pablo, in the southern part of La Laguna, a column of General Jaramillo's troops, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hernandez, in cooperation with a column commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Navas, defeated a large force of insurgents that had their rendezvous in Mount Maquiling.

The insurgents also attacked in force the town of Norzagaray, in Bulacan, but were driven off. On the 5th of October the town of Baler, on the Pacific coast, the capital of Principe, revolted and attacked the small detachment stationed there, which fortified the church and convent. A naval detachment sent from Binangonan, together with a similar detachment from the cruiser *Cebu*, went to the relief of the besieged, and after a desperate fight the insurgents were defeated and Baler was restored to Spanish sovereignty.

General Polavieja, after the conquest of Cavite, had requested the home Government to send him reinforcements of 20 battalions, in order to suitably garrison the positions captured and to complete the pacification of all the disaffected provinces. These had been refused him, and Gen. Primo de Rivera, in his reports, had stated that he needed no reinforcements and had disbanded the volunteers, who, according to non-Spanish authorities, had committed many outrages and cruelties on the natives. By October many of the troops sent from Spain in the first months of the insurrection had become enfeebled by sickness and hardships, and the necessity of additional troops was apparent.

As Gen. Primo de Rivera could not consistently ask for reinforcements from Spain, he was compelled to again resort to volunteers. These, by decree of the 16th of October, were called for from the provinces of Luzon, the Visayas, and the districts of Zamboanga, Surigao, and Cagayan de Misamis. The decree called for two classes of volunteers, local and mobilized. The local volunteers were to be employed in the defense of their own pueblos and for patrol service. When in service they were to receive the same pay and allowances as native troops. The mobilized volunteers were to be armed, equipped, and fed by the Government, and were to act in combination with the regular troops. They were to receive slightly greater pay and allowances than the native troops, and those who remained in the ranks for more than six months were to be entitled to certain privileges, including exemption for themselves and their first-born sons from military service, exemption for themselves and sons from the payment of taxes in kind, and the payment of cedula, etc. Also certain land bounties were provided for in the case of both classes of volunteers and medals to commemorate their service. The age limits were 18 and 50 years. This call for volunteers was everywhere responded to with enthusiasm.

In the month of November, although there were the usual encounters all over Luzon, there were no military operations of any importance, except the capture of Camansi, or Sinukuan, as the natives called it, which was an almost impregnable position of the insurgents, situated at the point of junction of the three provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, and Tarlac, being a small table-land on the top of a mountain, the slopes of which were densely wooded and very precipitous. The Spaniards made seven separate assaults on this intrenched position, charging up the slopes at an angle of 45 degrees before they succeeded in carrying it. The forces on each side were about equal, numbering some 1,500, and the insurgents left 93 dead on the field. The Macabebe volunteers under Col. Eugenio Blanco particularly distinguished themselves.

In the month of December, 1897, Gen. Primo de Rivera assembled a force of 8,000 men with which he invested the insurgents' stronghold of Biacnabató, a mountain fastness close to Angat, in the province of Bulacan, and about 60 miles from Manila.

In order to obtain this force of 8,000 regulars without leaving exposed other strategic positions, the governor-general replaced the regulars in the positions from which they were withdrawn by 30 companies of volunteers.

Archbishop Nozaleda cooperated in the investment of Biacnabató by placing at the disposal of Gen. Primo de Rivera between 20,000 and 25,000 men to carry supplies to the besieging army.

These men were adherents of the church and were led to offer their services by the exercise of the archbishop's influence.

In Biacnabató, besides the insurgent troops, were assembled Aguinaldo and many of the officials of his government, in addition to the principal military chieftains.

As the insurgent position was considered almost impregnable, being accessible only by a narrow pass, Gen. Primo de Rivera had to decide to take the place by assault, with the probable result of heavy loss to the Spaniards, to starve its garrison into surrender, or to accomplish the same result by negotiations. The last-named policy was adopted, Pedro A. Paterno, a prominent and wealthy Filipino who had resided for a number of years in Madrid, and who was ambitious of obtaining titles and other rewards for his services, acting as intermediary. The result was what was known as the compact of Biacnabató, which was signed December 14, 1897, by Emilio Aguinaldo and others on the part of the insurgents and by Pedro A. Paterno as attorney for the captain-general, acting in the name of the Spanish Government on the other part.

No official copy of this treaty has ever been made public, but it is known that it involved the delivery by the insurgents of all arms and ammunition and the evacuation everywhere of positions held by them, and an agreement on the part of the Spanish Government to pay the insurgents certain sums of money, subject to certain conditions.

Aguinaldo and 34 principal men of the insurgents were to leave the Philippines, and not to return without permission of the Spanish Government.

The insurgents stipulated that Lieut. Col. Primo de Rivera should accompany Aguinaldo and his party to Hongkong, and that Generals Tejeira and Monet should remain in Biacnabató until information was received of the arrival of Aguinaldo's party in Hongkong. These three officers had visited Biacnabató in connection with the peace preliminaries.

The insurgents have contended that certain radical reforms in the government of the islands were promised them, but the Spanish Government has denied that the treaty or compact as finally ratified contained such promises.

As a result of this treaty peace was brought about for the time being, and Aguinaldo, with his 34 followers, established themselves in Hongkong, where one installment of money was paid them.

Señor Sastron, the Spanish author, whose history of the insurrection is largely followed in this narrative, criticises his Government, and more particularly Governor-General Primo de Rivera, for concluding the insurrection by negotiation, claiming that the insurrection was at the time on the verge of collapse and should have been given its death blow with the sword, alleging that a peace brought about in the way it was was no peace at all, and that although an act of magnanimity on the part of the Spanish Government, it was bound to be interpreted by the insurgents as a proof of weakness.

SITUATION SUBSEQUENT TO THE COMPACT OF BIACNABATÓ—BRIGANDAGE AND REVOLTS.

Generals Tejeiro and Monet were charged with arranging the details relative to making inventories of and receiving the arms and munitions of war to be turned over to the Spaniards by the insurgents, in accordance with the Biac-na-bató compact.

Sastron affirms he was never able to obtain any official statement of the arms, etc., delivered, and suggests that possibly the information was not given out lest it might diminish the importance, in the minds of the people generally, of the result of the Biacnabató negotiations. With regard to the artillery surrendered, he contemptuously describes it as composed of lantacas and so-called cannon made of wood, strengthened with iron rings and covered at the rear with carabao hides.

In several provinces the insurgent chiefs showed an unwillingness to surrender the arms of their commands, and as the payment of the installments of money after the first was made conditional upon the delivery of all arms and the disbandment of all the insurgent organizations, Aguinaldo designated other chiefs to take charge in such provinces of the delivery of arms and the disbandment of the troops, General Ricarte being charged with this duty in Cavite, Gen. Paciano Rizal in La Laguna, and Gen. Miguel Malvar in Batangas, while the Chinese General Paua was to accomplish this task in the other provinces.

Generals Tejeiro and Monet were commissioned by the general in chief to go to the provinces of Cavite and La Laguna to receive the arms to be delivered in those provinces. In Silang and Maragondon General Tejeiro received the arms and the submission of the insurgents commanded by Riego de Dios and Guillermo Bayan and in Indang of the insurgents under Diego Mojica.

In the same town he received from Baldomero Aguinaldo the decree of the ex-president of the revolutionary government for the fulfillment of that condition of the Biacnabató compact, relative to the denunciation as traitors of all who, having taken part in the rebellion, refused to lay down their arms and give an unconditional adhesion to Spain. In this decree Aguinaldo asked the captain-general to treat with the greatest rigor every individual or faction that should continue in arms in the province of Cavite.

At the same time General Monet received in La Laguna similar proofs of adhesion and homage to the cause of Spain, and declared that the public spirit there was excellent.

In the town of Pagsanhan he received the arms of all insurgents commanded by Paciano Rizal, Tiño, and Falcon, and the submission of these leaders and their forces.

Miguel Malvar presented himself, with 500 men, but with only 100 rifles and 2 antiquated cannon.

There were numerous other presentations of leaders, with their forces, and deliveries of arms in the other provinces lately in rebellion in the month of January, 1898.

The insurgents having surrendered and delivered up their arms, or the most of them, began to look for some tangible proofs that the political reforms and correction of abuses which they had been led by their leaders to believe were promised at Biacnabató by the representatives of the Spanish Government, particularly in connection with the friars, would be put in operation. As time wore on and no such reforms appeared to be forthcoming, and the other installments of money were not paid, their dissatisfaction and restlessness increased, and in the month of February roving bands of robbers, called *tulisanes* or *ladrones*, began to commit depredations in the central provinces of Luzon.

About this time Gen. Primo de Rivera sent back to Spain Col. Diaz Matoni and the marine infantry under his command, thus materially reducing the number of Peninsular troops in the Philippines.

At the same time all the sick and the time-expired men were also returned, but no application was made for troops to replace them and the marine infantry.

REVOLT IN ZAMBALES.

In the month of March practically the entire province of Zambales, part of Pangasinan, and several towns in adjoining provinces revolted. A half-crazy fanatic named Gabino organized a religious sect, with a numerous following among the more ignorant and superstitious people, especially in Zambales and Pangasinan, and the arrest of some of these by the authorities caused his followers everywhere to rise in arms, with the result that many towns were attacked and pillaged and numerous small detachments of Spanish troops overwhelmed and practically destroyed. The friars were the special objects of their vengeance, and a number of parish priests were barbarously assassinated. One of Aguinaldo's former chiefs, Yocson, was said to have been the moving spirit in this uprising.

Troops under General Monet were sent to the scene. The rebels were everywhere defeated and the revolt suppressed.

In Ilocos Sur there was also an attempt at revolt in March, which was soon suppressed.

GRAVE CONDITIONS IN BULACAN.

In the province of Bulacan the situation in March was very serious.

The cabecillas or ringleaders of this province, who were in Hongkong with Aguinaldo, had appointed deputies to exercise their authority, and these proceeded to organize lodges of the Katipunan throughout the province and to install officials who in every town terrorized the loyal natives, while marauding bands wandered about pillaging and assassinating.

The battalion of rural police whose creation had been authorized had not entered upon their duties and the small detachments of soldiers scattered throughout the province were not strong enough to take the offensive.

REVOLTS IN THE VISAYAS.

In the month of April extensive revolts occurred in the Visayas, inspired by Tagalogs, especially in the island of Cebu. On the 3d the natives of the capital, Cebu, arose in arms and compelled the political-military governor, General Montero, with his small force of 40 men, and all the Europeans of the city to take refuge in the old fort or cotta, where they were besieged.

General Montero managed to dispatch steamers to Iligan and Iloilo, to communicate thence with Manila, asking for reinforcements and supplies. Two companies were immediately dispatched from Iloilo and succeeded in adding themselves to the besieged, who, however, were still too weak to take the offensive. As soon as information of the revolt reached Manila the captain-general dispatched to Cebu reinforcements, consisting of 31 officers and 754 men, under the command of General Tejeiro, who was well acquainted with the country, having formerly commanded there. They were transported on the steamer *Churruca* and the cruiser *Don Juan de Austria*.

The rebels made a stubborn defense, but were finally completely routed and the city restored to Spanish control. In the meantime, however, the flames of revolt had spread to the whole island, and General Tejeiro had to dispatch four columns to operate against the rebels. These succeeded in defeating the latter everywhere, and in the latter part of April the island was declared pacified, although General Tejeiro found it advisable to leave a small flying column in each of the four zones into which he had divided the territory. On the 22d of April he returned to Manila, having been designated as chief of the general staff of the army in view of the approaching war with the United States. Before leaving Cebu he dispatched some troops to Iloilo, on account of the threatening condition of affairs in Panay, and a company to Bohol, in view of the incipient uprising in that island.

In Panay the insurgents dominated Antique and Capiz provinces, and it was found necessary to assemble in Iloilo, the capital, the parish priests and the civilians of Spanish birth.

On April 9 Lieut. Gen. Basilio Augustin arrived in Manila Bay to assume the functions of governor-general of the Philippines and commander in chief of the army.

On the 10th he assumed command, relieving Gen. Primo de Rivera, who two days later embarked for Spain.

General Augustin was ignorant of the actual conditions prevailing in the islands, and understanding that the insurrection was entirely ended he brought his family with him and permitted them, shortly after his arrival, to accept an invitation from the Blancos to visit them in the interior at Macabebe.

FROM THE OUTBREAK OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR UNTIL THE RETURN OF AGUINALDO TO THE PHILIPPINES.

On April 22, 1898, news was received in Manila that a state of war between the United States and Spain existed since the 21st instant.

One of the immediate results of this information was that many of the principal Filipinos hastened to proffer their services to the cause of Spain, included among them being many of the late insurgent leaders who had not accompanied Aguinaldo to Hongkong, such as Mojica, Trias, Pio del Pilar, Riego de Dios, and Ricarte.

What was of greater importance to the Spaniards, however, was that many parties of natives who, whether they were regarded as brigands or insurgents, had for some time been openly in arms, immediately laid aside their factious attitude and manifested a disposition to return to their allegiance in the hour of trouble of the mother country. In spite of the small number of Spanish troops, and the deplorably weak defensive conditions of the islands, the Government felt confident that with the people of the Philippines once more loyal, nothing was to be feared from a hostile invasion. Still there were many who mistrusted the sincerity of this new attitude of the Filipinos, and when, after the destruction of the Spanish squadron in Manila Bay and the surrender of the arsenal of Cavite to the Americans, mobs of natives pillaged and sacked the latter place, possessing themselves of the arms stored there, this suspicion became almost a certainty.

When later the city of Cavite was evacuated by General Peña, who transferred his troops to San Francisco de Malabon, making that town the new capital of the province, armed mobs of natives invaded and pillaged Cavite, terrorizing such Spanish families as still remained there.

In the meantime the governor-general had assembled a "council of authorities" to devise measures for the public safety, among its members being Archbishop

Nozaleda, the provincials of the religious orders, the civil governor of Manila, the alcalde of the city, the assessor of the army, and the captain of the port, besides military officers of high rank.

After several sessions, in which there was a radical difference of opinion as to the propriety of the measures, it was decided to recommend the creation of a "consultive assembly" in which prominent natives were to be representatives of the people, and also the creation of a Filipino militia, to supplement the regular troops.

The organization of native militia was what certain members of the council of authorities described as "playing their last card."

General Augustin concurred in these recommendations, and on the 9th of May issued two decrees to carry them into effect.

The native members of the consultive assembly were announced to be the following:

Knight Grand Cross, His Excellency Don Pedro A. Paterno, Don Cayetano Arellano, Don Isaac Fernando de los Rios, Don Joaquin Gonzalez, Don Maximino Paterno, Don Antonio Rianzares Bautista, Don F. H. Pardo de Tavera, Don Manuel Genato, Don Gregorio Araneta, Don Juan Rodriguez, Don Bonifacio Arevalo, Don Ariston Bautista, Don José Luna Novicio, Dr. Don José Lozada, Don Ricardo Esteban Barreto, Don Teodoro Gonzalez, Don Pantaleon Garcia, and Don Pedro Serrano.

It was also intended to add later 20 more natives of the better class from the provinces.

The native militia were organized according to zones, each zone containing a certain number of companies, each company being composed of 3 sections of from 30 to 50 men each, the chiefs of the zones being natives with the rank of field officers. The organization and arming of these native militia proved to be a grave error—"the last card played and lost"—for in a few days after the native commanders had sworn loyalty to Spain these chiefs, with rare exceptions, went over to the insurgents, carrying their troops with them.

FROM THE RETURN OF AGUINALDO TO THE PHILIPPINES TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE FILIPINO INSURRECTION AGAINST THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE UNITED STATES.

On May 19 Aguinaldo arrived in Manila Bay on the United States dispatch boat *McCullough*. He shortly after landed at Cavite and issued a proclamation, dated May 20, addressed to the "Revolutionary chiefs of the Philippines," in which he exhorted them to bring about a general uprising of the Filipinos against the Spaniards, fixing noon May 31 as the hour for the revolt to begin.

He also enjoined the seduction of the force of native infantry from their loyalty.

This was shortly followed by other decrees, in which he announced the formation of a dictatorial government, with himself as dictator, and provided rules for the conduct of the war, enjoining that the methods of civilized warfare be strictly followed, referred to the beneficent intentions of the United States, and denounced the death penalty against all emissaries of the Spanish Government who should attempt to communicate with the insurgents except formally under a flag of truce, etc.

According to Sastron, intelligence of these proclamations and of the proposed uprising did not reach the Spaniards generally until after the uprising was an accomplished fact, but Aguinaldo's return having been discovered May 27, General Augustin, on Felipe Buencamino's suggestion, sent him to confer with Aguinaldo, the result being that Buencamino shortly went over to the insurgents.

SURRENDER OF GENERAL PEÑA AND HIS COMMAND TO THE INSURGENTS.

General Peña, on evacuating Cavite, retired to the coast towns of the province, occupying a line running through Bacoar, Cavite Viejo, Noveleta, Rosario, and Naic, his headquarters being at San Francisco de Malabon. The naval forces of the arsenal and the marine infantry were at Binacayan and Parañaque.

General Peña found it necessary to fortify his positions, but was unable to obtain any native laborers, although prepared to pay punctually. Having found it necessary to withdraw the marine infantry from the strategic position of Binacayan to reenforce other points, General Peña urgently requested from Manila reenforcements of 200 men for Binacayan, but they could not be spared.

Although Aguinaldo had indicated the 31st of May as the day for the general uprising, before that day attacks were made on Imus, Bacoar, Cavite Viejo, Binacayan, and Las Piñas.

General Augustin attempted to throw a column of 500 men into Imus, but they were unable to reach their destination, nor could the captain-general communicate with General Peña at San Francisco de Malabon. In the meanwhile insurgents were flocking into Cavite from the other provinces of Luzon.

On the last of May the general uprising appointed by Aguinaldo occurred. The positions held by General Peña's forces were everywhere attacked by overwhelming forces and capitulated successively after making a stout resistance, General Peña and his entire command of 2,800 men becoming the prisoners of the insurgents, and the whole province of Cavite falling into their possession.

According to Sastron the insurgents gave their prisoners such scanty rations that many soldiers went about the streets begging, while others, in order to secure better treatment, performed domestic service for natives, who delighted to parade the streets followed by Peninsular Spaniards as servants.

This author also testifies that the surgeons of the American fleet were untiring in their attendance upon the sick and wounded Spaniards in the Hospital of San Juan de Dios, Cavite, and also that the commanders of the American ships, particularly Captain Coghlan, frequently visited them and kept them supplied abundantly with wines, biscuit, etc.

Aguinaldo's government, finding the number of prisoners in Cavite Province excessive, sent a large part of them to Bulacan, in which province the insurrection had made very rapid progress.

DEFECTION OF BUENCAMINO—REVOLT IN PAMPANGA.

The important line between Bacoar and the Zapote River was under the general command of Colonel Pintos, of the Spanish regulars, and temporarily, on the 31st of May, under that of Pio del Pilar and Buencamino, who commanded a force of the newly organized Filipino militia, known as the "Anda Salazar" Tercio, Buencamino commanding the contingent at Bacoar. When the general uprising of May 31 occurred, Buencamino passed over to the insurgents, carrying with him the three-fourths of the tercio commanded by him, and Pio del Pilar, who had in the affairs immediately preceding the 31st, fought valiantly for the Spaniards, and who was under orders to take charge at Malibay and Pineda, also passed over to Aguinaldo. The Spanish contingent of regular troops retired to other points and the insurgents possessed themselves of the whole Bacoar-Zapote line. The loss of this important line was a fatal blow to the Spanish prospects, as was the defection of Pilar, who had an extensive acquaintance and great influence with the natives in the zone he defended as well as in Santa Ana, Pasig, and Taguig, and also in Malibay and Pineda.

The Spaniards having lost the Bacoar-Zapote line, it was an easy matter while the American squadron blockaded Manila by water for the insurgents to closely invest the city by land, completely isolating it from the other provinces, and this they promptly proceeded to do.

On the 1st of June the town of Mexico, in Pampanga, revolted, followed in a week by every town in the province except Macabebe, the home of the ever-loyal battalion of that name. This town was enabled to withstand the insurgent attacks until the 3d or 4th of July.

A column of Spanish troops under General Monet, which had for some time been operating in central Luzon, had about this time numerous encounters with the insurgents, particularly at Angeles and Bacolor.

Captain-General Augustin attempted to concentrate in Manila Monet's column and the detachments of Spanish troops scattered over the central and northern provinces, but none of them were able to comply with the order.

General Monet fought his way to Macabebe with his 700 men, with a view of rescuing from their peril the family of General Augustin, who were still in this besieged town.

He there placed the family of General Augustin and the wounded in the merchant steamer *Mendez Nuñez*, which, raising the Red Cross flag and aided by a fog, succeeded in reaching Manila without being discovered by the American squadron. General Monet and the officers of the general staff then embarked in a small boat and also succeeded in reaching Manila. Before leaving Macabebe he directed that the men be placed in cascoes and most of the officers on the gunboat *Leyte* and turned over the command to the next in rank. Lieutenant-Colonel Dujiols remained with the troops in the cascoes, which were towed by the *Leyte*.

When the American cruiser *Concord* was sighted the cascoes were cut loose. The *Leyte* was seized by the *Concord*, and all the Spanish officers on the former were made prisoners.

In the meantime the cascoes drifted helplessly about, and Lieutenant-Colonel Dujols and one other got into a small open boat, which appears to have been with the cascoes, and leaving the latter made their way to Manila to report the condition of affairs, arriving there June 30. In the meantime the cascoes containing the men were blown ashore near Hagonoy and Bulacan and all were made prisoners by the insurgents.

PROCLAMATIONS BY AGUINALDO.

On the 9th of June Aguinaldo, as dictator, issued a decree announcing that on the 12th a proclamation would be issued from Cavite Viejo, declaring the Philippines to be independent, and followed it with other decrees prescribing the machinery of civil government. Military chieftains were not to intervene in the government and administration of the provinces, except under exceptional conditions of war.

Aguinaldo sought in every way to create the impression that all he did was with the approval of the Americans, and about this time Buencamino, now closely associated with Aguinaldo, addressed a letter to General Augustin in which occurs the following:

"Manila being hemmed in by sea and land, without hope of aid from any source, and Señor Aguinaldo being inclined to make use of the squadron to bombard the city, I do not know frankly of any other issue than death, since your excellency knows that the entrance of 100,000 Indians, frenzied by battle, drunk with triumph and blood, would produce a hecatomb from which would be spared neither women, children, nor priests, especially the friars."

In an extended postscript he added:

"We have, then, at this date, seven provinces with various seaports, such as Taal, Batangas, Balayan, Cavite, Subig, and Mariveles, and three steamers with various launches and many vessels to keep up communications, aside from using the North American Squadron whenever we desire."

Buencamino concluded this epistle by advising General Augustin to capitulate before he was reduced to the necessity of yielding himself to the Tagalogs, who completely surrounded the city.

On June 23 Aguinaldo issued a decree changing the designation of his government to "revolutionary government" and announced an intention to establish a "true republic." He also provided for a congress and organized a cabinet.

THE LAST DEMANDS OF THE REFORMISTS.

By authority of the home Government General Augustin had already implanted what he considered as two important reforms, viz, the consultive assembly and the Filipino militia. But the reformist party was by no means satisfied with these measures alone, and on the 13th of June, when recent events had made the outlook for the Spaniards much gloomier, a commission of the most prominent Filipinos, headed by Pedro Paterno and José Lozaga, appeared at General Augustin's palace, the ayuntamiento, and presented a demand for certain such radical reforms as to constitute practically autonomy.

In his extremity General Augustin agreed to grant whatever they desired on the sole condition that the commission should succeed in inducing the rebel Tagalogs to lay down their arms.

It was too late. Aguinaldo had met with such triumphant success that when the commission of reformists presented themselves before him bearing the conditions upon which autonomy would be granted he absolutely rejected them, and several of the commissioners considering that their duty was fulfilled when they presented the propositions in question gave in their adherence to the cause of the insurrection.

ASSEMBLY OF THE SICK AND WOUNDED IN MANILA.

On June 18th Aguinaldo sent a letter to General Augustin offering to deliver up to him the Spanish sick and wounded in the Cavite Hospital. General Augustin made no reply to this letter, but the next day sent a commission of military surgeons in vessels furnished by Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas. This commission first called upon Admiral Dewey and afterwards on Aguinaldo, and the latter not withdrawing his offer, 185 sick and wounded were transferred from Cavite to Manila. The insurgents also permitted the sick and wounded to be taken from the Guadalupe Hospital, which had fallen into their hands, and as

those from the San Pedro Macati Hospital had already been gathered in there were assembled in the walled city more than 3,000 sick.

THE SPANISH PRISONERS OF ISLA GRANDE.

On July 7 the bark *Compañia de Filipinas*, flying the insurgent flag, appeared in Manila Bay and equipped herself with cannon obtained from Cavite Arsenal.

This vessel had been directed by her owners to proceed from Cagayan, where she was, to Formosa, to avoid capture by the American squadron. In two hours after leaving Aparri the crew revolted under the leadership of the second engineer, a Cuban, and seized the ship, the Cuban becoming captain of the ship, and, later, styling himself admiral of the Filipino squadron, which in those days consisted of some steam launches, called *Taaleno*, *Balayan*, *Taal*, *Bulusan*, and *Purissima Concepcion*, each of which had been equipped with one or two guns of 7 or 8 centimeters taken from the destroyed Spanish ships.

Aguinaldo directed the *Compañia de Filipinas* to proceed with insurgent troops to Olongapo, and when she arrived the naval garrison of that place, under the command of Capt. Julio del Rio, of the navy, was found to be assembled on an island—Isla Grande, or Malaquit—in Subig Bay. The insurgents demanded their surrender, and when this was refused prepared to bombard them. At this juncture the German war ship *Irene* appeared in the bay and ordered the *Compañia de Filipinas* to lower her strange flag. The latter vessel, without making any explanation, left the bay and returned to Manila.

The *Irene* after leaving some supplies with the Spaniards took off the women and children to Manila. Forty-eight hours afterwards two American warships appeared in Subig Bay, and after demanding the surrender of the Spaniards on the island, which was refused, bombarded them. The Spaniards soon raised the white flag and surrendered. The *Compañia de Filipinas* shortly afterwards returned to Subig Bay. The Spanish prisoners were placed on her and turned over to the insurgents on the beach of Olongapo. The insurgent commander of this zone sent most of the 635 Spanish prisoners thus received into the interior, leaving 52 at Olongapo. Among the 52 were a number of friars. These latter, according to Sastron, were made to act as carabaos by hauling carts loaded with rice.

INSURGENT ATTACKS ON MANILA.

The exterior line of Spanish defense of Manila extended from the small fort of San Antonio Abad, on the shore of Manila Bay, just south of Malate district, around to the Bacona de Vitas, on the bay shore north of the Tondo district, and consisted of a line of blockhouses and small forts with connecting lines of intrenchments. It was held by a force of 6,750 men. There was also an interior line of defense held by about 1,000 men and in addition the batteries of the walled city.

As soon as the insurgents possessed themselves of Cavite Province and the Bacoor-Zapote line, they invested the city of Manila from shore to shore of the bay, throwing up a line of intrenchments paralleling the Spanish exterior line. They made repeated assaults upon points of the latter line, and although repulsed with loss, they daily advanced their works nearer the Spanish line. These attacks continued at intervals for about eighty days, when on August 13 Manila was captured by the land and naval forces of the United States, the insurgents being kept back and not being allowed to enter the walled city, although, following the Americans closely, they succeeded in entering and occupying several points in the suburbs of the city.

It would appear that in the latter part of July the insurgents, becoming distrustful of the Americans, attempted to intrigue with the Spaniards; possibly it may have been simply an attempt to trick the latter. At any rate, according to Sastron, Captain Acevedo, commanding an advance post which had been repeatedly attacked by Pio del Pilar, the insurgent general commanding in his front, received from the latter a note of which the following is a translation:

"Sr. D. F. Acevedo Macati, 30th of July, 1898. My very dear friend: I inform you that yesterday I had a conference with my chief, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, who told me that on Monday, the 2d of August next, the attacks of the Americans against you will begin without fail.

"Therefore my said chief charges me with saying to you and to all who shelter themselves under the Spanish flag that you should have no fear and should not become disheartened, but that on the contrary you should fortify your hearts in

your struggle and make yourselves strong, and should not give way before their cannon.

"Furthermore, if, for example, you concentrate all your forces in Manila and abandon Santa Ana, and it be possible to cede it to me, I will establish myself there with my army.

"PIO DEL PILAR."

On the 5th of August General Augustin, who had on July 25 cabled the Madrid Government that "there is no possibility of resisting without reinforcements," received a cablegram from Madrid directing him to turn over the supreme command to the *segundo cabo*, Gen. Fermin Jaudenes, and the latter was in command when the capitulation occurred.

INSURGENTS OBTAIN POSSESSION OF ALL LUZON EXCEPT MANILA.

PROVINCES OF CAVITE, LA LAGUNA, BATANGAS, AND TAYABAS.

After the uprising in Cavite under Trias the militia of this province and of the adjoining province of La Laguna went over to the cause of the revolution, those of La Laguna succeeding in seizing at the same time the Spanish colonel, Perlas, who commanded there.

The Spanish commander, Colonel Navas, ordered the concentration of all the detachments at the capitals of the provinces of Batangas, La Laguna, and Tayabas, but his plans were disconcerted by the desertion of the soldiers of the Seventy-third Regiment (native), carrying with them the civil guard and the rural guides. Colonel Navas arrived at Lipa, en route to the city of Batangas, to find that the last native troops faithful to the Spanish cause had revolted and placed themselves under the municipal captain of Tanaúan. Also that the Spanish force of 500 men under Lieutenant-Colonel Blazquez, which had gone to Batangas, had surrendered to the insurgents. Navas therefore intrenched himself in Lipa, where he was soon besieged by thousands of insurgents, the latter having 4,000 rifles and 2 guns.

Finally, his rations and ammunition being nearly exhausted and having 110 wounded and 80 sick, he capitulated with honors to the insurgent chief, Marasigan de Calasa.

In Morong, the capital of the Morong district of La Laguna Province, 100 Spaniards bravely defended themselves from June 1 to August 19 against a host of insurgents, when, their rations, ammunition, and medicines being exhausted, they were compelled to surrender.

All the detachments in La Laguna, except a detachment of 60 at Calamba, which surrendered to 400 Tagalogs under Paciano Rizal, brother of the deceased Doctor José Rizal, succeeded in concentrating in Santa Cruz, the capital of La Laguna, to the number of 600 or 700 under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Alberti, of the Twelfth Cazadores, the civil governor, Don Antonio del Rio, cooperating in the defense.

The insurgents to the number of 10,000, under their leaders, Tiño, Cortes, Talcon, and others, Gen. Paciano Rizal being in supreme command, besieged Santa Cruz from June 24 to August 30, making repeated combined attacks, but always being repelled. On the 30th of August, Manila having fallen seventeen days before, and the outlook being desperate, the Spaniards accepted the favorable terms offered and capitulated, surrendering at the same time the gunboats *Otalora* and *Oceania*.

In Tayabas, the capital of the province of the same name, Maj. Joaquin Pacheco, of the infantry, civil governor and military chief of the province, with 443 men, sustained a siege of fifty-six days, making a most brilliant and heroic defense against overwhelming odds, but finally being compelled to surrender unconditionally. Nevertheless the insurgents accorded them the honors of war, the insurgent general Malvar saying in an address to his troops that "the heroism of its (Tayabas) defenders was the admiration of the revolutionary army."

AMBOS CAMARINES AND SORSOGON.

In Nueva Caceres, the capital of North and South Camarines, the civil guard revolted, wounding their commander and assassinating Captain Andren, his wife, and four of their eight children, and also Lieutenant Montiel and his wife. A few Spaniards escaped and the rest surrendered, but a large number of prisoners who had been confined in the prison being liberated, assassinated entire families of the Spaniards. The few who had escaped from Nueva Caceres, together with the fugitives from Sorsogon, succeeded in reaching Legaspi, where they were permitted by the insurgent chief to depart for Manila in the steamer *Santander*.

NORTHERN PROVINCES OF LUZON.

In all the northern provinces of Luzon the small detachments of Spanish troops, being attacked by overwhelming numbers of insurgents, with no possibility of succor, were compelled to surrender, a considerable force under command of Major Argues, however, surrendering without much resistance at Bagui to the insurgents under Tiño, who commanded in Ilocos Norte.

The whole of Luzon except Manila therefore fell into the possession of the insurgents soon after the capture of the capital of the archipelago by the Americans.

A single exception, however, must be made. A small detachment of cazadores of the Second Battalion, commanded by Capt. Enrique de las Morenas, political military commander of the district, and Lieutenants Elonso and Martin, made a most tenacious and heroic defense of the post of Baler, on the Pacific, in the district of Principe, for over a year after the fall of Manila and after the Spanish General Rios, by an arrangement with Aguinaldo's government, had twice sent an officer to inform them of the uselessness of further resistance, as Spanish sovereignty no longer existed in the Philippines, and ordering them to return to Manila. When finally convinced that General Rios had really sent such orders, the survivors yielded and returned to Manila to receive the plaudits of Spaniards and Americans alike.

INSURGENTS POSSESS THEMSELVES OF MINDORO.

The few Spanish troops in Mindoro concentrated in the capital, Calapan, but were compelled to surrender to an overwhelming force, the whole island falling into the control of the insurgents, and some civilians who had been unable to reach Calapan being barbarously murdered.

INSURRECTION IN MINDANAO AND THE VISAYAS.

After the declaration of war between the United States and Spain the Government of the latter country cabled to Gen. Diego de los Rios, at the time in charge of the comandancia general of Mindanao, to take over the command of the Visayas, also investing him with the title and attributes of governor-general and captain-general, and later, on June 30, enlarged his functions and authority, enjoining him to adopt such measures and reforms of a political or administrative character as would conduce to the welfare of these provinces and to the maintenance of the sovereignty of Spain and the defense of the integrity of the territory. These measures were necessary, as General Augustin, shut up in Manila, could exercise no control over affairs in these distant islands.

As General Augustin had lost control of the cable, he could not communicate direct from Manila to Spain. Therefore General Rios established and maintained for four months a cable service via Labuan, sending vessels there, which, eluding the vigilance of the American ships, transmitted thence his dispatches on the state of affairs to Spain and returned with replies.

General Rios was unable to strip Mindanao altogether of its garrison because of the ever-turbulent condition of the Moros. He therefore left there such detachments as he thought would suffice to keep in check the latter, and taking 100 European and 700 native troops of the Mindanao command, he proceeded to Iloilo, Panay, and established there the seat of government. He found in the Visayas 3,000 native troops and 250 European soldiers, most of the latter being sick.

With this force of 350 Spanish and 3,700 native troops he addressed himself to the performance of the task assigned him.

As the insurrection had already extended to the Visayas, General Rios, on assuming command, found it necessary to reduce revolted towns and to combat numerous parties in the field. The revolt was so general in the province of Capiz, Panay, that 15,000 insurgents had concentrated there in April.

General Rios entirely destroyed the town of Panay, Capiz, which had been taken by the insurgents, and conducted such an energetic campaign that until the end of October insurgent uprisings were smothered as soon as initiated.

Until information was received by General Rios of the peace protocol of August 12, 1898, he daily anticipated the arrival of the American squadron to take Iloilo. At this time he had in the capital, according to Sastron, only 2 pieces of mountain artillery, 300 Spanish soldiers, and 2,500 natives, many of the latter being disposed to desert at the first opportunity. This author relates that General Rios, in view of his scanty means of defense, determined to burn the city as soon as the enemy should attempt its capture. He therefore stored a large quantity of petroleum in the four principal points of the city, and putting a military engineer in

charge of each depository, instructed them to fire the city at each point as soon as the enemy's troops attempted to disembark or his ships to bombard the place. The inhabitants having previously abandoned the city, the troops, after crossing the bridges, were to destroy them and take up a defensive position on the left bank of the river.

It did not become necessary for the Spaniards to thus burn the town, but the insurgents later did, using, according to Sastron, the Spanish deposits of petroleum, just as General Rios planned to.

Soon after entering upon his duties as governor-general, General Rios attempted certain measures of a political character in the hope of retaining the loyalty of the natives by promising them reforms. He therefore convened a junta, or assembly, of the principal Europeans and natives, in order to make use of their influence with the natives at large, among them being Romero Salas, Gay, Melliza, Castillo, Mapa, and others. He issued an appeal to the natives, offering to submit to the Spanish Government all the reforms which were conceived to be necessary for the development of the resources of the country and for the welfare of the people. He also appealed to the authorities of every class, urging them to conduct themselves in their public and private capacities with strictest regard to justice and morality.

It was too late.

After the capture of Manila, the insurrection in the Visayas developed rapidly. The greater part of the native troops of the Visayas and Mindanao had to be disarmed and discharged very rapidly, after about 117 had been shot to death for being implicated in conspiracies, which were opportunely discovered, in Cotabato, Malabang, Iligan, Iloilo, and Cebu.

This energetic proceeding greatly restrained the insurrectionary movement and resulted in saving the lives of many Europeans scattered in small groups throughout the Visayan provinces and in the districts of Mindanao. It became necessary to assemble all the troops considered loyal, as well as all the Europeans in the Visayas, in the two cities of Iloilo and Cebu.

At Iloilo General Rios had only 1,200 soldiers and three small gunboats. With earthworks connected with intrenched houses, General Rios constructed a line of defense from the sea, where that flank was supported by the gunboats, round by the Iloilo River to beyond Molo. This line, rendered stronger each day by new defensive works and established at a distance of from 5 to 6 kilometers from Iloilo, rendered the city secure from insurgent attacks, and although myriads of insurgents, having among them approximately 10,000 rifles, repeatedly attacked the line, they were always repulsed with heavy loss.

Iloilo was held by the Spaniards until December 24, 1898, on which date General Rios, in compliance with cable instructions sent from the Spanish Government, December 20, evacuated the city; and the Iloilo command, troops at Cebu, and the public functionaries and Spanish private citizens of both these cities were all concentrated at Zamboanga, Mindanao, preparatory to their return to Spain.

The Spaniards had previously offered to allow United States troops to occupy Iloilo, relieving the Spanish garrison, and about December 13 a petition was received at Manila by Major-General Otis, the United States military governor, signed by business men and firms in Iloilo, asking for American protection.

There was some delay in obtaining from Washington authority to send troops to Iloilo to preserve peace and protect life and property, and when the troops sent arrived in Iloilo Bay December 28, the insurgents were found in possession of the city.

General Rios's instructions from Madrid required him to send back to Spain all the Spanish troops under his command, but he did not at this time think himself authorized to withdraw the garrison from Jolo, in the Jolo Archipelago, under the command of General Huertas, because of some considerations of international law; so Sastron explains.

In the month of March, 1899, the Spanish authorities, according to General Otis's report for the year 1899, advertised the sale of thirteen gunboats at the naval station of Isabela, on Basilan Island, a short distance south of Zamboanga.

These gunboats had been used by the Spaniards in policing the coasts of the southern islands. The gunboats were purchased by a syndicate of private individuals with the understanding that it would deliver them to the United States authorities in the harbor of Manila, the agent of the syndicate being promised escort by the United States Navy after he had obtained possession of the vessels. After the transfer from the Spanish authorities to this agent was effected, he steamed out of Isabela Harbor and awaited near Zamboanga the arrival of his escort. There was for some reason a delay in the arrival of the latter, and twenty-four hours before the United States war ship did arrive the insurgents of Minda-

nao seized the vessels, and after stripping them of about one-half of their armament abandoned them.

By this seizure the insurgents came into possession of a few pieces of artillery, 11 quick-firing guns, 375 rifles, and a considerable amount of ammunition for all guns and rifles.

With these guns and arms the insurgents later, during the absence of General Rios, who had gone to Manila to complete arrangements with the United States authorities for the repatriation of all peninsular Spaniards, attacked the Spanish troops in Zamboanga, and, although repulsed, mortally wounded the general in command, Montero, besides killing and wounding a number of others.

On May 19, 1899, in virtue of an agreement between the United States and Spanish authorities, United States troops arrived at Jolo and relieved the Spanish garrison there under General Huertas, which then proceeded to Zamboanga, from which point all the troops which had recently garrisoned the Visayas, Mindanao, and the Sulu Archipelago returned to Spain.

SPANISH PRISONERS OF THE INSURGENTS.

At the end of the year 1898 the insurgents had in their possession approximately 11,000 Spanish prisoners, about 9,000 of whom were officers and soldiers and the remainder civil officials and employees with their families and a number of friars. Most of these prisoners were kept in the remote mountain districts of northern Luzon, although there were small contingents in southern Luzon.

General Rios, after superintending the embarkation for Spain of his troops at Zamboanga, proceeded to Manila to arrange, if possible, for the liberation of these prisoners, but was unable to make any progress in the matter, although various Spanish organizations and individuals, especially the Spanish consul in Manila, Don Luis Marinas, assisted him in every possible way.

Finally Gen. Nicolas Jaramillo, president of the "commission for selection and transportation of war material," undertook serious negotiations with the so-called Filipino government, and sent, with the approval and assistance of the United States authorities, several commissions to treat with Aguinaldo for the liberation of these prisoners. They were all unsuccessful, principally on account of the impracticable conditions insisted on by Aguinaldo's government.

General Jaramillo succeeded in inducing the insurgent General Trias to release unconditionally about 197 officers and soldiers detained in Tayabas and the Camarines, but the great majority of the prisoners owed their final liberation to the rapid advance of the United States troops in northern Luzon, the insurgents being compelled in their hasty flight to abandon their prisoners. A large number also owed their liberation to similar operations of United States troops in southern Luzon.

It is a matter of dispute as to whether these prisoners received as humane treatment at the hands of the insurgents as was practicable to accord them. While some were well treated, many undoubtedly were subjected to great hardship and suffering, and many hundreds died as a result.

Sastron affirms that 115 were deliberately killed with machetes in the Camarines.

APPENDIX IX.

AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE WALLS OF MANILA, P. I., AND SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THE ENGLISH IN 1762.

[Compiled and written under direction of Maj. Gen. George W. Davis, U. S. Army, by Maj. James C. Bush, Artillery Corps, and Capt. A. C. Macomb, Fifth U. S. Cavalry.]

PART I.

AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE WALLS OF MANILA.

In May, 1570, Capt. Juan Salcedo, the grandson of Legazpi, the conqueror, was dispatched from Cebu to the island of Luzon to reconnoiter the territory and bring it under Spanish dominion.

It appears that a few soldiers under Martin de Goiti, who afterwards overran the Pampanga country, accompanied Salcedo to the north. Goiti was killed at Maestre de Campo during the attack of the Chinese in 1574.

They were well received by the native chiefs Lacondola, Rajah of Tondo, and his nephew, the young Rajah Soliman of Manila.

The sight of a body of European troops armed as was the custom in the sixteenth century must have profoundly impressed these chieftains; otherwise it seems hardly credible that they should have consented, without attempt at resistance or protest, to give over their land, yield their independence, and become the subjects of an invading foreigner.

A treaty of peace was signed and ratified by an exchange of drops of blood; promises of rewards made to the Lacondola family under oath, together with a remission of tribute in perpetuity.

Legazpi being advised of what had occurred in Luzon, proceeded to Manila, took formal possession of the surrounding territory, declared Manila to be the capital of the archipelago, and proclaimed the sovereignty of the King of Spain over the whole group of islands.

Gaspar de San Agustin, writing of this period, says: "Legazpi ordered the natives to finish the building of the fort in construction at the mouth of the Pasig, so that His Majesty's artillery might be mounted therein for the defense of the port and town. Also he ordered them to build a large house inside the battlement walls for Legazpi's own residence, and another large house and church for the priests, etc. Besides these two large houses he told them to erect 150 dwellings of moderate size for the remainder of the Spaniards to live in. All this they promptly promised to do, but they did not obey, for the Spaniards were themselves obliged to complete the work of the fortification."^a

^aThere exists a tradition, the main elements of which seem sufficiently well authenticated, that a palisaded fort, or cotta, had been built on the river side some time before the Spaniards came, and that this fort was armed with bronze guns, the art of casting having been derived from the Japanese, or Chinese, with whom the Tagalos had considerable intercourse.

Padre Juan de la Concepcion, writing in 1788, says (p. 398, Chap. IV, Pt. II, vol. 1, History of the Philippines): "The Maestre de Campo, Goiti, made a landing with 80 men, after turning over to Captain Salcedo the command of the fleet and the rest of the forces. He then attacked a palisaded fort situated on the river bank and armed with 12 good pieces, which were being excellently handled by the Moros of the fort. He directed his men to take careful aim at the men working the guns, and so well was this done that the chief gunner, who seemed to be a European, together with others, fell dead. The Moros abandoned their artillery and Goiti was able to engage in a hand-to-hand fight with the enemy. Both sides fought with desperate valor, but the heavy mortality finally caused the enemy to show their backs and flee, closely pursued by our men, who were at their heels. In the meantime the Indians who were friendly to the fleet had set fire to the

The city council of Manila was constituted on the 24th day of June, 1571. 1570 would, therefore, appear to be the date of the inception of Fort Santiago and the walls of Manila. These primitive works were built of timber. The first stone walls raised on the enceinte owed their origin, it is believed, to the efforts of the governor, Santiago de Vera. Perez Dasmariñas, who arrived in 1590, continued and improved these walls and also completed the erection of the stone Fort Santiago.^a

These erections were probably hastened by the events of 1574, the period when the possession of the islands was unsuccessfully disputed by a rival expedition under command of a Chinese, Li-ma-hong. His fleet consisted of 62 war junks, having on board 2,000 sailors, 2,000 soldiers, a number of artisans, and all that could be carried with which to gain and organize a kingdom.

On the 29th of November, 1574, the squadron arrived in the Bay of Manila, and Li-ma-hong sent forward his lieutenant—Sioco, a Japanese—at the head of 600 men to demand the surrender of the Spaniards; who, refusing to give credence to reports and alarms, found the Chinese within their gates before resistance could be offered.

By daybreak December 3 Li-ma-hong disembarked 1,500 men, who advanced in three divisions under the leadership of Sioco. The city was set on fire, and the enemy moved upon the fort while the fleet supported the attack.

Sioco at length entered Santiago, and a hand-to-hand fight ensued. For a time the issue seemed doubtful, but Salcedo finally gained the victory and pursued the Chinese who, harassed on all sides, fled in disorder to their ships.

By royal decree King Philip later directed that the city of Manila be fortified in a manner to insure it against all further attack and uprisings.

Gomez Perez Dasmariñas, the next governor, brought with him from Spain the royal instructions to carry into effect the above decree. Hence the work began in 1590 and continued under many governors till 1872. As this construction was carried on during different periods, often far apart, the building was not executed, therefore, according to any uniform plan. Evidence of this is clearly apparent not only in the character of the material employed, but in the varied and various systems of fortification represented, thus rendering the enceinte a most interesting study. Earth, brick, and volcanic tufa appear to be the materials used—brick for facing embrasures and parapets, earth and tufa for walls.

By this same decree the number of European troops in the colony was fixed at 400 men at arms, divided into six companies, each under a captain, a sublieutenant, a sergeant, and two corporals.

Recruits from Mexico were not to enlist under the age of 15 years.

The captain-general was allowed a bodyguard of 24 halberdiers, under the immediate command of a captain, the whole forming a strange force for so large an undertaking.

History records that in the year 1603 two Chinese mandarins came to Manila as ambassadors from the Emperor to the governor-general of the Philippines. These officials shortly returned to their own country, but the greatest anxiety prevailed in Manila, where rumors circulated that another Chinese invasion was in preparation. The natives openly avowed to the Chinese, who had entered the country in large numbers, that whenever they saw the first signs of a hostile fleet arriving they would murder them all. The Chinese were accused of secreting arms; the cry was falsely raised that the Spaniards had fixed a day for their extermination; they daily saw weapons being cleaned and put in order. There was, in short,

town of Manila, though it is also said that this was done by the inhabitants for the purpose of destroying the spoil, believed to have been considerable, which would have fallen into the hands of the Spaniards but for this circumstance. During the entire fight the house of the old rajah bore a little white flag in proof of his pacific intentions and that he not only kept out of the fight himself, but that he had not consented to any of his partisans engaging therein."

(This fight occurred May, 1570. Montero y Vidal, p. 36, vol. 1, says the chief gunner was a Portuguese and that the old rajah was Lacondola.)

The use of the word "Moro" and the designations "rajah" and "soliman" indicated a condition, also sufficiently established, namely, that certain of the Malays, professing the Mohammedan religion, had formed a settlement at or near Manila, and that this religion had obtained a hold upon the people.

Most of the natives of these islands are of Malay origin, and certain of them, as in Mindanao to-day, are of this religion.—J. C. B.

^a Montero y Vidal states (vol. 1, p. 100) that these works were constructed under the supervision of the Engineer Leonardo Iturriano, between the years 1590 and 1593.

every circumstantial evidence that the fight for their existence would ere long be forced upon them. In this extremity they were constrained to act on the offensive, and finally on the eve of St. Francis Day the Chinese openly declared hostilities and threatened the city. They totally defeated the Spanish force sent against them, killed ex-Governor Dasmariñas, and encouraged by this first victory besieged the city. After a prolonged struggle they were defeated and obliged to yield. It is estimated that 24,000 Chinese were slain or taken prisoners in this revolt.

Further wall building followed.

Juan de Silva executed certain work on the fortifications in 1609, which was improved by Juan Nino de Tabora in 1626, and again improved by Diego Fajardo in 1644, the erection of the San Diego bastion being completed in that year. This bastion, formerly called fundición or foundry, and situated at the extreme southern angle of the enceinte, facing bay and land, appears to have been the first of the large bastions added to the encircling walls, then of no great height nor of finished construction.

Buzeta, writing in 1851, declares Diego to have been the only fort existing on that part of the line for some time after its construction. In trace it appears to exemplify the method of Errard de Bar-le-Duc, the engineer of Henry of Navarre (about 1606). The shape of the bastion very much resembles that of an ace of spades; its orillons or curved corners (ears) masking small pieces of ordnance placed on the drawn-in flanks and sometimes on the ears themselves to defend the ditch.

One marked characteristic of this earlier work as regards trace results from placing the flanks of bastions perpendicular to the curtain—the portion of the wall joining two bastions.

Previous to 1645, when Count de Pagan of France published his treatise, which contained the development of a system that in a short time entirely superseded those of his predecessors, all bastion flanks were placed either perpendicular to the faces of the bastions themselves or to the curtain wall. This last condition is exemplified in all the work on the Manila enceinte built before 1739.

Pagan made the flank perpendicular to the line of defense—the line joining the curtain angle of one bastion with the salient of the next—in order as much as possible to cover the face of the opposite bastion.

Vauban, 1633–1707, “followed up the principles suggested by Pagan and employed them extensively with consummate skill and judgment.” An example of his first method appears upon the walls later on.

José Torralba erected another flanking element close to the Almacenes gate on the Pasig River side (1715). This flank defense fell about 1796 to make way for the new front of that date, and the Almacenes gate and the curtain wall on Calle de la Maestranza have very recently, 1903, been demolished to afford more room near the Muelle de Almacenes (storehouse wharf).

In 1729 Governor-General Fernando Váldez y Tamón restored the walls, which were afterwards heightened by Juan Arrechedera in 1745. The inscription over the portal inside Fort Santiago clearly proves that Váldez y Tamón had made certain additions to this fort and the walls in general during the restoration in question, and it seems equally certain that Fort Santiago and the curtain walls on the west or bay side and the east or land side remain to-day very much as Tamón and Arrechedera left them.

Certain detached redoubts and one modern bastion have been added to these two fronts, but the scarp remains otherwise practically unchanged. (See photograph of map.)

The work of Váldez y Tamón and Arrechedera completes the wall construction under old-school methods, the methods of the Italian masters, of Errard, and the “compound system” of de Ville (1629), which united the methods of the Italian and Spanish schools. An examination of the wall at the end of this period can not be without interest, and the map of Váldez y Tamón (photo-map) affords a clear idea of its condition.

La Real Fuerza de Santiago (the royal stronghold of Santiago) as Dasmariñas left it consisted of a castellated structure without towers, trapezoidal in trace, its straight gray front projecting into the river mouth. Arches supported an open gun platform above, called battery Santa Barbara, the patron saint of all good artillerymen. These arches formed casemates which afforded a lower tier of fire through embrasures. Curtain walls of simplest character, without counter forts or interior buttresses, extended the flanks to a fourth front facing the city.

Váldez y Tamón seems to have added, at a lower level, a large semicircular gun platform to the front and another of lesser dimensions to the river flank. The casemates were then filled in and embrasures closed. He also changed the curtain

facing cityward to a bastion front on a system prior to that of Vauban. A lower parapet, bordering the interior moat, connects the bastion salients.^a

^aFort Santiago, Manila. Montero's "Historia de Filipinas," Vol. II, p. 29, footnote 2, gives a description of this citadel of the former Spanish power in the Orient, the same being an extract from the voluminous final report of the governor and captain-general of the Philippines, Don Fernando Valdés y Tamón, rendered to the King of Spain in the year 1739, when the governor, being about to conclude his occupancy of the office, was no doubt preparing to return to Spain.

The original report makes reference to various plans and maps which accompanied it. Unfortunately these interesting papers are not at hand, though it is believed that the map of the city of Manila, which was drawn up during Governor Tamón's term of office and is referred to in this report, is identical with the map of Manila carried to England by General Draper after his successful siege of Manila in 1762.

This copy of Tamón's map is now deposited in the British Museum in London. It has been photographed on a reduced scale, and Mr. Pardo de Tavera has brought to Manila one of the photographic copies.

The date of execution of the original map is not included in the legend it bears, but it is considered safe to assume that this date was 1739, such being the date of the report which no doubt this map accompanied:

"Report rendered by order of His Catholic Majesty (God guard him), giving the fortress, citadels, forts, and penitentiaries under royal charge in the provinces of the Philippine Islands, with plans of the same, and exact information as to armaments, garrisons, pay, rations, and stores for their maintenance; gross expenses for the year and gross income, together with the sources from which obtained, together with a description of all the provinces, with notes as to important and curious matters, and a view of what they produce for the royal treasury.

"There is also herewith an account of the expense of holding and maintaining the same, made by Field Marshal D. Fernando Valdés y Tamón, in whose charge is the government of these islands, year 1739.

* * * * *

"The fort has a perimeter of 2,030 feet, and it is of a nearly triangular form. The south front, which looks toward the city, is a curtain with a terreplein, flanked by two demibastions, having also a lower and a more advanced rampart, with a ditch connecting with the river. Near the beginning of the north face there has been built, instead of a bastion, a cavalier with three faces of batteries, one looking seaward over the anchorage place, one facing the entrance, and the third looking upon the river. The latter is united with a tower of the same height as the walls, through which there is a descent to the water battery placed upon a semicircular platform, thus completing the triangular form of the fort.

"The walls are pierced for the necessary communications, the principal entrance being in the south wall and facing the city, the communication with the river and the sea being by a postern gate.

"The foregoing description can be better understood by reference to the plan, which also gives the guard stations, together with the barracks of the troops of the garrison and quarters of the warden and his subalterns.

"The reduced scale of the plan prevents the showing with clearness of other constructions, such as the chapel, various storehouses, the powder magazine, the bombproof, the sentry towers, the cisterns, etc.

"*Artillery, mounted and dismounted, with the necessary equipment for their use.*—Four bronze 2-pounders, 2 bronze 4-pounders, 1 bronze 6-pounder, 3 bronze 8-pounders, 1 bronze 10-pounder, 3 bronze 16-pounders, 8 bronze 18-pounders, 3 bronze 20-pounders, 4 bronze 25-pounders; total, 29. One iron 3-pounder, 1 iron 4-pounder, 1 iron 5-pounder, 1 iron 6-pounder, 2 iron 16-pounders, 2 iron 25-pounders, 4 iron 32-pounders; total, 12.

"*Munitions.*—One thousand five hundred and thirty-four cannon balls (iron) for guns listed above; 1 mortar (bronze), using a ball of 300 pounds; 95 muskets; 85 carbines, matchlock short; 3,414 musket balls for use with same; 161 grenades; 80 bar-shot; 148 cutlasses, boarding pikes, daggers, crowbars, handspikes, and shot tongs; 80 linternas (lanterns?), with arrangement for making fire; 200 arrobas (5,000 pounds) powder.

"The authorized garrison of the fort is composed of 1 company of Spanish infantry, commanded by the warden, who by His Majesty's order has 1 lieutenant, 1 adjutant, 1 ensign, 1 sergeant, and 5 minor officers, being an orderly, a flag bearer, fifer, and 2 drummers, with 60 soldiers, and 1 gunner, with 12 artillerymen. The laborers are native Pampangos, and are organized as a company of infantry, with a captain, ensign, sergeant, and the 3 minor offices of standard

Appended is a photograph of the quaint sixteenth-century gateway, recently restored, opening upon the exterior Plaza de le Fuerza.

Leaving this plaza, whose ramparts have been changed since 1739 to form a sort of extension of Fort Santiago, we come upon a line of wall facing the bay, without interior buttresses, and of the same simple construction as the curtain in the fort.

The tracing shows a cross section of the rampart, moat, and covered way recently taken at the west end of Calle Aduana. Neither this moat nor covered way existed in 1739, but the curtain wall remains essentially the same. The masonry simply forms a retaining wall for a terrace of earth in the rear—a rampart without other parapet than a breast-height wall, $1\frac{1}{2}$ feet in thickness. This same general construction obtains, with certain exceptions, throughout its length, from Calle Aduana to San Diego bastion. Four small bastions of ancient work, evidently added to the original wall, still exist on this front. Of these two have the northern flank and one, near Santiago, the southern flank half again as long as the other, thus producing a curtain line en crenailière.

That these bastions were not a part of this particular wall as at first built can hardly be doubted. They differ in construction, and it is certain that the old north front possessed no bastion prior to the one erected by Torralba in 1715. The same condition unquestionably obtained on the western side, where the indentations (en crenailière) afforded the only flank defense until Silva and Tabora executed their projects, 1609–1626, by adding bastions at these points.

Differing entirely from the others, the primitive character of this front points to considerable age, which idea is confirmed by the size and shape of its bastions. Small and narrow in plan, with flanks considerably longer than the faces, and standing perpendicular to the curtains, they answer in description to that of the old bastions of the Italian masters, of which those by Micheli on the enceinte of Verona, 1523, are supposed to be the oldest extant. Micheli's bastions are small, with narrow gorges and short faces, and are placed at great distances apart, it being the invariable practice when they were built, and for a considerable time afterwards, to attack the curtains and not the faces of the bastions.

On the east front bastion building slowly progressed, and before 1739 two others appeared—San Andrés and San Lorenzo—similar in plan to San Diego, evidently a part of Fajardo's project (1644).

A fourth bastion, with perpendicular, straight flanks, joined itself to the northeast angle. This also still exists, but greatly changed by subsequent engineers.

Neither the west nor land rampart affords other than a single tier of fire from open batteries.

Of the original north front little remains, this work having been entirely remodeled at the end of the eighteenth century. It consisted of a simple wall on an indented trace, without bastion till 1715.

Tartaglia, an Italian master, first described the covered way in 1554, so that it must have been used at a much earlier epoch of Italian fortification.

It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that so little work of this character appears on the map of Váldez y Tamón.

An estuary limited the city on the east and southeast, and this appears to have been excavated in part, forming a rude moat, beyond which a low wall, constituting a line of redans, with a place of arms opposite the old Real gate, extended from San Diego bastion to San Andrés. A short line of similar construction was built opposite San Gabriel bastion, northeast angle. To further develop the land front and prevent approach by the beach, a low battery, San Gregorio, had been built to the south of San Diego. This, however, played no particular part in the

bearer, fifer, and drummer, and 90 soldiers, of whom 3 are in receipt of good-conduct pay.

"The pay and rations of the regular garrison are distributed monthly and are as follows:

"*Officers.*—Warden, 66½ pesos (net); lieutenant, 15 pesos; adjutant, 5½ pesos; ensign, 4 pesos; sergeant, 3 pesos; constable of artillery, 4 pesos; captain of Pampangos, 6 pesos; ensign, 2½ pesos; sergeant, 2½ pesos.

"*Soldiers.*—The 60 Spanish soldiers, the 12 artillerymen, standard bearer, fifer, and drummers, 2 pesos; the Pampango soldiers and those in minor office, 1½ pesos.

"The total annual pay of the garrison amounts to 4,595 pesos in money and 1,219.5 fanegas (1,824.3 bushels) of rice, with which all are rationed, all of which is paid from the royal treasury and storehouses of Manila."

* * * * *

This description of Fort Santiago and its armament in 1739 is of interest in connection with the accounts of the British siege of Manila, which took place some twenty-three years later, as it is believed the armament was practically the same at both periods.—A. C. M.

siege by the British (1762), and has since been demolished; the statue to Legazpi and Urdaneta now occupies its site.

The first regular military organization in these islands was formed in the time of Pedro de Arándia (1754), who established one regiment composed of five companies of native soldiers, together with four companies which had arrived with the governor from Mexico. Each company numbered 3 officers and 106 men. This corps, afterwards known as the King's regiment (*Regimiento del Rey*), was divided into two battalions, each being increased to ten companies as troops returned from the provinces. During May, 1755, four artillery brigades were added to the establishment.^a

There were 16 fortified outposts in the provinces, including Zamboanga, besides the camp of Manila, Fort Santiago, and Cavite arsenal and fort (1757).

This fairly represents the military situation at the time the British laid siege to the city in 1762.

As a result of the "family compact" and the consequent effort to diminish the power and prestige of Great Britain, war was declared by this power against France and Spain.

The British were successful everywhere. In the West Indies the Caribbean Islands and Habana were captured, with great booty, by Rodney and Moncton, whilst a British fleet was dispatched to the Philippine Islands with orders to take Manila.

The evening of September 22, 1762, a British squadron of 13 ships, under command of Admiral Cornish, entered the bay. Brigadier-General Draper disembarked his troops next day at Fort San Antonio Abad, a bridge head about 2½ miles south of Manila. His demand for surrender being refused, the British advanced through Malate and Ermita, the Spaniards retiring within the Walled City. The force available for attack consisted of 1,500 European troops (one regiment of infantry and two companies of artillery), about the same number of sepoys, together with 700 sailors and 300 marines from the fleet. The defense could dispose of about 600 men of the King's regiment and 80 pieces of artillery, with a few artillerymen, 300 Spanish militia, and an unlimited supply of undisciplined natives.

The English frankly disregarded the strict rules of attack as understood in those days, and advanced to within 250 yards of the walls, where were two churches, which they seized and fortified.

One, San Juan de Bagumbayan, formerly stood near the present site of the headquarters post of Manila, and the other, called Santiago, not far from the north band stand on the Luneta. Behind and near this latter edifice were placed the mortar and breaching batteries (24-pounders).^b

^aField Marshal Pedro Manuel de Arándia y Santestaban was governor and captain-general of the Philippines from July, 1754, until his sudden death, May 31, 1759.

He was active and intelligent, doing much to organize the military forces in the islands, especially at Manila, and generally improving the city. It is particularly worthy of note that Governor Arándia was aware of the imperiling of the defense of Manila by the existence of various convents and churches outside of, but within close cannon shot of, the encircling walls of the fortress. He issued orders for the demolition of these structures, but from the bitter controversy this brought on with certain religious orders, the removal of the edifices was delayed until the sudden death of the governor, on the night of May 31, 1759. His successor does not seem to have pushed the point of the removal of these buildings, and so they remained; and by the counter defense they afforded the English in their attack upon Manila in 1762, the fortress was breached near the San Diego bastion and taken by assault.

^bReferring to the photograph of Váldez Tamón's map: At "a" was the Carranza battery, sometimes called San Gregorio; at "m" were placed the 24-pounder breaching guns; at "b" was Santiago Church, while San Juan de Bagumbayan Church stood at the corner in front of the Real gate, marked "S. Juan" on map; "d. d." indicates a line of stone houses fortified by British.

A reading glass brings out the word "breached," written by some one of General Draper's command, opposite the salient of San Diego. Just below "m," on the map, is other writing in English, indicating position of guns.

This map bears the stamp of the British Museum, shown in photograph just below Fort Santiago.

It is believed that General Draper made the map a part of his report and that his was a copy of the one which accompanied the report of Mariscal de Campo D. Fernando Váldez Tamón to the King in 1789.

The Spanish batteries on San Diego and San Andrés opened fire the 24th, but with little effect. Sorties proved unsuccessful. The admiral placed his flagship opposite San Diego and stationed others off the mouth of the Pasig to fire on Santiago and the town. The breach in San Diego wall widened day by day, and the defense grew hopeless. Matters reached a crisis when the natives refused to repair the fortifications, a hard labor the Europeans were unable to endure in this climate, under the circumstances. On the morning of October 6, the breach having been reconnoitered and found practicable, a storming party of 400 men, led by Major Fell, found the breach unguarded and were able to advance unopposed up Calle Real, the street now known as Palacio. The archbishop-governor signed the capitulation the same day.^a

^a For a detailed account of this siege see translation of the chapter of Ayerbe's work devoted to this subject, appended hereto. This, of course, represents the Spanish side.

(The author of this monograph has taken his material from both Spanish and English sources.—J. C. B.)

England declared war against Spain January 2, 1762, and Charles III, King of Spain, in due course made similar announcement.

The Philippines being at that time governed through the larger colony of Spain, or Mexico, all official news and practically all business was conducted through that country, following the route Madrid, Cadiz, Vera Cruz, Mexico, Acapulco to Manila. This, in the days of slow sailing vessels, required a voyage of some five months, and in case of unpropitious winds the time might extend to seven. Had due diligence been observed in notifying Manila of the existence of war between Spain and England, the warning should have reached its destination by the end of June, 1762.]

Spain's naval force in the Pacific was then, as always, weak, and it is altogether probable that at the time in question there was no ship at Acapulco that could be spared to carry dispatches. Probably, too, no particular heed was given to the Philippines, as they were a source of expense and possession of them had been retained principally on account of the influence of the various religious orders which had made extensive and permanent establishments there. But it is difficult to believe that unofficial notice of the coming of the English had not reached Manila in the summer of 1762. In fact, Montero, in his *General History of the Philippines* (Vol. II, p. 12), speaking of this time, says: "Some Armenian merchants who had come from Madras informed the archbishop (of Manila) of the preparation at that point of an expedition for the purpose of taking Manila." A Christian had also received by letter the same notice, and the Augustinian friar, Cuadrado, had received a letter speaking of the declaration of war between England and Spain.

The improbability of any relief being sent to Manila in case of need should alone have kept its armament and forces at a strength to discourage any attack which it would be profitable to send against it. A constant preparedness for war was indicated for Manila, Spain's most westward possession, in a century when war was more common than peace and at a time when England, never really friendly to Spain, had, by vanquishing the French in India, placed her flag over that country in undisputed possession. And in truth Manila even so far back as 1739 was prepared to withstand an attack. At that date the distinguished soldier who was governor of the Philippines, Field Marshal Valdés y Tamón, had completed Manila's walls and placed upon them a number of cannon sufficiently strong for the period.

The walls of his time were but little changed when the assault came, some twenty-three years later. A distinguished successor of his, Field Marshal Arándia, became governor of the Philippines in July, 1754. He seems to have examined carefully the defenses of Manila and approved of them, but not considering the garrison of the fortress sufficiently strong nor sufficiently well paid, he applied himself with energy to the organization of a suitable force. By December of that year he had formed the "Regiment of the King," consisting of 2 battalions of 10 companies each, each company consisting of 100 men and 3 officers. This force was formed from 5 companies that the general found scattered through the islands and from 4 companies he had brought with him from New Spain, or Mexico, the additional material being Spaniards found in the islands and natives of undoubted loyalty.

He also organized four detachments of artillery of some thirty-odd men each, with station in Manila, and established a school for instruction and exercises in the use of the cannon and mortars. The entire force was in an excellent condition

The treaty of Paris (January, 1763) took no account of the Philippine situation, and Spain found herself again in possession; and again the walls received the attention of her monarch.

The bastions, San Diego and San Andrés, with the curtain rampart, had received considerable damage during the siege, which had also developed certain weaknesses in plan.

Accordingly we find the engineer, Miguel Antonio Gomez, submitting a project for the required repairs and innovations, certain of which were approved by the royal order of November, 1766.

The Real or royal gateway then opened at the south end of what is now called

by May, 1755, and though not always concentrated in Manila was never farther away than Zamboanga.

The walls of Manila (see map of Manila, herewith appended) form a figure that may be roughly described as an acute triangle, the base being to the south and extending east and west perpendicular to the shore of Manila Bay, and the point occupied by the citadel, Fort Santiago, being to the north in the angle formed by the junction of the Pasig River with the bay. The west face being nearly on the bay shore, offered no foothold for a hostile landing and was protected from a heavy concentrated fire from a fleet by the shallowness of the bay within good cannon shot of the wall. The northerly and eastern side was protected very well by the Pasig River and a wide muddy estero, or slough, that followed along the walls. The southern face was the line of danger and no natural obstacle protected it. The wall here was reasonably strong and occupied a line some 500 yards long between the bastion of San Diego at the west and San Andrés at the east.

A hostile expedition would naturally land south of the city of Manila, where plenty of ground is available for camping purposes and the march toward the city would be unimpeded by any natural obstacle, such as hills or rivers. Both the English expedition of 1762 and the American expedition of 1898 landed here.

In considering the defenses of the city of Manila in 1757 and 1758, General Arándia noted the existence of several religious edifices outside of, but within close cannon shot of, the walls. Two of these establishments were near the south wall and were an evident danger to the defense of Manila, as their construction was massive, as was customary with the churches and convents throughout the Spanish colonies.

One of these was the Church of Santiago, distant some 230 yards southeast of the San Diego bastion. The other was the Church of San Juan de Bagumbayan, about equally distant from the San Andrés bastion, in a direction a little east of south and approximately some 400 yards from the San Diego bastion. Governor Arándia decided that these two establishments were, from their position, a constant menace to the city's defense, and he therefore ordered their demolition. The order brought on a bitter controversy with the religious orders, and while the dispute was still in progress and the governor had only succeeded in having a number of the trees near these institutions removed, he died, on the night of May 31, 1759.

His death was a loss to Spain, and the controversy with the church authorities had been so bitter that it seems to have been decided to leave the control of the islands in the hands of the church dignitaries, and with this view no governor and captain-general was appointed until after the English had captured the city. Under the rule of the archbishops the question of destroying any church buildings was abandoned, and both the Church of Santiago and that of San Juan remained to furnish the English strong emplacements for their batteries and protected points from which to breach Manila's wall. During the rule of the victors, which lasted from their taking of the city in October, 1762, until they sailed away in the early part of 1764, both of the offending churches were removed. The English rightly deemed their continuance a danger, especially when their own forces, by the departure of part of the fleet and from sickness, death, and desertion, had become reduced.

Under the rule of the church officials the garrison of Manila fell off materially in numbers and apparently in quality, while the fixed armament of the walls fell into ineffectiveness. When the time of trial came there was no military chief to build up a force to use the munitions of war prepared by the preceding governors. Such force as existed in Manila was disorganized and apparently without the knowledge to use effectively the numerous guns of position.

From these causes and the continued existence of the churches near Manila's south line the enemy was enabled to concentrate his fire upon the San Diego bastion from the absurdly short distance of 280 yards and at his leisure batter it into powder with his 24-pounders.

The English expedition appears to have been in the nature of a bargain with

Calle Palacio. It was the gate leading to the palace, and through which the old governors and archbishops made their state entries into the city. The bombardment had injured it, and for military reasons it was transferred to the middle of the curtain between San Diego and San Andrés, where it now stands. A demi-lune redoubt, under which the present roadway inconveniently runs, protects the entrance, and is undoubtedly the work of Gomez, as are the other detached redoubts on this front.

The new Real gate was built so narrow as to render it unsuitable for further formal entries, and these were made thereafter through the Parian gate, the street from thence being renamed Real, which it still retains.

The Parian redoubt seems unquestionably the work of Gomez, as was certainly the reconstruction of the right face and flank of the San Gabriel bastion, which limits the land front on the north, the new work being still plainly visible (completed 1787). Here also appears for the first time evidence of the influence of newer methods in fortification. This San Gabriel flank is made perpendicular to the line of defense instead of the curtain. It seems probable also that Gomez began the work on the present moat and covered way.

By royal order of December 16, 1796, the governor of the islands was authorized to carry on the fortification works described in the project presented by Francisco Sabatini, chief of engineers, owing to which the rampart front facing the Pasig was greatly modified, changed in fact to a bastioned front, resembling one by Vauban's first method, but without outworks.

the East India Company, and the attack on Manila was no doubt urged by that grasping corporation in hopes of large booty and future commercial advantages. The plan seems to have been for England to employ her fleet already in Indian waters and the company to furnish the greater part of the land forces.

As ordered from the English war office, the expedition was to consist of 6 ships of the line, 5 frigates, and 4 troopships, with some 5,000 men for land service to be picked up in Madras. Brig. Gen. William Draper, R. A., was sent out from England to command the land forces, while Admiral Samuel Cornish, already commanding the fleet in Indian waters, was to retain command of the fleet.

The troops gathered at Madras consisted of one regiment of infantry and two companies of artillery, all Europeans, with some 800 to 1,000 Sepoy riflemen and an equal number of Sepoy laborers. Part of the expedition consisted of men from the French troops recently vanquished in India and disbanded. Spanish historians state that there were 350 men of this description with the English, and that their presence was hardly a strength, as they were looking for an opportunity to desert to the enemy—that is, the Spaniards—during the attack on Manila.

It is regretted that no English publication treating on events of the year 1762 is at hand. But it is apparent that the English, from the weakness of the defense, due principally to the absence of any military chief or organizer, had no difficulty in storming Manila's walls in 1762. During the siege of Manila General Draper intimated to the archbishop that he would have difficulty in restraining a part of his forces—presumably referring to the Sepoy contingent, and perhaps including the Frenchmen, who were rendering compulsory service. The conduct of many of the troops after entering Manila seems to have more than borne out General Draper's doubt. They seemed, according to Spanish historians, to have acted most outrageously. But war, though cruel to-day, was more so in 1762, and the sacking of an enemy's city was a recognized right of the successful belligerent.

General Draper was some years later knighted by the English Government for his services at Manila, and in due course became a lieutenant-general.

It may be noted in this account, as well as in others, of the siege of Manila that the English made no determined effort to blockade the place, and consequently reinforcements and supplies were brought in unhindered from the country to the north, crossing the Pasig River by boats or by the bridge now known as the Bridge of Spain.

It is not believed that the besiegers would have found any great difficulty in destroying this bridge, which at that period was a pontoon construction, or in completely severing the communications of the garrison by the Pasig.

No doubt the progress of the siege on the south line was, from its commencement, so satisfactory that additional offensive measures were not deemed necessary. The failure to sever the city's communications is but an additional proof of the feebleness of the defense.

In conclusion it may be stated that Manila's walls failed to keep out the enemy, not from inherent weakness or faulty construction, but from the absence of a disciplined garrison which by bold sallies and counter blows would have rendered the near approach of an enemy most hazardous.—A. C. M.

From the salient of San Gabriel bastion to La Maestranza, where a demibastion was added, the entire character of the wall submitted to complete alteration. The resulting construction is clearly indicated in the appended photograph, taken at the crosscut made in widening the roadway at the point where the Santo Domingo gate formerly stood in the flank of the Aduana bastion. (Center of this front.)

This front is the only one affording a double tier of fire, and it is not easily understood from our present data why so elaborate a work should have been added here, when the siege of 1762 had so clearly indicated the need of further strengthening the most exposed flank. That this need was appreciated seems plainly indicated by the construction of the Luneta redoubt, authorized at the end of the eighteenth century, and ordered by Governor Enrile in 1835. This work stands directly in front of the Real redoubt, and beyond the glacis and advance moat. It is of very weak construction, even for that day, and poorly answers the purpose for which it was intended.

Sabatini continued the moat and covered way, which was probably completed by the engineer, Rafael Aguilar, who constructed the Carlos VI battery, a short distance from Balete and about 500 yards northeast of the headquarters post of Manila. This was comprised in several defensive works by this engineer, who probably erected the Plano bastion, and the outworks San Francisco and San Pedro, on the bay side. He appears also to have completed the moat and covered way. The building of this moat presented the problem of constructing a ditch in wet and rather unstable soil, close to the foot of a heavy wall, without disturbing the foundations. This appears to have been accomplished by making a long slope at the foot of the scarp, low enough to be under water, and extended to the bottom of the moat, thus presenting the section shown in tracing. (West end of Calle Aduana.)^a

A royal order of April 23, 1872, approved the last proposed changes in the Manila fortifications, but none were carried into effect. Thus the walls and covered ways stand to-day essentially as Rafael Aguilar left them.

Too weak to stand even so modest a siege as that of the British in 1762, unless manned by superior force, these ramparts have still answered their purpose for the Spaniards.

They were undoubtedly a great safeguard against the frequent threats of the Mindanao and Sulu pirates who ventered into the bay up to within sixty years ago. Also for more than a century the Spaniards were any day subject to hostilities from the Portuguese, while the aggressive foreign policy of the mother country during the seventeenth century exposed them to reprisals by the Dutch fleets, which in 1643 threatened the city of Manila. To this must be added the ever-present danger of uprising by the natives themselves.

The old ramparts have afforded a point of support and secure base but for which these islands could hardly have been held so long, and in certain respects their worth has not yet entirely disappeared, for no man is wise enough to say that they may not be needed again should foreign complications create an opportunity for revolt.

Manila, intramuros, is situated at the mouth and on the left bank of the Pasig River, latitude north 14° 46', longitude east 120° 57'. Its encircling walls measured 2½ miles before recent demolitions destroyed their continuity. It is a dull city, with narrow streets, bearing a heavy, somber, monastic appearance. It has six principal gates, three on the river side, named in order from the west, Almacenes, Santo Domingo, and Isabel II; the other three on the land fronts, called Parian, Real, and Santa Lucia, a seventh ranked as a postern in Spanish times—Postigo.

Formerly the drawbridges were raised and the city was closed and under sentinels from 11 o'clock at night until 4 in the morning. It continued so until 1852, when, in consequence of the earthquake of that year, it was decreed that the gates should thenceforth remain open night and day.

There exist seven bastions, Tenerias Aduana, San Gabriel, San Lorenzo, San Andrés, San Diego, and Plano, and five redoubts, Parian, Recoletos, Real, San Pedro, and San Francisco, besides the four small bastions mentioned.

From direct examination of the walls and of maps it would appear that there existed on the ramparts of Manila and outworks emplacements for 870 guns of all natures, requiring a theoretical war force of from 2,600 to 5,200 artillery to fully man, depending upon the number of reliefs per gun. The corresponding garrison of infantry, according to modern estimates, would number about 10,000.

^aFurther examination shows evidence of underpinning in addition to the slope mentioned.—J. C. B.

We need hardly add that no such numbers, either of men or guns, ever did actually constitute the defensive force of this fortress. This statement refers, of course, only to the garrison intramuros, and does not include the field forces,

Appended is a table showing the number and nature of guns found on the walls at the date of United States occupation. This table is copied from one inscribed upon a plan of the Manila walls furnished by the United States engineer office.

Armament of Manila fortifications, 1898.

Name of battery.	Rifled canon.		Smooth bore.		Field guns, R. S. B.		Mortars.		Kind.
	Number.	Caliber.	Number.	Caliber.	Number.	Caliber.	Number.	Caliber.	
Plata y Forma baja		Cm.	3	10		Cm.		Cm.	M. L. Bron.
Same alta			3	10					Do.
Bateria Sta. Barbara	5	16					4		Do.
Bateria Sn. Francisco			4	10					Do.
Same Sn. Miguel			2	10					Do.
Bateria Sn. Francisco			22	15					Do.
Rev'n. de Same	2	16							Do.
Puerta del Postigo			2	10					Do.
Bateria del Plana Sn. I.							5	21	Rifle Ir.
Puerta Sta. Lucia			2	10					M. L. Bron.
Bateria de Sn. José									
Rev'n de Sn. Pedro									
Bateria de Sn. Diego	9	16	1	15					Do.
Bateria Sn. Andrés			2	12	2				Do.
			6	15					
Bateria Sn. Lorenzo			2	10	4				
Puerto del Parian			4	10	4				
Rev'n del Parian			2	10					Do.
Bateria de Sn. Gabriel			2	10					Do.
Puerta de Isabel, 2º			5	15					Do.
Bateria de Herries			2	10					Do.
Bateria de Sn. Domingo			1	10					Do.
Bateria de la Compuerto			6	12					Do.
Pza. de Armas del Postigo	1	24							Steel B. L.
Same de Sta. Lucia							2	10	
Camino Cubierto							4	10	S. B. Bron.
Bateria de Sta. Pedro	2	15							B. L. Siege.
Bateria del	1	24							B. L. Steel.
Pastal			2	21	3				M. L.
Camino Cubierto							4	21	M. L. Rifled.
Baterio de la Luneta	4	14							Converted.
Bat. del Malecon del Sur	2	24							
	2	16	4	15	2	12	1	82	
Total	28		77		24		20		

Authorities.—Philippine Islands, Foreman, 1898; Military Legislation,^a Salinas, m. s., 1879; Historical Descriptions,^a Buzeta, m. s., 1851; Sucessos de las Filipinas, Morga, Mexico, 1609; extracts translated by Captain Macomb, Intelligence Bureau; map, Lieut. Col. C. E. L. B. Davis, Corps of Engineers; map, surveys, photographs, Lieut. E. M. Adams, Corps of Engineers; Encyclopedia Britannica; Annals of a Fortress, Viollet-le-Duc.

Respectfully submitted.

J. C. BUSH,
Major, Artillery Corps, U. S. Army.

Maps and photographs.

- 1. General plan Manila, intramuros, 1898.
- 2. Map of Governor Váldez y Tamón, showing condition of walls after restoration (about 1735). Original in British Museum.
- 3. New (artificial) river mouth.
- 4. La Real Fuerza de Santiago, The Royal Stronghold of Santiago. Old river mouth opened here.

^a Furnished by Señor Yeiarte, chief of bureau of archives.

5. Road leading east from Santo Domingo gate. Gate demolished 1902. Curtain of Sabatini's bastioned front on right, ordered built in 1795. Isabel II gate to right. San Gabriel bastion in background.
6. Road leading to Parian gate under Parian redoubt. Parian gate in distance. Covered way to left.
7. Parian gate from within the redoubt.
8. New Real gate from within the redoubt, ordered after siege by British, 1762.
9. Monument to Legazpi and Urdaneta, erected by General Davis from Spanish material found in Manila. San Diego bastion in background, breached by British, 1762.
10. View of moat from within the covered way, looking southeast toward San Pedro redoubt in distance.
11. Santa Lucia gate, archbishop's palace, and Malecon drive.
12. San Francisco redoubt, with bastion and wall in rear, taken from within the covered way opposite Plaza de la Fuerza.
13. Gateway at Fort Santiago; cut recently made in low parapet bordering interior moat.
14. Inscription over portal within Fort Santiago.
15. Cut recently made through flank of Aduana bastion, where Santo Domingo gate formerly stood.
16. An Errard bastion of 1606 (French) joined to an old wall. Bastion walls of similar shape on Manila walls have same height as curtain wall.
17. Cross section of wall, moat, and covered way taken at west end of Calle Aduana. (West, not south, front.)
18. View of moat looking west toward Real redoubt.
19. East face of Aduana bastion. (River front.)
20. Almacenes gate. (Demolished 1903.)
21. Interior moat and bastion front of Fort Santiago facing city. San Fernando bastion of the fort on right of picture (river side). Lower parapet bordering moat at end of bridge.
22. Interior moat and bastion front of Fort Santiago facing city. San Miguel bastion of the fort on left of picture (bay side). Lower parapet bordering moat at end of bridge.
23. La Plaza de la Fuerza, looking north.
24. Postigo Gate from within the walls.
25. The salient of San Andrés.
26. Where the old Real gate stood in 1762. South end of Calle Palacio (within the walls).
27. Santa Lucia gate from within.
28. San Antonio Abad. Bridge head where British landed in 1762 (land side).
29. Map showing relative positions of the two churches, Santiago and San Juan de Bagumbayan.
30. New entrance to division headquarters at Fort Santiago, constructed in 1903.
31. West front of Fort Santiago, showing improvements made in 1903.

Some of the legends inscribed upon various military works of the fortress of Manila, with translations into English, and some notes on the same.

[By Capt. A. C. Macomb, Fifth Cavalry, in charge Office Military Information.]

SANTIAGO.

Legend over entrance to office of commanding officer, Fort Santiago: "Reynando en las Españas y en las Indias L. C. Y. R. M. Del Rey N. S. que Dios gu.e D. Felipe V. Siendo Gon.or Cap.n Gen.l y Press.te de la R.l Aud.a de estas Islas Philip.s el M. Y.tte Sr. D. Fernando Valdez Tamon Brigadier de los R.s Exersitos de su M. G. Caullero del Hauito de S.n Tia o Serredifico este Cast.llo el año de 1731. Siendo Cast.no del por su M. G. el Capitan D. Carlos de Abarca y Valdez."

Free translation: "The Catholic and Royal Majesty of the King, our Lord (whom God guard), Philip V, reigning in Spain and the Indies, the Very Illustrious Don Fernando Váldez Tamón, brigadier of the royal armies of His Gracious Majesty, Knight of the Order of Santiago, being governor, captain-general, and president of the royal audiencia of these Philippine Islands. This fort was rebuilt in the year

1731, Capt. Carlos de Abarca y Valdez being commandant thereof for His Gracious Majesty."

NOTE.—Philip V, King of Spain from 1700 until 1746. Fernando Váldez Tamón, captain-general of the Philippines from August 14, 1729, until 1739.

SAN ANDRÉS.

Legend on wooden slab over sheltered doorway to magazine of Bastion San Andrés (the recess prepared for the Escudo of Spain above this legend is vacant): "Reinando las Españas la Católica y Rl. M. G. dl invictísimo Monarca D. P. V. Nro. Sr. Q. Ds. Gde. y gobernando en Su Rl. Ne. estas Islas Philipinas el My. Ilvs. Sr. Dn. Fernando Ves. Tamn. Cavro. del Orden Santiago del Conzo. de Su Rl. M. G. Su Goberor. el Capitan Gl. de estas dichas islas y Presste. de la Avda Rl. Chnsila. se fabro. este almazn. o casamata para el segvro i cvstodia dl polbra. a disposicion y orden de dicho señor. año de 1733."

Legend incised in wood just under the foregoing: "Reynando la Sra. Da. Isabel 2da. y con motivo de haber pasado revista de inspeccion al Cuerpo Nacional de Yngenieros el Excmo. Sor. Gral. 2.º cabo Dn. Ramon Montero, se restauro de orden de S. E. la anterior antigua ynscripcion en Enero de 1855."

Translation first legend: "The Catholic and Royal Gracious Majesty of the ever victorious Monarch Philip V, our Lord (whom God guard), reigning over Spain; and in his royal name governing these islands the Very Illustrious Don Fernando Váldez Tamón, Knight of the Order of Santiago, of the council of His Gracious Majesty, his governor and captain-general of these said islands, and president of the royal audiencia chancellery, this magazine or casement was built by direction and command of the said King in the year 1733 for the security and safeguarding of the powder."

Translation second legend: Doña Isabel II reigning, and pursuant to the inspection of the national corps of engineers by the most excellent general, second in command, Don Ramon Montero, the preceding old inscription was restored in January, 1855.

Legend over Parian gate: "Puerta del Parian. Año 1782."

Translation.—"Parian gate. Year 1782."

NOTE.—This year José de Basco y Vargas was captain-general and governor of the Philippine Islands and showed much activity in repairing the fortifications of Manila. The word "Parian" indicates a public market for the sale of small manufactured articles. The word might be translated as "bazaar."

Legend over Santa Lucia gate: "D. O. M. Carlo in Hispaniarum et Indiarum rege sapiente civitatis bono et ornamento portam Ehricuravii (?) Josephus Basco et Vargas Philippinis Prefectus. Anno MDCC(?)XXXI."

Free English translation: "To God, the best, the greatest. Charles, reigning in Spain and the Indies, wise ruler, good and illustrious citizen, this gate was built (or repaired?)—inscription not legible), being governor and captain-general of the Philippine Islands, José de Basco and Vargas, in the year 1781."

NOTE.—Charles III, King of Spain, 1758–1788. José de Basco and Vargas, captain of the Spanish navy, appointed governor and captain-general July, 1778, and served as such until November, 1787.

History of the Philippines by Montero, Volume II, page 288, says: "War having again been declared between Spain and England (June 16, 1779), Basco repaired the defenses of Manila and Cavite and the forts of the provinces, renewing in large part the guns of position."

Legend over Real gate: "Carlo in Hispaniarum et Indiarum Bege Bege Sapiente (not legible until cleaned of moss) Josephus Basco et Vargas Philippinis Prefectus. Anno MDCCLXXX."

Translation: "Charles reigning in Spain and the Indies, wise King (not legible at present), being governor and captain-general of the Philippines, José de Basco and Vargas. Year 1780."

NOTE.—See note under "Santa Lucia gate."

Legend over Isabel II gate: "Puerta de Isabel II. Año de 1861."


English translation: "Gate of Isabel II. Year 1861."

NOTE.—Maria Isabela Louisa (Isabel II), Queen of Spain, 1833–1868. In the year 1861 Lieut. Gen. José Lemery, royal army of Spain, was governor and captain-general of the Philippine Islands.

NOTE.

Face page 446.

It has been found impracticable to reproduce the map of Váldes y Tamón, referred to in Major Bush's article on the Walls of Manila, and it has therefore been omitted.



4.—FORT SANTIAGO.

6.--ROAD LEADING TO PARIAN GATE UNDER PARIAN REDOUBT.
Parian gate in distance. Covered way to left.

8.- NEW REAL GATE FROM WITHIN THE REDOUBT, ORDERED AFTER SIEGE BY BRITISH, 1762.

10.—VIEW OF MOAT FROM WITHIN THE COVERED WAY, LOOKING SOUTHEAST TOWARD SAN PEDRO REDOUBT, IN DISTANCE.


11.—SANTA LUCIA GATE, ARCHBISHOP'S PALACE, AND MALECON DRIVE.

13.—GATEWAY AT FORT SANTIAGO. CUT RECENTLY MADE IN LOW PARAPET BORDERING
INTERIOR MOAT.

GATEWAY AT FORT SANTIAGO.


14.—INSCRIPTION OVER PORTAL WITHIN FORT SANTIAGO.

15.—CUT RECENTLY MADE THROUGH FLANK OF ADUANA BASTION, WHERE SANTO DOMINGO GATE FORMERLY STOOD.



16.—AN ERRARD BASTION OF 1606 (FRENCH) JOINED TO AN OLD WALL.

Bastion walls of similar shape on Manila walls have same height as curtain wall.



17.—CROSS SECTION OF WALL, MOAT, AND COVERED WAY, TAKEN AT WEST END OF CALLE ADUANA (WEST FRONT).

18.—VIEW OF MOAT, LOOKING WEST TOWARD REAL REDOUBT.

19.—EAST FACE OF ADUANA BASTION (RIVER FRONT).

20.—ALMACENES GATE (DEMOLISHED 1903).

21.—INTERIOR MOAT AND BASTION FRONT OF FORT SANTIAGO, FACING CITY.

San Fernando bastion of the fort on right of picture (river side) Lower parapet bordering moat at end of bridge.

22 —INTERIOR MOAT AND BASTION FRONT OF FORT SANTIAGO, FACING CITY

San Miguel bastion of fort on left of picture (bay side) Lower parapet bordering moat at end of bridge.

23.—LA PLAZA DE LA FUERZA, LOOKING NORTH.


24.—POSTIGO GATE FROM WITHIN THE WALLS.

25.—THE SALIENT OF SAN ANDRES.

26.—WHERE THE OLD REAL GATE STOOD IN 1762. SOUTH END OF CALLE PALACIO
(WITHIN THE WALLS).

27.—SANTA LUCIA GATE FROM WITHIN.

28.—SAN ANTONIO ABAD. BRIDGE HEAD WHERE BRITISH LANDED IN 1762 (LAND SIDE).



Office Chief Engineer Officer.
Division of the Philippines.
 Manila, 9 9 August 1903.

30.- NEW ENTRANCE TO DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AT FORT SANTIAGO, CONSTRUCTED IN 1903.

31.—WEST FRONT OF FORT SANTIAGO, SHOWING IMPROVEMENTS MADE IN 1903.

PART II.

SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THE ENGLISH IN 1762; BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE SECOND CHAPTER OF THE MONOGRAPH BY MARQUIS DE AYERBE, ZARAGOZA, 1897; BY CAPT. A. C. MACOMB, FIFTH U. S. CAVALRY.

[*Preface.*—The author, the Marquis de Ayerbe, has prepared this study from the usual histories and reports treating of the period in review, assisted by the manuscript diary of Don Alfonso Rodriguez de Ovalle, an officer of the Spanish navy, who carried from Manila to Mexico the official "notifications of peace," together with "instructions relating to the evacuation of Manila by the English."

Ovalle sailed from Acapulco on the Spanish frigate *Santa Rosa* December 23, 1763, and reached Manila after a voyage of eighty-three days on March 15, 1764. Having delivered his dispatches and attended to other business he went aboard the *Santa Rosa* and sailed for Acapulco on June 27, 1764.

Ovalle, during his stay in Manila, drew up a narrative of events occurring during and after the English capture and occupation of Manila, and seems to have been diligent in seeking out the truth. These notes, together with an explanatory map, he sent to his friend the Marqués de Cruillas.

The manuscript has not been published, and it is now in the library of the author of this work, he being a descendant of the Marqués de Cruillas.

It is to be regretted that the map accompanying Ovalle's notes was not reproduced with this present publication.]

Early on the morning of September 14, 1762, rumors commenced to spread through the city of Manila that a vessel had anchored the evening of the preceding day beyond the island of Mariveles. As the galleon *Filipino* was expected daily from Acapulco, the archbishop, who was acting governor-general, believed it to be this vessel and sent out messengers with orders for its officers, together with letters from private citizens. The dispatch bearers were surprised to find that the captain of the ship would not allow them to approach the vessel, nor would he hold communication with anyone, only asking of some native boatmen "whether the galleon *Trinidad* had left for Acapulco, and if the *Filipino* had arrived in Cavite from that port." Without further incident the stranger raised anchor on the afternoon of the 17th and sailed away on an unknown course.

The visit of this vessel gave rise to many conjectures in Manila; among others, one that war might have been declared between Spain and England, and, if this were true, of the probability of the arrival in a short time of an English fleet, with the intent of committing depredations upon these islands.

In view of this the latest advices from Batavia were scanned, and they confirmed to some extent the fears. Immediately committees, representing the city and the commercial interests, were formed and the port officers were notified to arm two or three vessels and send them to await the *Filipino* at the mouth of San Bernardino Strait. This last order was suspended on the 21st, when it was learned that the strange vessel, supposed to be English, had not taken that course.

Suddenly, on the 22d, at 5.30 p. m., an English fleet of 15 vessels entered Manila Bay, and ran before the wind to Point Sangley, where it formed in line facing the province of Pampanga, within cannon shot of the forts.

The governor immediately gave instructions for the withdrawal of the powder from the fort of San Anton, where it was manufactured, and ordered the construction of gun carriages and other necessary military supplies, as well as the concentration in the city of people and rations from the nearest provinces. It is impossible to describe the confusion which all of this caused in the city.

As the garrison of Manila consisted of scarcely 500 men, 4 militia companies of Spaniards were organized, which added about 300 more, although notwithstanding the great necessity for men, they did not call upon the thousands of Sangleyes (Chinese traders) and natives, who perhaps might have rendered good service.

The governor commissioned Lieut. Don Fernando de Arcaya, of the pay department, to deliver to the chief of the English fleet a letter in which he stated the surprise and perplexity which the presence of the fleet had caused in Manila, as well as his desire to be informed of the reason for its coming. He also requested the fleet commander to inform him whether he was in need of anything. This letter was delivered on the morning of the 23d, but was not answered through the same channel. At about 11 o'clock two English officers arrived at the palace of the governor and handed him a letter from Admiral Cornisk [sic] and Brigadier-General Draper. It read as follows:

"The King of Spain having declared war against England, a fleet of that nation has now come to the Philippines to conquer the Fortress of Manila and the Philippine Islands; and if the Spaniards do not desire to experience the rigors of war, they should immediately capitulate, as we have resolved to convince them that even the most far-off dominions of the King of Spain are not safe from the British forces."

The governor answered him that same day "that no notice had been received in Manila of the breaking out of hostilities, and that, protesting against whatever harm might ensue, the faithful subjects and natives were determined to shed their blood for the sake of their King, as they had no authority from His Majesty for the delivery of the city, and, furthermore, that his forces were not inferior to those of the fleet, as would be proven by a vigorous defense."

It was then considered whether it was better to explode the fort of San Anton, together with the magazine and offices after removing the powder, or to temporarily defend it, placing a few cannon in the same to impede the landing of the enemy. The latter plan was resolved upon, it having been recommended by Don Gabriel de Magallanes, major of artillery, though against the opinion of the commanding officer of the forces, the Marquis of Villamediana. For this purpose 10 arrobas (250 pounds) of powder were reserved, and two 8-pounder guns were selected to defend the fort, which was armed only with small 1-pounders. But the dispatch of these munitions having been delayed, they had succeeded in covering but half of the road to their destination when, learning that a great part of the English troops had made a landing and taken possession of the fort, they returned to the city.

At nightfall two companies of 50 men of the regular troops went out to garrison the fort, but on approaching it and hearing a few shots coming from the enemy they, including the officers, fell back in disorder, with the exception of some 15 or 20 who remained under the command of Capt. Don Balasar Cosar. This detachment after fighting with courage the greater part of the night was compelled to retreat.

The enemy lost no time, as they promptly took possession of the convent of the Augustinian friars called Malate, which was nearer to the city. The governor ordered the miraculous image of San Francisco to be brought to his oratory, and sent a circular to the priests informing them "that it was time for them to leave their cloisters (convents) and assist in the defense of the city," which met with cheerful compliance.

On the 24th the English chiefs addressed to the natives and half-castes the following proclamation:

"We, Samuel Cornisk [sic], esq., and chief admiral of His Britannic Majesty's fleet in the Oriental Indies, and William Draper, esq., brigadier-general and commander in chief of his land forces against the Spaniards, hereby inform all the native and half-caste inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that they are to apprehend no damage from our arms, provided they do not join the Spaniards, our enemies, nor aid or abet them in any way; on the contrary we shall in this case extend to them our protection; relieve them from the taxes imposed upon them, so onerous to their interests. We shall preserve their country from ruin, and see that violence is not done to their wives and daughters. We shall always pay them good prices for the provisions and other supplies which they may bring to our camp, and we shall guarantee them full right to return unmolested to their homes.

"We further promise them the free practice of the Roman Catholic religion. But if they do not accept our friendly terms, they may expect from us the most severe punishment, which will fall most heavily upon those who may dare to offer resistance to our arms. Given aboard His Britannic Majesty's vessel *Norfolk*.

"CORNISK [sic].

"SEPTEMBER 24, 1762."

That same day, and in greater numbers the following day, the English could be seen scattered in the streets of the town of Santiago, especially in the vicinity of the church called Ermita, somewhat nearer Manila. Here they were attacked by some Spanish volunteers, who left the city for that purpose. D. José del Busto distinguished himself in pursuing them in all directions, and with the few men who accompanied him, gave them no rest, forcing them to retreat to Ermita, where they had established their headquarters. He dislodged them from the town of Santiago, causing them three deaths. This encouraged the Spaniards, who proceeded to imitate the example given by Busto.

The English captured that day a sampan (Chinese boat) of Sangleyes (Chinese traders) loaded with provisions; and as a galley was noticed entering the bay the commander of the fleet ordered a frigate to go in pursuit of it. The galley then changed its course and ran aground on the bank of Vиноanga, which being observed by the captain of the frigate, he sent two boats and a launch after it and captured it, together with 30,000 pesos and other articles of value; all of which were taken to the flagship of the fleet. A nephew of the archbishop (the acting governor-general), with Capt. D. José Cerezo, a sublieutenant, and his boatswain were taken prisoners; the rest of the crew escaped by jumping overboard.

This galley was one of the two which the governor had sent out after the *Filipino*, that was found in the port of Palapag, near the Cape of Espiritu Santo; and when captured was conveying to Manila the nephew of the archbishop with dispatches for that official.

The forts of Manila fired a few rounds at the church of Santiago, which accomplished little on account of the solid construction of that edifice.

On the 25th the English established themselves in front of this church and in some stone houses, which they fortified. Here they attacked all persons who happened in that vicinity, and although artillery fire from the bastions was turned upon them they sustained no damage.

The governing archbishop without delay dispatched D. Ignacio de Berrueta to the port of Palapag with orders for the commander of the *Filipino* to send the treasure in his charge to a place of safety, and to protect the same with artillery and men from the vessel in case of an emergency.

General Draper granted the governing archbishop's nephew permission to go to the city, but the latter absolutely refused to avail himself of the privilege until directed to do so by his uncle, who, after giving the necessary direction, sent a letter to the English general thanking him for his consideration.

The Spaniards were able to fire a few shots with the culverins from Fort Santiago, but with little success, notwithstanding that they had availed themselves of two hours when the English, having suspended their firing, were sending one of their vessels to the sand bank at the mouth of the Pasig River and placing two others in front of the bastion of the garrison (San Diego).

In the evening the English commenced the bombardment with three small mortars, placed by them in the church of Santiago. This could have been avoided by the destruction of the church on the preceding day by the Spaniards, as should have been done, as it offered a stronghold for artillery in that vicinity. The number of bombs which fell in the city and vicinity was about 160.

That night D. Cesar Fallet, a Swiss subject residing in the city, and D. José del Busto left Manila with two companies of 50 Spaniards and over 200 natives and mestizos (half-castes), with spears, guns, and two 8-pound cannon, with orders from the governor to drive the enemy from his position at all hazards.

On arriving at the church of San Juan, Fallet was left there with the greater part of his men and Busto was detached to take position at the side of the Santiago church; but having himself stumbled into an ambush prepared by the enemy, a heavy fire was brought on, which finally obliged the English to retreat to Ermita. Although Busto desired to attack the defenders of Santiago, he was not able to do so, for Fallet, believing that the enemy was cutting off his retreat, directed him to join his forces. Busto complied with this order and fell back to the church of San Juan. The firing continued during the whole night without material result to either side.

On the 26th the flagship opened fire at daybreak against the bastion of the fundición (foundry) with twelve 4-pound guns, but as she could not come close in on account of the shoal water near the shore, her distance from the city was too great to permit much damage, except that effected by some elevated shot which fell on the roofs of the churches.

A few bombs were fired which caused some casualties and compelled the small number of soldiers and natives who had left the city to return.

D. Pedro Iriarte, with 2 companies and 1,500 natives, left the city the next day for the purpose of protecting Fallet, but without being able to accomplish this, as the latter had already retreated. He then joined Busto, and while waiting for the reenforcement of a company under the command of D. Fernando de Arcaya, they did their utmost to take possession of the stone houses from whence the English were pouring upon them a heavy fire, but this effort did not meet with success.

Busto succeeded in driving off the enemy after a heavy engagement, but the latter, having fired a few rounds of grapeshot, the natives became panic-stricken and fled, leaving him alone with the small number of Spanish soldiers. The English, upon noticing this, attacked with greater vigor, driving them back to San Juan church. Busto made his retreat without ceasing to fire, and paused to pick up two abandoned cannon, with danger of being captured himself, as he was suffering from a severe bruise which he had received by falling with his horse, which had been killed. There were several casualties on both sides. General Draper sent a letter by one of his officers, under a flag of truce, to the governor, stating:

"As you see the advantage gained already by my troops, it will be better to surrender the city and other strong places of the islands before experiencing further

the sufferings of war and the brutalities of a portion of my forces that can with difficulty be restrained."

The governor summoned the judges of the supreme court, the commanding officer of the forces, and the field officers of the garrison, the Marquis of Monte Castro, who was a major of the militia, and other persons of prominence from among the city officers and merchants. The contents of General Draper's communication being read to them, the majority decided not to accede to its demand urging that means of defense still existed, and that not only were a large number of native reenforcements expected to arrive soon, but that provisions were obtainable as well as means of bringing them in. As the commander of the forces and three others alone did not favor these views, the meeting finally resolved to continue the defense, and this course was approved by the governor.

On the morning of the 29th some 500 natives, under the command of the governing archbishop, the judges of the supreme court, and several residents, sallied forth from the city; but the English poured such a heavy fire upon them from the church of Santiago that they fled hurriedly, without the chief being able to restrain them, and returned in disorder to the city.

An unfortunate incident took place soon after. When General Draper sent the nephew of the archbishop to the city, he sent one of his officers, under a white flag, to accompany him to his uncle; but the few scattering natives who had remained in the vicinity, upon seeing them, assaulted both, killing and mutilating the English officer and fatally wounding the archbishop's nephew.

General Draper complained bitterly to the governor on account of this, and demanded that the aggressors be delivered to him, stating that if they were not he would hang the officers of the captured galley. The governor offered to deliver them as soon as found.

During the night some of the mortars from the fortifications were used, and a few grenades were thrown into the fleet, without result other than that the latter rectified its position so as to prepare itself, assisted by the batteries in the church of Santiago, to inflict greater damage on the morrow.

Two thousand natives arrived to defend the city and the walls were crowded with people at night. The archbishop ordered the religious communities to furnish all men they had suited for soldiers, and succeeded in gaining a number of recruits in response to his patriotic call.

On the 27th and 28th the firing from both the fleet and the forts was continued without any damages or casualties on either side. A number of natives arrived from the province of Pampanga and were quartered in San Fernando (outside the fortress).

The same day a raging wind blew, which impeded the customary daily landing of war supplies by the English and also sunk some of their lighters, drowning one officer and a great number of sailors and causing the loss in the sea of one of the great mortars which they were bringing ashore.

Some of those who were able to save themselves from being drowned, including the deserting Malabar natives, begged, upon approaching the ditch wall of the fortress to be allowed to enter the city, but being answered by shots, and 3 of them being killed, the rest decamped.

The high wind continued with greater violence on the 30th, sinking 2 barks with 50 men, as well as the captured sampan. During the night one of the vessels of the fleet was driven on the beach, and although they lightened it, unloading the ordnance and heavy articles, they were not able to float it. D. José Eslava, assisted by some natives, picked up a large quantity of masts and spars which the waves brought ashore.

The English continued throwing bombs into the city and placed more mortars behind the Santiago church, which did great damage to the buildings.

One thousand natives from Pampanga arrived in the evening of this day, and on October 1 various orders were issued to supply them with arrows, spears, and other arms. On the 2d the English continued the firing and did not neglect to add more cannon, in such manner and to such an extent that they succeeded in opening a breach in the bastion of the fundición (foundry), sweeping the face which looked toward Santiago, and damaging the royal gate as well as the bastion of the Recoletan friars. They also threw an occasional bomb into the fortifications facing toward the sea.

A short time afterwards they used 9 cannons, recently placed in battery, destroying the parapets of the foundry bastion and so sweeping the wall that it had to be abandoned by its defenders, who were unable to find a place of safety on it.

The two vessels which had been anchored near the city poured in a fire as heavy as that of this battery, while the troops in the tower of the Santiago church kept up a vigilant fire on everyone who appeared above the walls or the bastions.

In the city affairs were, unfortunately, in dispute and confusion; everyone wished to give orders, although few obeyed even those of the governor, who, nevertheless, continued to issue them daily upon the advice of some who pretended to assist in the defense of the city.

On October 3, with a view of surprising the enemy's camp, over 3,000 Pampanga natives and 200 soldiers left the city at 2 o'clock in the morning, under the leadership of D. Francisco Rodriguez, a major from Cavite, who had come to the city upon the governor's call, and D. Santiago de Orendain, a lawyer of Manila.

To accomplish its purpose the force was divided into three sections, one going to San Lazaro, where it was awaited by D. Pedro Busto, who had recovered from the fall from his horse and was to take charge of the column, the other sections going, respectively, to San Juan de Bagumbayan and Ermita.

The plan was not badly arranged, but, following their custom, the natives commenced beating drums and uttering loud cries, thus warning the enemy and enabling them to prepare for the struggle. Otherwise the English might have been driven from their position, as the attack was made with such vigor and courage that a hand-to-hand engagement took place. The enemy regained strength upon noticing the poor discipline of the natives and the inferiority of their arms, which consisted principally of spears and short swords. [Probably bolos.—Tr.] The attackers were finally beaten back in hurried retreat by the heavy fire, leaving over 400 dead on the field. The enemy then drove out of the San Juan church the natives who had dislodged the small English guard and ascended the tower to ring the bells, promptly hanging the few who were captured alive.

In the evening the governor met in conference the judges of the supreme court, the commanding officer of the forces, the Marquis of Monte Castro, the various field officers of the forces in the city, the major from Cavite, the engineer, together with the prelates of the convents and many of the friars.

The governor stated the object of the meeting was to obtain their opinion as to the advisability of capitulating or continuing the defense.

The engineer set forth the bad condition of the fortifications and the practical impossibility of making embrasures, traverses, and counterworks without an abundance of gabions, bags, and brushwood, which were not on hand. He stated that if the breach was now impassable it would not be so long, dominated as it was by the fire of the enemy's batteries. He also indicated that the guns in the Carranza bastion would soon be dismounted, when the assault would be easy.

The governor stated that he was of the opinion that further defense was unwarranted, especially now after having heard the opinion of the engineer, and he deemed it proper to propose the surrender of the city. The majority of those present were of his opinion, but there were a few who, having small confidence in the knowledge and science of the engineer, believed that further resistance was practicable. This party insisted upon the building of the traverse and counterworks to impede the assault and upon the barricading of the streets, claiming, further, should the breach be opened they could then assemble their forces and capitulate.

It was finally resolved to continue the defense, and the Marquis of Monte Castro was placed in charge of the construction. He ordered certain of the friars (religious) to take some natives to the foundry and make the necessary tools for building the traverse, but nothing was accomplished, although Padre Pascual Fernandez of the company of Jesus, professor of mathematics, as well as the rest of the friars worked with the greatest of zeal.

In the same meeting the major from Cavite recommended that the governor have all the women, children, and aged people leave Manila, taking with them their wealth. One of the judges of the supreme court proposed that an officer be appointed to remain in the city with full power to continue the defense or to effect a capitulation, while the governor and the court officers and a great part of the residents should leave.

The prosecuting attorney, who was in charge of matters relating to food, insisted that a scale of prices for the same be determined, and represented the pressing necessity for an arrangement for the distribution and expenditure of rations, as well as the advisability of paying the natives [presumably referring to the natives serving as soldiers in the defense—Tr.]. But the meeting accomplished little or nothing and adjourned amidst disputes and controversies.

It was only determined to exhort the religious orders to continue their care of the natives assisting in the defense of the walls and to leave the direction of all matters in the hands of the governor, as before, with authority to capitulate in case that he concluded that the fortress was no longer defensible. Before accomplishing this the guns were to be spiked to prevent their use by the enemy. But

even this measure was not carried out when the hour came, though the nails for the purpose had been set aside.

The enemy, on his part, did not stop the firing and opened a breach in the bastion of the fundición (foundry), which silenced the fire from that point, as one cannon had fallen inside the ditch, while others were dismounted, and the one or two that were still serviceable were so exposed to the rifle fire of the enemy from the Santiago church that it was practically impossible to reload them.

In spite of the deadly danger, D. Martin Goycoa, assisted by D. Eusebio de Soto and two friars, succeeded, under orders of the governor, in withdrawing the guns near the ditch that would otherwise have fallen into the same.

On the 4th more natives arrived in the city from the provinces, and the friars who spoke their dialects harangued them by the orders of the governor.

The enemy threw bombs of a larger caliber, but they only damaged one house. They perceived also from the tower of Santiago the abandoned state of the foundry bastion, and cannonaded from their batteries the breach already made. This breach was not further visited by the engineer of the defense, nor was there any one who gave heed to it thereafter.

The governor continued issuing new orders, to which no attention was paid, and the commander of the forces contented himself with directing the friars not to let the natives climb the bastions. From the lack of discipline great disorder and confusion reigned in the city. It was resolved, in order to prevent the islands being left without anyone to rule them in the name of His Majesty, to appoint as lieutenant to the acting governor and captain-general, Judge D. Simon de Anda y Salazar, who left the city this same day, October 4, with a commission to visit the provinces.

On the 5th, before the dawn, the English delivered a heavier fire than on any of the preceding days, with the purpose of completely destroying the bastions of the fundición.

After they succeeded in making the breach practicable, a French adventurer entered the same, followed by some fifteen or twenty Englishmen, who, finding no obstruction, nor even anyone to offer them resistance, signaled to their companions, and about 400 men, who had been held in reserve at the camp, entered the city.^a

The garrison and some of the citizens and natives on duty at the royal gate offered the greatest resistance, but the English finally overcame them, killing 40 men of the garrison, and also killing some of the wounded, among them being the major of the regiment, D. Martin de Goycoa, whom we have already mentioned.

The enemy only lost 4 men, among them a sergeant who received an arrow shot in the forehead.

It is indeed a sorrowful thing to be said, but Maj. D. Miguel Valdez, commanding the regiment, shamefully fled on this occasion, and his bad example was followed by some of the residents and soldiers, and a great part of the natives.^b

An Irish pilot named Raymond Kelly made a very notable defense of the bastion of Carranza, where he was killed.

At the Parian gate some resistance was made at first, but the defenders soon fled, leaving 5 of their number and 17 of the enemy dead. The enemy then proceeded without opposition until near Fort Santiago.

The column which occupied the walls at the left side of the foundry took possession of the defenses as far as the bastion of the gate of Santa Lucia, losing in the movement the majority of its men. The gate of Santiago was the only one left free.

It occurred that the columns following down the walls, the English under command of General Draper and the Spanish under Colonel Monzon, came face to face in the Plaza del Palacio, but did not attack each other.

As soon as the archbishop, acting governor, learned the above occurrences, he retired to Fort Santiago with the judges, some of the officers, many residents, and a part of the natives, without leaving any instructions or orders for the guards of the palace, which, consisting of only 50 men, immediately surrendered.

He only ordered an officer to go under a flag of truce to General Draper and state to him his desire for the cessation of hostilities, and, further, that he could safely enter the town, there being none to offer resistance.

^a Five hundred marines, dressed, armed, and uniformed like the regular English troops, also entered the city this day, and committed all kinds of depredations in the convents, churches, and residences. (Ovalle. Siege of Manila, 1763. Manuscript.)

^b Rodriguez Ovalle.

The officer complied with his mission and accompanied General Draper upon his entrance, which was accomplished without further incident other than the firing of a few shots by our men from the cabildo (city hall), killing one soldier and wounding an officer, which gave Draper cause to threaten those present that if this were repeated he would put to the sword everyone found in the streets. The threat calmed the bolder spirits.

The governor from Fort Santiago ordered the Swiss, Cesar Fallet, to ask for terms of capitulation, but two English officers coming at the same time to ask, in the name of their chief, for the surrender of the city, his services were not required.

The governor and the commanding officers of the forces, with the pretext of going personally to interview these officers, left the fort, whereupon the natives and the officers with them, believing themselves abandoned, jumped from the walls into the river, where several were drowned and others killed by the fire which the English immediately directed upon them from the walls.

The English without delay took possession of the fort and sent to the palace the judges of the supreme court and other personages whom they found there, stating that their presence with the governor was necessary in order to negotiate the capitulation.

The terms of the same were drawn by these individuals and were to the effect that the residents were to remain subjects of His Catholic Majesty, free in the practice of their religion, with their lives and property guaranteed; that the forms of government, both ecclesiastic and civil, were to remain as then existing; that the persons who had left the city during the siege were not to be molested if they wished to return; that the exterior and interior commerce of the residents should be freely permitted and allowed to enter and depart from the city when necessary in the way of business. They further asked for the garrison the honors of war and the settlement of their pay which was in arrears, stating that His Catholic Majesty would be responsible for such sum as the English might advance for this purpose.

Besides this \$1,000,000 was to be paid to the English for the expenses of their navy and to save the city from plunder.

To these propositions, which the governor considered would be accepted without hesitation, the British chiefs replied, that the city would be respected as well as its inhabitants and that no looting should take place; that the people were to be respected in their national religion, but they would be under the government of His Britannic Majesty, with the following terms, which we herewith exactly transcribe:

First. The officers will be considered as prisoners of war under their word of honor, and will be granted the use of their swords.

Second. The ordnance and war supplies will be turned over to the commissary of His Britannic Majesty.

Third. The port of Cavite shall be surrendered, as well as all the forts existing in the islands.

Fourth. All the conditions submitted by the governor which are not contrary to these will be guaranteed by the payment of 4,000,000 pesos, to be delivered one-half in cash and the other half secured by the necessary guaranties for its collection.

Furthermore they gave the governor and other prominent persons (personajes) of the city to understand that if the port of Cavite was not immediately surrendered and the 4,000,000 of pesos delivered they would be put to the sword; and the English, in fact, placed their soldiers under arms to enforce the threat.

Some commissioners from the governing archbishop went immediately to interview General Draper and offered to deliver to him the port of Cavite and all the money of the "obras pias" (pious savings), together with the entire treasure which was to be brought by the galleon *Trinidad*, binding themselves, in case these amounts did not make the sum asked, to issue an order for the payment of the remainder against the treasury of His Catholic Majesty. The proposition of the commissioners was accepted with the condition that if before or on that day, the 7th of October, the vessel *Trinidad* had been captured by the English fleet, which had gone to look for it, the treasure brought by the said vessel was not to be included in the 4,000,000 pesos. The governor immediately issued an order for the governor of Cavite to deliver the said port, and another addressed to the commander of the *Trinidad* to deliver the treasure to the English captains.

In spite of the promises made by General Draper to the governing archbishop and other prominent persons (personajes) of the city, including the merchants, no sooner had the English troops entered the city than they commenced to plunder.

They left nothing that was of any value in the private residences and rendered

useless whatever they did not want to carry with them; they committed thousands of atrocities and abused many women. In the convent of Santo Domingo they cut off the head of the image of Our Lady of the Rosary and threw it on the floor.

They took all the chalices from the churches, the patines, and the ornaments, and wore the latter to show their contempt, and tied to the tails of their horses the priestly robes. The archives from the supreme court, the secretary's office, and the royal treasury, as well as many others from private residences, were burned, they being zealously assisted in their evil work by a large part of the house servants of the Spaniards and by all the natives who came to defend the city.

General Draper pretended not to be aware of all this and gave orders to have guards placed in the convents and houses for the purpose of protecting them from plunder. He ordered the hanging of two Sangleyes for robbery, and caused to be returned many articles of clothing that showed use, together with other articles of little value, but no one recovered any object that was of any value, while many boxes of silver plate (*plata labrada*) were sent aboard the English vessels.

Draper also published on the 8th a proclamation stating to the natives that "he had come to lighten their work and that the war was only made against the Spaniards."^a

A. C. MACOMB,

Captain, Fifth U. S. Cavalry, Division of Military Information.

NOTE.—The Carranza bastion mentioned in this article on pages 451 and 452 does not appear on any map, but it is believed to have been a small outwork of the San Diego bastion, erected a short distance south of it.

San Eugenio bastion or battery was on the wall fronting the bay and a short distance north of the San Diego bastion. It was no doubt injured by the fire of the fleet, which was directed on this part of the wall.—Translator.

^aRodriguez Ovalle.

DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, SEPTEMBER 1, 1903.

DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Maj. Gen. James F. Wade, U. S. Army, commanding.
Headquarters: Fort Santiago, Manila, P. I.

The division comprises:	
Department of Luzon	11,510
Department of the Visayas	3,804
Department of Mindanao	3,950
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	19,264
Signal Corps	480
Medical Department	887
Ordnance Corps	41
Noncommissioned staff officers	120
	<hr/>
	1,528
	<hr/>
Strength of division	20,792

DEPARTMENT OF LUZON.

Brig. Gen. George M. Randall, commanding.
Headquarters: Estado Mayor, Calle Arroceros, Manila, P. I.
Includes the island of Luzon, and all the islands north of a line passing south-eastwardly through west pass of Apo to the twelfth parallel of north latitude, thence easterly along said parallel to 124° 10' east of Greenwich, but including the entire island or Masbate, thence northerly through San Bernardino Straits.
Principal islands.—Luzon, Polillo, Catanduanes, Masbate, Ticao, Burias, Sibuyan, Tablas, Mindoro, Marinduque, Lubang, and Romblon.

Troops in department.

Engineers, Companies I and K	208
Field Artillery, Ninth and Eighteenth Batteries	229
Coast Artillery, Tenth, Thirty-eighth, Eighty-fifth, and One Hundred and Eighth Companies	439
First Cavalry, Troops G and H	90
Fifth Cavalry, Troops A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H	888
Sixth Cavalry, Troops E, F, G, and H	188
Eleventh Cavalry, headquarters and 12 troops	758
Twelfth Cavalry, headquarters and 12 troops	502
Thirteenth Cavalry, headquarters and 12 troops	836
Fourth Infantry, headquarters and 12 companies	859
Fifth Infantry, Companies E, F, G, and H	208
Eleventh Infantry, headquarters and 12 companies	998
Twenty-seventh Infantry, headquarters and 12 companies	1,123
Thirtieth Infantry, headquarters and 12 companies	1,020
Philippine Scouts, Companies 1 to 34 inclusive and the Thirty-eighth, Forty-first, Forty-second, and Forty-seventh Companies	3,669
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Total for Department of Luzon	11,510

DEPARTMENT OF THE VISAYAS.

Brig. Gen. Theodore J. Wint, commanding.

Headquarters: Iloilo, Panay.

To include all the islands south of the southern line of the Department of Luzon and east of longitude 121° 45' east of Greenwich and north of the ninth parallel of latitude, excepting the island of Mindanao and all islands east of the Straits of Surigao.

Islands.—Samar, Negros, Cebu, Bohol, Leyte, and Panay.

Troops in department.

Engineers, Company F	85
First Cavalry, Troops E and F	106
Fourteenth Infantry, headquarters and 12 companies	814
Eighteenth Infantry, headquarters and 12 companies	840
Twenty-ninth Infantry, headquarters and 12 companies	1,125
Philippine Scouts, Companies 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, and 46	834
Total for Department of the Visayas	3,804

DEPARTMENT OF MINDANAO.

Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, commanding.

Headquarters: Zamboanga, Mindanao.

To include all the remaining islands of the Philippine Archipelago.

Islands.—Mindanao, Busuanga, Paragua, Jolo, Tawi-tawi, Siasi, Basilan, Samal, Calamianes, Cagayanes, Cuyos.

Troops in department.

Engineers, Company E	87
Field Artillery, Seventeenth Battery	118
Fifteenth Cavalry, headquarters and 12 troops	888
Seventeenth Infantry, headquarters and 12 companies	702
Twenty-third Infantry, headquarters and 12 companies	863
Twenty-eighth Infantry, headquarters and 12 companies	1,030
Philippine Scouts, Forty-eighth, Forty-ninth, and Fiftieth Companies	262
Total for Department of Mindanao	3,950

List of garrisoned towns in the Philippine Islands, with provinces, islands, and departments, September 1, 1903.

Station.	Miles from Manila.	Province.	Island.	Department.	Troops.
Camp McGrath, Batangas ^{a d} .	681	Misamis	Mindanao	Mindanao	
Camp Morrison (Salomague), ^{a d}	180	Batangas	Luzon	Luzon	
Camp Stotsenburg (Angeles) ^a	49	Pampanga	do	do	
Camp Vicars ^a	17	Rizal	do	do	
	496	Cagayan	do	do	
	50	Pampanga	do	do	
	612	Tayabas	do	do	
	444	Boregon	do	do	
	271	Benguet	do	do	
	84	Bulacan	do	do	
	27	Laguna	do	do	
	22	Rizal	do	do	
	247	Tawi-Tawi	Tawi-Tawi	Mindanao	
	572	Samar	Samar	Visayas	
	126	Mindoro	Mindoro	Luzon	
	322	Sorsogon	Luzon	do	
	44	Laguna	do	do	
	623	Misamis	Mindanao	Mindanao	
	23	Rizal	Luzon	Luzon	
	37	Laguna	do	do	
	122	Mindoro	Mindoro	do	
	4	Rizal	Luzon	do	
	29	Bulacan	do	do	
	427	Albay	do	do	
	448	Leyte	Leyte	Visayas	
	384	Samar	Samar	do	
	437	Leyte	Leyte	do	
	102	Pangasinan	Luzon	Luzon	
	527	Samar	Samar	Visayas	
	403	Iloilo	Guimaras	do	
Camp McGrath, Batangas ^{a d} .	113	Batangas	Luzon	Luzon	
Camp Morrison (Salomague), ^{a d}	308	Ilocos Sur	do	do	
Camp Stotsenburg (Angeles) ^a	50	Pampanga	do	do	
Camp Vicars ^a	790	Lanao	Mindanao	Mindanao	
Camp Wallace (San Fernando) ^{a d}	285	Union	Luzon	Luzon	
Catbalogan ^{a d}	402	Samar	Samar	Visayas	
Catubig	542	do	do	do	
Cebu ^{a d}	450	Cebu	Cebu	do	
Corregidor ^a	50	Corregidor	Corregidor	Luzon	

^a Telegraph station.^b Telephone station.^c Railroad station.^d Ports.

ry.

Scouts.

Scouts.

C, D, E, F, G, Companies Phil.

Navalry. Scouts.

17th Battery Field Artillery; A, B.

Navalry; 12th Company Philippine

la.

	a Telegraph station.	b Telephone station.	c Railroad station.	d Ports.
Mariveles ^a	do	Bataan	do	do
Mataling Yalis ^b	796	Mindanao	Mindanao	Mindanao
Misamis ^{a d}	610	do	do	do
Montalban ^b	17	Luzon	Luzon	Luzon
Naic ^a	28	do	do	do
Nasugbu ^{b d}	60	do	do	do
Nueva Caceres ^{a d}	535	do	do	do
Oas	439	do	do	do
Oslob ^a	512	Cebu	Visayas	Visayas
Parang ^{a b d}	773	Mindanao	Mindanao	Mindanao
Pilar ^d	445	Luzon	Luzon	Luzon
Pinamalanayan ^d	147	Mindoro	do	do
Placer		Mindanao	Mindanao	Mindanao
Polab ^d	156	Mindoro	Luzon	Luzon
Polangui	445	Luzon	do	do
Polos ^{a c}	7	do	do	do
Puerta Princesa	449	Paragua	Mindanao	Mindanao
Punta Separacion	501	do	do	do
Sablayan	202	Mindoro	Luzon	Luzon
San Francisco de Malabon ^a	19	Luzon	do	do
San Isidro ^a	69	do	do	do
San Mateo ^a	14	do	do	do
San Pedro Tundun		do	do	do
San Tolan	17	do	do	do
Santa Cruz	20	do	do	do
Santa Rosa ^b	29	do	do	do
Santa Maria		do	do	do
Santo Tomas ^a	46	Bulacan	do	do
Sisal ^{a d}	68	Batangas	do	do
Silang	782	Sisal	Mindanao	Mindanao
Sorogon ^a	83	Luzon	Luzon	Luzon
Surigao ^{a d}	389	do	do	do
Tabaco ^a	587	Mindanao	Visayas	Visayas
Tegoloan	453	Luzon	Mindanao	Mindanao
Talasey	656	Luzon	Luzon	Luzon
Tanay ^b	34	Rizal	do	do
Tinl	445	Albay	do	do
Tucuran ^{a b}	750	Cotabato	Mindanao	Mindanao
Tuguegarao ^a	500	Cagayan	Luzon	Luzon
Zamboanga ^{a d}	630	Zamboanga	Mindanao	Mindanao

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